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2001-18-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 767-300 series airplanes modified by supplemental type certificate SA7019NM-D, that requires modification of the in-flight entertainment (IFE) system to install a switch to remove power from the IFE system, and revision of flight crew and cabin crew procedures. This action is necessary to ensure that the flight crew and cabin crew are able to remove electrical power from the IFE system when necessary and are advised of appropriate procedures for such action. Inability to remove power from the IFE system during a non-normal or emergency situation could result in inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or cabin. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
74-17-01: 74-17-01 SARGENT INDUSTRIES, PICO DIVISION: Amendment 39-1913. Applies to Sargent Industries, Pico Division Regulator P/N 30001 incorporated in passenger evacuation slides and slide/rafts on aircraft certificated in all categories. \n\n\tNote: This regulator is installed in, but not limited to, Pico, Air Cruiser and International Inflatable slides on B-707, B-727, B-737, DC-6, DC-7, DC-8, DC-9, DC-10, and L-188 aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within two years after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent delayed actuation of regulator P/N 30001, modify the Sargent Industries, Pico Division regulator, P/N 30001, in accordance with Sargent Industries, Pico Division Service Bulletin 25-51, dated March 14, 1974, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 16, 1974.
74-17-05: 74-17-05 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: Amendment 39- 1920 as amended by amendment 39-2263 is further amended by Amendment 39-2359. Applies to Grumman Model G-1159 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 10 hours' time in service after receipt of telegram dated July 17, 1974, unless already accomplished or noted otherwise. Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southern Region. Deactivate the ground spoilers by accomplishing the following: 1. Remove the electrical connector on the ground spoiler solenoid operated control valve P/N 1159 SCH 230-1. Cap and stow. Placard control valve "INOPERATIVE". 2. Pull and lock out ground spoiler circuit breaker (2 amp) (Pilot's Circuit Breaker Panel). 3. Disconnect the ground spoiler actuators from the solenoid actuated control valve by either of the following methods: 1st METHOD (A) Removehydraulic line P/N 1159H20014-770 GRSU-6 which connects the ground spoiler control valve to hydraulic flow divider P/N 1159 SCH 255-1. (B) Remove AN815-6 union from flow divider. Remove restrictor-filter P/N H962-041 from the control valve and install in open port of flow divider using P/N 1159H20011- 6 O-ring. Leave port open to atmosphere. Plug open port of control valve with P/N AN814-6DL plug and P/N 1159HZ0011-6 O-ring. Safety plug. (C) Plug both ends of line removed and place line and union in storage, OR 2nd METHOD (A) Disconnect restrictor-filter P/N H962-041 from the control valve. Leave restrictor-filter attached to the hydraulic line P/N 1159H20014-770 GRSU-6 and open to the atmosphere. Secure the hydraulic line and restrictor-filter. (B) Plug the control valve with P/N AN814-6D plug and P/N 1159H20011-6 O-ring. 4. Without hydraulic system pressure applied, check that the ground spoiler cylinders are locked. This may be accomplished byapplying an upward force of approximately 50 pounds to the trailing edge surface of the ground spoiler. There shall be no motion of the cylinder piston. If the piston extends, readjust the cylinder terminal end until a locked condition results. 5. Repeat item 4 with "Combined" hydraulic system pressure applied. 6. Install following placard adjacent to the Ground Spoiler Hydraulic Pressure Arming Switch with the words "GROUND SPOILERS INOPERATIVE". 7. To prevent the Speed Brake/Take-Off warning from sounding during landing incorporate Grumman Interim Aircraft Service Change (ASC) 181 "Speed Brake/Flap Warning - Ground Disable" by September 13, 1974. The "NO GRD SPOILER" light will be inoperative. 8. Follow the Airplane Flight manual procedures for selection of ground spoiler switch, "armed" for take-off, to prevent hydraulic system pressure fluctuations in the event of failure of the left engine during take-off. For flight operation with the ground spoilers inoperative, attention is directed to the following limitations in the AFM: Page 1-9, Anti-Skid Brakes. The airplane will not be dispatched with the anti- skid system inoperative. Page 1-10, Takeoff with 10 degree flaps. No takeoff will be made when using 10 degree flaps. Page 1-27, Note at bottom of page. Add 680 feet to the required field length or subtract 680 feet from the available field length in determining allowable weight. Landing field lengths in AFM are unchanged - See AFM Page 4-126. In order to reactivate the ground spoilers, Grumman ASC 180 - Flight Controls (ATA No. 27) "Reactivation of Ground Spoilers" or equivalent approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region, must be complied with. Amendment 39-1920 was effective August 9, 1974, and was effective on receipt for all recipients of the telegrams dated July 17, 1974, and July 25, 1974, and the letter of July 29, 1974, which contained this amendment. Amendment 39-2263 became effective on July 18, 1975. This amendment 39-2359 becomes effective September 1, 1975.
2005-13-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Cessna Model 650 airplanes, that requires inspecting to determine the part number of the actuator control unit (ACU) and replacing the ACU with a new, improved ACU if necessary. This AD also requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded movement of the horizontal stabilizer, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
69-13-04: 69-13-04 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP: Amdt. 39-826. Applies to PA-31 and PA-31-300 airplanes, serial numbers 31-2 through 31-259. Compliance required as indicated: Modify the landing gear warning system to comply with FAR 23.729(e) (formerly CAR 3.359) as follows: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the aircraft in accordance with instructions contained in Piper Kit 760-250 dated October 23, 1968, or an alternative method approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. Effective July 3, 1969, revised September 3, 1969.
2005-13-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400, -400D, -400F; 767-200, -300, -300F; and 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires installing a jumper wire between the wiring of the fire extinguisher switch and the fuel shutoff switch for each engine, and other specified actions. This AD is prompted by a certain combination of conditions, which could cause the fuel spar shutoff valves to remain partially open. We are issuing this AD to prevent a latent open circuit that could leave the fuel spar shutoff valve in a partially open position when the engine fire switch is activated, which could result in fuel from the engine feeding an uncontrolled fire in the engine or the strut.
75-14-02: 75-14-02 MESSERSCHMITT BOELKOW BLOHM GMBH: Amendment 39-2246. Applies to Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohm (MBB) Model BO-105 Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure in service of certain main rotor hub quadruple nuts due to cracks resulting from manufacturing defects, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next twenty hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, determine the production lot number of the two installed main rotor hub quadruple nuts, P/N 105- 14101.19 and .20. NOTE: Quadruple nuts are identified "VIERFACHNUSS" on P/N drawings. Production lot number of nuts is set forth as first two digits of serial number recorded in MBB individual aircraft historical record document, under the heading of Main Rotor Head Assembly No. 105-14101. (b) If the lot number determined in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD is 06 or 07, or if the lot number cannot be determined, before further flight, except that the aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR Section 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the work can be performed, remove the two quadruple nuts and replace with serviceable parts of the same part number. (Messerschmitt Boelkow Blohn BO-105 Alert Service Bulletin No. 9 covers this same subject). This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by the telegram dated May 14, 1975, which contained this amendment.
56-11-01: 56-11-01 de HAVILLAND: Applies to All Model 104 "Dove" Aircraft. Compliance required by May 31, 1956. As a result of the two accidents caused by pilots feathering the wrong propeller after engine failure, the British Air Registration Board has classified the following as an essential modification. The FAA concurs. The left-hand needle (oil pressure) of the combined oil pressure and temperature gage for the starboard engine could be mistakenly interpreted as applying to the port engine. To minimize the possibility of such confusion either Part A or part B of Dove Modification 879 must be incorporated as soon as possible but not later than May 31, 1956: Part A. To turn the instruments clockwise through 90 degrees and put temporary markings on the instrument bezel. Part B. To turn the instruments clockwise through 90 degrees and re-mark the dials to give correct presentation or to fit modified instruments with vertical lettering and figures. (Dove Modification 879 is covered in de Havilland Service Technical News Sheet Series CT (104) No. 132 dated April 13, 1956.)
68-13-01: 68-13-01 PIPER: Amendment 39-613. Applies to PA-31 and PA-31-300 type Aircraft Serial Numbers 31-2 through 31-220 inclusive 31-222, 31-223, 31-225, 31-228, 31-234, 31-237, 31-238, 31-240, 31-242 and 31-243. To preclude in-flight fire attributed to arcing from electrical wires to the fuel crossfeed line behind the fuel control panel in the cockpit accomplish the following within the next (5) hours time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive unless already accomplished. A. Remove fuel control panel cover assembly P/N 41448-00 and inspect all wiring for chafing or interference at the fuel crossfeed line, the spar structure and the fuel control cable. Also inspect for chafing of the fuel crossfeed line against the spar structure and the P/N 41448-00 cover. Replace all chafed wires and any fuel crossfeed line chafed or worn in excess of 10 per cent (approximately .003 inch) of the wall thickness. B. Reroute wiring and secure fuel crossfeed line to assure adequate clearance in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 278 (Kit No. 760216) or later FAA approved revision or in accordance with an FAA approved equivalent modification. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 278 dated May 27, 1968 covers this subject). This amendment is effective June 25, 1968 and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated May 29, 1968 which contained this amendment.
2005-13-23: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 155B, SA-365N and N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters. That AD currently requires inspecting the hydraulic brake hose (hose) for crazing, pinching, distortion, or leaks at the torque link hinge and replacing the hose, if necessary. That AD also requires inspecting the hose and the emergency flotation gear pipe to ensure adequate clearance, and adjusting the landing gear leg, if necessary. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD and adds another model helicopter to the applicability. This amendment is prompted by notification by the manufacturer and the European Authority that another affected model helicopter, the Model EC155B1, may have the same unsafe condition and should be added to the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a hose, resulting in failure of hydraulic pressure to the brakes on the affected landing gear wheel, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter during a run-on landing.