Results
58-25-05: 58-25-05 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-24 Aircraft, Serial Numbers 1 Through 336. Compliance required by February 1, 1959. It has been determined that an unsafe condition exists with respect to the door latch arrangement of the aircraft affected. At present it is not possible to open the cabin door from the inside if it has been locked on the outside. In order to preclude occupants becoming inadvertently locked inside the cabin of PA-24 aircraft in the case of some emergency, the main cabin door latch assembly must be modified to permit opening the door from inside the aircraft under all conditions. (Item No. 1 of Piper Service Letter No. 305 dated October 1, 1958, presents an acceptable method of modifying the aircraft.)
58-12-02: 58-12-02 PIPER: Applies to All Models J-3, PA-11, PA-15, PA-16 and PA-17 Aircraft. Compliance required not later than July 15, 1958. There is a possibility that some aileron hinge reinforcing brackets P/N 10931-02 supplied to the field during the past three years were fabricated from aluminum instead of steel. Brackets, which have been replaced since June 1954, must be inspected to determine the type of material. All aluminum brackets are to be removed and replaced with steel brackets. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 165 covers this subject.)
58-04-03: 58-04-03 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-23 Aircraft, Serial Numbers 23-1 to 2-1253 Inclusive. Compliance required at next 100-hour inspection but not later than April 1, 1958, whichever occurs first. As a result of a number of failures, the hollow rudder trim tab adjustment screw, P/N 18453-00, must be replaced with a solid screw, P/N 18453-02. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 162 covers this same subject.)
2008-15-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for BHTC Model 430 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: "It has been determined that the existing rigging procedures for the tail rotor pitch change mechanism have to be changed due to possibility of parts interference.'' The cumulative effect of individual part tolerances resulting in the total assemblage of those parts being out of tolerance could result in the tail rotor yoke striking another part other than the flapping stop (parts interference) cited in the MCAI. Also, the misalignment of the tail rotor counterweight bellcrank may result in higher tail rotor pedal forces and a higher pilot workload after failure of the 1 hydraulic system. Both parts interference and the misaligned counterweight bellcrank create an unsafe condition. This AD require actions that are intended to address these unsafe conditions.
57-21-01: 57-21-01 PIPER: Applies to All Model PA-23 Aircraft. Compliance required at next regular inspection period but not to exceed 100 hours. Inspect the attachment of the rudder trim tab control rod to the rudder trim tab. If a flat head pin has been installed it must be replaced by an AN 23-10 clevis bolt and AN 960-10L washer, secured with an AN 320-3 nut and AN 380-2-2 cotter pin. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 159 covers this subject.)
2008-15-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to determine if certain carriage spindles are installed, repetitive inspections for corrosion and indications of corrosion on affected carriage spindles, and if necessary, related investigative action and corrective action. This AD also provides optional terminating action. This AD results from a report of corrosion found on carriage spindles that are located on the outboard trailing edge flaps. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion of the carriage spindle, which could result in fracture. Fracture of both the inboard and outboard carriage spindles, in the forward ends through the large diameters, on a flap, could adversely affect the airplane's continued safe flight and landing.
57-19-01: 57-19-01 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-23, Serial Numbers 23-129, 23-132 to 23-228 Inclusive; 23-230 to 23-766 Inclusive; 23-768 to 23-850 Inclusive; 23-852 to 23-883 Inclusive; 23-885 to 23-937 Inclusive; 23-939 to 23-1017 Inclusive; 23-1019, 23-1020, 23-1022 to 23-1030 Inclusive; 23-1032 to 23-1042 Inclusive; 23-1044, 23-1046 to 23-1057 Inclusive; 23-1059 to 23- 1064 Inclusive; 23-1066, 23-1069 to 23-1074 Inclusive; 23-1076, 23-1078 to 23-1082 Inclusive. Compliance required by November 1, 1957. Inspect the Heim rod end bearing (P/N HMX-4M) located where the front elevator control tube attaches to the lower horn on the control column. If more than six threads show on the rod end, rerig the control column so that six or less threads are exposed. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 156 dated July 2, 1957, covers this subject.)
2008-14-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During fatigue tests (EF3) on the A340-600, multiple damage were found in the upper side shell structure at skin and frame (FR) 84 & 85 interface, from stringer 6 to 15 LH/RH. This damage occurred between 58,341 and 72,891 simulated Flight Cycles (FC). Due to the higher Design Service Goal and different design (e.g. skin thickness) for A330-200 and A340-300 aircraft series, the damage assessment concluded on [a] potential impact on these aircraft series. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of integrity of the upper shell structure of the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-14-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes, that requires replacing the wire harness support bracket of the integrated drive generator (IDG) of the forward engine mounts with a new support bracket, and modifying the angle of the bracket near the oil filter. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent arcing of the IDG wire harness, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the area of the forward engine mount bolt retainer and/or fire detector responder. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
56-27-03: 56-27-03 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-23, Serial Numbers 23-1 Through 23-800 Except 23-732, 23-736, 23-739, 23-740, 23-741, 23-769, 23-777, 23-784, 23-787, 23-794, 23-797 and 23-799. Compliance required by February 1, 1957. In order to prevent fatigue cracking in the aileron balance weight bracket at a point where the bracket tubes are welded to form a 90 degree angle, it will be necessary to remove both the right and left aileron balance weight brackets and reinforce them with gussets, Piper P/N 17126- 07 in accordance with the instructions and sketch contained in Piper Service Bulletin No. 149 dated December 10, 1956.
57-02-01: 57-02-01 FORNEY (ERCOUPE): Applies to All Models 415-C, -CD, -D, E, G and F-1 Aircraft. Compliance required at every 100 hours. There have been several failures of the rudder horn attachments. Experience has indicated that these failures are attributed to improper ground handling technique rather than to unusual flight loads. The design of the aircraft has placed the fins and rudders at the height which owners and operators have found convenient for pushing or pulling with their hands when moving the airplane in and out of hangers and along the ground. Such handling tactics will subject the surfaces to higher loads than those for which they are designed and should be avoided. The following inspection would be made and corrective action taken when necessary. A load of 10 pounds should be applied to the trailing edge of the rudder while the controls are locked in neutral position. The trailing edge should not deflect more than one-half inch, nor should there be evidence of a clicking noise occurring in the vicinity of the center rudder hinge when the rudder is deflected. If the deflection exceeds 1/2 inch, the control system should be checked to establish that the deflection is in the rudder. Once the deflection has been established as in the rudder or if a clicking noise is heard even though the deflection was less than 1/2 inch, the rudder should be removed and the main spar inspected for cracks. The outboard skin should also be removed sufficiently to inspect the rudder horn attaching structure and the roots of the rudder ribs for cracks or damage. Any parts found cracked or deformed should be replaced. (Except for the cracked rudder ribs, Ercoupe Service Bulletin No. 25, dated July 31, 1953, covers this same subject.) This supersedes AD 53-26-02.
2008-14-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A109E and A119 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Technical Agent for Italy, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: "Some cases of interference between the hydraulic pipe, P/N 109-0761-65-103, and the tail rotor control rod assembly have been detected on Model A109E helicopters * * * The interference, if not corrected, could damage the hydraulic pipes and lead to the loss of the hydraulic system No. 1 in flight. This AD * * * is issued to extend the same mandatory corrective actions to A119 model due to its design similarity with A109E.'' This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition.
53-24-04: 53-24-04 PIPER: Applies to PA-18, Serial Numbers 18-1 to 18-3000 Inclusive; PA-20, Serial Numbers 20-1 to 20-928 Inclusive; and PA-22, Serial Numbers 22-1 to 22-1689 Inclusive. Compliance required not later than February 1, 1954. In order to preclude the possibility of loss of fuel and hydraulic oil and fire in flight caused by chafing of these lines between the firewall and muffler, the following should be accomplished: (a) To prevent contact with the muffler, reroute the fuel primer line, and wheel brake hydraulic line if necessary, so that they do not pass behind the muffler. (b) Use clamps to fasten the lines to the firewall to prevent movement and vibration of these lines. (Piper Aircraft Corp. Service Letter No. 213 covers this alteration.)
2006-17-03: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Models S10, S10-V, and S10-VT sailplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the connection between the aileron push-rod and the connecting shaft to determine if a safety washer is installed. If there is no safety washer installed, this AD requires you to modify the aileron control assembly. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent a loose bearing in the aileron control lever, which could result in separation of the aileron control system. Separation of the aileron control system could lead to loss of aileron control.
55-07-02: 55-07-02 PIPER: Applies to All Model PA-22 Aircraft Except Serial Numbers 22-2377, 22-2379, 22-2385, 22-2388, 22-2389, 22-2391, 22-2394 and Up. Compliance required by June 1, 1955. Numerous instances have been reported of cracking in the leading edge of the streamlined tube of the landing gear at the point where the tube joins the inboard end of the axle. To prevent future failures, this joint should be reinforced by welding a steel strap reinforcement. (Piper Service Letter No. 124 dated August 30, 1954, covers the same subject.)
51-19-02: 51-19-02 PIPER: Applies to Models PA-18 Serial Numbers 18-487 to 18-730 Inclusive; PA-20 Serial Numbers 20-554 to 20-690 Inclusive; and PA-22 Serial Numbers 22-1 to 22-90 Inclusive. Compliance required by August 31, 1951. Overage oil radiator hose was installed in an undetermined number of Piper airplanes. Inspect immediately to determine that the proper hose marked with a solid white line and a broken red line and AN H-35 or MIL H-6000 are installed. Defective hose are marked "Aromatic Resistant Gates Vulco" followed by a date with the opposite side marked by a solid white line and broken red line. All defective hose should be replaced as soon as possible but not later than August 31, 1951. (This information supersedes that in Piper Service Letter No. 165 dated March 23, 1951.)
2008-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: To prevent the possible in-flight failure of the vertical fin, leading to loss of control of the aircraft * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-14-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for IAE V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, V2533-A5, V2525-D5, and V2528-D5 turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain No. 4 bearing oil system components from service at the next shop visit or by an end date determined by the engine model. This AD results from instances of oil loss from the No. 4 bearing compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent heat damage to high- pressure turbine (HPT) and low-pressure turbine (LPT) critical life limited hardware such as the HPT stage 1-2 airseal. Damage to the HPT stage 1-2 airseal could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
46-37-01: 46-37-01 PIPER: (Was Mandatory Note 12 of AD-691-02 and Mandatory Note 1 of AD- 780-3.) Applies to J3C-65 and J3C-65S, Serial Numbers 14027 and Up and All PA-12. Compliance required by November 1, 1946. To prevent possible failure of the fuel strainer bowl, replace the present thin fuel strainer bowl gasket with a 1/8-inch thick cork and neoprene gasket supplied by Piper. The bowl seat nut should be tightened only finger tight. The bowl should be carefully examined for signs of flaws or cracks and should be replaced if any are found. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 89 dated July 11, 1946, covers this same subject.)
2008-14-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: "It has been determined that some helicopters have been fitted with a CRES steel fitting, part number (P/N) 407-030-750-103, and the installation of the tailboom attachment bolt does not meet the design criteria.'' We are issuing this AD to require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition that results from an improper installation of the tailboom attachment bolt in the upper left-hand tailboom attachment CRES steel fitting.
53-05-01: 53-05-01 BOEING, CONVAIR, DOUGLAS and LOCKHEED: Applies to All Boeing 377, Convair 240 Series, Douglas DC-6 Series, and Lockheed 749 Series Airplanes With Curtiss Reversing Propellers.\n\n\tItems I through IV are to be accomplished by means of progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than September 1, 1953, and shall be completed no later than March 1, 1954. (For Boeing 377 completion must be no later than July 1, 1954.) The replacement program in item III and the maintenance and inspection program in item V shall be instituted no later than April 1, 1953.\n\n\tI.\tRevise propeller slip rings, brush cap connector plug and harness to provide isolation of the reverse slip ring and brushes by relocating them between the "Common" and "Bonding" slip rings and brushes, which are both maintained at ground potential. Curtiss Information Reports have been issued to cover this subject, as follows: Convair 240 Series, Report No. 245S dated November 5, 1951; Douglas DC-6 Series, Report No. 249S dated December 4, 1951; Boeing 377, Report No. 258S dated March 21, 1953; Lockheed 749 (C634S Propeller), Report No. 250S dated April 15, 1952; Lockheed 749 (C632S Propeller), Report No. 267S dated May 14, 1952.\n\n\tII.\tA. Install Curtiss brush cap P/N 148764, which has provisions for a separate brush cap connector for the reversing lead. This change may be accomplished after or simultaneously with I, and in accordance with Curtiss Information Report No. 273-S, dated January 15, 1953.\n\n\t\tB.\tIsolate the reversing circuit from the propeller brush cap to (and including) the "I" terminal on the reverse pitch relay, in the manner described below. Where applicable, the same isolation shall be provided for the extension of the reversing circuit to the secondary reverse lock relay.\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tTerminal strips. Any one of the following methods of isolation may be used:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tElimination of connections at terminal strips by using continuous wiring.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tProviding separate covered terminal strip for reversing lead connections.\n\n\t\t\t\t(c)\tIsolating the reversing lead stud, terminals, and associated hardware from all nearby components in an insulating cover which is so designed or secured to the wiring that the wire will stay in place in case of breakage of the terminal; or so that the broken wire and terminal will remain insulated by the cover from contact with other circuits if the wire comes off its terminal. The nature of the cover design or provisions for its attachment must be such that its installation will not be overlooked during maintenance. \n\n\t\t\t\t(d)\tRemoving or grounding studs adjacent to the reversing lead stud and securing all adjacent wiring and the reversing lead to prevent contact of broken leads with reversing terminal or contact of broken reversing lead with other terminals. If the adjacent studs are grounded, rather than removed, the studs must be identified distinctively so that they will not inadvertently be used for the attachment of wires serving other circuits.\n\n\t\t\t(2)\tMultiple pin connector assemblies. Any one of the following methods of isolation may be used:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tElimination of connectors by using continuous wiring.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tProviding separate connectors for each reversing circuit.\n\n\t\t\t\t(c)\tDeactivating all pins adjacent to the one carrying the reversing circuit. These pins are to be retained in the connector but identified distinctively so that they will not be used inadvertently. When distinctively identified, these pins may also be used for circuits which cannot supply sufficient energy to drive the pitch-change motor or to release the pitch change motor brake, or for circuits which are energized only when reversing is desired. At the points where wires are attached to the connector pins, all exposed metal parts are to be protected with insulating covers so secured that contact between circuits cannot occur in case of failure of the connection or in case foreign material is left in the connector assembly.\n\n\t\t\t(3)\tExposed terminals on relays or switches.\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tAs specified in item B(1)(c) for terminal strips, or\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tIf the terminal is a type which cannot be protected as specified above, cover all exposed metal components with insulating material and secure all wires so that no wire can touch another terminal if the wire breaks or falls off its own terminal. Install insulating barriers as necessary to prevent inadvertent contact between broken or loose wires and other terminals.\n\n\t\t\t(4)\tReverse circuit wiring. Modify in one of the following ways:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tPhysically isolate the reverse wire from all other circuits.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tIf the wiring is run in bundles with other wires, a shielded wire is to be used. The shielding shall be grounded at both ends, and a protective cover shall be provided over the shielding. The shielding shall be carried as close as possible to all terminal points.\n\n\t\t\t(5)\tNacelle filter. If the reverse wire and, where applicable, the lead to the secondary reverse lock relay, is enclosed in conduit or shielding for its entire length from the brush cap to the "I" terminal of the reverse pitch relay, the lead may be routed so as to bypass the nacelle filter thus eliminating the need for isolating the condenser terminals. If the reverse wire is isolated in such manner that filtering is still necessary, provide an additional filter which is physically separated from the existing nacelle filter.\n\n\tIII.\tComply with AD 56-08-01.\n\n\tIV.\tAn unmodified C632S Series propellers which have both the reverse pitch circuit and the feathering circuit opened by the same limit switch when the propeller blades are at the reverse pitch position modify the propeller limit switch arrangement so that it will be possible to energize the increase pitch circuit by operating the feathering control even when the propeller is in reverse pitch. Curtiss Information Reports have been issued to cover this subject, as follows: CV-240 Series, Report No. 245S, dated November 5, 1951;DC-6 Series, Report No. 249S, dated December 4, 1951; L-749 Series, Report No. 267S, dated May 14, 1952.\n\n\tV.\tMaintenance practices.\n\n\t\tA.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours:\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tInspect all points specified in items II.B.(1) and II.B.(3). The inspections of item II.B.(1) may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in items II.B.(1)(a) or II.B.(1)(b).\n\n\t\tB.\tAt any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reverse wing, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed for inspection. Damaged wiring will be replaced as necessary.\n\n\t\tC.\tAt each scheduled service nearest to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switches open when throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position. \n\n\t\tD.\tAt any time that operations are performed which may affect the relative position of the solenoid lock and throttle switches, but in any event at intervals not to exceed 1,500 hours: Check the relationship between the position of the pedestal strikers when they are: (a) in contact with the solenoid latch; (b) at the point where the detent roller contacts the first detent cam; and (c) when the reversing microswitches are actuated. It shall not be possible for the switches to be actuated before the latch and the detent engage the striker and the cam. This determination shall be made by positive measurements rather than observation of engine r.p.m. at which these actions take place.
50-23-01: 50-23-01 PIPER: Applies to All Models PA-17 Aircraft and PA-15 Aircraft Equipped With PA-17 Type Landing Gear Shock Struts. Compliance required by July 15, 1950. Inspect landing gear shock strut end fittings, P/N 11806 (four per airplane) for cracks or other defects in the small bend radii. Replace fittings found to be defective. Excessive tightening of the attachment bolts may induce failure by restricting rotation of the fitting on the bolt, therefore, the end fittings should be installed free to rotate. (Piper Service Letter No. 129, dated October 28, 1949, covers the same subject.)
2008-14-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The Aviation Authority of Canada with whom we have a bilateral agreement states in the MCAI: "Horizontal stabilizers part numbers 206-023-119-167 and 407-023-801-109 may have manufacturing flaws on the inside surface of the upper and/or lower skin at the tailboom attachment inserts. These flaws may result in cracking of the skin and failure of the horizontal stabilizer.'' The manufacturer's service information states that in addition to cracks, the horizontal stabilizer may have deformation or debonding around and between the inserts. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-17-02: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-09-05, which applies to certain GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG (previously identified as BURKHART-GROB FLUGZEUGBAU INDUSTRIESTRABE) Model G102 ASTIR CS sailplanes. AD 84-09-05 requires you to install a modified spherical locking bolt and nut in the forward horizontal stabilizer connection to the vertical stabilizer and install new locking pins in the aft connecting plate for the horizontal stabilizer. Since we issued AD 84- 09-05, fatigue cracks were found in the modified spherical locking bolt. Consequently, this AD requires you to replace the modified spherical locking bolt, the retaining pins (collar bolts), and associated hardware; add a life limit on the spherical locking bolt and the retaining pins; and repetitively inspect the front and rear horizontal stabilizer attachment. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks in the spherical locking bolt, which could result in failure of the horizontal stabilizer connection. This failure could lead to loss of control.
49-14-01: 49-14-01 PIPER: Applies to Model J3 Series, Serial Numbers 14027 and Up; PA-11, Serial Numbers 11-1 to 11-910; and PA-12, All Airplanes. To be accomplished by April 20, 1949. Inspect the fittings (P/N 40861) at each end of the elevator connector tube (P/N 40261) to determine if the end fittings are riveted to the tube with two rivets 90 degrees apart. If not, attach the end fitting to the tube with two 1/8-inch diameter, 3/4-inch long soft steel, flat or round head rivets 90 degrees apart; or replace with a new connector tube assembly. Full forward position of the control stick will expose the rearward fitting and full rearward position of the stick will expose the forward fitting. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 111 covers the same subject.)