Results
2021-16-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-19-11 for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters. AD 2020-19-11 required repetitive borescope inspections of the 90-degree tail rotor gearbox (TGB) and depending on the inspection results, removing the TGB from service. This AD was prompted by the determination that additional parts may be susceptible to the unsafe condition. This AD retains \n\n((Page 46960)) \n\nthe inspection requirements of AD 2020-19-11, and revises the compliance time and applicability. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-07-22: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), applicable to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently require that the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program be revised to include inspections that will give no less than the required damage tolerance rating for each structural significant item, and repair of cracked structure. Those ADs were prompted by a structural re-evaluation that identified additional structural elements where, if damage were to occur, supplemental inspections may be required for timely detection of fatigue cracking. This amendment requires additional and expanded inspections, and repair of cracked structure. This action also expands the applicability of the existing ADs to include additional airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the continued structural integrity of the entire fleet of Model 747 series airplanes. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-20-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of an A319 and an A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were as a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. Such reworks were also performed on some rudders fitted on A310 and A300-600 aeroplanes. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane.* * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-19-04: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One case of elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced on an aeroplane of the A320 family. Investigation has revealed that the failure occurred at the servo-control rod eye-end. Further to this finding, additional inspections have revealed cracking at the same location on a number of other servo-control rod eye-ends. In several cases, both actuators of the same elevator surface were affected. The root cause of the cracking has not yet been determined and tests are ongoing. A dual servo-control disconnection on the same elevator could result in an uncontrolled surface, the elevator surface being neither actuatednor damped, which could lead to reduced control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
77-10-11: 77-10-11 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amendment 39-2905. Applies to Models 240, 340/440 airplanes, including those modified for turbopropeller power per STC's SA1054WE, SA1096WE and SA4-1100, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To detect stress corrosion to the aluminum uplock quadrant lug in the nose landing gear and prevent possible failure of the lug, accomplish the following: a. Within the next 60 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 60 hours time in service thereafter, until (c), below, is performed: (1) Remove the AN 3-21 bolt attaching the nose landing gear uplatch release cable clevis and the emergency release cylinder to the uplock assembly. (2) Inspect P/N 240-5250109-6 nose landing gear uplock quadrant for cracks in the AN3 bolt attach lug using a 2X or stronger magnifier, or dye penetrant method. (3) If cracks are found, prior to further flight, replace the quadrant with either a new aluminum quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-6, or a steel quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-9. If a new aluminum quadrant is installed, perform steps (1) through (4) at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service. (4) Reinstall the AN3 bolt attaching release cable and emergency release cylinder and check rigging of the nose landing gear uplock installation per the applicable maintenance manual. b. After the effective date of this AD, all aluminum quadrants, P/N 240-5250109-6, must be replaced before accumulating 1,200 hours time in service. c. Installation of a steel quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-9, constitutes terminating action for this AD, and normal maintenance practices may be observed. d. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 to authorize operation of the aircraft to a base for the accomplishment of the inspections required by this AD. e. Equivalent inspections and replacement parts may be used when approved by the Chief,Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Note: General Dynamics Service Bulletins 600 (240D) Service Bulletin No. 32-3 and 640 (340D) Service Bulletin No. 32-2 pertain to this same subject. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1977.
2021-17-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model A109C, A109K2, A109E, A109S, and AW109SP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack on the tail rotor (TR) mast. This AD requires an inspection of certain TR sleeve assemblies for discrepancies, an inspection of certain TR shaft assemblies for discrepancies, a repetitive measurement of the position of the bushing of the TR sleeve assembly in relation to the pitch change slider assembly, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of * * * [an] in-service aeroplane during scheduled maintenance. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the surface defects were a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. * * * * * An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * [[Page 56287]] We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It was noticed in production that the distance between the wire harnesses 5376VB/2M and 5377VB/1M which are above the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) door 4, and the air conditioning duct could be too small. This could result in collision between the flexible air conditioning hose and wire harnesses. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the short circuit of wires dedicated to oxygen, which, in case of emergency, could result in a large number of passenger oxygen masks not being supplied with oxygen, possibly causing personal injuries. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
78-14-07: 78-14-07 BELL: Amendment 39-3257. Applies to Bell Models 205A-1 and 212 helicopters, certificated in all categories, that are equipped with skid landing gear having aft cross tube assemblies, P/N 205-050-400-7, -29, -35, or -705, or forward cross tubes assemblies, P/N 205-050-400-5, -13, -37, -39, -701, and -703. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the skid landing gear forward and aft cross tubes as a result of a crack from possible surface circumferential tool marks or scores, accomplish the following: (a) For aft cross tube assemblies, P/N 205-050-400-7, -29, -35, and -705, installed on Model 212 helicopters: (1) Remove and replace aft cross tubes with 900 or more hours' total time in service on the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD) within the next 100 hours' time in service. (2) Remove and replace aft cross tubes with less than 900 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, prior to attaining 1,000 hours' total time in service. (3) After initial compliance with paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), these aft cross tubes must be removed and replaced on a repetitive basis not to exceed 1,000 hours' time in service. (b) For aft cross tube assemblies, P/N 205-050-400-7, -29, -35, and -705 installed on Model 205A-1 and for forward cross tube assemblies, P/N 205-050-500-5, -13, -37, -39, -701, and -703, installed on Models 205A-1 or 212 helicopters, accomplish the following one-time inspection of the tube assembly surface, 17 inches either side of the helicopter centerline, for surface circumferential tool marks or scores, using a light and 10-power or higher magnifying glass or an equivalent inspection method: (1) Inspect tubes with 900 or more hours' total time in service on the effective date of this AD within the next 100 hours' time in service. (2) Inspect tubes with less than 900 hours' total time in service on the effective date of this AD, prior to attaining 1,000hours' total time in service. (3) Compliance with Bell Helicopter Textron Technical Bulletin Nos. 205-77-3 or 212-77-8, paragraph 1, fulfills compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD for the forward cross tube assembly. (4) Remove tubes, having surface circumferential tool marks or scores, within 50 hours' time in service after compliance with paragraphs (b)(1), (2), or (3) above, and install tubes free of circumferential tool marks or scores. (c) Operators not having kept time in service records on individual cross tubes should use skid gear assembly time in service for the purposes of this AD. (Bell Helicopter Textron Service Bulletin No. 212-77-17 dated December 14, 1977, and Technical Bulletins Nos. 212-77-8 and 205-77-3 dated September 13, 1977, and No. 205-78-4 dated March 8, 1978, pertain to this subject.) This amendment becomes effective August 10, 1978.
2004-07-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD); applicable to certain Airbus Model A321-111, -112, and -131 series airplanes; that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect fatigue cracking in the area surrounding certain attachment holes of the forward pintle fittings of the main landing gear (MLG) and the actuating cylinder anchorage fittings on the inner rear spar; and repair, if necessary. The existing AD also provides for optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment revises the inspection threshold and repetitive intervals for the currently required repetitive inspections. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct fatigue cracking on the inner rear spar of the wings, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-16-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain BALONY KUBICEK spol. s r.o. Models BB78Z, BB85Z, BB92Z, and BB130P balloons. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as failure of the envelope vertical load tape. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-17-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney PW1500G and PW1900G series turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks in the high-pressure compressor (HPC) rotor shaft that resulted in in-flight shutdowns (IFSDs) and unscheduled engine removals (UERs). This AD requires removal and replacement of the HPC front hub and HPC rotor shaft. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-17-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-800 and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that several of the fittings that provide attachment between the radome and fuselage were cracked to the point of failure on airplanes modified in accordance with a certain supplemental type certificate (STC). This AD requires demodification of the STC installation on the airplane by removing the external equipment installed during the STC modification (including the radome, antenna, and associated structure), installing doubler and fasteners, and system deactivation by pulling and collaring associated circuit breakers if installed. This AD also requires inspecting the external and feed- through doublers, intercostals, skin, and frames in the area around the removed external equipment for cracking, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-15-17: 77-15-17 ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES (IAI): Amendment 39-2990. Applies to Model 1123 airplanes, S/N's 107, 151, 152, 153, 155 through 180, and 182 through 186, certificated in all categories, except those previously modified in accordance with IAI Service Bulletin No. WW-7A. Compliance is required within the next 150 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible rupture of the hydraulic pressure line between the hydraulic pump and the firewall, accomplish the following: (a) Remove and discard hose P/N 6723087-43 attached between the hydraulic pump pressure port and the AN837-6 elbow installed on pylon. (b) For airplanes S/N's 175 through 180 and 182 through 186, remove and discard brackets P/N's 5723548-3 and -5. (c) Remove the AN837-6 elbow from pylon, and reinstall with washer P/N 5723548- 7 on engine side of firewall. (d) Install hose P/N 6723087-57 between hydraulic pump pressure port andAN837- 6 elbow, with 45-degree fitting of hose attached to elbow on pylon. (NOTE: Position the elbow on pylon to allow hose to be as straight as possible. Bend radius of hose may not be less than 5.0 inches.) This amendment becomes effective August 29, 1977.
2004-07-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-15, DC-9-31, and DC-9-32 airplanes, that requires repetitive visual and x-ray inspections to detect cracks of the upper and lower corners and upper center of the door cutout of the aft pressure bulkhead; corrective actions, if necessary; and follow-on actions. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires modification of the ventral aft pressure bulkhead. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the corners and upper center of the door cutout of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid decompression of the fuselage and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-15-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all GE Aviation Czech s.r.o. (GEAC) H75-200, H80-100, and H80-200 model turboprop engines. This AD was prompted by several reports of engine gas generator speed (Ng) rollbacks occurring below idle on GEAC H75- 200, H80-100, and H80-200 model turboprop engines. This AD requires an inspection of a certain part number (P/N) fuel control unit (FCU) and, if deficiencies are detected, replacement of the FCU with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-17-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the potential for the flexible hose assembly of the fuel motive flow (MF), installed between the pylon and wing, to be installed twisted in the shroud, which can restrict the flow of fuel for the MF and cause fuel imbalance and damage to the shroud assembly. This AD requires inspecting for damage of the left and right MF fuel line assemblies (including the flexible-hose and shroud assemblies), and replacing damaged parts, as specified in a Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD \n\n((Page 44601)) \n\nto address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-24-03: 77-24-03 HILLER HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3088. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12C, D, E (4 place), L, E-L, and L4's certificated in all categories incorporating control levers P/N 72229 or 72210. All aircraft serial numbers up to No. 5024 are included. S/N 5024 and subsequent will have the guard installed at the time of manufacture. (a) To prevent hazardous engine power loss from inadvertent shutoff of the fuel control valve, within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a guard on the fuel shutoff valve handle in accordance with the instructions described in Paragraph 2B in Hiller Service Bulletin No. 72-1 dated June 17, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (b) Equivalent methods of fabrication and installation of a guard on the fuel shutoff valve handle may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate helicopters to a base for accomplishment of the modification required by Paragraph (a) of this AD. This amendment becomes effective January 6, 1978.
96-08-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, that requires modification of the engine fuel feed system. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the coupling nut on the fuel tube on the outboard strut (engine position 1) fractured. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such fracturing of the coupling nut, which could result in release of fuel onto the engine cowling and a subsequent fire.
2021-15-51: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bell Textron Inc. (type certificate previously held by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.) Model 204B, 205A, 205A-1, 205B, and 212 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a fatal accident in which an outboard main rotor hub strap pin (pin) sheared off during flight, resulting in the main rotor blade and the main rotor head detaching from the helicopter. This AD requires removing the pins from service before further flight and prohibits installing them on any helicopter. The FAA previously sent an emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters and is now issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installation of an automatic shutoff system for the center tank fuel boost pumps, and installation of a placard in the airplane flight deck if necessary. This AD also requires revisions to the Limitations and Normal Procedures sections of the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew of certain operating restrictions for airplanes equipped with an automated center tank fuel pump shutoff control. This AD further requires installation of a secondary control relay for the electrical control circuit of each of the two center tank fuel boost pumps. Additionally, this AD requires a revision to the maintenance program to incorporate Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) No. 28-AWL-23. This AD also provides an option of installation and maintenance of universal fault interrupters using a certain supplemental type certificate, which terminates certain requirements of this AD. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent center tank fuel pump operation with continuous low pressure, which could lead to friction sparks or overheating in the fuel pump inlet that could create a potential ignition source inside the center fuel tank. These conditions, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
90-03-12: 90-03-12 BOEING: Amendment 39-6495. Docket No. 89-NM-180-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes with a door 5 crew rest area, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2776, dated June 8, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 12 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent empennage control cables from snagging on the cable shroud brackets above the Door 5 crew rest area, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA. Install control cable block plates in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25- 2776, dated June 8, 1989. \n\n\tB. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then sendit to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tC. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6495, AD 90-03-12) becomes effective on March 5, 1990.
2021-16-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-8, 737-9, and 737-8200 (737 MAX) airplanes; and certain Model 737-800 and 737-900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that the aft cargo compartment fire suppression capability is reduced if the airplane is dispatched or released with failed electronic flow control of air conditioning packs, as is currently allowed by these airplane models' master minimum equipment lists (MMELs). This AD prohibits the carriage of cargo in the aft cargo compartment when the airplane is dispatched or released with failed electronic flow control of air conditioning packs. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-17-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Austro Engine GmbH E4 and E4P model diesel piston engines. This AD was prompted by a report of oil pressure loss on an E4 model diesel piston engine. This AD requires removing a certain oil pump from service and replacing it with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above with certain part number (P/N) fan rotor spinners installed. This AD requires removing from service certain fan rotor blade retainers, and removing from service the fan rotor spinner support that was installed with those fan rotor blade retainers. This AD was prompted by a fan rotor spinner support found cracked at the attachment lugs. We are issuing this AD to prevent high-cycle fatigue cracking of the fan rotor spinner support attachment lugs, leading to separation of the fan rotor spinner assembly, uncontained failure of the engine, and damage to the airplane.