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86-19-12: 86-19-12 ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (Allison, formerly Detroit Diesel Allison): Amendment 39-5373. Applies to Model 250-C30 Series engines installed in, but not limited to, Sikorsky Model S-76A, Bell Models 206L-1, modified to incorporate the Allison 250-C30 engine, and 206L-3, and McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (Hughes) Models 369F and 369FF aircraft. SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Applies to Sikorsky Aircraft Model S-76A helicopters certificated in any category and equipped with Allison Model 250-C30 and -C30S engines. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent conditions that can lead to a possible gas producer turbine rotor uncontained failure and to prevent critical secondary damage in the event of a gas producer turbine rotor uncontained failure, accomplish the following: NOTE: Paragraphs (a)(1) thru (a)(3) of this AD are equivalent to the technical requirements of AD 84-24- 02 which is superseded by this AD. Paragraphs (a)(4) and (b) delineate final corrective actions for all Model 250- C30 Series engines to prevent the above described failure/secondary damage. (a) Allison Model 250-C30 and -C30S engines installed in Sikorsky Aircraft Model S-76A helicopters (1) Within the next 30 days after December 18, 1984, for aircraft in compliance with telegraphic AD (TAD) T84-16-51, and prior to further flight for aircraft not in compliance with TAD T84-16-51, perform the following: (i) Install the Sikorsky Model A-76A helicopter engine compartment protective shields, P/N 76070-20077-013 or P/N 76070-20077-014, in accordance with Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 76- 71-7 dated November 9, 1984, or FAA-approved equivalent; and concurrently, (ii) Install Allison first stage turbine wheel external energy absorbing rings, P/N 23031910, L.H. and 23031920, R.H., around the Allison Model 250-C30 and -C30S engines in accordance with Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3124 initial issue dated November 15, 1984, or Revision 1 dated December 16, 1985, and prerequisite CEB-A-72-3125 dated November 15, 1984, and Sikorsky ASB 76-71-7 dated November 9, 1984, or FAA-approved equivalents; or, install an Allison first stage turbine wheel internal energy absorbing ring P/N 23031909, or P/N 23032263, or FAA-approved equivalent, in accordance with Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-72-3128 initial issue dated November 15, 1984, or Revision 1 dated September 30, 1985, and Sikorsky ASB 76-71-7 dated November 9, 1984, or FAA-approved equivalents. NOTE: The engine manufacturer in Revision 1 dated December 16, 1985, to Allison CEB-A-72-3124 added an inspection of the first stage turbine wheel external energy absorbing ring turbine mount link P/N 23031441 for misalignment and mounting bracket P/N 23031446 for cracks at intervals of 25 hours time-in- service. While the FAA concurs with the desirability of this inspection, it is not made mandatory by this AD.(2) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the compliance with (a), above, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time-in-service, inspect the Sikorsky Model S-76A helicopter engine compartment protective shields in accordance with Chapter 5 of Sikorsky Airworthiness and Inspection Requirements Manual, Publication No. SA 4047-76-2-1 dated November 12, 1984, or FAA-approved equivalent. (3) At the next engine repair/overhaul shop visit after December 18, 1984, but not later than November 30, 1986, update the engines to the "Allison Assured Engine" configuration and continue to maintain in accordance with Allison Commercial Service Letter, CSL-3068 initial issue dated October 1, 1985, or CSL- 3068, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1985, or FAA-approved equivalent with the following exception to the November 30, 1986, compliance deadline: At the next engine repair/overhaul shop visit after December 18, 1984, but not later than March 30, 1986, inspect and modify the 29-34 labyrinth seal for engines with more than 100 hours time-in-service since turbine overhaul or repair, in accordance with Allison CEB-A-72-3127, Revision 2, dated April 3, 1985, or prior issues and CEB-A-72-3131, Revision 1, dated April 22, 1985, or initial issue, respectively, or FAA-approved equivalents. NOTE: The date November 30, 1986, that appears in paragraph 4B and 8 of Allison Commercial Service Letter CSL-3068, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1985, should read March 30, 1986. (4) At the next turbine repair/overhaul shop visit after the effective date of this AD, but not later than November 30, 1986, perform the following: (i) Install first stage turbine wheel internal energy absorbing ring P/N 23031909, or P/N 23032263, or FAA-approved equivalent, in accordance with Allison CEB-A-72-3128, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1985, or initial issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. (ii) Replace existing second stage turbine wheel P/N 6892762, or P/N 689822,or P/N 23004233 with P/N 23032280, or FAA-approved equivalent, in accordance with Allison CEB-A-72-3132, dated February 1, 1985, or FAA-approved equivalent. (iii) Remove engine external energy absorbing ring P/N 23001910, L.H. or P/N 23001920, R.H., as appropriate, in accordance with Allison CEB-72-3136 dated July 31, 1985, or FAA-approved equivalent. (iv) The Sikorsky Model S-76A helicopter engine compartment protective shields, P/N 76070-20077-013 or P/N 76070-20077-014, may be removed in accordance with Sikorsky Customer Service Notice No. 76-158 dated January 14, 1985, after compliance with Paragraphs (a)(4)(i), (ii), and (iii) above. NOTE: The engine containment configurations 1 thru 4, and authorized configuration mixes listed in Appendix 1 of Sikorsky Customer Service Notice No. 76-158 dated January 14, 1985, continue to be FAA-approved until November 30, 1986; after this date only configurations 3 and 4 are authorized per Paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (a)(4) of this AD for Allison Model 250-C30 and -C30S/Sikorsky Model S-76A installations. (b) Allison Model 250-C30, -C30L, -C30M, -C30P, and -C30S engines installed in aircraft other than Sikorsky Aircraft Model S-76A helicopters At the next turbine repair/overhaul shop visit after the effective date of this AD, but not later than November 30, 1987, perform the following: (1) Install first stage turbine wheel internal energy absorbing ring P/N 23031909, or P/N 23032263, or FAA-approved equivalent, in accordance with Allison CEB-A-72-3128, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1985, or initial issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. (2) Replace existing second stage turbine wheel P/N 6892762, or P/N 6898922, or P/N 23004233 with P/N 23032280, or FAA-approved equivalent, in accordance with Allison CEB-A-72-3137, Revision 1, dated May 3, 1985, or initial issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. The manufacturers' specifications and procedures, identified and described in this document, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1): Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin 76-71-7 dated November 9, 1984 Sikorsky Airworthiness and Inspection Requirements Manual, Publication No. SA 4047-76-2-1 dated November 12, 1984 Sikorsky Customer Service Notice 76-158 dated January 14, 1985 Allison CSL-3068, Rev. 1, dated September 15, 1985 Allison CSL-A-3062, Rev. 1, dated January 15, 1985 Allison CSL-A-3066, Rev. 1, dated January 15, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3124, Rev. 1, dated December 16, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3125 dated November 15, 1984 Allison CEB-A-72-3127, Rev. 2, dated April 3, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3128, Rev. 1, dated September 30, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3131, Rev. 1, dated April 22, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3132 dated February 1, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3136 dated July 31, 1985 Allison CEB-A-72-3137, Rev. 1, dated May 3, 1985 All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturers may obtain copies upon request to Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., P.O. Box 420, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206-0420; and Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corp., North Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06601. These documents also may be examined at the Office of Regional Counsel, FAA, ATTN: Rules Docket No. 84-ANE-21, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment supersedes AD 84-24-02, Amendment 39-4957, 49 FR 48531, effective December 18, 1984. This amendment becomes effective on October 3, 1986.
2004-24-04: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC models 250-C30R/3, -C30R/3M, -C47B, and -C47M turboshaft engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive electrical signal inspections of the hydromechanical unit (HMU) Power Lever Angle (PLA) potentiometer. This ad continues to require those inspections and adds replacement of the existing HMU with a new design HMU as a mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD results from the manufacturer releasing a redesigned HMU that has a dual-element potentiometer. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded and sudden changes in engine power.
2014-05-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking in the fuselage skin underneath the satellite communication (SATCOM) antenna adapter. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the visible fuselage skin and doubler if installed, for cracking, corrosion, and any indication of contact of a certain fastener to a bonding jumper, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking and corrosion in the fuselage skin, which could lead to rapid decompression and \n\n((Page 12376)) \n\nloss of structural integrity of the airplane.
2023-03-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-300 airplanes. This AD was prompted by failed lockwires on the attachment of the left-hand main landing gear (MLG) trunnion bearing to spar 2. This AD requires inspecting for damage of the left- and right-hand MLG trunnion bearing attaching parts, replacing damaged parts, and modifying the MLG trunnion bearing attaching parts, as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
88-03-09: 88-03-09 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5839. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, and -83 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 34-177, dated April 28, 1987, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent erroneous information from being transmitted to the Digital Flight Guidance Computer (DFGC) from the Digital Air Data computer (DADC) in the event of an electrical transient, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), inspect Honeywell P/N HG280D80 DADC in affected airplanes to determine if Modification 8 has been installed, in accordance with Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 34-177, dated April 28, 1987, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf Modification 8 has been installed and identified, no further action is necessary. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf Modification 8 has been installed but not identified, identify the DADC in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf Modification 8 has not been installed, modify and identify the DADC in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60); or Honeywell, Incorporated, Commercial Aviation Division Technical Services, Mail Station MN23-6345, P.O. Box 889, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective March 11, 1988.
82-26-06: 82-26-06 DeHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-4517. Applies to Model DHC-6 (serial numbers 1 through 709, 711 through 735, 737 through 753, 755 through 761, 763 through 779, and 791) airplanes which incorporate a windscreen washer/deicing system certificated in any category. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent leakage of isopropyl alcohol in the crew compartment and a possible crew compartment fire, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and each 200 hours time-in-service thereafter inspect the windscreen washer/deicing system for evidence of leaks in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of DeHavilland Service Bulletin S/B No. 6/422, Revision A dated June 18, 1982. (1) Replace any defective components which could cause leaks and ensure that all tubing is secured in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions Step 3 and Step 6. (b) On or before November 30, 1983: (1) Install a permanent placard having letters of 1/8 inch minimum height on or near the washer/deicing fluid tank filler which states "DO NOT USE ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL OR ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL MIXTURES." (2) Install a placard having letters of 1/8 inch minimum height adjacent to the windscreen washer/deicing system switch which states "WASHER ONLY" and operate the airplane in accordance with these placard limitations. (3) On airplanes certificated for flight into icing conditions, install an electrically heated windscreen in accordance with DeHavilland Modification S.0.0. 6007, Issue 7 dated May 17, 1982. (c) The inspections per paragraph (a) of this AD need not be accomplished when the placards required by paragraph (b) are installed. (d) The airplane may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. (e) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-170, Federal Aviation Administration, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581, telephone: (516) 791-6680. This amendment becomes effective on December 27, 1982.
2023-03-22: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-09-04 R1, which applied to DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG-1000T gliders equipped with a Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH (currently Solo Vertriebs-und Entwicklungs-GmbH) (Solo) Model 2350 C engine. AD 2015-09-04 R1 prohibited operation of the engine and required performing a magnetic particle or dye penetrant inspection of the propeller shaft and reporting the results of the inspection to Solo. This AD is prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as occurrences of rupture of the eccentric axle on Solo Model 2350 C engines (installed on DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG-1000T gliders in the United States) and an occurrence on a Solo Model 2350 D engine (installed on Schempp-Hirth Flugzeugbau GmbH (Schempp-Hirth) Model Duo Discus T gliders in the United States). This AD requires repetitive replacement of the eccentric axle, adds the Schempp-Hirth Model Duo Discus T gliders to the applicability, and retains from AD 2015-09-04 R1 the option of operating the glider with the engine non-operative instead of replacing the eccentric axle. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-23-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit operators from performing CAT 2 or CAT 3 automatic landings or roll- outs at certain airports. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action for the AFM revision. This AD is prompted by data showing that the magnetic variation table installed in the Honeywell inertial reference system (IRS) is obsolete at certain airports. We are issuing this AD to prevent the airplane from departing the runway during a CAT 2 or CAT 3 automatic landing or roll-out, due to magnetic and IRS deviations.
2004-23-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-135 and -45 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires a one-time inspection to detect incorrect wiring of the electrical connectors to the pressure switches and cartridges on the fire extinguisher bottles for the engines and the auxiliary power unit (APU); disconnection and reconnection of the wiring, as necessary; and adjustment of the length of the harnesses on the fire extinguisher bottles to avoid future misconnections. This amendment requires additional adjustment of the length of the harnesses; installation of a color-coded identification system to avoid misconnections during maintenance; and a functional test of the engine fire extinguisher system. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include additional airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the issuance of erroneous commands or the receipt oferroneous information pertaining to the fire extinguisher system for the engines and the APU, which could result in the inability to put out a fire in an engine or in the APU. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2023-02-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain inertial reference units (IRUs) have out-of-date magnetic variation (MagVar) tables. This AD requires assessing the values between the MagVar tables of the affected IRUs and the most recently published MagVar data tables, and corrective actions if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
86-05-11 R1: 86-05-11 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-5255 as amended by Amendment 39-5335. Applies to all Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in any category, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2233, Revision 2, dated May 9, 1986. \n\n\tTo detect faulty self-locking nuts that could lead to separation of an engine, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time inspection of the outboard attach fitting nuts of all nacelle struts for adequate self-locking torque of the nuts, part number BACN10HR162, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 57A2233, Revision 2, dated May 9, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 600 landings after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time inspection of the inboard attach fitting nuts of all nacelle struts for adequate self-locking torque of the nuts, part number BACN10HR162, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2233, Revision 2, dated May 9, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tC.\tDefective nuts must be replaced prior to further flight. \n\n\tD.\tUpon the request of an operator, an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the inspection time in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of that operator, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this proposal who have not already receivedinformation on inspection procedures from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAmendment 39-5255 became effective March 31, 1986. \n\tThis Amendment 39-5335 becomes effective July 7, 1986.
2004-24-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd. & Co KG (RRD) (formerly Rolls-Royce plc), models Spey 555-15, 555-15H, 555-15N, and 555-15P turbojet engines, with magnesium split low pressure (LP) compressor case, part number (P/ N) EU.73418A installed. This AD requires replacement of the magnesium split LP compressor case with a serviceable compressor case that is a combination of a steel front LP compressor case and a shortened split compressor case. This AD results from several reports of bird ingestion and LP compressor stage 1 rotor blade failures that have resulted in penetration of the magnesium LP compressor case, and damage to the airplane.
2000-04-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2 series turbofan engines, that requires replacement of the fuel tube connecting the flowmeter to the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) and the fuel tube(s) connecting the Main Engine Control (MEC) or Hydromechanical (HMU) to the flowmeter with improved fuel tubes. This amendment is prompted by reports of fuel leaking in the core cowl cavity under high pressure that can be ignited by the hot engine case temperatures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent high-pressure fuel leaks caused by improper seating of fuel tube flanges, which could result in an engine fire and damage to the airplane.
2023-03-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. This AD requires, depending on the airplane configuration, installation of Teflon sleeves, cap sealing of fasteners, detailed inspections, and corrective actions. This AD also requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate more restrictive airworthiness limitations (AWLs). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
79-19-11: 79-19-11 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3564. Applies to McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10, -10F, -30, -30F and -40 airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 350 hours' time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate the possibility of one side of the dual brake control valve jamming due to a separated improperly swaged retaining bolt collar accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tInspect the nameplate on the dual brake control valves, located in the left and right wheel wells above and aft of the brake system accumulators, to ascertain whether valves were manufactured by Weston Hydraulics or McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company. Valves manufactured by Weston Hydraulics Company require no further action. \n\n\t(b)\tModify and reidentify McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company dual brake control valves in accordance with Subpart 2, Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. A32-169, dated August 27, 1979. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 24, 1979.
2004-23-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Model MD900 helicopters. This action requires reducing the life limit of certain Notar fan system tension- torsion (TT) straps. This action also requires, at a specified time interval, removing each affected TT strap from the helicopter, doing a visual and x-ray inspection, and replacing any unairworthy part before further flight. Reporting the discovery of any unairworthy TT strap is also required. This amendment is prompted by two recent in-flight TT strap failures. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of a TT strap resulting in loss of directional control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2023-03-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, and AS355N helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a partially broken tail rotor drive fan support (fan support) and a completely broken fan support. This AD requires repetitively inspecting certain part-numbered fan supports (affected parts), and depending on the results, removing an affected part from service and replacing it with a serviceable part, which constitutes a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD also requires replacing affected parts with serviceable parts unless already accomplished and prohibits installing an affected part on any helicopter, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-21-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Failures of the recline actuator metal fitting have been reported on seat backrests of in-service aircraft. * * * * * * * * Actions required by this AD are intended to prevent further failures of the seat backrests which could result in injury to passengers or crew members during an emergency landing. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2000-04-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, that requires modification of the forward and aft evacuation slide systems by replacing the Velcro restraints for the support logs with frangible link restraints. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the ingestion of sill support-log material into the aspirator of the escape slide, which could result in failure of the escape slide to inflate.
70-24-04: 70-24-04 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-1114. Applies to Cessna 177 Series (Serial Numbers 17700001 thru 17701530) Airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To assure that the fuel shutoff valve will return to the full open position after being shut off, accomplish either Paragraph A or B as follows: A) Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection, accomplish the following: (1) Visually inspect the operation of the fuel shutoff valve by removing the safety wire between the knob and bracket. Then pull the knob out to the full closed position followed by moving the knob forward to the full open position. (2) Check the fuel shutoff valve arm at the firewall to assure that it has returned to the full open position. (3) If the inspection discloses that the fuel shutoff valve is operating normally, reinstall .018 mild steel wire between the knob and bracket. (4) If the inspection discloses that bending of the fuel shutoff valve flexible control wire occurs between the firewall support and the shutoff valve which prevents the fuel shutoff valve from returning to the full open position, prior to further flight make the necessary replacements, adjustments or repairs to assure proper fuel shutoff valve operation, and reinstall .018 mild steel wire between the knob and bracket or alternatively install a heavier fuel shutoff valve control cable P/N S2113-1 and associated parts in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE70-24, dated September 25, 1970, or later FAA approved revision or any other method approved as an equivalent by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. B) Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install heavier fuel shutoff valve control cable P/N S2113-1 and associated parts in accordance with Cessna Service Letter SE70-24, dated September 25, 1970, or later FAA approved revision or any other method approved as an equivalent by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. C) When the replacement of the heavier fuel shutoff valve control cable P/N S2113-1 and associated parts described in either Paragraphs A(4) or B of this AD have been accomplished, the inspections required by this AD are no longer required. This amendment becomes effective December 8, 1970.
2014-02-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecnam srl Model P2006T airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracks of the nose landing gear (NLG) lower link. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2022-27-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-2A12 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a lateral offset observed on the head-up display (HUD) of several airplanes between the synthetic vision system (SVS) and actual runway due to mechanical misalignment of the HUD during manufacturing and assembly. This AD requires revising the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit steep approach landing (SAL) and enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) operations. This AD also requires calibrating the HUD. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
96-25-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Raytheon (Beech) Model 400A and 400T series airplanes, that currently requires an inspection of certain flap roller retention components to detect discrepant or missing parts; replacement of those parts; and installation of new washers on the roller attach bolts. This amendment requires the replacement of certain previously-installed washers with new and stronger washers. This amendment also expands the applicability of the rule to include additional airplanes. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that some locking tab washers on the roller attach bolt could fail, due to the absence of an inner tang. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the loss of roller attach nuts and the flap roller, which could result in the loss of a flap when the airplane is subject to load limit conditions, and consequently lead to reduced controllability of the airplane.
2023-02-10: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-25-11 for certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. AD 99-25-11 required repetitive inspections for cracks along the face of the retraction attachment boss in the nose landing gear (NLG) sidewall; and corrective action, if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack found on the left-hand sidewall well on the NLG, and by the determination that additional airplanes are subject to the identified unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 99-25-11, and expands the applicability. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-04-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for DORNIER LUFTFAHRT GmbH Model 228-212 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as main landing gear axle failure caused by initial fatigue cracking and small pre-damage by corrosion. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.