Results
47-43-11: 47-43-11 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 22 of AD-723-3.) Applies to All Model 18 Serial Numbers. Compliance required prior to next periodic inspection. Remove bolts connecting the elevator push-pull rod to the elevator horn and bellcrank and ascertain that the shank diameter falls within the limits of 0.248 to 0.250. Bolts outside these limits should be replaced with NAS 54-12 bolts. In view of the similarity of the Lockheed bolts with standard AN bolt, it is suggested that they be replaced with close tolerance bolts, NAS 54-12 and the push-pull rod. P/N 72149 placarded "Use NAS 54-12 bolt".
2022-11-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model DHC-6-1, DHC-6-100, DHC- 6-200, DHC-6-300, and DHC-6-400 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as cracks and corrosion damage to the aileron internal structure. This AD requires visually inspecting the entire aileron internal structure, correcting any damage found, and reporting the inspection results to Viking. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-05-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of stiff operation of the elevator pitch control system and jammed elevator controls. This AD requires replacing pressure seal assemblies; doing repetitive inspections for dirt, loose particles, or blockage of the flanged tube and drain hole for the pressure seals, and corrective action if necessary; replacing the aft air-intake duct assembly with a new or modified assembly and installing a dripshield; and installing gutters on the horizontal stabilizer center section and modifying the side brace fittings. We are issuing this AD to prevent moisture from collecting and freezing on the elevator control system components, which could limit the ability of the flightcrew to make elevator control inputs and result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-16-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Short Brothers Model SD3 series airplanes, that requires installing a new warning annunciator light on the central warning panel and revising the Normal Procedures Section of the Aircraft Flight Manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures related to the new light. This action is necessary to prevent an engine shut-down in icing conditions, which could result in loss of control of the airplane and consequent injury to flightcrew and passengers. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
72-01-03: 72-01-03 BELLANCA: Amdt. 39-1373. Applies to Models 17-30A (Serial Numbers 30394, 30395, 30396, 30397, 30398, 30399, 30400, 30401, 30402, 30403 and 30405); 17-31A (Serial Number 32-53); and 17-31ATC (Serial Numbers 31022, 31023, 31024 and 31025) Airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of engine power due to fuel starvation, accomplish the following: Prior to next flight replace hose Aeroquip P/N 359-8D-0153, located between the firewall and engine driven fuel pump, with hose Bellanca P/N 198003-10, or an equivalent method of compliance approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Bellanca Service Letter No. 68 dated December 3, 1971, pertains to this subject. This amendment becomes effective January 5, 1972, to all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated December 17, 1971.
69-14-03: 69-14-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-794. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 1,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of the windshield heating circuit, install 20K ohm resistors and 1 mfd capacitors into both phases of the heating circuit for pilot's and copilot's main windshield in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Modification Bulletin No. 30-PM 3092, Revision 8, dated July 22, 1968 or later ARB-approved revision or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective August 10, 1969.
2022-11-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Model PA-46-600TP airplanes. This AD was prompted by testing that showed that the wing splice assembly could fail before the assembly reaches its established life limit. This AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section (ALS) of the existing maintenance manual (MM) or instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) to reduce the life limit of the wing splice assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
46-44-03: 46-44-03 CESSNA: (Was Mandatory Note 3 of AD-768-4.) Applies Only to 120 and 140 Aircraft Serial Numbers 8001 to 9619, Inclusive. Compliance required prior to January 1, 1947. Rework attachment of windshield upper edge by the installation of a retaining channel deeper than the original and extending the entire width of the fuselage. The channel consists of two pieces; one an 0.040-inch 24ST alclad strip, 1 7/8 inches x 42 inches, outside of the windshield and with the rear edge inserted between the fuselage top skin and the front flange of the spar "U" channel; the other an 0.032-inch 24ST alclad strip, 1 13/16 inches x 44 inches, inside of the windshield and overlapping the above-mentioned spar flange. These strips are secured to the top skin and spar flange by a single row of 44 AN 456AD4 rivets. A piece of felt, 2 3/4 inches x 44 inches x 1/16-inch thick, SAE F-55 or equivalent, should be folded over the edge of the windshield and cemented thereto to provide a seal and a tight fit in the channel. This modification is necessary to insure that the windshield will not pull out at the top and alter the airflow, thereby seriously affecting the operational characteristics of the airplane. (Cessna Service Letter No. 14-120 and 140 covers this same subject.)
72-07-02: 72-07-02 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-1415. Applies to the following airplanes: MODELS SERIAL NUMBERS AFFECTED 172 28000 thru 29999 172 36000 thru 36999 172 46001 thru 46754 172A 46755 thru 47746 172B 17247747 thru 17248734 172C 17248735 thru 17249544 172D 17249545 thru 17250572 172E 17250573 thru 17251822 172F 17251823 thru 17253392 172G 17253393 thru 17254892 172H 17254893 thru 17256512 172I 17256513 thru 17257161 172K 17257162 thru 17258855 Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To reduce the possibility of engine power interruption at altitudes above 5000 feet caused by vapor formation in the fuel lines, accomplish the following: (A) Effective now, the airplane must be operated on a single fuel tank immediately upon reaching cruise altitudes above 5000 feet. (B) On or before April 1, 1972, install at the fuel selector valve applicable Cessna placards P/N's 0509021-1, 0509021-2 or 0509021-3 as provided with Cessna Service Letter SE72-7, dated March 17, 1972, or any FAA-approved equivalent placard which reads as follows: SWITCH TO SINGLE TANK OPERATION IMMEDIATELY UPON REACHING CRUISE ALTITUDES ABOVE 5000 FEET. (C) Compliance with the provisions of Paragraphs A and B is no longer required when the fuel system has been modified by the installation of applicable Cessna Kit No. SK172-31B or SK172-32 referenced by Cessna Service Letter SE72-7, dated March 17, 1972, or by the accomplishment of any equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective March 25, 1972.
2022-10-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A320-214, -251N, and -271N airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that damaged seat rail covers were detected in the forward and aft seat fixation area of some airplanes during initial delivery. This AD requires a one-time detailed inspection of the affected passenger seats and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
52-02-03: 52-02-03 MARTIN: Applies to All Models 202 and 202A Aircraft. Compliance required not later than May 1, 1952. Relocate such oxygen bottles as necessary from lower center section to location in upper right forward baggage compartment in order to eliminate the high pressure line now in the bottom of the fuselage.
2022-10-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-12/47E airplanes. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as a batch of incorrectly sized fuel transfer ejector nozzles that were installed on Model PC-12/47E airplanes during production. This AD requires removing the affected fuel transfer ejectors from service and prohibits installation of the affected fuel transfer ejectors. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-04-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300- 600 series airplanes); and Model A310 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an uncommanded slide back of the co-pilot seat to the end stop position. This AD requires a one-time inspection for a part number, a tensile test of the affected seats, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and prevent unwanted movement of a pilot or co-pilot seat in the horizontal direction, which could lead to inadvertent input on the flight control commands and possibly result in loss of controllability of the airplane.
72-19-03: 72-19-03 NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL: Amdt. 39-1519. Applies to all Models NA-265, NA-265-20, and NA-265-30 airplanes, plus NA-265-40, serial numbers 282-1 thru 282- 98; NA-265-50, serial number 287-1; and NA-265-60, serial numbers 306-1 thru 306-37. Within the next 25 hours' time in service after receipt of this telegram, but not later than 1 October 1972, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished, comply with the inspection and parts replacement provisions of North American Rockwell Sabreliner Service Bulletin 72-14 dated 25 August 1972, or later FAA approved revision, or equivalent FAA approved inspection and replacement. This amendment is effective September 15, 1972 and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated 25 August 1972 which contained this amendment.
2004-16-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for MD Helicopters, Inc. Model MD900 helicopters. This action requires installing a fan input force limiting control rod assembly fail-safe device (fail-safe device). This AD also requires, after installing a fail-safe device, before the first flight of each day, checking the fail-safe device for bent clips, taut lanyards, and piston rod movement. If any of these conditions are found, this AD requires replacing the control rod assembly with an airworthy control rod assembly before further flight. This amendment is prompted by an accident report of fatigue failure of the piston rod in the spring capsule on a control rod assembly. The actions specified in this AD are intended to provide a temporary backup support system in the event of a piston rod failure and to prevent subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
47-10-21: 47-10-21 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 23 of AD-763-3.) Applies to Model 49 Serials Up to and Including 2088. Compliance required prior to July 1, 1947. Install steel torque links, LAC P/N 293882, on each main landing gear. (LAC Service Instruction 49/SI-100A covers this same subject.)
2013-04-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS332C, AS332L, and AS332L1 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the main landing gear control panel (control panel) 33G, connector 100G, and wiring. It also requires tests to ensure that these modifications function correctly. This AD was prompted by reports of electro-valve power supply disruptions while a helicopter is on the ground, causing the landing gear to retract and the helicopter nose to drop. This results in damage to the forward section of the helicopter's bottom structure. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded landing gear retraction that would cause the helicopter nose to drop and hit the ground while the rotor blades are spinning.
2022-09-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that on the A350 final assembly line (FAL), certain load sensing drive struts (LSDS) and drive struts (DS) were found not adjusted (the nut was not torqued) and not locked. Investigation revealed that the LSDS and DS had been changed as re-work action due to pre-installation damage, but production operations (adjustment and locking) were not done afterwards. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, inspection of the LSDS for correct adjustment and locking, and replacement if necessary, and, for certain other airplanes, replacement of each affected DS with a serviceable part, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
87-16-05: 87-16-05 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-5687. Applies to Lockheed Model L-188A and L-188C airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To ensure the continuing structural integrity of these airplanes, accomplish the following: A. Within one year after the effective date of this AD, incorporate a revision into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program which provides no less than the requirements specified for the structurally significant details listed in Section III C. of Lockheed Report No. LR29428, dated January 16, 1984, and Revision A, dated May 14, 1986, or later revision approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. B. Cracks found in the structurally significant details as a result of the supplemental inspections required by paragraph A., above, must be repaired before further flight in accordance with an FAA-approved method.C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base to accomplish the requirements of this AD. D. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Order Administration Dept. 65-33, U-33, B-1. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. This Amendment becomes effective August 31, 1987.
59-12-07: 59-12-07 WRIGHT: Applies to R-1300-1A Engines Installed in North American T-28A Aircraft. Compliance required by July 1, 1959, or within the next 10 hours of operation, whichever occurs first. There is a possibility that a small number of R-1300-1A engines were released by the military for civil sale and use with crankshafts that had undergone a chrome plating salvage repair operation during the last military overhaul. This operation was found to render the crankshaft unsafe and accordingly was discontinued. Engines with these salvaged crankshafts have a note to this effect in the records and log sheets kept for the engine. No other identification of such engine was provided. A re-examination of the military records of these engines must be made and if any indication is found that the crankshaft has been salvaged by chrome plating it is mandatory that the engine be removed from service consistent with the above stipulated compliance provisions and prior to reuse of the engine in civil aircraft the affected crankshaft must be replaced.
2022-09-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all CFM International, S.A. (CFM) LEAP-1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1, LEAP- 1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the detection of melt-related freckles in the billet, which may reduce the life of certain compressor rotor stages 6-10 spools, high pressure turbine (HPT) rotor interstage seals, HPT rotor stage 2 disks, low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 1 disks, LPT stage 2 disks, LPT stage 3 disks, and LPT stage 4 disks. This AD requires revising the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the applicable CFM LEAP-1A Engine Shop Manual (ESM) and the operator's existing approved continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP) to incorporate reduced life limits for these parts. This AD also requires the removal of certain LPT stage 4 disks identified by serial number (S/N) prior to their new life limits. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-17-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Model 600N helicopters, that requires applying serial numbers to several life-limited components related to pitch control and removing and replacing the components according to new life-limits. This amendment is prompted by fatigue tests that indicate a need for shorter service lives for these components. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the collective pitch control tubes, collective stick housings, and collective pitch tube assemblies, which can cause loss of collective pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
50-38-01: 50-38-01\tNORTH AMERICAN: Applies to All Model AT-6 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished at the next annual inspection and at each succeeding annual inspection thereafter.\n \n\tSeveral recent incidents have indicated that the inspections presently required are not sufficiently comprehensive to reveal all areas of the airplane which may have been adversely affected by intergranular corrosion, and that the required inspections should be repeated periodically. Accordingly, in order to minimize the possibility of structural failure due to such corrosion, the following must be accomplished: \n\n\tInspect all accessible structural aluminum alloy components for evidence of intergranular corrosion particularly in the following locations: At the upper and lower deck and the most forward and two aft bulkheads in the monocoque fuselage; frame around the baggage door; inboard end of horizontal stabilizer spars; fuel cell doors in the wing center section; wing attach angles; two inboard ribs oneach outer wing; trailing edge ribs above flaps; and the outboard rib of the wings, especially at the trailing edge. Full use should be made of all access provisions to accomplish as thorough an inspection as possible. \n\n\tIn conducting these inspections, full reliance cannot be placed on visual examination alone. A screwdriver or other instrument should be used to explore for dull sounding areas and for material which may be penetrated easily by pressure applied to the screwdriver tip or similar sharp point. Areas adjacent to joints and sheared edges should be examined thoroughly. \n\n\tFormed material in particular has been found to be subject to rapid intergranular corrosion, because of poor heat treatment of parts, which were formed in the annealed condition, and later heat treated. \n\n\tAll corroded parts must be replaced. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 47-41-01.
2004-16-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes, that requires replacing the existing digital flight guidance computer(s) (DFGC) with a new or modified DFGC(s). This action is necessary to prevent a premature flare from occurring on approach due to erroneous data being provided to the DFGC(s); and also to prevent uncertainty about autopilot engagement status, which could cause the pilot to apply unneeded force to the control column and possibly result in a runaway condition of the autotrim. Either condition could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe conditions.
2013-04-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A310-203, -204, -222, -304, -322, and -324 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a design review of the fuel tank access covers and analyses comparing compliance of the access covers to different tire burst models. `Type 21' panels located within the debris zone revealed that they could not sustain the impact of the tire debris. This AD requires modifying the wing manhole surrounds and replacing certain fuel access panels. We are issuing this AD to prevent a possibility of a fire due to tire debris impact on the fuel access panels.