Results
2021-02-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain retaining rings could cause damage to frame forks, brackets and edge frames, and their surface protection; subsequent investigation showed that the depth of the frame fork spotfacing on structural parts is inadequate to accommodate the retaining ring. This AD requires repetitive inspections of certain areas of each cargo door for damage and corrective action. This AD also provides an optional terminating modification, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires you to incorporate text from the service information into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This AD results from a recent safety evaluation that used a data-driven approach to analyze the design, operation, and maintenance of the MU-2B series airplanes in order to determine their safety and define what steps, if any, are necessary for their safe operation. Part of that evaluation was the identification of unsafe conditions that exist or could develop on the affected type design airplanes. Field reports indicate an unsafe condition of improper rigging and/or adjustment of the propeller feathering linkage. Service centers found the unsafe condition during inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper rigging of the propeller feathering linkage. The above issue, if uncorrected,could result in degraded performance and poor handling qualities with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
54-09-01: 54-09-01 RANGER: Applies to All 6-440-C Series Engine Models. To be accomplished as indicated. To preclude the failure of carburetor hotspot heater assembly P/N 7683, 7697, 7699 or 7708, due to corrosion from accumulations of exhaust products which in some instances have been found to completely close the inner passages, the following inspection should be accomplished by July 31, 1954, and additionally, as indicated below: 1. Remove the manifold pipes and inspect the hotspot casting for cracks on both the outside surfaces and the inside carburetor air passages, particularly at the bottom. 2. If no cracks are evident, the hotspot may be replaced with the hot air supply blocked off, per Ranger Engine Service Bulletin No. 91. Since no appreciable benefit in icing protection is provided by the use of the hotspot, it will be permissible to operate the engine with the hotspot blocked off. If the hotspot is blocked off, it is suggested that hot lubricating oil be applied to coatthoroughly the internal passage walls formerly used for exhaust gas circulation through the hotspot; this will tend to retard further corrosion. 3. If it is desired to continue to use a heated hotspot, it should be checked initially, and at 400-hour intervals to ascertain that the hot air passages are unobstructed with carbon or other exhaust gas products. This can most easily be accomplished by blocking off one hot air boss with a plate and pouring into the other hot air passage, 120 cc's of oil or gasoline. If this will not all be contained in the hotspot casting, a new hotspot casting should be utilized since no satisfactory method is known whereby all of the deposits can be removed. 4. If the hotspot has been used unheated since the last overhaul, only the initial inspection in 1. need be performed before normal overhaul.
2021-02-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-02- 03, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. AD 2019-02-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2019-02-03 and requires incorporation of an airworthiness limitation that applies only to certain airplanes. This AD also requires replacing or modifying certain engine fire control panels, which terminates the revised airworthiness limitation added in this final rule when a certain condition is met. Since the FAA issued AD 2019-02-03, the manufacturer has developed a new fire handle design that will eliminate the need for the airworthiness limitations required by AD 2019-02-03. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a center vent tube (CVT) failure leading to a loss of oil pressure and subsequent in-flight engine shutdown. This AD requires removal of an affected extension duct and replacing it with a part eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes and all Model A300-600 and A310 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the pitch trim system to detect continuity defects in the autotrim function, and follow-on corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this new AD requires replacing the flight augmentation computers (FACs) with new improved FACs. This AD also revises the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from the development of a final action intended to address the unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent a sudden change in pitch due to an out-of-trim condition combined with an autopilot disconnect, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
57-16-02: 57-16-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-7 Series Aircraft Prior to Fuselage No. 697. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAn operator recently experienced a failure in the threaded area of the forward end of the rudder tab push-pull tube P/N 3483231, which resulted in a declared emergency and unscheduled landing due to loss of rudder control. Investigation reveals that tubes reamed to accommodate the end fittings are unsatisfactory. Also, it has been determined that many rudder tab push tube assemblies, P/N's 3593396, 3593396-501, as well as 3483231, have been reamed in order to accommodate the end fittings. \n\n\tOn all aircraft on which the above-mentioned assemblies have 5,000 hours of operation or more an inspection must be conducted within the next 300-hour operation, unless already accomplished, to determine whether the rods have been reamed and for signs of failure of the tube and end fittings. All assemblies found cracked and those reamed in excess of the limits outlined in Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 181 reissued February 8, 1957, must be replaced. Unless disassembled, x-ray is believed to be the only reliable means of verifying whether the tubes have been reamed in excess of the limits specified by Douglas. \n\n\tAll assemblies not cracked and are not reamed in excess of the limits specified in the Douglas Service Bulletin must be visually reinspected at periods not to exceed 300 hours of operation until they are replaced with new push-pull tube assembly, P/N 3593396, which have been manufactured without resorting to reaming. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 68, reissued February 8, 1957, describes the modifications required to install P/N 3593396 on those aircraft that presently incorporate P/N 3483231.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 56-24-3.
66-27-06: 66-27-06 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 39-296 is further amended by Amendment 39-2452. Applies to Models G-164 and G-164A Airplanes that have elevators with Serial Number 461 and Below. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the elevator torque tube due to cracks, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes with 1,000 or more hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) within the next 25 hours' time in service after April 22, 1966, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (b) For airplanes with 500 or more but less than 1,000 hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) within the next 100 hours' time in service after April 22, 1966, or before the accumulation of 1,025 hours' time in service whichever occurs first, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (c) For airplanes with less than 500 hours' time in service on April 22, 1966, comply with (d) before the accumulation of 600 hours' time in service and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with (f). (d) Remove two inboard blind rivets that attach the elevator leading edge skin cover, to the right-hand elevator torque tube. Visually inspect the torque tube for cracks where inboard elevator rib, is welded to the torque tube and between the two inboard blind rivets. If no cracks are found, install new rivets before further flight. If cracks are found, comply with (f) before further flight. (e) Within the next 25 hours in service after the effective date of the amendment, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours in service, visually inspect the lefthand elevator torque tube for cracks where the inboard rib is welded to the torque tube. This inspection must be repeated at intervals of 100 hours until the aircraft is altered in accordance with paragraph (f). (f) Modify torque tube in accordance with Grumman Model G-164 Alert Service Bulletin No. 33, dated March 8, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by an FAA Aircraft Engineering Division or Engineering and Manufacturing Branch. This supersedes AD 66-11-01. Amendment 39-296 was effective October 29, 1966. This amendment, 39-2452 is effective December 16, 1975.
2000-06-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Turbomeca Makila 1 series turboshaft engines, that requires a one-time visual inspection of the scavenge and lubrication systems for obstruction due to coke deposits, then reconditioning of the engine oil system prior to return to service. This amendment is prompted by a report of an in-flight engine shutdown due to roller bearings contaminated by certain types of detergent oil. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent in-flight engine shutdown due to roller bearing failure following oil contamination.
59-09-03: 59-09-03 HARTZELL: Applies to All Propeller-Engine Combinations Consisting of HC- 82-XG Series Propellers Installed On Lycoming 0-320 Series Engines and On Some 0-340 Series Engines (as noted below). Compliance required as indicated. There are six 3/8-inch diameter bolts used to hold the HC-82XG Series propellers on the 0-320 and some 0-340 engines (if a Hartzell HC-82XL Series propeller is installed on a Lycoming 0-340 Series engine, the bolts are already 7/16-inch in diameter). A number of these bolts have broken and, in several cases, the failures progressed, allowing the propeller to separate from the engine. In order to minimize the possibility of this type of failure, inspect and take action as follows: (1) If the mounting bolts have not been checked for the proper torque within the last 100 hours, check these bolts for the proper 30 foot-pounds torque before completing the next 25 hours' operating time and at or before completing each 100-hour operating period thereafter until item (2) is complied with. (2) At next engine or propeller overhaul but not later than January 1, 1961, change mounting bolts from 3/8-inch to 7/16-inch. Use bolts specified in Hartzell Bulletin No. 68. Change marking on propeller from HC-82XG-( ) to HC-82XL-( ). Change markings on 0-320 Series engines as instructed in Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 253A. The model designation of Lycoming 0-340 Series engines will not change since, when this AD is complied with, all 0-340 engines will incorporate 7/16-inch bolts. (Hartzell Bulletins Nos. 41 and 68 and Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 253A cover this same subject.)
2006-15-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) that supersedes AD 2003-09-01, which applies to certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd (Pilatus) Model PC-6 airplanes. AD 2003-09-01 currently requires you to inspect and correct, as necessary, the aileron control bellcrank assemblies at the wing and fuselage locations. Since we issued AD 2003- 09-01, the FAA determined the action should also apply to all the models of the PC-6 airplanes listed in the type certificate data sheet of Type Certificate (TC) No. 7A15 that were produced in the United States through a licensing agreement between Pilatus and Fairchild Republic Company (also identified as Fairchild Industries, Fairchild Heli Porter, or Fairchild-Hiller Corporation). In addition, the intent of the applicability of AD 2003-09-01 was to apply to all the affected serial numbers of the airplane models listed in TC No. 7A15. This AD retains all the actions of AD 2003-09-01, adds those Fairchild Republic Company airplanes to the applicability of this AD, and lists the individual specific airplane models. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct increased friction in the aileron control bellcrank assemblies, which could result in failure of the aileron flight-control system. Such failure could lead to problems in controlling flight. DATES: This AD becomes effective on August 23, 2006. As of June 17, 2003 (68 FR 22582, April 29, 2003), the Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 27-001, dated June 5, 2002, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
2000-06-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, and -400 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive visual inspections to detect cracking of the corners of the door frame and the cross beams of the aft cargo door, and corrective actions, if necessary. That AD also provides an optional terminating action for certain repetitive inspections. This amendment requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also mandates accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking of the corners of the door frame and the cross beams of the aft cargo door, which could result in rapid depressurization of the airplane.
2018-13-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce plc (RR) Trent 1000-A, Trent 1000-C, Trent 1000-D, Trent 1000-E, Trent 1000-G, and Trent 1000-H turbofan engine models. This AD requires inspecting the intermediate-pressure compressor (IPC) stage 1 rotor blades, IPC stage 2 rotor blades, and IPC stage 2 dovetail posts, and removing any cracked parts from service. This AD was prompted by crack findings on the IPC rotor blades, which could lead to separations resulting in engine failures. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-08-02: 66-08-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-216 Part 39 Federal Register March 23, 1966. Applies to Model 727 Airplanes Delivered July 2, 1965, through January 20, 1966, and Airplanes that Have Had Flap Drive Coupling Sleeve, P/N 33513-1, Replaced. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.\n \n\tTo prevent disengagement of the flap drive and the outboard aileron lockout, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 125 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect flap drive coupling sleeve, P/N 69-33513-1, to ensure that the end of the coupling sleeve, opposite the flange end, is rolled 180 degrees, forming a lip. \n\n\t(b)\tReplace sleeves having ends not rolled 180 degrees before further flight. \n\n\t(Boeing telegram to Boeing operators, dated January 20, 1966, pertains to this subject.)\n \n\tThis directive effective March 23, 1966.
57-06-03: 57-06-03 PRATT & WHITNEY: Applies to All Wasp Major Engines. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than May 31, 1957. As a result of propeller shaft oil transfer bearing failures, several cases of loss of propeller control occurred which make it impossible to feather the affected propellers. It has been determined that brazing of the propeller shaft oil transfer tube adapter to the propeller shaft oil transfer bearing is subject to failure if the brazing is not adequate. To assure that the brazed joint is satisfactory, the following inspection must be accomplished on bearings with brazed oil tube transfer adapters: 1. X-ray the brazed joints to determine if brazing is satisfactory (limits established by Pan American World Airways and/or Pratt & Whitney Aircraft.) 2. Subject the bearing to 1,500 p.s.i. hydraulic pressure test. 3. Conduct a dye penetrant inspection of the brazed joints. If the bearing does not pass these inspectionsit must be repaired or replaced. A new bearing, P/N 341627, which has eliminated the brazed joints is available and may be used. This new bearing does not require the above mandatory inspections. Information on inspection procedure and limitation is available from Pratt & Whitney Aircraft.
2006-14-07: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 737 series airplanes. That AD currently requires inspection of the elevator tab inboard hinge support structure to detect fatigue cracking and corrective action if necessary. That AD also provides an optional terminating action. This new AD adds airplanes to the applicability and requires new repetitive inspections. For airplanes having elevators with laminated rear spars, this new AD requires repetitive inspections for interlaminar corrosion, delamination, or disbonding in the rear spar, repetitive inspections for cracking in the spar web, and repair including related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For airplanes having elevators with solid rear spars, this new AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking in the spar web and repair including related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks in the elevator rear spar web at the tab hinge bracket locations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking, corrosion, interlaminar corrosion, delamination, and disbonding in the elevator rear spar, which may reduce elevator stiffness and lead to in-flight vibration. In-flight vibration may lead to elevator and horizontal stabilizer damage and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2006-14-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-200 and -300, and A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain rotary actuator assemblies for the leading edge slat. This AD results from a leak found at the seal of the torque limiter output shaft of the Type A rotary actuator of leading edge slat No. 1. We are issuing this AD to prevent a decrease in the torque limiter function, which could result in degradation and damage to the attachment bolts of the leading edge slat, loss of the slat, and consequent reduced control of the airplane.
2018-15-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (TR) pitch rod. This AD is prompted by a report of several cases of damaged TR pitch rod ball joints. The actions of this AD are intended to correct an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
67-27-03: 67-27-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-762. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failures of the flap carriage links P/N AB09 A943 and post modification PM 2245 flap carriage links P/N AB09 A3657, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes equipped with carriage links P/N AB09 A943, within the next 500 landings after January 15, 1967, or before the accumulation of the number of landings specified in Column 2 or Column 3, as applicable, for the respective flap numbers specified in Column 1, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed the number of landings specified for that flap number and series of airplane, replace carriage links P/N AB09 A943 with new links of the same part number; or replace with carriage links P/N AB09 A3657. If carriage links P/N AB09 A3657 are used as replacements, they must be replaced in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (b). (Column 1) (Column 2) (Column 3) Flap No. Number of Landings Number of Landings (link location) 200 Series Airplanes 400 Series Airplanes 1 3,000 2,000 2 10,000 8,000 3 24,000 16,000 (b) For airplanes equipped with carriage links P/N AB09 A3657, within the next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of the number of landings specified in Column 2 or Column 3, as applicable, for the respective flap number specified in Column 1, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed the number of landings specified for that flap number and series of airplane, replace carriage links P/N AB09 A3657 with new links of the same part number, or replace with carriage links P/N AB09 A943. If carriage links P/N AB09 A943 are used as replacements, they must be replaced in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (a). (Column 1) (Column 2) (Column 3) Flap No. Number of Landings Number of Landings (link location)200 Series Airplanes 400 Series Airplanes 1 4,000 3,000 2 12,000 10,000 3 32,000 24,000
51-11-04: 51-11-04 TEMCO: Applies to Models GC-1A and GC-1B and Includes All Serial Numbers. Compliance required as indicated. A. At each 100-hour or annual inspection, all bushings in all landing gear pivot points should be inspected for wear that would allow fore and aft travel of the main landing gear. The total fore and aft travel of the wheels, measured at the center of the axle, due to the cumulative slack in the worn bushing, should not be more than 3/8-inch. This check should be made with the hydraulic pressure relieved on the system and with the landing gear in two positions: (1) Unlocked and in an intermediate position near to, but not in, the full down position; and (2) With the landing gear just entering the wheelwell. If the total fore and aft travel of the wheel of either landing gear is more than 3/8-inch in either position, the landing gear assembly must be repaired as necessary to reduce this travel to less than 3/8-inch. B. At the next 100-hour or annualinspection, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished, install spacer emergency landing gear pull down system to prevent inadvertent unthreading of drive screw. (TEMCO Service Bulletin No. 28 covered this same subject.) C. At each 100-hour or annual inspection, the emergency extension system should be inspected for proper adjustment in accordance with paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of TEMCO Service Bulletin No. 28.
2006-13-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes. This AD requires a one- time deactivation of the auxiliary fuel system, repetitive venting and draining of the auxiliary fuel tank sumps, and revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual to limit the maximum cargo weight. This AD results from a re-evaluation of the floor structure and cargo barriers conducted by the STC holder. We are issuing this AD to prevent structural overload of the auxiliary fuel tank support structure, which could cause the floor beams to fail, damaging the primary flight controls and the auxiliary power unit fuel lines that pass through the floor beams, resulting in loss of control of the airplane. We are also issuing this AD to prevent structural overload of the cargo barriers, which could cause the barriers to fail, allowing the cargo to shift, resulting in damage to the auxiliary fuel tanks, residual fuel leakage, and consequent increased risk of a fire.
2021-01-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for M7 Aerospace LLC Models SA26-AT and SA26-T airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of the airplane power lever linkage detaching from the TPE331 engine propeller pitch control (PPC) shaft. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the PPC for proper torque and making any necessary corrections until the replacement of the PPC assembly and the installation of a secondary retention feature (safety wire) are done. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-14-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A300 F4-600R series airplanes and Model A300 C4- 605R Variant F airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain structure in the fuselage zone at the lavatory venturi installation in the nose section, and performing a related investigative action and corrective action if necessary. This AD results from an analysis that revealed that airplanes equipped with Airbus Modification 08909 had a concentration of loads higher than expected in the fuselage zone (high stress) at the lavatory venturi installation in the nose section, which could be the origin of cracks that developed in the fuselage skin and propagated from the edge of the air vent hole. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin, which could result in loss of the structural integrity of the fuselage and consequent rapid depressurization of the airplane.
2006-14-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, and A340-300 series airplanes, and Model A340-541 and A340-642 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to determine if certain emergency escape slides/slide rafts (referred to as slide/rafts) are installed in certain crew/passenger doors; and, if so, performing a one-time inspection to determine if the electrical harnesses of the slide/rafts are properly routed, and rerouting the harnesses if necessary. This AD results from report that a slide/raft failed to deploy properly during a deployment test. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper routing of the electrical harnesses of certain slide/rafts, which could prevent proper deployment of the slide/rafts and delay evacuation of passengers and flightcrew during an emergency.
2018-13-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767-300 and -300F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracking in the lower outboard wing skin at the farthest outboard fastener of the inboard segment of a certain stringer. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the lower outboard wing skin at the inboard segment of a certain stringer, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.