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2011-09-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires repetitive inspections for hydraulic fluid contamination of the interior of the strut disconnect assembly; repetitive inspections for discrepancies of the interior of the strut disconnect assembly, if necessary; repetitive inspections of the exterior of the strut disconnect assembly for cracks, if necessary; and corrective action if necessary. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the inspections. This AD was prompted by reports of system disconnect boxes that have been contaminated with hydraulic fluid and, in one incident, led to subsequent cracking of titanium parts in the system disconnect assembly. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct hydraulic fluid contamination, which can cause cracking of titanium parts in the system disconnect assembly, resulting in compromise of the engine firewall. A cracked firewall can allow fire in the engine area to enter the strut and can lead to an uncontained engine strut fire if flammable fluid is present. Cracking of the disconnect box may also reduce the effectiveness of the fire extinguishing system in the engine compartment and could contribute to an uncontained engine fire. In addition, a cracked disconnect box can leak flammable fluids into the engine core, which can initiate an engine fire, and lead to one or both fire conditions discussed above.
96-14-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-200 "combi" and 747-300 "combi" airplanes. This action requires the installation of a new hose and fitting for the oxygen supply system. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that a gasket seal in the oxygen hose assembly was omitted during installation. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent leakage of oxygen from the passenger oxygen supply lines, which could prevent an adequate flow of oxygen from reaching passengers in the event of a deployment of the passenger oxygen masks.
2011-09-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Airbus, in the frame of the Extended Service Goal (ESG) exercise, has demonstrated by post-certification analysis that, among the types of yokes in service, one component on the CF6-80C2 forward engine mounts (skinny cast yoke) does not meet the Design Service Goal (DSG) requirements. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a deterioration of the structural integrity of the forward engine mount. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible separation of the engine from the engine mount during flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
59-23-01: 59-23-01 PIAGGIO: Applies to All Models P.136-L1 and P.136-L2 Aircraft. Compliance required by December 31, 1959. In order to preclude the water rudder cables from fouling the bolt end and nuts that secure the microswitch to the water rudder retraction cylinder, a cable guard plate must be installed. The Registro Aeronautico Italiano considers compliance mandatory. (Piaggio & Co. Change Order No. 36 L-48 covers the same subject.)
96-14-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires a visual inspection to verify proper clearance between the number 18 fuel nozzle secondary transfer fuel tube and the pylon drain tube of the engine, and various follow-on actions. This amendment also requires the installation of clamps and associated fasteners between the environmental control system (ECS) controller tube and the pylon drain tube. This amendment is prompted by reports of chafing of the number 18 fuel nozzle secondary transfer fuel tube of the engine due to an improperly installed or loose pylon drain tube. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such chafing, which could lead to subsequent fuel leakage and a possible engine fire.
90-08-10: 90-08-10 FAIRCHILD INDUSTRIES, INC.: Amendment 39-6573. Docket No. 89-NM-265-AD. Applicability: All Model F-27 and FH-227 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced structural capability of the wing due to undetected fatigue cracks, accomplish the following: A. Within 25 hours time-in-service after August 21, 1989 (the effective date of AD 89-15-01, Amendment 39-6292), perform a dye penetrant inspection for cracks in the wing outer panel upper surface stringer splice fitting, in accordance with Fairchild Industries Service Bulletin F27-51-8, dated April 22, 1974, [reference paragraph 2A(6)(e), page 5; and Figure 14, page 24] or Fairchild Industries Service Bulletin FH227-51-4, dated January 17, 1979 [reference paragraph 2A(6)(e), page 5; and Figure 14, page 23], as appropriate, and Maryland Air Industries Alert Service Letters F27-681 and FH227-57-6, both dated June 29, 1989, as appropriate. B. If cracks are found in the wing outer panel upper surface stringer splice fittings, prior to further flight, accomplish the following: 1. If cracks found are less than or equal to .100 inch on the Model F-27 series airplanes, or less than or equal to .075 inch on the Model FH-227 series airplanes, perform the blending operation in accordance with Maryland Air Industries Drawing No. D27-7723, dated July 27, 1989. Perform a dye penetrant inspection after the blending operation to ensure that all damaged material has been removed. Pay particular attention to the maximum torque value and gaps as shown on Maryland Industries Drawing D27-7723, dated July 27, 1989. 2. If cracks found are more than .100 inch on the Model F-27 series airplanes, or more than .075 inch on the Model FH-227 series airplanes, replace aluminum fittings with new steel fittings, in accordance with Maryland Air Industrie Drawing No. 27-133008, dated July 28, 1989. NOTE: For thoseairplanes that have removed and replaced the wing outer panel upper surface stringer splice fittings, with serviceable parts, in accordance with AD 89-15-01, Amendment 39-6292, accomplish the requirements of paragraph C., below. Included in this group of airplanes are those that were granted an alternate means of compliance to the requirement of replacement with serviceable parts. C. Within one year time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, replace all aluminum fittings part number (P/N) 27-133008-21 with a new steel fitting, P/N 27-133008-23, in accordance with Maryland Air Industries Drawing No. 27-133008, dated July 28, 1989. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-170, FAA, New England Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who willeither concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-170, FAA, New England Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Maryland Air Industries, Inc., Hagerstown, Maryland 21740. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York. Airworthiness Directive 90-08-10 supersedes AD 89-15-01, Amendment 39-6292. This amendment (39-6573, AD 90-08-10) becomes effective on May 14, 1990.
91-15-03: 91-15-03 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY: Amendment 39-7066. Docket No. 91-ANE- 25. Applicability: General Electric Company (GE) CF6-6 series turbofan engines installed on, but not limited to, McDonnell Douglas DC10-10 aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft, accomplish the following: (a) Remove from service stage 1 fan disks identified by serial number (S/N) in Group A, Figure 3 of GE CF6-6 Service Bulletin (SB) 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, within the next 10 cycles in service (CIS) after the effective date of this AD and replace with a serviceable part. (b) Eddy current inspect in accordance with GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, the bore forward corner of stage 1 fan disks identified by S/N in Group B, Figure 3 of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, as follows: (1) For disks which on the effective date of this AD have not received an eddy current inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, inspect in accordance with the following schedule: (i) Within the next 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD, for disks which on the effective date of this AD have accumulated 1,250 CIS or greater since accomplishing the immersion ultrasonic inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (ii) Within the next 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 1,250 CIS since the immersion ultrasonic inspection, whichever comes later, for disks which on the effective date of this AD have accumulated less than 1,250 CIS since accomplishing the immersion ultrasonic inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (2) For disks which on the effective date of this AD, have received an eddy current inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, inspect in accordance with the following schedule: (i) Within the next 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD for those disks which on the effective date of this AD have accumulated 1,500 CIS or greater since accomplishing the immersion ultrasonic inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (ii) Within the next 100 CIS after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 1,500 CIS since accomplishing the immersion ultrasonic inspection, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, whichever occurs later, for those disks which on the effective date of this AD have accumulated less than 1,500 CIS since accomplishing the immersion ultrasonic inspection in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (c) Thereafter, eddy current inspect the bore forward corner of stage 1 fan disks which meet the acceptance criteria of paragraph 2.A.(2)(c) of the Accomplishment Instructions of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, at intervals not to exceed 500 CIS since last eddy current inspection. (d) Remove from service prior to further flight and replace with a serviceable part, disks inspected in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c) of this AD, which do not meet the acceptance criteria of paragraph 2.A.(2)(c) of the Accomplishment Instructions of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (e) Remove from service and replace with a serviceable part all Group B stage 1 fan disks at the next shop visit but no later than 2,500 CIS since immersion ultrasonic inspection in accordance with the AccomplishmentInstructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, or June 30, 1992, whichever occurs first. (f) Immersion ultrasonic inspect in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.B. of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991, at the next engine shop visit or no later than December 31, 1991, whichever occurs first, stage 1 fan disks identified by S/N in Group C, Figure 3 of GE SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (g) For the purpose of this AD, "shop visit" is defined as the induction of the engine into the shop for any reason. (h) Stage 1 fan disks that have been inspected to the Immersion Ultrasonic Inspection of CF6-6 Commercial Engine Service Memorandum (CESM) No. 98, have been found serviceable and comply with the immersion ultrasonic requirements of this AD. (i) Remove from service prior to further flight those disks inspected in accordance with paragraph (f) of this AD which do not meet the acceptance criteria of paragraph 2.B. of the Accomplishment Instructions of GE CF6-6 SB 72-962, Revision 3, dated May 22, 1991. (j) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (k) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Inspector, (maintenance, avionics, or operations, as appropriate) an alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance schedules specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803-5299. The inspections and removal of fan disks shall be done in accordance with the following General Electric service documents: Document No. Page No. Issue Date CF6-6 S/B 72-962 1 and 13 Rev. 3 May 22, 1991 2 thru 4 Rev. 2 Feb. 8, 19918, 12, and 14 6, 9, 10 Rev. 1 Dec. 20, 1990 5, 7, and 11 original July 2, 1990 Total Pages: 14 CF6-6 CESM No. 98 1 thru 3 Rev. 2 Oct. 5, 1989 Total Pages: 3 This incorporation was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to General Electric Company, Technical Publications Department, 1 Neumann Way, Cincinnati, Ohio 45215. This information may be examined at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 311, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW, Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-7066, AD 91-15-03) becomes effective on August 5, 1991.
95-20-01 R1: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 95-20-01 R1, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) Models 65 and L-23F (military conversion) airplanes. This AD requires fabricating and installing a placard that specifies not to operate the airplane with the cabin door removed, and incorporating a copy of the AD into the Limitations Section of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). A recent accident of one of the affected airplanes that was operating with the cabin door removed prompted the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the possibility of a reduction in stability, controllability, or airplane climb performance during operation, particularly in single-engine operations at high gross weights. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before December 27, 1995.
2011-09-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that supersedes an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The revision 01 of Airbus A340 ALS [Airworthiness Limitations section] Part 3 introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this revision constitutes an unsafe condition. * * * * * The unsafe condition is a safety-significant latent failure that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2010-07-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls-Royce plc RB211-Trent 700 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high-pressure-and-intermediate pressure (HP-IP) turbine internal and external oil vent tubes for coking and carbon buildup, and cleaning or replacing the vent tubes if necessary. This AD requires the same actions, but adds additional inspections of the vent flow restrictor. This AD results from further analysis that the cleaning of the vent tubes required by AD 2007-02-05 could lead to loosened carbon fragments, causing a blockage downstream in the vent flow restrictor. We are issuing this AD to prevent internal oil fires due to coking and carbon buildup that could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
96-14-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8-301, -311, and -315 series airplanes, that currently requires modification of the airspeed limitations placard and revision of the Airplane Flight Manual to specify operating at lower airspeeds when the airplane is operating at full flaps. That action also provides for the optional termination of the requirements of the AD for certain airplanes. That action was prompted by a report that incorrect rivets were installed on the outboard flaps assemblies of these airplanes. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the outboard flaps of the wings due to the installation of incorrect rivets in the flap assemblies, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This new amendment requires the installation of the previously optional terminating modification on certain airplanes.
2011-09-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several in-service reports of finding trapped water on the bottom of the cockpit windshield frames (or lower windshield frames) that resulted in either corrosion or water ingress into the cockpit. In one occurrence, the trapped water caused severe corrosion of numerous anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the lower windshield frame, such that the intended fastening function was seriously compromised. Corrosion of the lower windshield frames, including the anchor nuts that secure the windshield to the aircraft structure, can result in a serious structural degradation possibly leading to the loss of the windshield during flight. Also, water could leak into the cockpit and cause either a malfunction or failure of the electrical and electronics systems in the area of the cockpit instrument panels. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-09-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Further to accomplishment of A340 ALI tasks 545104, which require a rototest inspection as per Non Destructive Testing Manual (NTM) 54-51-04 of engine pylon pyramid attachment areas at aft end of lower arms between Rib 1 and Rib 2 (2 fastener locations/pylon), four findings have been reported and repaired. * * * * * The unsafe condition is cracking, which might impact the structural integrity of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
74-08-09 R2: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all transport category airplanes, that currently requires installation of placards prohibiting smoking in the lavatory and disposal of cigarettes in the lavatory waste receptacles; establishment of a procedure to announce to airplane occupants that smoking is prohibited in the lavatories; installation of ashtrays at certain locations; and repetitive inspections to ensure that lavatory waste receptacle doors operate correctly. That AD was prompted by fires occurring in lavatories, which were caused by, among other things, the improper disposal of smoking materials in lavatory waste receptacles. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent such fires. This amendment revises the existing AD to allow dispatch relief in the event a lavatory door ashtray is missing.
99-15-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect looseness or gap of the press fit bushing installation of the actuator fittings of the aileron trim tabs, and eventual replacement of the bushings with new, staked bushings. Accomplishment of such replacement terminates the repetitive inspections. This action also provides for an optional temporary preventive action, which, if accomplished, would terminate the repetitive inspections until the terminating action is accomplished. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent looseness or gap of the bushings. In the event of failure of the redundant trim tab actuator, such looseness or gap of the bushings could lead to trim tab flutter and consequent structural failure of the trim tab and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2011-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. This AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the center wing upper and lower rainbow fittings, and corrective actions if necessary; and repetitive replacements of rainbow fittings, which would extend the repetitive interval for the next inspection. This AD results from a report of fatigue cracking of the wing upper and lower rainbow fittings during durability testing and on in-service airplanes. Analysis of in- service cracking has shown that these rainbow fittings are susceptible to multiple site fatigue damage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue cracks, which could grow large and lead to the failure of the fitting and a catastrophic failure of the center wing.
96-13-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 and C-9 (military) series airplanes, that currently requires the implementation of a program of structural inspections to detect and correct fatigue cracking in order to ensure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes as they approach the manufacturer's original fatigue design life goal. This amendment requires, among other things, revision of the existing program to require additional visual inspections of additional structure. This amendment is prompted by new data submitted by the manufacturer indicating that certain revisions to the program are necessary in order to increase the confidence level of the statistical program to ensure timely detection of cracks in various airplane structures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking that could compromise the structural integrity of these airplanes.
78-26-12: 78-26-12 CESSNA: Amendment 39-3382. Applies to Models 210G, H, J (Serial Number 21058819 through 21059199); 210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); T210G, H, J (Serial Number T210-0198 through T210-0454 and 21058140); T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062274 through 21063025); and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000141) airplanes. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated unless already accomplished. To detect binding of fuel quantity transmitter float arms and assure proper operation of the fuel quantity indicating system accomplish the following: A) On Models 210M, N and T210M, N (Serial Numbers 21062761 through 21063025) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000063 through P21000141) airplanes, before next flight (except that the airplane may be flown to a location where this inspection may be accomplished, provided the pilot visually verifies through the fuel filler neck that adequate fuel is available to complete the flight), completely fill, then drain the leftand right fuel tanks with the engine inoperative and the airplane stationary in the level ground attitude. Observe the fuel quantity gauge during draining and upon completion of drainage, verify that the respective fuel quantity gauge indicates empty. Remove any Cessna P/N C668002-0101 or -0102 fuel quantity transmitter from which an erroneous fuel quantity reading is observed and check for binding of the float arm. Replace any fuel quantity transmitter found binding with an airworthy component. After replacement, check for fuel leaks and proper functioning of the fuel gauging system. B) For Models 210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers 21058819 through 21059199 and 21062274 through 21062760), T210G, H, J, M (Serial Numbers T210-0198 through T210-0454, 21058140 and 21062274 through 21062760) and P210N (Serial Numbers P21000001 through P21000062) airplanes, before next flight, review the aircraft maintenance records to determine if a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June7, 1978. 1. If a fuel quantity transmitter has not been replaced since June 7, 1978, make an entry in the aircraft maintenance records indicating that this Airworthiness Directive has been accomplished and the airplane may be returned to service. 2. If a fuel quantity transmitter has been replaced since June 7, 1978, comply with the requirements of Paragraph A). C) The review of the aircraft maintenance records required by Paragraph B) may be accomplished by the holder of a Pilot's Certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any aircraft owned or operated by that person. D) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Cessna Service Letter SE 78-69, dated November 15, 1978, or later approved revisions pertains to the subject matter of this AD. This amendment becomes effective on January 4, 1979, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by an airmail letter from the FAA dated November 15, 1978.
2011-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing an auto shutoff feature for the center override/jettison fuel pumps, and installing power control circuitry for the center override/jettison and main jettison fuel pumps. This AD also requires installing new software in the electrical load management system (ELMS) electronics units in certain power management panels; installing airplane information management system 2 (AIMS-2) software in the AIMS-2 hardware; and making certain wiring changes. This AD was prompted by results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
96-12-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS 101 series turboshaft and LTP 101 series turboprop engines, that requires removal from service of suspect disks for a one-time inspection of the disk tenon area of the gas generator turbine disk. This amendment is prompted by a report of a gas generator turbine disk tenon failure. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent total loss of engine power, inflight engine shutdown, and possible damage to the aircraft.
68-01-06 R1: 68-01-06 R1 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-537 as amended by Amendment 39-5989. Applies to all Model CL-44D4 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the main landing gear during landing or takeoff due to cracks in the main landing gear bogie beam, accomplish the following: A. Within the next 20 landings after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 20 landings, perform a visual inspection of the left and right main landing gear bogie beam, P/N 44-87574, for cracks, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(1) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. B. At intervals not to exceed 500 landings or 12 months, whichever occurs first, perform the inspection and modification, if necessary, in accordance with paragraphs 2.A.(2), 2.A.(3), 2.A.(4) and 2.A.(5) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. C. Any structure found to be cracked as a result of the inspections required by paragraph A. or B., above, must be replaced, prior to further flight, with an airworthy part or an FAA-approved equivalent part. 1. Replacement parts must be inspected prior to installation, in accordance with paragraph 2.A.(3) of Canadair Service Bulletin 493-CL44, dated February 29, 1988. 2. Replacement parts must be repetitively inspected in accordance with paragraphs A. and B., above. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Canadair, LTD., Commercial Aircraft Technical Services, Box 6087, Station A, Montreal, Quebec H3C 3G9, Canada. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This action amends AD 68-01-06, Amendment 39-537. This amendment, 39-5989, becomes effective September 5, 1988.
2011-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is prompted by a report from the manufacturer of finding cracks in rudder pedal assemblies at the quadrant attachment weld on early 750 XL aircraft. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-12-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal, Inc. (formerly Textron Lycoming) LTS101 series turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop engines, that requires identifying, removing, and replacing certain defective power turbine rotors. This amendment is prompted by reports of workmanship deficiencies on certain power turbine rotors that can reduce the published life limit of the disk. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent power turbine rotor failure, which could result in loss of engine power.
2011-08-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of one Airbus A319 and one A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were the result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. Such reworks were also performed on some rudders fitted on A330-300 and A340-200/-300 aeroplanes. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllabilityof the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-12-06: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (AD's), applicable to Teledyne Continental Motors and Rolls-Royce, plc O-200 series reciprocating engines, that currently require resetting engine timing to 24o Before Top Center (BTC). This amendment returns to the 28o BTC engine timing for those engines equipped with improved cylinders that have strengthened heads. In addition, this amendment drops the TCM O-200C model which never went into production. This amendment is prompted by the availability of improved cylinders. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible cylinder cracking with subsequent loss of engine power.