Results
2011-23-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the 1.04-inch nominal diameter wire penetration hole, and applicable related investigative and corrective actions. This AD reduces the compliance times for those actions. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking in the frame, or in the frame and frame reinforcement, common to the 1.04- inch nominal diameter wire penetration hole intended for wire routing; and recent reports of multiple adjacent frame cracking found before the compliance time required by the existing AD. Such cracking could reduce the structural capability of the frames to sustain limit loads, and result in cracking in the fuselage skin and subsequent rapid depressurization of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-06-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Avions Pierre Robin Model R2160 airplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting the weld area between the strut and the lower plate of the nose landing gear leg for cracks, and replacing the strut when cracks are found. The AD is the result of several reports of cracks in the weld securing the nose wheel steering bottom bracket to the nose landing gear leg on the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent nose landing gear failure caused by cracks in the weld area between the strut and the lower plate of the nose landing gear leg, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
77-16-05: 77-16-05 CESSNA: Amendment 39-2998. Applies to Models 210-5(205), 206, P206/TP206, U206/TU206, 207/T207, and 210/T210 series airplanes of the serial numbers specified below. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent malfunction of the P/N C291503-0101 or P/N 1216100-1 fuel selector valve, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn Model 210-5(205) series (serial numbers 205-0481 thru 205-0577), Model 206 series (serial numbers 206-0001 thru 206-0275), Model P206/TP206 series (serial numbers P206-0001 thru P20600647), Model U206/TU206 series (serial numbers U206-0276 thru U20603123), Model 207/T207 series (serial numbers 20700001 thru 20700322), Model 210/T210 series (serial numbers 21058221 thru 21061154, and T210-0001 thru T210-0454) airplanes, examine the aircraft maintenance records to determine whether the fuel selector valve has been changed subsequent to December 19, 1975.If the valve has not been changed, make an entry in the maintenance record indicating this AD is not applicable to the airplane and no further action is necessary. Examination of the records and the record entry may be accomplished by the owner/operator. \n\n\tIf the valve has been changed subsequent to December 19, 1975, accomplish a fuel valve inspection and, if indicated, replacement in accordance with paragraph C. below. \n\n\tB.\tOn Model U206/TU206 series (serial numbers U20603124 thru U20603712, U20603714 thru U20603791, U20603793 thru U20603797, U20603799 thru U20603803, U20603805, U20603808 thru U20603812, U20603814 thru U20603846, U20603848, U20603850, U20603851, U20603853 thru U20603857, U20603861, U20603862, U20603867 thru U20603871, U20603875, U20603876, U20603882 and U20603886), Model 207/T207 series (serial numbers 20700323 thru 20700373, 20700375 thru 20700394), and Model 210/T210 series (serial numbers 21061155 thru 21061731, 21061733 thru 21061766, 21061768 thru 21061860, 21061862 thru 21061881, 21061883 thru 21061987, 21061990 thru 21061993, 21061995 thru 21062005, 21062007 thru 21062009, 21062012 thru 21062017, 21062020 thru 21062022, 21062024 thru 21062027, 21062029, 21062033 thru 21062037, 21062043) airplanes, accomplish a fuel selector valve inspection and, if indicated, replacement in accordance with paragraph C. below. \n\n\tC.\t1.\tPlace fuel selector valve in OFF position. \n\n\t\t2.\tRemove selector valve handle and associated parts. Obtain access to the valve by removal of the control valve pedestal and selector valve access plate from the floor. \n\n\t\t3.\tCheck the selector valve serial number. If the serial number is 1421 thru 3269 inclusive, accomplish the pull test inspection described in paragraph C.4. below. If the serial number is not within this block, the valve is not affected, and the aircraft may be returned to service after reassembly. \n\n\t\t4.\tUsing tools fabricated in accordance with Figure 1, or an equivalent test arrangement, accomplish a pull test on the selector valve in accordance with the following procedures: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tRemove safety wire, roll pin, and valve handle shaft from valve control yoke. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tFeed cable through hole in yoke and crimp cable securely. Place bar in loop in other end of cable. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tRemove four screws securing selector valve cover. Break the seal between the cover and body and rotate the cover to positively assure it is free. \n\n\t\t\td.\tAttach a tensiometer to the cable in the section between loops and from a seated or squatting position, with one foot on each side of the valve, using the legs and arms to lift, apply an upward force of 130 pounds minimum to 150 pounds maximum directly in line with the shaft while observing the shaft for movement. Exert upward force gradually. If any upward movement of valve shaft is noted, release force immediately. Drain fuel from airplane and install a new valve in accordance with the aircraft's Service Manual Instructions. \n\nCAUTIONIf the shaft pulls out of the valve body, fuel spillage may result. Therefore, all precautions applicable to working with or around open fuel should be observed. \n\n\t\t\te.\tIf no upward movement of the valve shaft is noted or evident, reassemble the valve and aircraft and return to service. \n\n\n\n\nAD 77-16-05 \n\n\tD.\tAny equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tCessna Service Letter SE77-22, dated June 27, 1977, or later approved revisions pertain to the subject matter of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 11, 1977.
79-09-01: 79-09-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-3452. Applies to Model 727-100 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing 727 Service Bulletin No. 24-30, revised May 18, 1966, that complied with FAA AD 66-30-02 by having been modified to Option No. 2 in said service bulletin. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent generator electrical lead damage and possible hydraulic fire from cable clamp failure allowing the electrical leads to chafe against hydraulic lines or components, accomplish the following: \n\t1.\tWithin the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and every 2,000 hours time-in-service thereafter, inspect the No. 1 generator electrical leads from the pressure feed through fittings (below the floor level) to the engine strut feed through, all generator electrical lead clamps, hydraulic systems, and airframe for routing separation and insulation chafing. Repair or replace any electrical lead, hydraulic line, airframe part or clamp damage as required in accordance with approved maintenance procedures. \n\tThe repetitive 2,000 hour inspection interval may be adjusted by FAA air carrier maintenance inspectors to the nearest scheduled maintenance inspection period. \n\t2.\tIf the generator electrical leads are not routed with at least three (3) inches separation from hydraulic lines or components, provide additional physical protection with aircraft quality Skydrol resistant insulation wrap and clamp as required. \n\t3.\tIf generator electrical leads are routed with at least three (3) inches separation from hydraulic lines or components, no further action is required under this AD. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 8, 1979.
78-03-04: 78-03-04 BOEING: Amendment 39-3136. Applies to all Boeing 707-100/-100B/-200 series airplanes, certificated in all categories upon the accumulation of 20,000 landings. \n\tAccomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin the next 750 landings, unless accomplished within the last 750 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1500 landings, X-ray inspect the upper rear spar chord horizontal leg and adjacent wing skin from the side of the body at BBL 70.5 to WS274 in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 3304, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Wing skins or rear spar chords found cracked are to be repaired prior to further flight in accordance with paragraph B. \n\tB.\tRepair in accordance with 1 or 2 below as applicable, prior to further flight except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed: \n\t\t1.\tAirplanes with skin cracks near the rear spar which do not extend beyond the fastener pattern of stringer No. 1 may continue in service for a maximum of 750 additional landings, subject to the following conditions: \n\t\t\ta.\tCrack ends must be stop drilled per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304. \n\t\t\tb.\tIf crack ends in a fastener hole, the hole must be inspected per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304 to assure there is no crack progression beyond fastener hole, then an additional 1/16" oversize must be made and an oversize fastener installed. \n\t\t\tc.\tEddy current inspection per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304 of crack ends must be conducted at intervals not to exceed 50 landings. Any crack progression requires repair in accordance with 2 below prior to further flight. \n\t\t\td.\tCracks must be permanently repaired within 750 landings in accordance with 2 below. \n\t\t2.\tRepair in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tC.\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time-in-service by the operator's fleet average from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 77-06-03. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 1, 1978.
2010-26-52: We are publishing in the Federal Register an amendment which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators that supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHT) Model helicopters with certain tail rotor blades (blades). The superseded AD requires, before further flight, replacing certain blades with airworthy blades. This AD retains the requirements of the superseded AD but adds new blade part numbers (P/Ns) and serial numbers (S/Ns) to the applicability. This AD was prompted by another incident in which the blade tip weight separated from a blade during flight, causing vibration. This incident led to the determination that additional blades could be affected, and should be added to the applicability. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the blade tip weight, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
65-06-03: 65-06-03\tBOEING: Amdt 39-49 Part 39 Federal Register March 17, 1965. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Aircraft with the Serial Numbers Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2029. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tCracks have recently been discovered on two airplanes in the aft elevator control quadrant, P/N 50-3119, around the upper two bolts, P/N NAS 1105, which attach the quadrant to the elevator control torque tube. In both instances, Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1259 had not been accomplished, and an interference fit existed between the quadrant and torque tube. As a result of these cracks, the following or an equivalent approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, shall be accomplished: \n\t(a)\tWithin the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 600 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect by eddy current or fluorescent dye penetrant the aft elevator quadrant, P/N 50-3119, in accordance with paragraph 3.c. of Service Bulletin No. 2029 or later FAA-approved revisions for evidence of cracks in the upper hub and in the vicinity of the two upper bolts which attach the quadrant to the elevator control torque tube. \n\t(b)\tIf a crack is found, replace the elevator control quadrant with one of the same part number before further flight. The inspections in (a) also apply to the replacement part. \n\t(c)\tWithin the next 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish rework and dimensional checks in accordance with paragraph 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin 2029 or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\t(d)\tWhen the rework and dimensional checks required by (c) are accomplished, the repetitive inspections specified in (a) may be discontinued. \n\t(e)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2029 covers this same subject.) \n\tThis directive effective April 16, 1965.
97-05-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 737 series airplanes. This action requires removal of the main rudder power control unit (PCU) and replacement with a serviceable unit. This amendment is prompted by a report of the installation of an incorrect bolt on the main rudder PCU. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the bearing of the main rudder PCU due to installation of an incorrect bolt; such cracking could result in seizure of the bearing and resultant uncommanded rudder movement.
97-05-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-200, -300, and -400 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the front spar web of the center section of the wing, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking found in the front spar web. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the leakage of fuel into the forward cargo bay, as a result of fatigue cracking in the front spar web, which could result in a potential fire hazard.
94-05-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires modification or replacement of designated passenger cabin floor panels. This amendment is prompted by a report that, during manufacture, the inserts that attach the floor panels to the seat tracks and floor beams were installed using sealant rather than required adhesive. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the passenger cabin floor capability to support the airplane interior inertia loads under emergency landing conditions.
89-21-02: 89-21-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-6342. (Docket No. 89-NM-171-AD) \n\tApplicability: All Model 727 and Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent engine separation, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 5 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to indicate that only FAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nuts specified in the table below shall be installed on the engine mount cone bolt on Boeing Models 727 and 737-100, -200, - 200C airplanes. \n\n\n\nBoeing Model 727: \n\nLine No.\nFAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nut \n1 - 193\nBACN10B-10L or BACN10GW-10 or NAS1804-10\nor LHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1 \n194 - 692\nLHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1 \n693 - 1832\n69-59074-1 \n\n\n\nBoeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C: \n\nLine No.\nFAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nut \n1 - 124\nLHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1\n125 -1585\n69-59074-1\n\t\t\t \n\tNo substitute shall be used for the LHEB220-108 or Boeing 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 60 days after the incorporation of paragraph A., above, conduct an inspection to verify that each installed engine mount cone bolt nut conforms to the approved type design as described in paragraph A., above, and, if the 69-59074-1 is installed, verify its authenticity. If the authenticity of the engine mount cone bolt nut 69-59074-1 cannot be verified, replace it with an authentic 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut prior to further flight. The authenticity of the FAA-approved 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut is determined by the following method: \n\n\t\tThe only FAA-approved sources for the 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nuts are The Boeing Company and Standard Press Steel. The authentic part markings of the engine mount cone bolt nuts are labeled on the vertical rim of the nut base at the largest diameter; nuts produced prior to 1969 may have the part marking on the sloping surface in lieu of the vertical rim. The authentic cone bolt nut is identified as "-SPS 69-59074-1-" with a single space between the "S" and "6" and absolutely no other markings. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 10 days after completion of the inspection required by paragraph B., above, for each airplane, submit a report of findings of counterfeit engine mount cone bolt nuts installed on the airplane to the Manager, Manufacturing Inspection Office, ANM-108, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168. This report must include the model of the airplane inspected, the date of inspection, and the number of cycles flown since the last engine maintenance where engine mount cone bolts were installed. \n\n\tNOTE: The report should be forwarded through the assigned air carrier Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will then send it to the Manager, Manufacturing Inspection Office, ANM-108. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternatemeans of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6342, AD 89-21-02) becomes effective on October 16, 1989.
50-04-01: 50-04-01 BRIGGS AND STRATTON: Applies to All Aircraft Equipped With Army Air Force Type A-8 Ignition Switches Manufactured by Briggs and Stratton. \n\n\tInitial compliance required not later than March 1, 1950, and every 100 hours operation thereafter. \n\n\tA serious hazard may exist on this type switch after considerable use has worn the internal switch lever stops, allowing overtravel past the "OFF" position. Such overtravel may allow the magneto ground to be broken and permit the engine to fire when the switch is in the "OFF" position. \n\n\tType A-8 ignition switches manufactured by Briggs and Stratton can be identified by the name Briggs and Stratton stamped on the rear of the switch case. Another distinguishing feature of this switch is a formed sheet metal lever which is not found on other makes of type A-8 switch. \n\n\t1.\tInspection should consist of the following: Check switch lever for overtravel past the "OFF" position. Figure 1 shows the location of the switch lever in the "OFF" position. The pointer projecting from the lever points to the middle "F" in the word "OFF". When the lever can be turned to a point beyond the centerline of the "O" in the word "OFF", the rotation stops have becomes worn and the switch should be replaced. \n\n\n\n\n\t2.\tThis inspection must be repeated at 100-hour intervals. \n\n\t3.\tInspection may be discontinued if switch is replaced by Type A-8 of another make or by some other satisfactory type ignition switch.
87-24-08: 87-24-08 BOEING: Amendment 39-5775. Applies to Model 757 series airplanes, line position 0002 through 0138, certificated in any category. Compliance required within the next one year after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent shutdown of the power transfer unit and inability to extend the landing gear, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tModify the hydraulic system in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-29A0035, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, and which has the concurrence of an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective December 29, 1987.
97-05-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all owners/operators of aircraft equipped with AlliedSignal Avionics Inc. (AlliedSignal) Models GNS-XLS or GNS-XL global positioning systems (GPS) Flight Management Systems. This action requires inserting a limitation into the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or Flight Manual Supplement Limitations Section prohibiting the use of these AlliedSignal GPS units on previously published non-precision approaches. This action is prompted by recent reports of flight course deviations because of erroneous information provided by the GPS Flight Management System. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent deviation from an intended flight path during a non-precision approach to an airport.
2011-22-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-215-1A10, CL-215-6B11 (CL-215T Variant), and CL-215-6B11 (CL-415 Variant) airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Multiple cracks were reported on the Main Landing Gear (MLG) upper member forward lug, part numbers 160-714-3 (L/H) and 160-714-4 (R/H). An investigation determined the cause to be fatigue cracks at the base of the step radius with multiple initiation sites. The fatigue cracking may compromise the structural integrity of the MLG during takeoff or landing, leading to failure. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
97-04-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. (formerly Garrett Auxiliary Power Division) GTCP85 Series auxiliary power units (APUs), that currently requires removing the existing turbine wheel shroud and installing one constructed of Hastelloy "S" material, or installing a containment augmentation ring. This amendment deletes the option of installing a turbine shroud constructed of Hastelloy "S" material. This amendment is prompted by a report of insufficient APU containment capability with the Hastelloy "S" shroud alone installed. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent turbine shroud fragments from exiting the APU and puncturing the APU compartment, which could result in reduced fire extinguishing capability in the APU compartment.
97-03-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Auxiliary Power International Corporation (APIC) Model APS3200 Auxiliary Power Units (APUs). This action requires replacement of the existing Electronic Control Box (ECB), incorporating its On Board Replaceable Module (OBRM) programmed with originally approved software version 2.0.2 or 3.2 with improved software version 4.1, or replacement of the existing OBRM of the ECB programmed with version 2.0.2 or version 3.2 with a new OBRM programmed with software version 4.1. This amendment is prompted by reports of continued fuel flow to the APU after the APU was commanded to shutdown, resulting in internal APU fires. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent internal APU fires due to ECB malfunction, which, if left unnoticed by flight or ground crews, could result in damage to the aircraft.
82-27-05: 82-27-05 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4525. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes, fuselage numbers 520 through 556, and prior airplanes modified in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-156, dated June 12, 1970, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude excessive brake application on landing resulting from an unannunciated failure of the anti-skid system, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 days from the effective date of this AD install a placard in clear view of the flight engineer as close as practicable to the Number 1 DC load meter which reads, "With DC Bus 1 unpowered, Anti-Skid system and annunciator are inoperative." \n\n\tB.\tWithin 6 months from the effective date of this AD, modify the anti-skid control system circuitry in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-175, dated July 2, 1982, or laterrevisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The following procedure may be used as an alternative to the anti-skid checkout procedure specified in paragraph 2.D. of Service Bulletin 32-175: \n\n\t\tRestore electrical power and functionally test anti-skid off/fail (INOP) light circuitry as follows: \n\n\t\t1.\tVerify parking brake is released. \n\n\t\t2.\tPlace anti-skid switch S1-352 located on engine instrument panel to "ARM." Verify anti-skid off/fail (INOP) light on captain's instrument panel is not illuminated. \n\n\t\t3.\tAt EPC circuit breaker panel, 28 volt DC Bus 1 miscellaneous section, open circuit breaker B1-406, "LANDING GEAR WARN AND INTERLOCK" and at 28 VDC Bus 1 Heat, Vent, Ice Protection Section, open circuit breaker B1-820, Left, Right, and NLG and MAIN DOORS WARNING. Verify anti-skid off/fail (INOP) light is illuminated. \n\n\t\t4.\tClose circuit breaker B1-406 and B1-820 to restore system to normal condition. \n\n\t\t5.\tReturn parking brake to original position. \n\n\t\t6.\tRemove placard installed per paragraph A., above. \n\n\tC.\tAlternative means of compliance providing an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined atFAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 3, 1983.
2011-21-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter Model EC225LP helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the side mount of the pilot and copilot seats to determine if any floor attachment screw, nut, or washer is missing. If a screw, nut, or washer is missing, this AD also requires installing airworthy parts. This AD is prompted by a report that some of the floor attachment screws and nuts under the pilot and co-pilot seats were missing. Further investigation has shown that some of the cup washers that need to be used in installing countersunk head screws that attach the pilot and co-pilot seat frame to the floor were missing. A missing floor attachment screw, washer, or nut, if not detected, could reduce the strength of the seat attachment. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect a missing floor attachment screw, washer, or nut and help prevent detachment of the seat from the floor during an emergency landing.
2010-08-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a recent in-service event the flight crew of a Trent 700 powered A330 aircraft reported a temporary Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) shortfall on engine 2 during the take-off phase of the flight.* * * Data analysis confirmed a temporary fuel flow restriction and subsequent recovery, and indicated that also engine 1 experienced a temporary fuel flow restriction shortly after the initial event on engine 2. * * * Based on previous industry-wide experience, the investigation of the event has focused on the possibility for ice to temporarily restrict the fuel flow.* * * * * * * * The scenario of ice being shed and causing a temporary blockage inthe engine fuel system may lead to a temporary fuel flow restriction to the engine. This may result in a possible engine surge or stall condition, and in the engine not being able to provide the commanded thrust. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
97-04-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-802 and AT-802A airplanes. This action requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the applicable maintenance manual to change the life limit of the tail landing gear spring. This action results from analysis of the life limits of both the tail landing gear and main landing gear after a fatigue failure of the main landing gear on one of the affected airplanes. This analysis revealed that the life limit of the tail landing gear spring should be 3,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) instead of 3,500 hours TIS to be consistent with the main landing gear spring. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of a tail landing gear spring before the life limit of the part is achieved, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
97-03-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 and 767 series airplanes, that currently requires inspection of the door opening thrusters and door opening/snubbing actuators for proper oil quantity, and modification of the off-wing compartment latching assemblies. This amendment adds a requirement for replacement of the currently installed door opening thrusters with new, improved thrusters for Model 747 series airplanes. This amendment also removes Model 767 series airplanes from the applicability of the AD, since those airplanes are addressed currently in a separate AD. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the requirements of the existing AD do not adequately detect leakage of fluid from the actuators. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such leakage, which could result in failure of the escape slide to deploy; such failure could delay and possibly jeopardize the successful emergency evacuation of an airplane.
2011-21-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Diamond Aircraft Industries Model H-36 "DIMONA'' powered sailplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A report has been received of a failed air brake control system torsion tube on a Diamond (formerly Hoffman) H 36 powered sailplane. The results of the subsequent investigation show that the failure was due to corrosion damage. This condition, if not detected and corrected, may lead to failure of the air brake control system in flight, resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-03-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A, SAAB 340B, and SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the hubcap drive coupling of the main wheel with an improved coupling. This amendment is prompted by reports of unexpected decreases in the pressure of the main wheel brake due to incorrect engagement between the main wheel coupling and the wheel speed transducer, which can result in false signals being sent to the anti-skid control box. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of brake effectiveness due to a decrease in the pressure of the main wheel brake.
89-05-04 R1: 89-05-04 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-6148 as revised by Amendment 39-6484. Docket No. 89-NM-107-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 7, dated October 13, 1988, certificated in any category, that have reworked or interim production flap tracks (part numbers identified in the service bulletin). \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude additional flap track failures, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAccomplish either paragraph A.1. or A.2., below according to the compliance schedule indicated. \n\n\t\t1.\tAccomplish A.1.a. through A.1.c., below: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tWithin five landings after March 8, 1989, (the effective date of Amendment 39-6148), revise the limitations section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by adding the following instructions. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM: \n\n\t\t\t\t"Landing Flaps \n\n\t\t\t\tMaximum landing flaps shall not exceed 25 degrees, unless deemed necessary for safe operation by the pilot. The pilot shall document each use of 30 degree flaps in the airplane log book." \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 15 landings after March 8, 1989, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 15 landings, until paragraph B.2., below, is accomplished on the affected tracks, perform a close visual inspection of both sides of each flap track for cracks emanating from the first four fail-safe bar fastener holes of flap track numbers 1, 3, 6, and 8 (Borescope inspections, conducted in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989, or through the access hole in the forward end fairing, are acceptable). \n\n\t\t\tc.\tWithin 10 landings after any use of 30 degree flaps, conduct the inspection specified in paragraph A.1.b., above. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 15 landings after March 8, 1989, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 landings, until paragraph B.2., below, is accomplished on the affected track, perform a close visual inspection of both sides of each flap track for cracks emanating from the first four fail-safe bar fastener holes on each side of flap track numbers 1, 3, 6, and 8 (eight holes per track). (Borescope inspections, conducted in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989, or through the access hole in the forward end fairing, are acceptable.) \n\n\tNOTE: Although 30 degree flaps are not prohibited in complying with paragraph A.2., it is recommended that 25 degree flaps be used whenever possible. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 75 landings after March 8, 1989, (the effective date of Amendment 39-6148), remove the bolts from the first four fail-safe bar fastener holes on each side of the track (eight per track) of flap track numbers 1 through 8 (except tracks 4 and 5 with a spliced-in end fitting) and accomplish B.1. or B.2., below: \n\n\t\t1.\tInspect fastener holes for cracks, in accordance with the eddy current procedures identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. If no cracks are found, prior to further flight, apply an organic corrosion inhibitor (LPS-3 or equivalent) to the fastener hole and reinstall serviceable fasteners using corrosion inhibiting grease. Repeat at intervals not to exceed 75 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tVerify that fastener holes are: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tCorrosion-free, by using magnifying borescope inspection procedures described in the enclosure to Boeing Letter B-221T-89-247, dated January 24, 1989, entitled "Borescope Inspection of Flap Track Holes, " and \n\n\t\t\tb.\tCrack-free, by using eddy current inspection procedures described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. \n\n\tRepeat these inspections at intervals not to exceed 1,500 landings. Bolts are to be reinstalled as noted in paragraph B.1., above. Verification that fastener holes are crack-free and corrosion-free constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph A., above, for that track. Any track, which on subsequent inspection is found to have developed corrosion in a fastener hole, must be inspected in accordance with paragraphs A. and B.1., above, until the condition is corrected. \n\n\tC.\tFor tracks inspected in accordance with paragraph B.2., above, within 300 landings after tracks have been found to be crack-free and corrosion-free, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 300 landings, perform an ultrasonic and close detailed visual inspection of both sides of the forward end of each track for cracks, with the fairing removed, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 150 landings after March 8, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6148), unless accomplished within the last 150 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 landings, remove the fairing from the forward end of flap tracks number 4 and 5 with spliced-in end fitting, and perform an ultrasonic and close detailed visual inspection of both sides of the forward end of each track for cracks, in accordance with the inspection procedures described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. \n\n\tE.\tWithin the next 50 landings after August 15, 1988 (the effective date of AD 88-16-03, Amendment 39- 5985), unless accomplished within the past 950 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, visually inspect numbers 1 through 8 flap track webs for cracks extending from all fastener holes not inspected in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs A., B., C., or D., above, or paragraph L., below. These visual inspections must be accomplished in accordance with the procedures described in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2146, Revision 4, dated August 25, 1988. \n\n\tF.\tCracked tracks must be replaced or reworked prior to further flight in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2146, Revision 4, dated August 25, 1988. \n\n\tG.\tTracks which have had any of the first four fail-safe bar fastener holes reworked in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 7, dated October 13, 1988, or in accordance with any other procedure approved by the FAA, are subject to the requirements of paragraph A. and B.1., above, until compliance with paragraph B.2., above, is established. \n\n\tH.\tCarriage of fifth engine is not permitted unless a close visual inspection, described in paragraphs A.1.b. or A.2., above is conducted prior to the flight. \n\n\tI.\tReplacement of any flap track with a flap track approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD for that flap track. \n\n\tJ.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, whichprovides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tK.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tL.\tWithin 300 landings after the effective date of this amendment, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 landings, remove the fairing from the forward end of flap track numbers 1 through 8 (except tracks 4 and 5 with a spliced-in end fitting) and visually inspect the flap track webs for cracks extending from the fifth through the tenth most- forward fail-safe bar fastener holes on each side of the track. These visual inspections must be accomplished inaccordance with the procedures described in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2146, Revision 4, dated August 25, 1988. \n\n\tM.\tWithin the next 9 months after the effective date of this amendment accomplish the following on the first four fail-safe bar fastener holes on each side of the track (eight per track) of flap track numbers 1 through 8 (except tracks 4 and 5 with a spliced-in end fitting): \n\n\t\t1.\tModify the fastener holes in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. \n\n\t\t2.\tVerify that modified fastener holes are crack-free and corrosion-free in accordance with paragraph B.2., above. (NOTE: Modification of the fastener holes does not terminate the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph B.2.) \n\n\tN.\tFor airplanes on which the first four flap track fail-safe bar fastener holes have been verified to be corrosion-free in accordance with paragraph B.2. of this AD, within 6 months after the effective date of this amendment, and until reworked and interim production flap tracks are replaced with more durable later design flap tracks in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989, revise the Limitations Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) by adding the following instructions: \n\n\t\t"Landing Flaps \n\n\t\tMaximum landing flaps shall not exceed 25 degrees, unless deemed necessary for safe operation by the pilot." \n\n\tNOTE: In complying with paragraphs A. through D. and paragraph N. only, above, Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 57A2229, Revision 7, dated October 13, 1988, or Revision 8, dated January 31, 1989, may be used in lieu of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. \n\n\tIn complying with paragraph M., above, Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 8, dated January 31, 1989, may be used in lieu of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229, Revision 9, dated November 2, 1989. In complying with paragraphs E., F., and L., above, Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2146, Revision 3, dated May 9, 1986, may be used in lieu of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2146, Revision 4, dated August 25,1988. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD revises AD 89-05-04, Amendment 39-6148. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6484, AD 89-05-04 R1) becomes effective on February 23, 1990.