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87-15-11: 87-15-11 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-5680. Applies to Model S-61L, S- 61N, S-61NM and S-61R series helicopters certificated in all categories and S-61A and S-61V series helicopters certificated in restricted category equipped with main gearbox servo cylinder support brackets (P/N's S6135-20248-0 and -2) or bracket assemblies (P/N's S6135-20249-0 and - 1). Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To preclude possible fatigue failure of the main gearbox servo support bracket (P/N's S6135-20248-0 and -2) or bracket assembly (P/N's S6135-20249-0 and -1) accomplish the following: (a) Replace the P/N's S6135-20248-0 and -2 servo support brackets or the P/N's S6135-20249-0 and -1 support bracket assemblies with serviceable parts in accordance with the following schedule: (1) For Model S-61A, S-61L, S-61N, S-61NM, and S-61V helicopters, replace the servo support bracket or assembly within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 23,200 hours time in service on-the bracket or assembly, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, replace the bracket or assembly in intervals not to exceed 23,200 hours time in service. (2) For the Model S-61R helicopter, replace the servo support bracket or assembly within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 6,200 hours time in service on the bracket or assembly, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, replace the bracket or assembly at intervals not to exceed 6,200 hours time in service. (b) Operators who have not kept records of hours time in service on individual component parts that were installed at time of issuance of the initial rotorcraft airworthiness certificate shall substitute rotorcraft hours time in service. (c) For purposes of complying with this AD, the hours time in service for individual components that were not installed at the time of issuance ofthe initial rotorcraft airworthiness certificate must be determined from operators rotorcraft records. (d) Upon request, an alternate means of compliance which provides a level of safety equivalent to the requirements of this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone (617) 273-7118. (e) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone (617) 273-7118, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. This amendment, 39-5680, becomes effective on August 10, 1987.
91-15-07: 91-15-07 SCHEMPP-HIRTH: Amendment 39-7070. Docket No. 91-CE-17-AD. Applicability: Cirrus and Cirrus VTC sailplanes (serial numbers 1 through 183, with or without a Y suffix), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 30 calendar days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent tail flutter that could result in complete loss of control of the sailplane, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the 8mm diameter drive tube on the elevator drive lever with a round bar in accordance with drawing Cirrus No. 30.011/1 - Elevator Drive Axle of Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265-6, dated April 27, 1982. (b) Determine the elevator hinge moments and weights using the criteria on page 27 of the Cirrus service manual. If the moments and weights exceed the published criteria, prior to further flight, accomplish the following: (1) Remove the tail parachute from operation and perform the requirements in Action 3, a) through d), of Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265-6, dated April 27, 1982. (2) Install a mass balance on the elevator in accordance with drawing Cirrus No. 30.001/1 - Elevator mass balance of Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265-6, dated April 27, 1982. NOTE: Although not required by this AD, the pages referenced by Action 3 e) and Action 5 of Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265-6, dated April 27, 1982, should be incorporated into the service manual. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, Europe, Africa, Middle East office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The inspections and replacements required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265-6, dated April 27, 1982, which incorporates the following pages: Pages Revision Level Date 1 through 4 Original April 27, 1982 Cirrus No. 30.001/1, as referenced on page 2 of Technical Note 265-6. Attachment Undated Cirrus No. 30.011/1, as referenced on page 1 of Technical Note 265-6. Attachment Undated Page 27 of the Schempp-Hirth Cirrus Service Manual Attachment April 27, 1982 (The attachments listed in the above table are sent by the manufacturer as part of Technical Note 265-6). This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Schempp-Hirth Flugzeugbau GmbH, Postfach 1443, D-7312 Kirchheim, Federal Republic of Germany. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri,or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW, Room 8401, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-7070, AD 91-15-07) becomes effective on September 1, 1991.
2025-03-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model A109E, A109K2, A109S, AB412, AB412 EP, AB139, and AW139 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that certain rescue hoist cable assemblies may be equipped with a defective ball end. This AD requires inspecting certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and, depending on the results, replacing the rescue hoist cable assembly. This AD also allows installing certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and certain rescue hoists provided its requirements are met. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
86-24-13: 86-24-13 CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY: Amendment 39-5484. Applies to Model 441 (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine flameout when in or departing an icing environment, accomplish the following: (a) Revise the airplane Pilot's Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM) by inserting Appendix 1 of this AD in the "LIMITATIONS" section of the POH/AFM. Appendix 1 procedures supersede any other POH/AFM procedures which may be contradictory. (b) The requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD may be accomplished by the holder of a pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any airplane owned or operated by him. The person accomplishing these actions must make the appropriate aircraft maintenance record entry as prescribed by FAR 91.173. (c) Airplanes maybe flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by contacting the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, ACE-115W, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 946-4400. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document referred to herein upon request to GTEC, P.O. Box 5217, Phoenix, Arizona 85010; Telephone (602) 231- 1000; or Cessna Aircraft Company, P.O. Box 7704, Wichita, Kansas 67277; Telephone (316) 946-6143; or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on December 15, 1986. APPENDIX 1 Supplement to the POH/AFM Cessna Model 441 Airplanes The ENGINE IGNITION OVERRIDE switches shall be selected to ON during all operations in actual or potential icing conditions described herein: (1) During takeoff and climb out in actual or potential icing conditions. *(2) When ice is visible on, or shedding from propeller(s), spinner(s), or leading edge(s). *(3) Before selecting ANTI-ICE, when ice has accumulated. (4) Immediately, any time engine flameout occurs as a possible result of ice ingestion. (5) During approach and landing while in or shortly following flight in actual or potential icing conditions. *Note: If icing conditions are entered in flight without the engine anti-icing system having been selected, switch one ENGINE system to the ANTI-ICE ON position. If the engine runs satisfactorily, switch the second ENGINE system to the ANTI-ICE ON position and check that the second engine continues to run satisfactorily. CAUTION Flight in actual or potential icing conditions will be limited by duty cycle of the ignition system. Ignition system time limits must be observed to prevent exceeding duty cycle times. Operator should verify these limits for his particular installation. For the purpose of this supplement, the following definition applies: "Potential icing conditions in precipitation or visible moisture meteorological conditions: (1) Begin when the OAT is plus 5 degrees C (plus 41 degrees F) or colder, and (2) End when the OAT is plus 10 degrees C (plus 50 degrees F) or warmer. The procedures and conditions described in this appendix supersede any other POH/AFM procedures and conditions which may be contradictory.
78-08-02: 78-08-02 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-3179. Applies to Canadair CL-215-1A10 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1001 through 1050 which incorporate aluminum alloy water door hinge plates 215-33159-2, -3, -6 or 7. Compliance required prior to U.S. airworthiness certification. Unless already accomplished replace the aluminum water door hinge plates, P/N 215- 33159-2, -3, -6 or -7 with steel hinge plates, P/N 215-33159-8 or approved equivalents in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of Canadair Service Information Circular No. 143-CL-215, Issue 3, Revision B, dated October 20, 1977, or an approved equivalent. Equivalent replacement parts and installation procedures must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. is amendment is effective April 14, 1978.
2000-07-24: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 series airplanes, that requires installation of new, improved bonding jumpers on the horizontal stabilizer. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure adequate electrical bonding between the horizontal and vertical stabilizers. Inadequate electrical bonding, in the event of a lightning strike, could cause electrical arcing, and result in damage to the hydraulic lines and consequent failure of the hydraulic systems.
2024-26-09: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-10- 02, which applied to all Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-1A10 and BD- 700-1A11 airplanes. AD 2021-10-02 required repetitive general visual inspections of the left- and right-hand elevator torque tube bearings for any sand, dust, or corrosion; repetitive functional tests of the elevator control system; and replacement of the elevator torque tube bearings if necessary. This AD continues to require certain actions in AD 2021-10-02 and requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate a new airworthiness limitation. This AD was prompted by a determination that a new airworthiness limitation is necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-22-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of missing plugs found prior to airplane delivery, during manufacturing inspections, at various locations in certain stringers of the lower lobe cargo compartments. This AD requires drilling a hole and installing and bonding plugs in certain stringers of the lower lobe cargo compartments. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing or misaligned plugs which, in the event of a fire, could cause an increased rate of loss of Halon in the lower cargo compartments, and result in the inability to extinguish a fire and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
90-24-06: 90-24-06 GARRETT ENGINE DIVISION, ALLIED-SIGNAL, INC. (formerly Garrett Turbine Engine Co., GTEC, formerly AiResearch Manufacturing Company of Arizona): Amendment 39-6685. Docket No. 90-ANE-15. Applicability: Models TFE731-2, -2A, -3, -3A, -3AR, -3B, -3BR, -3R, -5, -5AR, and -5R turbofan engines equipped with thermocouple lead assemblies, part numbers (P/N) 3073950-1/-2/-7/-15, 3074175-1, and P/N 3073950-1 reworked to P/N 3077031-1/-2, installed in aircraft certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent overtemperature and damage of turbine components, accomplish the following: a. Remove from service and replace with a serviceable part thermocouple lead assemblies with serial numbers listed in Table 1, in Garrett Service Bulletin (SB) TFE731-A77-3020, dated April 27, 1990, within 25 operating hours in service after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of the above Garrett SB. Engines with thermocouple lead assemblies with serial numbers having a "T" suffix are excluded from the requirements of this AD. b. Test suspect lead assemblies in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of Garrett SB TFE731-A77-3020, to determine if additional maintenance action is required before further operation of the engine in service. c. Remove from service engines that had suspect lead assemblies removed as required by paragraph a. of this AD, in which the removed lead assembly tested faulty, until the engine has been determined to be airworthy in accordance with the accomplishment instruction of the SB. d. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. e. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through a FAA Airworthiness Inspector, the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806- 2425, may approve an equivalent means of compliance or an adjustment of the compliance schedule which provides an equivalent level of safety. The removal, replacement, and testing of certain thermocouple lead assemblies and the testing of certain engines shall be done in accordance with Garrett SB TFE731-A77-3020, dated April 27, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Garrett General Aviation Services Division, Distribution Center, 2340 East University, Phoenix, Arizona 85034. Copies may be inspected at the Regional Rules Docket, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Room 311, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 8301, Washington, DC 20591. This amendment (39-6685, AD 90-24-06) becomes effective on November 13, 1990.
2015-22-02: We are superseding emergency airworthiness directive (AD) No. 2015-16-51 (Emergency AD 2015-16-51) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited (Bell) Model 429 helicopters. Emergency AD 2015-16-51 required inspections of each inboard and outboard tail rotor pitch link assembly for axial or radial bearing play, and if there was axial or radial bearing play, removing the tail rotor pitch link and inspecting for wear. Emergency AD 2015-16-51 was prompted by several reports of worn tail rotor pitch link spherical bearings. We are issuing this supersedure to retain the inspection requirements in Emergency AD 2015- 16-51 while revising the applicability and compliance time to clarify that all Bell Model 429 helicopters require recurring inspections regardless of hours time-in-service (TIS) accumulated on the helicopter. These actions are intended to prevent pitch link failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.