Results
96-04-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200 and -200C airplanes, that currently requires installation of fail-safe straps onto the engine inlet attach ring of the nose cowl. This amendment requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the attach ring of the nose cowl, and replacement of cracked attach rings. Replacement with an improved attach ring, if accomplished, would terminate the requirement to inspect the attach ring repetitively. This amendment is prompted by the development of an improved attach ring that eliminates the need for repetitive inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the attach ring of the nose cowl, which could result in separation of the nose cowl from the engine following failure of a turbine blade.
92-03-10: 92-03-10 SAAB-SCANIA: Amendment 39-8165. Docket 91-NM-139-AD. Applicability: Model SAAB 340B series airplanes, Serial Numbers 160 through 226, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent reduced structural integrity of the wings, accomplish the following: (a) Within 250 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the inner-wing fuel tanks for foreign objects that could block or restrict the flow of fuel between the outer and inner fuel tanks, in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991. (b) If foreign objects are found as a result of the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, remove the foreign objects; submit a report of such findings to SAAB Aircraft Product Support, in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991; and perform additional inspections in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-511) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM- 113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. (e) The inspection required by this AD shall be done in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from SAAB-Scania AB, Product Support, S-581.88, Linkoping, Sweden. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (f) This amendment (39-8165, AD 92-03-10) becomes effective on March 16, 1992.
2010-23-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of one A319 and one A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were a result of de- bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-03-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to American Champion Aircraft Corporation (American Champion) Models 8KCAB, 8GCBC, 7GCBC, and 7ECA airplanes that are equipped with metal spar wings. This action requires inspecting (one-time) the wing front strut fittings for cracks or scratches, replacing any wing front strut fittings found cracked or scratched, and reporting the inspection results to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Fatigue cracks found on the wing front strut fittings on two Model 8KCAB airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of a wing assembly caused by cracked or scratched wing front strut fittings, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
96-03-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes and Model DC-10-30, DC-10-40, and KC-10A (military) airplanes. For Model MD-11 series airplanes, the AD requires an inspection to determine the serial number of the forward trunnion bolts on the main landing gear (MLG), and rework or replacement of the bolts, if necessary. For Model DC-10-30, DC-10-40, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, the AD requires an inspection for evidence of missing chrome and for corrosion on the chrome surfaces, or verification that the forward trunnion bolts have been chrome plated in a specific manner; and rework or replacement of the bolts, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of chrome flaking on the bearing surface of the trunnion bolts due to improper cleaning of the base material prior to chrome plating. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent premature failure of the trunnion bolts and subsequent collapse of the MLG as a result of severe corrosion on the bearing surface and in the mechanical fuse due to chrome flaking.
80-19-14: 80-19-14 PIPER (Ted Smith): Amendment 39-3915. Applies to Aerostar Model 600, 601 and 601P airplanes Serial Nos. 0001 through 0807 certificated in all categories. To prevent possible loss of control due to structural failure of the vertical and horizontal stabilizer aft attach fittings, accomplish the following. (a) Within 100 hours' time in service since the last dye penetrant or visual inspection or within 5 hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD, if no dye penetrant or visual inspection previously accomplished, visually inspect the aft horizontal and vertical stabilizer attach fittings for cracks per part I.A. of Piper Service Bulletin 600-88A dated July 29, 1980. (b) If any crack extends into the web area of the fitting, replace cracked part with like serviceable part and replace fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59 600-88 or Kit 59 600-88A. (c) If more than 3 cracks are found in the flange area, replace cracked part withlike serviceable part and replace attach fitting flange fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59 600-88 or Kit SB 600-88A. (d) If three (3) or less cracks are found in the flanges in any one fitting and do not extend into the web area of the fitting, within 200 hours' time in service or 180 days whichever occurs sooner from discovery of cracks, replace the fitting and fitting fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59600-88 or Kit 59600-88A. (e) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This supersedes Amend. 39-3835 (45 FR 46346), AD 80-12-08. This amendment becomes effective September 25, 1980.
2010-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200 series airplanes. This AD requires installing a new insulation blanket on the latch beam firewall of each thrust reverser (T/R) half. This AD results from an in-flight shutdown due to an engine fire indication; an under-cowl engine fire was extinguished after landing. The cause of the fire was uncontained failure of the starter in the engine core compartment; the fire progressed into the latch beam cavity and was fueled by oil from a damaged integrated drive generator oil line. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fire from entering the cowl or strut area, which could weaken T/R parts and result in reduced structural integrity of the T/R, possible separation of T/R parts during flight, and consequent damage to the airplane and injury to people or damage to property on the ground.
96-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A and SAAB 340B series airplanes, that requires repetitive operational tests of the valve limit switch of the propeller brake. This amendment also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive tests. This amendment is prompted by a report that when the propeller brake was not properly engaged the crew did not receive a "PROP BRAKE" warning due to a faulty valve limit switch. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a valve limit switch from failing to send input to the warning system; absence of a "PROP BRAKE" warning could result in the crew being unaware that the propeller brake is not properly engaged and the propeller may turn without warning.
52-14-02: 52-14-02 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers Except as Otherwise Indicated. Item IV Also Applies to All 340 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers. Items I through IV are to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than August 1, 1952, and shall be completed no later than August 1, 1953. I. The following changes to the electrical circuits are to be accomplished: (NOTE: These changes apply to airplanes which have not been modified since they were manufactured. (See item II for modified airplanes): A. Insulate exposed terminals at unfeathering relay, install insulating separator between throttle microswitches, and secure wires as specified in Convairogram No. 4, dated March 7, 1951. II. To prevent inadvertent actuation of the reversing solenoid valves, the following changes to the electrical circuits are to be accomplished toprotect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other circuits and to protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other: (NOTE: These changes are known to apply to some aircraft which were modified by operators so that they differ from the originally manufactured configuration. Other airplanes which have design features in the reversing solenoid circuits which are similar to those outlined below, but which are not specifically referred to in this list, should have these points protected in a manner equivalent to that described herein.) A. Modify the following multiple pin connector assemblies as specified in item 2 of attachment A (see 52-13 for attachment A): 1. Connector at wing-fuselage disconnect. 2. Connector at Hamilton Standard Reversing box No. 80340 (covered by change specified in item C.) B. Modify the following terminal strips as specified in item 1 of attachment A: 1. Terminal strip at firewall junction box. 2. Terminal strip in junction box at fuselage Station No. 109. C. Hamilton Standard reversing relay box: Reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., to be shielded from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. If reversing relay boxes are used which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, it shall not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors in the two relay boxes. D. Reversing solenoid circuit wiring: Modify in accordance with item 4 of attachment A. E. Protect the exposed terminals of the secondary throttle lock relays, (if used), as specified in item 3 of attachment A. F. Install insulating separator between throttle microswitches, and secure wires as specified in Convairogram No. 4, dated March 7, 1951. III. Other circuit modification: All airplanes are to be modified to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 221. IV. Reverse solenoid lock assembly on all airplanes which do not have "lift up" throttles, either (a) Install a warning light system as described in Convair Service Bulletin No. 240-381 except that the system shall be so arranged that it will indicate to the crew when the solenoid lock has just started to move to the open position, or (b) adjust the lock actuating handles so that not less than 1 inch of movement is required before the lock opens. V. Maintenance practices (to be instituted not later than August 1, 1952): A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: 1. Inspect all points specified in items I and IIB. The inspections of item IIB may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in item 1(a) or 1(b) of attachment A. B. At any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary. C. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. D. At any time that operations are performed which may affect the relative position of the solenoid lock and throttle switches, but in anyevent at intervals not to exceed 1,500 hours: Check the relationship between the position of the pedestal strikers when they are: (a) In contact with the solenoid latch; (b) at the point where the detent roller contacts the first detent cam, and (c) when the reversing microswitches are actuated. It shall not be possible for the switches to be actuated before the latch and the detent engage the striker and the cam. This determination shall be made by positive measurements rather than observation of engine r.p.m. at which these actions take place. VI. Operating instructions: Comply with item 5 of Attachment A, AD 52-13-02 Lockheed. VII. (NOTE: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a further directive.)
2022-02-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW1500G and PW1900G model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by an analysis of an event involving an International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2533-A5 model turbofan engine, which experienced an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling. This AD requires removing certain HPT 1st-stage and HPT 2nd-stage disks from service and replacing with parts eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-24-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Damage to the lower lateral fittings of the 80VU rack, typically elongated holes, migrated bushes [bushings], and/or missing bolts have been reported in-service. In addition damage to the lower central support fitting (including cracking) has been reported. In the worst case scenario a complete failure of the 80VU fittings in combination with a high load factor or strong vibration could lead to failure of the rack structure and/or computers or rupture/disconnection of the cable harnesses to one or more computers located in the 80VU. This rack contains computers for Flight Controls, Communication and Radio-navigation. These functions are duplicated across other racks but during critical phases of flight the multiple system failures/re-configuration may constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-03-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Fairchild Aircraft SA226 and SA227 series airplanes. This action requires replacing the nuts that attach the power control cable to the lever attach point clevis with nuts that have safety wire holes, safety-wiring the power control cable to the lever attach point clevis, inspecting to assure that the power cable is securely attached to the power control cable bracket, and correcting any attachment problems. Reports of power control cable attaching hardware failure on two of the affected airplanes prompted this action. In one of these instances, the power control cable disconnected from the lever attach point clevis, resulting in engine shutdown. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such power control cable disconnection, which could result in engine shutdown and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.
77-23-08: 77-23-08 HUGHES HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3081. Applies to Hughes Models 269A, 269A-1, 269A-2, and 269B helicopters equipped with main rotor blade P/N 269A1125, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131-1, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145-1, all blade Serial Numbers; and P/N 269B1145-25, all blade serial numbers. Compliance required as indicated. Small cracks have been discovered on several main rotor blades under the blade root fittings, radiating from the outboard bolt hole on the upper and lower side of the blade. To prevent main rotor blade failure due to extension of these cracks under the fittings, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: (a) For main rotor blade P/N 269A1125, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131, all Serial Numbers; and P/N 269B1145, Serial Nos. 0001 through 1313 - (1) Prior to the accumulation of 210 hours' time in service for main rotor bladeshaving less than 200 hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, and within the next 10 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having between 200 and 1000 hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, unless already accomplished within the last 390 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 400 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection, until a total of 1000 hours' time in service is reached, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (2) For main rotor blades accumulating a total of 1000 hours' time in service, subsequent to January 16, 1967, and for main rotor blades having 1000 or more hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, within the next 10 hours time in service, unless already accomplished within the last 90 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection until themain rotor blade is retired from service, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (b) For main rotor blade P/N 269A1131-1, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145-1, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145, Serial Nos. 1314 and subsequent; and P/N 269B1145-25, all Serial Numbers. Prior to the accumulation of 1025 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having less than 1000 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, and within the next 25 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having 1,000 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection until the main rotor blade is retired from service, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (c) Cracked blades must be removed before further flight, marked conspicuously to avoid inadvertent return to service, and replaced with new or serviceable used blades in accordance with (1), (2), or (3) below. Blades listed in (1), (2), and (3) are different types. Do not intermix types (1), or (2) or (3) blades. Main rotor blades, either those originally installed or replacement blades, must meet the requirements of this AD and must be retired from service before they exceed their maximum service life of 1366 hours' time in service. (1) Main rotor blade P/N 269B1145 and/or P/N 269B1145-1 and/or P/N 269B1145-25. (2) Main rotor blade P/N 269A1131 and/or P/N 269A1131-1. (3) Main rotor blade P/N 269A1125. This supersedes Amendment 39-642 (33 FR 12085), AD 68-17-07. This amendment becomes effective December 27, 1977.
2010-25-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires changing the emergency open doors procedure by incorporation of a temporary revision into the FAA- approved airplane flight manual (AFM) for all airplanes. This AD also requires replacement of the passenger door retaining bracket with an improved design retaining bracket for certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by several reports of the rear passenger door departing the airplane in flight. We are issuing this AD to change the emergency open doors procedure and retrofit the rear passenger door retaining bracket, which if not corrected could result in the rear passenger door departing the airplane in flight.
2010-06-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model MD-900 helicopters that currently requires applying serial numbers to certain parts, increasing the life limit for various parts, maintaining a previously established life limit for a certain vertical stabilizer control system (VSCS) bellcrank assembly and bellcrank arm, and correcting the part number for the VSCS bellcrank arm. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD, except it reduces the life limit of the swashplate spherical slider bearing (slider bearing). It further corrects what was described as a ''bellcrank arm'' life limit in the current AD and correctly describes it as another ''bellcrank assembly'' life limit. This amendment is prompted by two reports of cracks in the slider bearing that occurred well before the previously increased retirement life of 2,030 hours time-in-service (TIS) was reached. The actions specified by this AD are intendedto establish appropriate life limits for various parts, and to prevent fatigue failure of those parts and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
96-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8 series airplanes, that requires modification of a certain battery temperature monitor. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the battery temperature monitor, which resulted in smoke in the flight compartment. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the battery monitor, which could result in smoke in the flight compartment.
96-03-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This action requires an inspection for damage of the fuel tube located in the forward engine strut, and repair, if necessary; installation of a new support bracket and clamps on the power feeder conduit; and an inspection for proper positioning of the power feeder conduit in each engine strut, and adjustment, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of worn fuel tubes that were caused by the power feeder conduit moving and touching the fuel tube. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent wear of the fuel tube, which could result in a fuel leak in the engine strut and a consequent fire hazard.
2021-26-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-07- 17, which applied to all Saab AB, Support and Services Model SAAB 2000 airplanes. AD 2020-07-17 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2020-07- 17, it has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2020- 07-17 and requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
65-22-02: 65-22-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-139 Part 39 Federal Register September 29, 1965. Applies to Model 1329 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 5001 through 5063. Compliance required within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent uncontrolled pitch trim actuation, accomplish the inspection and repair as described in Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 329-218, "Horizontal Stabilizer Trim System- Inspection of A-723L, A-723LA, A-723LD, and A-723N Stabilizer Trim Contactors," or perform an equivalent FAA-approved inspection and repair. This directive effective September 29, 1965.
87-09-03: 87-09-03 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM GMBH: Amendment 39-5995. Final copy of priority letter AD issued May 7, 1987. Applies to Model BO-105, BO-105LS, and BK-117 series helicopters certificated in any category with main rotor blade secondary bolt P/N's 105-14101.35, 105-14101.79, 105-14101.11, and 105-141021.05 installed. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the secondary main rotor blade retention bolt and possible loss of control of the main rotor blade, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect all bolts having more than 100 hours' time in service for cracks at the junction of the head and shank using a magnetic particle inspection or a dye penetrant inspection method prior to further flight. If the dye penetrant inspection method is used, bolts with solid film lubricant coating shall have the coating removed in the affected area (to approximately 5 MM below the bolt head) using Scotch Brite or equivalent. Use MEK or equivalent to clean the surface prior to dye checking. Coated crack-free bolts need not be recoated prior to reinstallation. (b) Inspect bolts with less than 100 hours' time in service in accordance with paragraph (a) prior to accumulating 100 hours' time in service. (c) If cracks are found, remove bolt from service and replace with an airworthy bolt prior to further flight. (d) Conduct the inspection of paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service since last inspection. (e) Reinstall bolts in accordance with the following instructions. Lubricate crack-free bolts (per MBB Maintenance Manual) with Molykte BR2 (MBB Maintenance Manual item CM- 102) or Aeroshell grease #22 (MBB Maintenance Manual item CM-101) and install per the applicable MBB Maintenance Manual with the following exceptions: (1) Make certain that no lubricant is on the threaded area of the bolt; (2) Before installing the nut, lightly tap the head of the bolt with aplastic or rubber mallet to seat the bolt in the hole; (3) Install nut, and torque to 70-90 inch pounds (8-11 Newton meters); and (4) If required to install cotter pin, back off the nut to next available cotter pin hole, and install cotter pin. (f) Upon request, an alternate means of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with the requirements of this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0100. (g) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to operate helicopters to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. This amendment, 39-5995, becomes effective August 26, 1988, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD No. 87-09-03, issued May 7, 1987, which contained this amendment.
2010-23-26: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following the occurrence of cracks on the MLG [main landing gear] rib 5 RH [right-hand] and LH [left-hand] attachment fitting lower flanges, DGAC [Direction Generale de l'Aviation Civile] France AD 2003-318(B) [parallel to part of FAA AD 2006-12- 13] was issued to require repetitive inspections and, as terminating action * * *[.] Subsequently, new cases of cracks were discovered during scheduled maintenance checks by operators of A300B4 and A300-600 type aeroplanes on which the terminating action * * * [was] embodied. This condition, if not corrected, could affect the structural integrity of those aeroplanes. * * * * * We are issuingthis AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-06-03: Drive Shaft
95-26-15: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting an airworthiness directive that was sent previously by individual letters to all known U.S. owners and operators of various transport category airplanes equipped with Allied Signal Commercial Avionics Systems CAS-81 TCAS. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the audio output of the CAS-81 TCAS. This AD requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures to cycle power to the TCAS processor via the circuit breaker or power bus, and to perform a TCAS functional test to verify proper operation of the TCAS. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the flightcrew is advised of the potential hazard associated with failure of the audio output of the CAS-81 TCAS, and of the procedures necessary to address it.
72-03-07: 72-03-07 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-1391. Applies to Models 310 (Serial Numbers 310Q0074 through 310Q0425, except 310Q0261, 0271, 0279, 0402, 0409, 0411, 0416, 0420, 0424); Models 340 (Serial Numbers 340-0001 through 340-0009, except 340-0005); Models 401 (Serial Numbers 401B0029 through 401B0204); Models 402 (Serial Numbers 402B0007 through 402B0201); Models 414 (Serial Numbers 414-0052 through 414-0173, except 414-0152, 0153, 0168, 0172); and Models 421 (Serial Numbers 421B0001 through 421B0209, except 421B0144, 0201, 0205, 0208); and all other 300 and 400 series airplanes which may have the original barrel assemblies replaced with new or used assemblies shipped by the manufacturer between January 1, 1970, and December 15, 1971. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent landing gear failure accomplish the following in accordance with Cessna Service Letter ME71-28 dated December 24, 1971, and Supplement No. 1 dated January 28, 1972, or any equivalent methods approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region: A) Within the next 5 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect barrel assemblies of the main landing gear upper struts for hydraulic leaks and surface cracks. If such discrepancies are noted, prior to further flight, replace the appropriate barrel assemblies. B) To accomplish the inspection required by Paragraph A the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the inspection may be performed. C) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, conduct chemical tests to determine if barrel assemblies of the main landing gear upper struts are composed of dissimilar or incorrect metals. If such discrepancies are noted, prior to further flight, replace with appropriate and correct barrel assemblies. D) Report all defects found in complying with this AD. Such reports must be made in writing and sent to Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region, and should include such items as aircraft serial number, total time in service and nature of defect. (Report approved by the Bureau of the Budget under BOB No. 04-R0174.) This amendment becomes effective February 9, 1972.
92-16-02: 92-16-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8311. Docket No. 92-NM-119-AD. Supersedes AD 92-06-13, Amendment 39-8193. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 1, dated February 14, 1992: Within 60 days after March 18, 1992 (the effective date of AD 92-06-13, Amendment 39-8193), revise the wiring in certain panels, the wing-body disconnects, and the wing-strut disconnects, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 1, dated February 14, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 2, dated May 28, 1992: Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the wiring in certain panels, the wing-body disconnects, and the wing-strut disconnects, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 2, dated May 28, 1992. Procedures that were accomplished previously in accordance with Revision 1 of the service bulletin, and that have not changed in Revision 2 of the service bulletin, need not be repeated. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then sent it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n \n\t(e)\tThe modification shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 2, dated May 28, 1992, which includes the following list of effective pages: \n\n\nPage Number\nRevision Level\nDate \n1, 3-4, 7-8, 12-14\n2\nMay 28, 1992 \n2, 5, 10\n1\nFebruary 14, 1992 \n6, 9, 11\nOriginal\t\nDecember 10, 1991 \n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\nThis incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. The incorporation by reference of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-78A0052, Revision 1, dated February 14, 1992, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 18, 1992 (57 FR 9381, March 18, 1992). Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on July 27, 1992.