Results
2010-21-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that the AD is issued following a report of a crack discovered in the area of the center cross-member at station X 2325, at the attachment point of the yaw channel ball-type control sheath stop, of a Model AS355N helicopter fitted with the collective-to-yaw control coupling. Investigations revealed that the helicopter did not have the structural doublers, which are combined with the collective-to-yaw control coupling installation. Repetitive loads on the non-modified cross- member may cause it to crack. A crack can reduce the yaw control travel. This AD requires actions that are intended to prevent reduced yaw control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2010-21-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France Model AS350B3 and EC130 B4 helicopters. This amendment is prompted by a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that a dormant failure of one of the two contactors 53Ka or 53Kb can occur following certain modifications. Failure of a contactor can prevent switching from "IDLE'' mode to "FLIGHT'' mode during autorotation training making it impossible to execute a power recovery and compelling the pilot to continue the autorotation to the ground. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to an unintended touchdown to the ground during a practice autorotation at a flight-idle power setting, damage to the helicopter, and injury to the occupants.
84-15-05: 84-15-05 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4891. Applies to all Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Model 214ST helicopters certified in all categories equipped with main rotor collective lever assembly P/N 214-010-474-109 or -113. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the collective lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly prior to accumulating 1,250 hours time in service. For helicopters that have accumulated more than 1,250 hours time in service on the lever assembly, remove and replace the lever assembly within the next 50 hours time in service or by September 1, 1984, whichever comes first. This amendment becomes effective August 3, 1984.
2010-21-16: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires modifying the auxiliary hydraulic power system (including doing all applicable related investigative and corrective actions). This new AD requires these same actions, using corrected service information. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, as well as reports of electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which are routed within the tire burst area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrically shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables, which could result in a fire in the wheel well. We are also issuing this AD to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2010-21-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Recently, a brake fire was reported which was caused by a ruptured brake piston. The fire was quickly extinguished but caused damage to the paint and hydraulic/electrical harness and its components. Detailed investigation showed that a hydraulic lock must have been present close to the affected brake creating enough internal pressure to rupture the piston. The most probable scenario for the hydraulic lock is a loosened (not necessarily disconnected) brake QD [quick-disconnect] coupling. Further investigation of the service experience files at Fokker Services showed that more brake fires have occurred on aeroplanes in a pre-mod SBF100-32-127 configuration. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability and possible brake fires, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
87-11-02: 87-11-02 THE DEHAVILLAND AIRCRAFT COMPANY OF CANADA, A DIVISION OF BOEING OF CANADA, LTD.: Amendment 39-5625. Applies to all Model DHC-7 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To assure that flames will not penetrate the rear cargo compartment liner to the fuselage primary structure, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the DHC-7 rear cargo liner in accordance with DH Modification No. 7/2499, as detailed in DeHavilland Service Bulletin No. 7-25-49, Revision A, dated July 11, 1986, or later revisions approved by the Manager, New York Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to The de Havilland Aircraft Company of Canada, A Division of Boeing of Canada, Ltd., Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This amendment becomes effective June 21, 1987.
87-22-05: 87-22-05 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5751. Applies to all Model H.S. 748 series airplanes with a large freight door, certificated in any category. Compliance required within the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent inadvertent opening of the freight door in flight, accomplish the following: A. Inspect the large freight door shoot bolt lever, barometric (pressure lock) lever, bellows assembly, dry air cartridge and microswitches for damage, distortion and/or wear in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 52/129, dated May 1986. If any damage, distortion and/or wear is discovered as a result of the inspection required by this paragraph, prior to further flight, adjust, repair, or replace the affected components, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 52/129, dated May 1986. B. Install a placard to indicate that the aircraft must be depressurized before opening its large freight door, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 11/7, dated December 1, 1986. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective November 13, 1987.
2010-21-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires replacing aluminum fire extinguisher discharge tubes with new, improved tubes; checking the fire extinguisher container for certain serial numbers; replacing fire extinguisher containers that have affected serial numbers; inspecting the pressure indicator on certain fire extinguisher containers for discrepancies; and performing corrective action if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of accidental discharge of a fire extinguisher container and damage to an aluminum discharge tube. Investigation revealed that following the discharge an inaccurate pressure indication, due to the indicator dial being incorrectly staked, showed that the container was fully charged. We are issuing this AD to prevent inaccurate pressure readings and subsequent damage to the discharge tubes during operation, which could result in failure of the fire extinguisher system and an uncontained fire inan emergency situation.
2010-21-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-9, -9A, -11, -15, -17, and -17R turbofan engines. This AD requires overhauling fan blade leading edges at the first shop visit after 4,000 cycles-in-service (CIS) since the last total fan blade overhaul was performed. This AD results from reports of failed fan blades. We are issuing this AD to prevent high-cycle fatigue cracking at the blade root, which could result in uncontained failures of first stage fan blades and damage to the airplane.
92-23-01: 92-23-01 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI); CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; GARLICK HELICOPTERS; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION, INC; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; PILOT PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.; SOUTHERN AERO CORPORATION; AND SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION: Amendment 39-8401. Docket No. 90-ASW-42. Applicability: All BHTI Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, 205B, and 212 helicopters, certificated in any category, and military Model UH-1B, UH-1F, and UH-1H helicopters, certificated in the restricted category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent separation of the main rotor pillow blocks from the hub assembly as a result of bolt cracking, which could result in loss of the main rotor and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD; or at the next main rotor hub retention strap change; or at the next hub assembly overhaul; whichever occurs first, remove the four bolts, part number (P/N) 204-011-171-003, joining the two pillow blocks to the main rotor yoke assembly. Reinstall the pillow blocks using new (zero time) bolts, P/N 204-011-171-003; nuts, P/N EB080 or 42FLW-820; and washers, P/N 140-007-33S28-3 as follows: (1) Coat the shank of the bolts with corrosion prevention compound, such as MIL-C-16173 Grade 1, and dry torque the bolts and nuts 65 to 79 foot-pounds. Retorque nuts within 15 to 30 hours time in service after the initial installation. If the torque has reduced below the minimum value of 65 foot-pounds, repeat the torque check at intervals of 15 to 30 hours time in service until the torque remains at or above 65-foot pounds or until the torque check has been accomplished four times. If during the fourth check the torque has reduced below 65 foot-pounds, remove and replace the bolts, washers, and nuts and repeat the torque check procedure of this paragraph. (2) After initialinstallation or retorque, apply sealant, such as BHTI P/N 299-947-107 TYIII CL7, to the four bolt heads, washers, nuts and yoke mating surfaces to prevent moisture from entering the pillow block retention area. (b) Thereafter, remove the bolts and associated hardware from the pillow block and replace with new bolts, washers, and nuts as described in paragraph (a) of this AD at each hub assembly overhaul, at each change of the main rotor hub retention strap, or whenever the bolts are removed for any reason. NOTE: Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Alert Service Bulletins 204-90-27, Revision A; 205-90-38, Revision A; and 212-90-62, Revision A, all dated October 11, 1990, pertain to this AD. A copy of the service bulletins may be obtained from Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. (c) Rework or repair of the bolts, P/N 204-011-171-003; nuts, P/N EB080 or 42FLW-820; and washers, P/N 140-007-33S28-3, is not authorized. (d) An alternative method ofcompliance or adjustment of the compliance times, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. Operators shall submit their request through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) This amendment becomes effective April 23, 1993.
2010-21-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During ground manoeuvring, prolonged operation with either engine in the restricted range between 82% and 90% RPM [revolutions per minute] will result in damage [e.g., cracking of the blade or hub] to the propeller assembly that could eventually result in the release of a propeller blade. * * * EASA [European Aviation Safety Agency] AD 2007-0268 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2008-13-02, amendment 39-15565] was issued to require the installation of a Propeller Warning Placard and implementation of a corresponding Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) limitation instructing the flight crew to taxi with the condition lever at FLIGHT in order to minimisethe time spent by the engines in the restricted range. BAE Systems has now developed a Propeller Speed Warning System * * *. * * * * * A released propeller blade could result in engine failure and loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-03-10: 91-03-10 CASA: Amendment 39-6883. Docket No. 90-NM-17-AD. Applicability: Model C-212 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: A. Modify the propeller speed and pitch control system so that the control cannot be moved into reverse thrust while in flight, and so that the propeller pitch settings cannot be adjusted for ground operation while in flight, in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-76-07, dated July 27, 1990, or in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM- 113, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. Airworthiness Directive 91-03-10 supersedes AD 90-04-11. Amendment 39-6508. This amendment (39-6883, AD 91-03-10) becomes effective on March 11, 1991.
2010-20-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following a review of operational data of the Tay 651-54 engine, it has been found that the actual stress levels in the Tay 651-54 engine High Pressure Compressor (HPC) stages 1, 3, 6, 7 and 12 discs were higher than those originally assumed and therefore the approved lives needed to be reduced. We are issuing this AD to prevent HPC stages 1, 3, 6, 7, and 12 discs from exceeding the approved reduced life limits, which could result in an uncontained failure of a disc and damage to the airplane.
2010-20-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Two cases of complete nose landing gear (NLG) shock absorber bolts failure were reported to the manufacturer. In both cases, the crew was unable to retract the gear and was forced to an In Flight Turn Back. In one case, the aircraft experienced a low speed runway excursion. The root cause of the bolts failure has been identified being due to a bolt(s) over-torque. The investigation has highlighted that the design of the NLG shock absorber was not tolerant to the over-torque, and an inspection plan has been developed to track any NLG shock absorber-to-main barrel attachment bolts status. * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-14-11: 91-14-11 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-7052. Docket No. 91-NM-37-AD. Applicability: Model ATP series airplanes, on which Modification (c)AC11431 has not been accomplished, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent loss of the main landing gear (MLG) wheel from the axle and reduced controllability of the airplane on takeoff or landing, accomplish the following: A. Install a new axle washer and a new axle nut on all MLG's [Modification (c)AC11431], in accordance with Dowty Aerospace Service Bulletin 200-32-137, dated November 6, 1990. NOTE: British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-32-28, dated November 6, 1990, references the Dowty Aerospace Service Bulletin for modification instructions. B. An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. D. The installation requirements shall be done in accordance with Dowty Aerospace Service Bulletin 200-32-137, dated November 6, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-7052, AD 91-14-11) becomes effective on August 6, 1991.
2010-20-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model DC-10-30, DC-10-30F, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC- 10-40F, and MD-10-30F airplanes. This AD requires doing a one-time inspection of the wire bundles to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank, and marking the location if necessary; a one-time inspection for splices and damage of all wire bundles routed above the center upper auxiliary fuel tank; a one-time inspection for damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center upper auxiliary fuel tank; and corrective actions, if necessary. This AD also requires installing non-metallic barrier/shield sleeving to the wire harnesses, new clamps, new attaching hardware, and new extruded channels. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2010-20-24: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires incorporating changes to the electronic flight information system and the airplane flight manuals. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded changes to the communications radio frequency, altitude preselect, and/or transponder codes. We are issuing this AD to correct faulty integration of hardware and software, which could result in unannunciated, uncommanded changes in communications radio frequency, transponder codes, and altitude preselect settings. These uncommanded changes could result in loss of communication with air traffic control due to improper communications frequency, autopilot level off at the incorrect altitude, or air traffic control loss of proper tracking of the aircraft.
91-14-18: 91-14-18 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-7059. Docket No. 91-NM-42-AD. Applicability: All Viscount Model 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced structural integrity of the wings, accomplish the following: A. Within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 180 days, perform an eddy current inspection to detect corrosion along the total length of the top surface of the left and right wing spar upper boom in accordance with British Aerospace Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 321, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, or PTL No. 190, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, as applicable. B. If corrosion is found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with PTL No. 321, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, or PTL No. 190, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, as appropriate; or in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. C. An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. E. The inspections and repair requirements shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL) No. 321, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, or PTL No. 190, Issue 1, dated January 13, 1989, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-7059, AD 91-14-18) becomes effective on August 6, 1991.
96-04-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A340 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion and cracking of the shortening mechanism pins in the main landing gear (MLG), and repair or replacement, if necessary. It also requires replacement of the shortening mechanism pin and retraction mechanism pins; the forward pintle pin; the shortening mechanism bellcrank pin; and the bellcrank subassembly of the shortening mechanism. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the shortening mechanism pins due to improper grinding of the chrome plating during manufacture, which led to the initiation of stress corrosion and cracks. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of these pins, which could lead to a significant reduction of the shock absorber capability or damage to various components of the MLG, and eventually could lead to the failure of the MLG.
77-18-04: 77-18-04 BEECH: Amendment 39-3028. Applies to Models C90 (serial numbers LJ-689 through LJ-713), E90 (serial numbers LW-167 through LW-216), A100 (serial numbers B-213 through B-232), B100 (serial numbers BE-10 through BE-22), Model 200 (serial numbers BB- 175 through BB-185, BB-187 through BB-193, BB-195 through BB-198, BB-200 through BB- 202, and BB-204 through BB-223), and Model 200T (serial numbers BT-1 and BT-2) airplane certificated in all categories. Compliance: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To assure proper locking of the cabin door and to prevent possible incidents involving loss of cabin pressurization, within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0914 or later approved revisions and instructions contained in the applicable airplane maintenance manual: A. Visually inspect the cabin door latch hooks and pins for proper engagement and adjustment, check the door latch mechanism for over center position when locked, and adjust latch hooks, pins and/or door latch mechanism if necessary. B. Any equivalent means of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective on September 12, 1977.
51-24-01: 51-24-01 LYCOMING: Applies to All Lycoming GO-435-C2 Engines Serially Numbered 1815-11 and Below Not Having the Letter "P" Stamped on the Upper Right-hand Corner of Each Cylinder Rocker Box and Installed in Navion Model B Aircraft. To be accomplished by June 1, 1952 or next overhaul, whichever occurs first. To prevent loosening of the exhaust valve seats in Lycoming GO-435-C2 engines installed in Navion Model B airplanes, the exhaust valve seats are to be peened in the cylinder head. The cylinders must be removed from the engine for this operation. When peening is accomplished, stamp "P" 1/8 inch high on upper right-hand corner of cylinder rocker box flange face near exhaust push rod. (Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 145 also covers this subject.
56-17-02: 56-17-02 de HAVILLAND: Applies to All Model DHC-3 Otter Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. The Canadian Department of Transport has issued the following directive with which the FAA concurs and considers mandatory. "Any malfunctioning of the flap hydraulic circuit check valve would fail to lock the flaps in any flaps-extended position. When the valve operates properly, the flaps remain stationary when the flap selector lever is moved to the 'up' position and until the flap pump is operated. However, if the valve sticks open for any reason, selecting 'flaps up' results in a rapid flap retraction without use of the pump. Such retraction at high speeds will produce large stick forces and out-of-trim condition which flight tests have shown to be very dangerous when the aeroplane is trimmed for a high flaps-extended speed (full aircraft nosedown trim). "Therefore, until modifications now under development are incorporated, the following restriction is mandatory: "(a) The flap selector must not be placed in the up position until it is desired to retract the flaps, nor at speeds in excess of the following: Flap Setting Maximum Trim Speed Landing (35 degrees) 65 mph IAS Takeoff (30 degrees) 75 mph IAS Climb (15 degrees) 85 mph IAS "The previous '15 degrees climb flap limitation' on the use of flaps is canceled and the special 50- hour inspection of the flap controls, etc., may be discontinued." Incorporation of de Havilland Modifications 3/731, 3/744 and 3/745 is required by November 1, 1957, as outlined in D.H. Engineering Bulletin Series "O" No. 34, dated January 21, 1957. When these Modifications are incorporated, the operating restrictions in section (a) above will no longer be required.
2010-20-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In completing a review of Engine Manual repair/acceptance limits for titanium compressor shafts, Rolls-Royce has found the specified limits to be incorrect such that the shot peened surface layer at life critical features (the axial dovetail slots) may have been inadvertently removed in-service. Removal of the shot peened layer results in increased vulnerability of the part to tensile stresses, which could reduce the life of the shaft to below the published life limits. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the intermediate-pressure (IP) and high-pressure (HP) shaft, which could result in an overspeed condition, possible uncontained disc failure and damage to the airplane.
71-25-04: 71-25-04 NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL: Amendment 39-1352. Applies to Models NA-265, NA-265-20, NA-265-30, NA-265-40, NA-265-60, NA-265-70. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the aileron control cables, accomplish the following: Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 500 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 12 months, whichever occurs first, inspect the aileron control cables and replace as necessary; provided however that, if as a result of any inspection, more than three wires are found to be broken, the repetitive inspection interval will be decreased, or replacement required, as follows: (a) With four to six wires broken, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service. (b) With more than six wires broken, or if an equivalent reduction to the cable cross section area is present due to wear, replace the cable with a new or serviceable cable before further flight. Inspect the aileron control cables (P/N's 246-52324, 246-52325, 246-52339, 276-523005- 11, 276-523006-11, 276-523008-11, as applicable) in accordance with the following instructions: 1. Remove aileron control cables from the aircraft and inspect per step 9 or follow steps 2 through 16. 2. Lower wing flaps. 3. Open main wheel well doors or remove both wheel well cover assemblies as applicable. NOTE: Use normal safety precautions such as disconnecting the batteries to prevent inadvertent wing flap or landing gear wheel well door actuation. 4. In the left hand wheel well, disconnect the lower left hand aileron cable turnbuckle. 5. In the right hand wheel well, disconnect the upper left hand cable from the left hand aileron sector (P/N 246-52314). 6. Disconnect the left hand outboard aileron sector (P/N 246-52305-1), accessible through the left hand flap well, by removing the sector pivot bolt. 7. With the aileron sector pivot bolt removed disconnect the upper & lower left hand aileron cables from the sector. 8. Cable slack will now be available to allow pulling the upper left hand cable down into the landing gear strut well for inspection per step 9. 9. Clean the cable for a visual inspection. The cables must be bent in a "U" and inspected with a four power, or greater, magnifying glass in the area of pulley contact. 10. The lower left hand aileron control cable must be pulled inboard into the wheel well for inspection of the cable that passes over the pulley. Inspect per Step 9. 11. If the inspection of the left hand aileron control cables shows that they do not require replacing, reconnect and rig the left hand aileron control cables (See Note, below). 12. Disconnect the lower right had aileron cable turnbuckle located in the right hand wheel well. 13. Disconnect the upper cable at the aileronsector (P/N 246-52364) located in the right hand wheel well. 14. Pull the upper aileron cable down into the right hand main landing gear strut well and inspect per step 9. 15. Pull the lower aileron control cable into the right hand wheel well and inspect per step 9. 16. If the inspection of the two right hand cables reveals that they do not require replacing, reconnect and rig the aileron control system (See Note, below). NOTE: Instructions pertaining to the installation of new or serviceable cables and the rigging of the aileron control system are contained in the applicable maintenance documents. This amendment becomes effective December 4, 1971.
92-13-09: 92-13-09 CANADAIR, LTD.: Amendment 39-8279. Docket No. 92-NM-33-AD. Supersedes AD 92-03-06, Amendment 39-8161. Applicability: Model CL-600-1A11 series airplanes, serial numbers 1004 to 1085, except serial number 1037; Model CL-600-2A12 series airplanes, serial numbers 3001 to 3066; and Model CL-600-2B16 series airplanes, serial numbers 5001 to 5049; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent severe damage to an airplane in the event of an engine fire, accomplish the following: (a) Within 30 days after February 11, 1992 (the effective date of AD 92-03-06, Amendment 39-8161), accomplish the following: (1) For Model CL-600-1A11 series airplanes: Perform an inspection for potential crossed wiring in the engine fire extinguishing system, and inspect the electrical connectors for unlocked or inoperative pins, in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0581, dated September 8, 1989.(2) For Model CL-600-2A12 and CL-600-2B16 series airplanes: Perform an inspection for potential crossed wiring in both the engine fire detection and warning system and the engine fire extinguishing system, and inspect the electrical connectors for unlocked or inoperative pins, in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A601-0309, dated September 8, 1989. (b) If any wiring discrepancies are detected as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, correct the discrepancies and replace any discrepant electrical connectors found, in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0581, dated September 8, 1989 (for Model CL-600-1A11 series airplanes); or Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A601-0309, dated September 8, 1989 (for Model CL-600-2A12 and CL-600-2B16 series airplanes); as applicable. (c) Within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, or the next time the fire bottles are removed from the airplane, whichever occurs first, modify the engine fire extinguishing warning harnesses and perform a functional test, in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0581, dated September 8, 1989 (for Model CL-600-1A11 series airplanes); or Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A601-0309, dated September 8, 1989 (for Model CL-600-2A12 and CL-600-2B16 series airplanes); as applicable. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE-170, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the New York ACO. (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) The inspection and modification shall be done in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0581, dated September 8, 1991 (for Model CL-600-1A11 series airplanes); or Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A601-0309, dated September 8, 1989 (for Model CL-600-2A12 and CL-600-2B16 series airplanes); as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 11, 1992 (57 FR 3006, January 27, 1992). Copies may be obtained from Bombardier, Inc., Canadair, Aerospace Group, P.O. Box 6087, Station A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; at the FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream,New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on July 23, 1992.