Results
2018-26-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of loose, worn, or missing attachment bolts for the main landing gear (MLG) center door assemblies. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the forward and aft MLG center door assembly attachments for loose, missing, damaged, or bottomed-out attachment bolts, and any wear to the retention clip assemblies as applicable; and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also provides an \n\n((Page 67044)) \n\noptional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The back-up mode can be activated by an electrostatic discharge or by a malfunction of the collective pitch signal. The two engines fitted on the same helicopter can therefore be frozen in this back- up position at 85% N1. Freezing both engines in the back-up mode can lead to an inability to continue safe flight and forced landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Rolls-Royce plc models RB211-524D4-19, -524D4-B-19, -524D4-B-39, -524D4X-19, and 524D4X-B-19 turbofan engines with a cold stream nozzle assembly Part Number (PN) LJ32826 installed. This action requires inspection for cracks and repair of the cold stream nozzle assembly longitudinal flange. This amendment is prompted by a report of the loss of a large section of cold stream nozzle assembly in flight. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracks that could result in failure of the cold stream nozzle assembly, possible release of cold stream nozzle debris from the engine, and possible damage to airplane control surfaces.
90-24-09: 90-24-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-6815. Docket No. 90-NM-231-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57- 2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failure of the flap tracks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks for evidence of cracking, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, and in accordance with the following schedule: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor Group 1 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor Group 2 airplanes: Perform inspection at flap track positions 1, 2, 7, and 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occursfirst; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor Group 3 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occurs first; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tIf cracking is found, replace the flap track prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990. \n\n\tC.\tIf no cracking is found, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, at intervals not to exceed 300 flight cycles for Group 1 airplanes, and 1,200 flight cycles for Group 2 and Group 3 airplanes. \n\n\tD.\tAccomplishment of the modification of the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraphs A. and C. of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6815, AD 90-24-09) becomes effective on December 5, 1990.
2007-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as loose rivets on frames C18 BIS and C19, which could result in a reduced structural integrity of the tail area. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-20-09 PL: 97-20-09 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; FIREFLY AVIATION HELICOPTER SERVICES (PREVIOUSLY ERICKSON AIR CRANE CO.); GARLICK HELICOPTERS, INC.; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; RANGER HELICOPTER SERVICES; ROBINSON AIRCRANE; SCOTT PAPER CO.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN HELICOPTER; SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION; WESTERN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, INC.; UNC HELICOPTERS; AND U.S. HELICOPTER, INC.: Priority Letter issued on September 17, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-35-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model HH-1K (Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) H5NM), TH-lF (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), TH-1L (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1A (TCDS H3SO), UH-1B (TCDS H1RM, H3NM, H13WE, H3SO, H5SO, and R00012AT), UH-1E (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, H8NM, and H4NM), UH-1F (TCDS H2NM, H7NE, H11SW, H12NM, and R00008AT), UH-1H (TCDS H13WE, H3SO, and H15NM), UH-lL (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1P (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), and SW204 (TCDS H6SO), SW204HP (TCDS H6SO), SW205 (TCDS H6SO), helicopters, with tailboom vertical fin spar, part number (P/N) 205-032-899, 205-030-846, or 205-032-851, all dash numbers, installed, certificated in any category.\n\n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repairremove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent in-flight failure of the tailboom vertical fin spar (vertical fin spar) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 8 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, modify the vertical fin spar as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the first four rivets from the fin spar located at the bottom of the vertical fin spar left-hand side at the tailboom and vertical fin spar junction, and the first four rivets aft of the junction along the lower edge of the vertical fin spar side-skin as shown (see Figure 2).\nCAUTION: Extreme care must be taken when drilling and removing rivets from the side of vertical fin spar to ensure the vertical fin spar assembly is not damaged.\n\n\t\t(3)\tTrim the vertical fin spar left-hand side-skin using extreme care to not damage the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 3).\n\n\t\t(4)\tDeburr the rivet holes and trimmed side-skin edges. Remove all debris. In a ventilated work area, remove any surface contaminants with a cloth that has been dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent.\n\n\t\t(5)\tReattach the side-skin to the vertical fin spar using MS 20470AD rivets. DO NOT install the bottom two rivets into the vertical fin spar where the side-skin was trimmed.\n\n\t\t(6)\tAttach the vertical fin spar side-skin lower edge using the rivets specified in Figure 2.\n\n\t\t(7)\tRefinish all reworked areas.\n\n\t(b)\tAfter modifying the vertical fin spar assembly, immediately inspect the vertical fin spar, and thereafter, inspect at intervals not to exceed 8 hours TIS, for cracks as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the lower aft tailboom inspection door, located at tailboom station 180 (see Figure 4).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(3)\tThrough the lower aft tailboom inspection door, using a bright light and an inspection mirror, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top skin on the forward side, paying special attention to the left-hand edge and the adjacent surfaces (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(4)\tIn a ventilated work area, clean all surfaces to be inspected with a cloth dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent. Using a bright light and a 10x magnifying glass, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top-skin on the in-board and out-board sides, the vertical edge, and the two open rivet holes. Using a bright light and a mirror, inspect the aft side of the vertical fin spar in the same area. Special attention must be given to the left-hand edge of the vertical fin spar and any adjacent surfaces between fin station 66.31 and 71.31 (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(5)\tIf any crack is discovered on the vertical fin spar, replace the vertical fin spar assembly with an airworthy vertical fin spar assembly before further flight.\n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(e)\tPriority Letter AD 97-20-09, issued September 17, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.
2018-26-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-25-19 for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B3 and EC130B4 helicopters. AD 2016-25-19 required inspecting the pilot's and co-pilot's throttle twist for proper operation. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2016-25-19 and adds certain model helicopters to the applicability. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2000-17-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR42-200, -300, and -320 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
2000-17-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, that requires modifications of the engine turbine cooling air panel at the flight engineer/second officer's console, pilot s caution and warning light panel on the main instrument panel, and monitoring system for the engine turbine air temperature. This amendment is prompted by reports of an undetected fire breaching the high speed gearbox (HSGB) case on certain Rolls Royce engines installed on in-service airplanes due to lack of an internal fire detection system within the HSGB. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent undetected fires originating within the HSGB from breaching the HSGB case, which could result in engine damage and increased difficulty in extinguishing a fire.
2007-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 aft bearing forward lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
83-02-05: 83-02-05\tMCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4544. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8-70 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.\n\n\tTo prevent separation of the exhaust nozzle plug, accomplish the following within 300 flight hours after the effective date of this AD:\n\n\tA.\tReplace all NAS560XK4-5 screws with NAS560XK4-4 screws and check for running torque at the exhaust plug splice in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A78-107, dated November 30, 1982, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tB.\tReplace all nut plates not meeting the minimum run down torque of five-inch pounds.\n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance which providean equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1).\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 7, 1983.
2000-17-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. (Fairchild) SA226 and SA227 series airplanes equipped with certain Ozone Industries, Inc., main landing gear (MLG) assemblies. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the MLG drag brace assembly (consists of both brace and links) for cracks, and requires you to replace or rework any cracked MLG drag brace assembly. This AD is the result of several reports of cracks in the MLG drag brace assemblies on the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in MLG drag brace assembly. Continued airplane operation with such cracks could lead to MLG failure and result in loss of control of the airplane during takeoff or landing operations.
91-05-16: 91-05-16 BOEING: Amendment 39-6913. Docket No. 90-NM-154-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the structural integrity of the main landing gear (MLG) actuator beam arm and actuator beam attached bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings or 4 years of service, after new or overhauled main landing gear installation, whichever occurs first, or within the next 600 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tPerform visual and ultrasonic inspections of the actuator beam arm clevis for evidence of cracking, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tIf cracks are found, prior to further flight, remove andrework, or replace the actuator beam arm in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the ultrasonic inspections in accordance with the service bulletin, at intervals not to exceed 600 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tRemove both of the actuator beam bolts and perform a one-time visual and dye penetrant inspection for evidence of plating degradation, corrosion, or cracking, in accordance with the service bulletin. If evidence of plating degradation, corrosion, or cracking is found, prior to further flight, rework or replace the bolts in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tModification of the actuator beam arm, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraph A.1. of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6913, AD 91-05-16) becomes effective on April 1, 1991.
2003-15-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc Trent 768-60, Trent 772-60, and Trent 772B-60 turbofan engines. This AD is prompted by several reports of low power surges. We are issuing this AD to prevent a possible dual-engine in-flight surge, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
51-29-02: 51-29-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 Series aircraft. Compliance required by February 1, 1952, and each 500 hours thereafter. Inspect the main landing gear side brace attachment fittings, P/N 20-310-1033 L and R, for cracks particularly from the edge of the forging to the lower inboard attaching bolt hole. If defects are found, the parts should be replaced by undamaged parts. In view of unavailability of parts and controlled inspection procedures under which satisfactory operation has existed, it will be considered satisfactory to operate the aircraft with a cracked fitting under the following procedure until further notice. Inspect at periodic intervals not to exceed 150 hours with approximately an 8-power magnifying glass or dye penetrant or any equivalent method. If cracks extend beyond bolt hole, either through or around the hole, the fitting must be replaced.
2018-25-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain holes for the vertical tail plane (VTP) tension bolts connection are not properly protected against corrosion. This AD requires modifying the VTP tension bolts connection by adding sealant and protective treatment to the head of the connection, at the barrel nut cavities, and in the surrounding area. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
82-20-05: 82-20-05 SOCIETE NATIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39- 4466. Applies to Model AS-350 and Model AS-355 series helicopters certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent possible failure or seizure of tail rotor drive shaft bearings (part numbers SKF 6007-2RS1MT47CA/AS704A33.651.010.) accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the perpendicularity of each bearing relative to the tail rotor drive shaft in accordance with paragraph 1(C)(1)(a) and figure 1 of Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale Service Bulletin No. 05.08 for the Model AS-350 helicopter, and Service Bulletin No. 05.02 for the Model AS-355 helicopter, both dated May 27, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the applicable service bulletin), or an FAA approved equivalent method. \n\n\tNOTE:\tExcept for helicopter model applicability, the provisions of Service Bulletin Nos. 05.08 and 05.02 are identical. \n\n\t\t(1)\tWhen perpendicularity of the bearing relative to the shaft is within a runout indication of less than 0.2 mm (.008 in.), inspect the bearing in accordance with paragraph 1(C)(2) of the applicable service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWhen perpendicularity of the bearing relative to the shaft gives a runout indication of 0.2 mm (.008 in.) or more, and the bearing time in service does not exceed 300 hours, inspect the bearing in accordance with paragraph 1(C)(2) of the applicable service bulletin and replace the rubber sleeve with a serviceable sleeve. \n\n\t\t(3)\tWhen perpendicularity of the bearing relative to the shaft gives a runout indication of 0.2 mm (.008 in.) or more and the bearing has more than 300 hours' time in service, remove the bearing and rubber sleeve from service and install a serviceable sleeve and bearing. \n\n\t(b)\tAccomplish paragraph 1(C)(2) of the applicable service bulletin at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\t(c)\tFor bearings with less than 1,100 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, remove the rubber sleeves and bearings from service and install serviceable sleeves and bearings, before or upon achieving 1,200 hours' time in service. \n\n\t(d)\tFor bearings with 1,100 hours' or more time in service on the effective date of this AD, remove the rubber sleeves and bearings from service and install serviceable sleeves and bearings within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tWhen the tail rotor drive shaft rear section is disassembled in accomplishing the requirements of this AD, install the drive shaft in accordance with paragraph 1(C)(3) of the applicable service bulletin. When a bearing is replaced, the bearing perpendicularity relative to the tail rotor drive shaft must provide an out-of-round indication of 0.15 mm (.006 in.) or less when examined in accordance with paragraph 1(C)(1)(a) of the applicable service bulletin. \n\n\t(f)\tEquivalent means of compliance must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, Federal Aviation Administration, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium, or the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, ASW-100, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 15, 1982.
58-01-01: 58-01-01 AERO COMMANDER: Applies to All Models 520, 560, 560A, 560E and 680 Aircraft With Serial Numbers 231 Through 580 except 315, 466, 471, 485, 492, 509, 523, 547, 568, 570, 572, 574, 576, 579. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than July 1, 1958. A number of failures of the vent lines located above the nacelle upper fire shield have resulted in the release of fuel and/or fuel vapor in the engine compartment creating a dangerous fire hazard. These failures are a result of interference or chafing between wing structure and the carburetor return and the fuel tank vent lines. Also, failures have occurred at the carburetor vapor return elbow located in the upper fire shield. Replace the portions of the carburetor vapor vent and fuel tank vent lines located above the upper fire shield with flexible hose assemblies, P/N 6630086-237, 6630086-223, and 6630086-229, or equivalent. Securely fasten the hose assemblies to the wing structure with hose clamps to prevent interference or chafing. Replace the existing carburetor vapor return line elbows located at the upper fire shield with antirotation fittings, P/N 5630085-21 and 5630085-29, and install upper fire shield channels, P/N 5630086-25 and 5630086-23. (Additional details relative to this rework are included in Aero Design Service Bulletin No. 45 dated September 20, 1957.)
2018-23-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, and A330-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of dual flight management system (FMS) resets with the loss of flight plan (F-PLN) data. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit required navigation performance-authorization required (RNP-AR) operations using flight management guidance envelope computer (FMGEC) standard P5H3. This AD would also require modifying the FMS software of airplanes equipped with FMGEC standard P5H3. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as an excessive lateral play caused by a nonconforming washer that might lead to the deterioration of the elevator trim tab bearing fatigue resistance. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is prompted by several reported cases of rupture of the (hydro-mechanical metering unit (HMU)) constant delta pressure valve diaphragm on Arriel 2B1 engines, due to the wear of the delta P diaphragm fabric. Rupture can result in the loss of the automatic control mode of the helicopter, accompanied with a deterioration of the behavior of the auxiliary back-up mode (emergency mode). The loss of automatic control mode coupled with the deteriorated performance of the backup mode can lead to the inability to continue safe flight, forced autorotation landing, or an accident. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
69-25-04: 69-25-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-886. Applies to Fairchild Hiller F-27 and FH-227 type Airplanes, except FH-227D and FH-227E, certificated in all categories. To prevent the hazards associated with the flaps driving off the ends of the screw jacks due to a single failure of the drive system which actuates the normal flap control limit switches and the emergency power cutoff switches, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 125 hours' in service, until incorporation of the modification noted in (b). (1) Inspect the universal joint at each end of the wing flap connecting shaft assembly P/N 27-727994-11 located between the flap motor gearbox at wing station 141 left (installed in the wheel well of the left nacelle) and the gearbox at wing station 121 left, to assure some freedom of movement in all axes. (2) Inspect the universal joint of the actuator shaft P/N 27-727920-7, -9, or -13, as applicable, also located on the gearbox at wing station 121 left, noted in (a)(1) above, to assure some freedom of movement in all axes. (3) If freedom of movement is not determinable, remove and replace deficient universal joint pin or bolt before further flight. (4) Lubricate the three universal joints, noted in (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, in accordance with applicable maintenance manual instructions. (b) Within the next 1000 hours' in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished, separate the existing flap "up and down" limit switches from the emergency flap power cutoff switches by complying with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin F-27-27-64, Revision 3, dated 1 October 1969, for F-27 type airplanes with pre-select flap control, and Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin FH-227-27-22, Revision 1, dated 2April 1969 for FH-227 type airplanes, or later revisions thereto, or equivalent modification both approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Upon request with substantiation data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, compliance time may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective December 6, 1969.
2007-03-07: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 737 airplanes. The existing AD currently requires installation of a new rudder control system and changes to the adjacent systems to accommodate that new rudder control system. For certain airplanes, this new AD adds, among other actions, repetitive tests of the force fight monitor of the main rudder power control unit (PCU), repetitive tests of the standby hydraulic actuation system, and corrective action; as applicable. For those airplanes, this new AD also adds, among other actions, replacement of both input control rods of the main rudder PCU and the input control rod of the standby rudder PCU with new input control rods, as applicable, which ends the repetitive tests. For certain other airplanes, this new AD adds installation of an enhanced rudder control system in accordance with new service information. This AD results from a report of a fractured rod end of an input controlrod of the main rudder PCU and a subsequent report of a fractured rod end of the input control rod of the standby rudder PCU. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of one of the two input control rods of the main rudder PCU, which, under certain conditions, could result in reduced controllability of the airplane; and to prevent failure of any combination of two input control rods of the main rudder PCU and/or standby rudder PCU, which could cause an uncommanded rudder hardover event and result in loss of control of the airplane.
84-21-02: 84-21-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-4936. Applies to Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, listed in Section 3.0 of Boeing Document No. D6-35022, "Supplemental Structural Inspection Document" (SSID), Revision A, dated April 1984. Compliance is required as indicated in the body of the AD.\n\n\tTo ensure the continuing structural integrity of the total Boeing Model 747 fleet accomplish the following on the candidate fleet, unless already accomplished:\n\n\tA. Within one year after the effective date of the AD, incorporate a revision into the FAA approved maintenance inspection program which provides no less than the required Damage Tolerance Rating (DTR) for each Structural Significant Item (SSI) listed in Boeing Document D6-35022, Revision A, dated April 1984, or later FAA approved revisions. The required DTR value for each SSI is listed in the document. The revision to the maintenance program shall include and be implemented in accordance with the proceduresin Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of the SSID.\n\n\tB. Cracked structure must be repaired before further flight in accordance with an FAA approved method. \n\n\tC. Aircraft may be ferried to a maintenance base for repair in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199.\n\n\tD. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tE. Operators who have acceptably incorporated Boeing Document No. D6-35022, Revision A, dated April 1984, or later FAA approved revisions, into their approved maintenance program are exempt from the provisions of this AD.\n\n\tNOTE: Acceptable incorporation is considered to include the reporting requirements of Section 6.0 of the SSID.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington.\n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1).\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 23, 1984.
2000-17-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France Model EC120B helicopters. This action requires adjusting the clearance of the cabin sliding door if necessary. This amendment is prompted by an in-flight loss of a cabin sliding door, which had been locked in the fully opened position. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent in-flight loss of a cabin sliding door, impact with the horizontal stabilizer, main rotor, or fenestron tail rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.