Results
66-11-02: 66-11-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-213 Part 39 Federal Register March 17, 1966. Applies to Model 188A and 188C Series Airplanes Except Those Modified in Accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11), Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), or an Equivalent Approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Compliance required as indicated. To detect spanwise cracks in the wing lower surface aft of the main gear fulcrum fitting and chordwise cracks in the wing lower surface plank, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 700 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 700 landings before the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 1,400 landings from the last inspection until repaired or modified in accordance with (b), accomplish the following or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: (1) Inspect for cracks in accordance with (i) or (ii) the wing plank riser radius (Item 7, Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Figure 3) of riser number 29, plank 5 and riser number 36, plank 6 between Wing Stations 162 and 172 and between Wing Stations 204 and 214, of airplanes not modified in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318. (i) Inspect externally, by the ultrasonic technique described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D, Section 2.B.(5)(c), pages 25 through 31, or later FAA- approved revision. Test block design must be in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB- 625B, Figure 2, or later FAA-approved revision. If indication of a crack is found, inspect before further flight in accordance with (ii). (ii) Inspect internally, by dye penetrant method, as described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625B, Sections 2(A) through 2(F), or later FAA-approved revision. (2) Inspect for cracks the internal plank area surrounding the bulkhead angle (P/N810970) at the Wing Station 211 attachment hole or holes, as applicable, located between the lower number 6 plank risers 37 and 38, by dye penetrant method, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88 SB-625C, Section 2G, or later FAA-approved revision. (b) Repair cracks found during the inspections required by this AD before further flight in accordance with Lockheed Drawing 841318A (including Notes 10 and 11) or Lockheed Drawing 841318B (including Notes 11, 13, and 19), as applicable, and the accomplishment instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-625C or later FAA-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair is to be performed. Seal all splice areas to be covered with repairs in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D or later FAA-approved revision. NOTE: Regional approval required by (b) may be facilitated by obtaining prior approval of a Structural DER. (c) The repetitive inspections required by (a)(2) may be discontinued if, during the inspections required by (a), no cracks are found, and before further flight the airplane is modified in accordance with Note 10 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318A or Notes 13 and 19 of Lockheed Drawing No. 841318B, as applicable. (d) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. (e) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective April 16, 1966. Revised April 15, 1966. Revised September 23, 1966.
2006-25-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Model F27 Mark 500 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine whether certain main landing gear (MLG) drag stay units (DSUs) are installed. This AD also requires an ultrasonic inspection to determine if certain tubes are installed in the affected DSUs of the MLG, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report that, due to fatigue cracking from an improperly machined radius of the inner tube, a drag stay broke, and, consequently, led to the collapse of the MLG during landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity or collapse of the MLG.
66-27-01: 66-27-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-297 Part 39 Federal Register November 2, 1966. Applies to Models 707-300B and -300C Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 18922, 18926, 18937, 18953, 18960, 18964, 18975, 18976, 18977, and 18991.\n \n\tCompliance required within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tVisually inspect the inboard aileron center hinge clevis for cracks or evidence of hammer-peening using a glass of at least 5-power in accordance with Section 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2377 or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division: FAA Western Region. Replace cracked parts and parts showing evidence of hammer-peening before further flight with a new part of the same part number or a part inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks and evidence of hammer-peening.\n \n\tThis directive effective November 2, 1966.
2007-03-19: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed and eddy current inspections of the main fittings of the main landing gears (MLG) to detect discrepancies, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. The AD also currently requires servicing the shock strut of the MLGs; inspecting the shock strut of the MLGs for nitrogen pressure, visible chrome dimension, and oil leakage; and servicing any discrepant strut. This new AD requires installing a new, improved MLG main fitting, which terminates the repetitive inspection and servicing requirements of the existing AD. This AD results from stress analyses that showed certain main fittings of the MLGs are susceptible to premature cracking, starting in the radius of the upper lug. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct premature cracking of the main fittingsof the MLGs, which could result in failure of the fittings and consequent collapse of the MLGs during landing. DATES: This AD becomes effective March 15, 2007. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of March 15, 2007. On August 13, 2004 (69 FR 41421, July 9, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Bombardier Alert Service Bulletin A601R-32-088, including Appendices A, B, and C, dated February 20, 2003.
2007-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all of the airplanes identified above, that requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to include a new airplane maintenance manual task that specifies a detailed inspection after each ram air turbine (RAT) retraction. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, a one-time inspection to detect breaks in the bottom flange fitting of the RAT and corrective actions, if necessary; for certain airplanes, an adjustment of the ejection jack; and, for certain other airplanes, replacement of the aluminum part with an improved steel part. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the RAT yoke fitting, which could result in the loss of RAT function and possible loss of critical flight control in the event of certain emergency situations. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
59-06-02: 59-06-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-7 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required by first block overhaul after receipt of parts but not later than December 1, 1959. \n\n\tSeveral instances have occurred wherein the green indicator light for one of the main landing gear failed to go on when the landing gears were extended. In one case, after landing, it was noted that the left gear downlatch was not fully engaged and the ground lock safety pin could not be installed. Subsequent investigation and laboratory tests revealed that the orifice check valve could malfunction due to contaminants in the hydraulic fluid of sufficient quantity and size (approximately 0.003-inch diameter) and thereby prevent full extension of the gear. \n\n\tTo overcome this difficulty, remove existing orifice check valve assembly, P/N 4498423-503 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4498423-5503 (Skydrol Aircraft), from each main landing gear actuating cylinder and replace with new orifice check valve assembly, P/N 2230565-5-093 (Mineral Oil Aircraft), or P/N 4481262-5-093 (Skydrol Aircraft). (Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 353 dated January 30, 1959, covers this same subject.)
67-14-04: 67-14-04 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-397 Part 39 Federal Register April 14, 1967. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in the fin top actuator fitting P/N AB 21A 1009 (pre modification PM 378) for 200 Series airplanes and P/N AK 21A 6283 (post modification PM 378) for 400 Series airplanes, accomplish the following: (a) Within 6,000 landings, or for aircraft which have exceeded 5,800 landings, within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the actuator fitting P/N AB 21A 1009 or P/N AK 21A 6283 as appropriate, for cracks in accordance with BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin 55-A-PM 2707, Issue 1, dated November 16, 1966, or later ARB-approved issue. (b) Repeat the visual inspections of (a) at intervals not exceeding 600 hours' time in service for aircraft which have no cracks, and at intervals of 100 hours' time in service for aircraft which havecracks that do not exceed either 0.30" for item (1), or 0.45" for item (2) of Figure 1, specified in BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin 55-A-PM 2707, dated November 16, 1966, or later ARB-approved issue. (c) Actuator fittings which have cracks which exceed the acceptable limitations defined in BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin 55-A-PM 2707 are unserviceable and must be replaced before further flight, in accordance with BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin 55-PM 2707, dated October 18, 1966, or later ARB-approved issue, or FAA-approved equivalent. (d) Within 10,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, modify actuator fittings P/N AB 21A 1009 or P/N AK 21A 6283, in accordance with BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin 55-PM 2707, dated October 18, 1966, or later ARB-approved issue or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, Middle East Region. (e) The repetitive inspections required by (a) and (b) of this AD may be discontinued after the actuator fittings are modified in accordance with (c) or (d) of this AD. (f) For the purpose of complying with this AD subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. This directive effective May 14, 1967.
2007-03-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the discovery of exfoliation corrosion in the fittings of some PC-6 airplanes. These fittings are installed exterior to the bottom skin of the wing skin. If not corrected, undetected corrosion in this area could lead to failure of the fitting and subsequent loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The unsafe condition is incomplete closure of the main entry door, which may result in the door opening in flight, causing damage to wing, fuselage, engine, and/or tail, and possible damage to the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
70-07-02: 70-07-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-961. Applies to Model 707 and 720 Series airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2961, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD on aircraft having 14,000 or more flights, unless already accomplished. Aircraft having less than 14,000 flights on the effective date of this AD must be inspected after they have accrued 13,000 flights but no later than 50 hours' time in service after they have accrued 14,000 flights, unless already accomplished during this specified interval. \n\n\tFor the purpose of compliance with this AD, the number of flights may be determined by dividing the total flight time on an airplane by the operator's fleet average flight time per flight for the type airplane considered. \n\n\tTo prevent walkway panel failures between body stations 344 and 352: \n\n\t(a)\tInspect the left-hand and right-hand walkway panels on all airplaneslisted in Boeing Service Bulletin 2961, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions. Perform inspections in accordance with Accomplishment Instruction, Part II, unless already accomplished in accordance with Service Bulletin 2961, dated 13 January 1970, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found, perform: \n\n\t\t(1)\tThe preventative modification described in Part II of Boeing Service Bulletin 2961, Revision 1, dated 11 March 1970, or later FAA-approved revisions, or \n\n\t\t(2)\tReinspections at intervals not to exceed 1500 flights in service (for eddy current or dye penetrant inspection) or 500 flights (for visual inspection) in accordance with Part II of Boeing Service Bulletin 2961, Revision 1, or \n\n\t\t(3)\tAn equivalent modification or inspection program approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found during any of the inspections, perform the preventative modification in accordance with Part II of Boeing Service Bulletin 2961, Revision 1, 11 March 1970, or later FAA-approved revisions, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tInspections required by this AD may be discontinued when the approved preventative modification has been accomplished. \n\n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-932, 35 F.R. 1159, AD 70-02-12. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 28, 1970.
2007-02-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for DORNIER LUFTFAHRT GmbH Model 228-212 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the landing gear carbon brake assembly. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the airworthiness authority for the European Union. We are issuing this AD to inspect the landing gear carbon brake assembly to detect and replace loose bolts or self-locking nuts, which could result in the brake assembly detaching and malfunctioning, degrade brake performance and potentially cause loss of control of the aircraft during landing and roll-out.
49-12-01: 49-12-01 CURTISS-WRIGHT Applies to Model C-46 Series aircraft equipped with Aileron Tab Motor Bracket Assembly, Curtiss-Wright P/N 20-030-5050. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished within the last 475 hours' time in service, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection. Inspect the aileron trim tab motor support bracket (P/N S-20-030-5050) attached to the aft face of the 70 percent rear spar at wing Station 178.36 for cracks. Defective parts should be replaced. Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase. Revised December 28, 1964.
67-27-01: 67-27-01 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT: Amdt. 39-474, Part 39, Federal Register September 9, 1967. Applies to Fan Jet Falcon Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 thru 94. Compliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent jamming of the engine power lever, modify the type MF 2006 pressurization control microswitch installation by the addition of a support, P/N MY.20.240.3801, and a leaf spring, P/N MY.20.240.3802, in accordance with Avions Marcel Dassault Service Bulletin No. 211, (76-4), revision 1, dated April 4, 1967, or later SGAC-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. This amendment effective October 9, 1967.
2007-02-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as incorrect monitoring of the fire detection system; therefore, its integrity is not guaranteed at all times. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
67-09-04: 67-09-04 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 39-374 Part 39 Federal Register March 24, 1967. Applies to Models G-164 and G-164A Restricted Category Airplanes, Serial Numbers 301 through 450, and Serial Numbers below 301 Which Have Been Modified to Incorporate Parking Brake Installation and Stick Control Lock Kit P/N A1521-301K. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent fouling of the control stick by the surface control lock and inadvertent locking of the right toe brake master cylinder during flight maneuvering, accomplish the following: (a) On Model G-164 airplanes, Serial Numbers 301 through 400: Within the next 25 hours' time in service after April 7, 1966, install a tension spring and two "S" hooks in accordance with Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation drawing A1521, Revision B, Sheet 2 or equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (b) On all airplanes listed in the applicability statement: Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify the parking brake and stick control lock installation in accordance with Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation AG-CAT Service Bulletin No. 39, February 15, 1967, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Compliance time specified in (b) may be increased upon approval by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, of the appropriate request with substantiating data submitted to an FAA maintenance inspector. This supersedes AD 66-10-02. This directive effective March 24, 1967.
70-09-05: 70-09-05 SIKORSKY: Amdt. 39-978. Applies to Orlando Helicopters Airways, Inc. Models HRS-1/CH-19, HRS-3/H-19B, H-19D, H-19G helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 15 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main rotor shaft due to fatigue cracks originating from surface defects, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect main rotor shaft P/N S14-35-4308-1, -2, -3, or -4 for cracks and surface defects in accordance with Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 55B35-3 dated April 3, 1970, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. (b) Main rotor shafts exhibiting crack indications, or unsalvageable surface defects, shall be retired from service prior to further flight and replaced with a shaft which has been inspected in accordance with paragraph (a). (c) Main rotor shafts found with salvageable surface defects may be reworked in accordance with Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 55B35-3 dated April 3, 1970, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent rework procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. Should the extent of rework necessitate removal of the shaft from the main gear box, then the replacement shaft must be inspected in accordance with paragraph (a). (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region may adjust the compliance time specified in this airworthiness directive if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This amendment becomes effective April 30, 1970.
2007-01-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes. That AD currently requires an initial general visual inspection of the power feeder cables of the integrated drive generator (IDG) and the fuel feed lines of engine pylons No. 1 and No. 3 on the wings for proper clearance and damage; corrective actions if necessary; and repetitive general visual inspections and a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This new AD requires the existing actions, and for certain airplanes, this AD requires installation of new clamps on the power feeder cables of the IDG of engine pylons No. 1 and No. 3. This AD results from reports of IDG power feeder cables riding against structure and fuel lines in the No. 1 and No. 3 pylons. We are issuing this AD to prevent potential chafing of the power feeder cables of the IDG in engine pylons No. 1 and No. 3 on the wings, and consequent arcing on the fuel lines in the engine pylons and possible fuel fire. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective February 14, 2007. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of February 14, 2007. \n\n\tOn February 24, 2004 (69 FR 2657, January 20, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-54A011, Revision 02, dated May 31, 2002.
70-02-04: 70-02-04 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-916. Applies to Viscount Models 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes. To provide immediate indication of failures in the electrical generation system, to preclude a simultaneous failure of all generators, and to ensure that emergency electrical power is supplied to certain emergency equipment necessary to continue flight to a safe landing, accomplish the following: (a) For Models 744, 745D, 810 series airplanes, within the next 1000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, install a bus-bar under the voltage warning light in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Modification Leaflet No. D3232, dated 1 August 1969, (for Model 744 and 745D series airplanes) or No. FG2107, dated 18 July 1969, (for Model 810 series airplanes) or later ARB-approved issues or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) For Models 744 and 745D series airplanes, within the next 1000 hours' time in serviceafter the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished - (1) Install PVC sheathing over the generator equalizing lines in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Bulletin for Modification No. D969, Issue 3, dated 17 March 1969, or a later ARB-approved issue or an FAA-approved equivalent; and (2) Modify the electrical power distribution system in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Modification Leaflet No. D3239, dated 6 June 1969, or a later ARB-approved issue or an FAA- approved equivalent to ensure that the electrical power for the following equipment is supplied from the No. 4 D.C. Emergency Bus-Bar: (i) Pitot head heater No. 1 (port). (ii) Flight deck lighting (i.e., instrument panels, pedestals, magnetic compass and circuit breaker panels). (iii) D.C. and/or A.C. communication equipment for emergency communications. (iv) Artificial horizon. This amendment becomes effective February 5, 1970.
2006-26-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce engines. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks of the outer V-blades of the thrust reverser, and corrective action if necessary. This AD also provides for optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of cracked outer V-blades in the thrust reversers. We are issuing this AD to prevent separation of a thrust reverser from the airplane during normal reverse thrust or during a refused takeoff, which could result in impact damage to other airplane areas. If a thrust reverser separates from the airplane during a refused takeoff, the engine could produce forward thrust, resulting in unexpected thrust asymmetry and a possible runway excursion.
2006-26-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain EMBRAER Model EMB-145XR airplanes. This AD requires replacement of certain segments of the passenger seat tracks with new, improved seat tracks. This AD results from instances where the shear plungers of the passenger seat legs were not adequately fastened. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadequate fastening of the seat leg shear plungers, which could result in failure of the passenger seat tracks during emergency landing conditions and consequent injury to passengers.
70-23-01: 70-23-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-1103. Applies to Boeing Model 747-100 Series airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this ad, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failures of the spindle nut, accomplish the following: \n\tReplace the wing gear upper side strut spindle nut in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 32-2055 dated October 2, 1970, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\tThe amendment becomes effective November 6, 1970.
2004-26-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211-524 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope insepctions of the head section and meterpanel assembly of the combustion liner, and replacement, if necessary, with serviceable parts. In addition, that AD allows an optional installation of a front combustion liner with a strengthened head section as a terminating action to the inspection requirements. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the head section and meterpanel assembly of the combustion liner, and replacement if necessary with serviceable parts. This AD also requires reduction of the inspection intervals of certain RB211-524 engine models that have not been repaired to RR Field Repair Scheme FRS5367/B, and a mandatory terminating action to be completed by a certain date. This AD results from five events that are directly attributed to combustor headbreakup and meterpanel failure which were found at overhaul inspection. At least one of these events resulted in a combustion case burn-through. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine combustion liner deterioration, which can result in combustion liner breakup, case burn-through, and engine fire.
71-21-03: 71-21-03 SIKORSKY: Amdt. 39-1303. Applies to all S-61 Type Helicopters certified in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent a hardover in the auxiliary servo system, as the result of fracture of the servo valve input linkage, accomplish the following: a. Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, install a secondary link in the servo valve input linkage in accordance with Section 2, paragraphs A., B., C., and G., of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B65-6A, dated 1 July 1971, or later approved revisions or an equivalent installation, both approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. b. Install secondary links per paragraph (a) on all spare units, prior to installation on the aircraft. This amendment is effective October 7, 1971.
46-13-03: 46-13-03 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 6 of AD-723-2.) Applies to Model 18 Aircraft. Compliance required before next 10 hours of operation. The oil tanks should be examined to determine whether or not they are of the hopper type, and appropriate action in one of the following manners must be taken: 1. If a hopper type oil tank is installed and is to be retained in accordance with Note 14(b) of Aircraft Specification A-723-4 (for use with oil dilution), the following action must be taken (applies only to Serial Numbers 2294 and up): (a) Install a propeller feathering reserve oil tank (P/N 174399) forward of the firewall. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 18/SB-115 dated April 18, 1945, covers this same subject.) (b) Rework the hopper assembly to provide better support at the sump by installing a new support assembly (P/N 174321). At each engine change, remove plate and elbow on bottom of sump housing (P/N 114690) and inspect hopper with a light and mirror. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 18-99 dated September 29, 1943, covers this same subject.) 2. If the hopper type oil tank is to be removed, the following action must be taken (applies only to Serial Numbers 2294 and up, except Serial Numbers 2359, 2403, 2464, and 2465): Remove the hopper type oil tank and propeller feathering lines and replace with a conventional type tank (P/N 73662), fitted with a standpipe to provide a reservoir of oil for propeller feathering, and install a separate feathering line from the oil tank to the feathering pump. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 18-100 dated March 3, 1944, covers this same subject.) 3. On airplanes which have conventional oil tanks other than P/N 73662, the standpipe at the outlet in each tank must be revised in one of the following manners, whichever is applicable. (Applies to all Series 18 airplanes, except Models 18-07 and 18-40, with Serial Numbers 2293 and below, 2359, 2403, 2464, and 2465.) (a) If the tanks are equipped with the standard 3 31/32-inch long standpipes (P/N 164101), the standpipe in each tank should be removed and a new 4 15/16-inch standpipe (P/N 16401, change D) installed. b) If the tanks are equipped with oil stick gage foam guards, the existing standpipe in each tank should be cut off near the bottom of the tank, the foam guard cut off approximately 5.38 inches from the bottom surface of the oil tank outlet connection boss, and a new standpipe assembly (P/N 173806) installed. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 18-105 dated October 19, 1943, covers this same subject.)
2006-24-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (RAC) Models 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the forward, vertical, and aft flanges of both the left and right wing rear spar lower caps for cracks, repair any cracks found, and report the inspection results to RAC. This AD results from additional fatigue cracks found in this area since inspections were performed to comply with Emergency AD 2006-18-51, which required immediate visual inspections of this area. We are issuing this AD for the purpose of performing a more rigorous inspection requiring cleaning and paint stripping of this section of the wing rear spar to detect and correct cracking in the wing spar lower caps of the affected airplanes before the cracks lead to failure. These wing rear spar cracks may result in wing failure which could result in the wing separating from the airplane with consequent loss of control.