Results
2008-24-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2008-24-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 737- 600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes by individual notices. This AD requires accomplishing a wiring test of the autoshutoff system to verify continuity and a visual verification that the wiring is correctly installed; doing corrective actions, if necessary; and doing a functional test of the autoshutoff system, and applicable maintenance actions. This AD is prompted by a report of a failure of the left-hand fuel pump of the center wing tank to shut off after being selected "OFF'' by the flightcrew during flight on a Boeing Model 737-700 series airplane. Subsequent to that report, the failure was found on two additional airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent extended dry-running of the fuel pump, which could lead to localized overheating of parts inside the fuel pump,and which could produce an ignition source inside the fuel tank.
2000-22-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-22-51, which was sent previously by individual letters to all known U.S. owners and operators of Model HH-1K, TH-1F, TH-1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P; and Southwest Florida Aviation SW204, SW204HP, SW205, and SW205A-1 helicopters manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (BHTI) for the Armed Forces of the United States. This AD requires establishing a retirement life for certain main rotor masts, creating a component history card or equivalent record, and identifying certain masts as unairworthy. This AD also requires removing the hub spring, if installed, and determining whether a main rotor mast (mast) has ever been installed on a helicopter while operated with a hub spring. Conducting certain inspections based on the retirement index number (RIN) and on whether the helicopter was ever operated with a hub spring is also required.Replacing any mast that has inadequate radius or a burr in the damper clamp splined area is also required. Finally, this AD requires sending information concerning the mast to the FAA. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of a crack in a mast with a lower RIN value than the established life limit. This action is necessary to preclude the occurrence of a fatigue crack in the damper clamp splined area of a mast. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of a mast or main rotor trunnion (trunnion), separation of the main rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
93-23-08: 93-23-08 CORPORATE JETS LIMITED (FORMERLY BRITISH AEROSPACE): Amendment 39-8742. Docket 92-NM-245-AD. Applicability: Model DH/BH/HS/BAe 125 series airplanes, excluding Model BAe 125-1000A series airplanes; equipped with Garrett Model TFE 731-3 series engines; as listed in Corporate Jets Limited Service Bulletin SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D,E,F, & G, Revision 2, dated March 31, 1993; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent overheating of the battery contactors and emergency contactors and a potential fire in the rear equipment bay, accomplish the following: (a) For Model BAe 125-800A series airplanes: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the mounting arrangements of the battery contactors and emergency contactors in the rear equipment bay, Modification Number 253501, Parts A, B, F, & G, as appropriate; and prior to further flight, perform a functional test; in accordance withCorporate Jets Limited Service Bulletin SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D,E,F, & G, Revision 2, dated March 31, 1993. (b) For all other airplanes: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the mounting arrangements of the battery contactors and emergency contactors in the rear equipment bay, Modification Number 253501, Parts C, D, & E, as appropriate; and prior to further flight, perform a functional test; in accordance with Corporate Jets Limited Service Bulletin SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D, & E, Revision 1, dated February 4, 1993; or SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D,E,F, & G, Revision 2, dated March 31, 1993. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The modifications and tests shall be done in accordance with Corporate Jets Limited Service Bulletin SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D, & E, Revision 1, dated February 4, 1993; or Corporate Jets Limited Service Bulletin SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D,E,F, & G, Revision 2, dated March 31, 1993; as applicable. (NOTE: The issue date of Service Bulletins SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D, & E and SB.24-293-3501A,B,C,D,E,F, & G is indicated only on page 1 of each document; no other page of these documents is dated.) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Corporate Jets, Inc., 22070 Broderick Drive, Sterling, Virginia 20166. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on December 29, 1993.
2000-24-02: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect wear of the inboard flap trunnions, and to detect wear or debonding of the protective half-shells; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment requires accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and resultant wear damage on the inboard flap drive trunnions or on the protective half-shells, which could result in failure of the trunnion primary load path; this would adversely affect the fatigue life of the secondary load path and could lead to loss of the flap.
2000-24-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires replacing the ground support bracket(s); and rerouting the ground cables of the galley external power and main external power, or ground cables of the main external power; as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent arcing and heat damage to the attachment points of the main external and galley power receptacle ground wire, insulation blankets outboard and aft of the receptacle area, and adjacent power cables, which could result in smoke and fire in the forward cargo compartment. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-24-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to detect discrepancies at certain areas around the entry light connector of the sliding ceiling panel above the forward passenger doors, and repair, if necessary. For certain airplanes, that AD also requires installation or modification of a flapper door ramp deflector on the forward entry drop ceiling structure. For certain other airplanes, that AD requires inspection of the wire assembly support installation for evidence of chafing, and corrective actions, if necessary. For certain airplanes subject to the existing AD, as well as additional airplanes being added to the applicability of this AD, this action adds a requirement for modification of a support bracket for the ramp deflector assembly. This action is necessary to prevent chafing of electrical wire assemblies above the forward passenger doors, which could result in an electrical fire in the passenger compartment. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2016-05-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-07-52 for certain Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters. AD 2014-07- 52 required repetitively inspecting certain reinforcement angles of the rear structure to tailboom junction frame (reinforcement angles) for a crack at 10 hour time-in-service (TIS) intervals, repairing any cracked reinforcement angle, and allowed an optional repetitive inspection with a 165 hour TIS inspection interval as a terminating action for the 10 hour TIS inspections. This AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 2014-07-52 and requires the inspection of the area around each reinforcement angle screw hole as terminating action to the 10 hour TIS inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect a crack in the reinforcement angle, which if not corrected, could result in loss of the tailboom and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-21-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * [F]uel leaks and failed fasteners [have been reported] in the region of the rear spar root joint attachment fitting at wing rib 2. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is stress corrosion failures in the region of the rear spar root joint attachment fitting at wing rib 2, which could lead to reduced structural integrity of the wing, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-24-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604) series airplanes. This action requires installation of protection shields in the wheel bay of the main landing gear (MLG). This action is necessary to prevent water, ice or slush accumulation on the aileron quadrants and/or control cable pulleys in the wheel bay of the MLG during ground roll. Such water, ice or slush accumulation could subsequently freeze during the climb to cruise altitude and cause stiffness in the aileron controls, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2016-04-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, -200B, -200C, -200F, -300, -400, - 400D, and -400F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of significant fuselage skin damage at certain parts of the dorsal fairing, due to wear from the dorsal fairing. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for wear and cracks of the fuselage skin under the dorsal fairing, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires repetitive post-repair external surface high frequency eddy current inspections of the blended areas of the skin and detailed inspections of the unrepaired areas, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fuselage skin damage of the dorsal fairing area, which could result in skin cracking and consequent depressurization of the airplane.