Results
2000-07-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection of a certain passenger seat wire assembly to detect chafed or damaged wires; repair, if necessary; and installation of protective sleeving. This amendment is prompted by a report of arcing emanating from a certain passenger seat wire assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing of the passenger seat wire assembly against a bracket at the lower sidewall panel due to insufficient clearance between the bracket and seat wire assembly, which could result in arcing damage to the passenger seat wire assembly and consequent smoke and fire in the main cabin.
69-20-01: 69-20-01 PILATUS AIRCRAFT WORKS, INC: Amdt. 39-853. Applies to Model PC- 6 Series Aircraft Serial Numbers 1 through 723 and 2001 through 2050. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent the rudder trim control cable from coming off the pulleys aft of bulkhead 6 (rear cabin wall), accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service, inspect the clearance between the cable keeper and the cable pulleys aft of bulkhead 6 in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 92, dated March 1969, or later Swiss Federal Air office approved revision or an FAA approved equivalent. (b) If the clearance between the keeper and the cable pulleys is found to be greater than .040 inch, replace the old cable keeper, P/N 6201.16, with a redesigned cable keeper, P/N 916.96.06.244 in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 92, dated March 1969, or later Swiss Federal Air Office approved revision or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective October 27, 1969.
2006-16-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9- 83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. This AD requires installing a clamp, a bonding jumper assembly, and attaching hardware to the refueling manifold in the right wing refueling station area. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent arcing on the in-tank side of the fueling valve during a lightning strike, which could result in an ignition source that could ignite fuel vapor and cause a fuel tank explosion.
2018-16-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by report indicating that cracks were found on the fuselage frame webs at stations forward and aft of the overwing emergency exits between stringer-7 (S-7) and S-8. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the fuselage frame webs at certain stations between S-7 and S-8 and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-07-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a detailed visual inspection of the external power feeder cables in the forward cargo compartment between certain stations to detect chafing or damage; repair, if necessary; and installation of spiral wrap. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the external power feeder cable due to being chafed during maintenance. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and damage to external ground power feeder cables, which could result in electrical arcing and consequent structural damage and smoke and fire in the forward cargo compartment.
56-20-04: 56-20-04 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240, 340 and 440 Aircraft. Compliance recommended at the next engine change or airplane overhaul but required not later than December 31, 1957. Several recent accidents involving nacelle fires have indicated certain deficiencies in the construction of the fire seals between zone 1 and zone 2. To correct this condition the following rework of the present cowling and zone seals is required. 1. Incorporate an additional fireproof seal at the zone 1 to zone 2 shroud-to-cowl seal around the periphery of the diaphragm where the bottom and side cowl meet. 2. Improve the present nacelle seals by incorporating a fireproof seal along the longitudinal juncture of the cowl segments and also improve the present cowl hinge point seals. 3. Replace any existing aluminum material in the zone 2 chimney vent with steel material. (Applicable to CV-240 aircraft only.) The following Convair Service Bulletins cover acceptable methods of compliance with these modifications: Nos. 240-472 and 340-177 cover item No. 1; Nos. 240-474, 240-481A, 340- 209, 340-210A, 440-30 and 440-32A cover item No. 2; Nos. 240-470 and Revision 1 cover item No. 3. (Compliance with Revision 2 to 240-470 is not required.)
2006-16-04: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC 250-B and 250-C series turboshaft and turboprop engines. That AD currently requires a onetime inspection of the fuel nozzle screen for contamination, and if contamination is found, inspection and cleaning of the entire aircraft fuel system before further flight. That AD also requires replacing the fuel nozzle with a new design fuel nozzle, at the next fuel nozzle overhaul or by June 30, 2006, whichever occurs first. This AD requires the same actions, but would add additional part numbers (P/Ns) to the list of affected fuel nozzles. This AD would also explain that the existing AD, as worded, allows certain part number (P/N) fuel nozzles back into service. Those fuel nozzles must not be allowed back into service. This AD is prompted by the discovery that several P/Ns of fuel nozzles were inadvertently left out of AD 2004-24-09. We are issuing this AD to minimize the risk of sudden loss of engine power and uncommanded shutdown of the engine due to fuel contamination and collapse of the screen in the fuel nozzle.
2006-15-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires modifying the wiring for the master dim and test system. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires related concurrent actions as necessary. This AD results from a report that the master dim and test system circuit does not have wiring separation of the test ground signal for redundant equipment in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent a single fault failure in flight from simulating a test condition and showing test patterns instead of the selected radio frequencies on the communications panels, which could inhibit communication between the flightcrew and the control tower, affecting the continued safe flight of the airplane.
2018-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and Model MD-90- 30 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of loss of airspeed indication due to icing. This AD requires modifying the air data heat (ADH) system. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-13-04: 66-13-04 LEARJET: Amdt. 39-237 Part 39 Federal Register May 17, 1966. Applies to Models 23 and 24 Airplanes. Compliance required before further flight, unless already accomplished, except that the airplane may be flown to a base where the repair can be performed, provided the following restrictions are contained on a placard in clear view of the pilot: "(a) No passengers may be carried. "(b) Monitor the cabin pressure indicator for proper pressurization control. If automatic and/or manual control of the cabin pressure is not properly effective: "(1) Turn air bleed off to shutoff bleed air. "(2) Reduce power to reduce bleed air pressure as necessary. "(3) Don oxygen masks. "(4) Expedite descent to a safe altitude." Modify the pressure control static air system in accordance with Lear Service Kit SK23/24-230 or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1966.
2006-15-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas airplane models, that requires a one-time inspection for chafing or signs of arcing of the wire bundle for the auxiliary hydraulic pump, and other specified and corrective actions, as applicable. This AD also requires that, for certain airplanes, installation of additional protective sleeving on the upper portion of the auxiliary hydraulic pump wire assembly. This AD results from reports of shorted wires and evidence of arcing on the power cables of the auxiliary hydraulic pump, as well a fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in loss of auxiliary hydraulic power, or a fire in the wheel well of the airplane. The actions specified by this AD are also intended to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
72-15-03: 72-15-03 LEARJET: Amendment 39-1489 amended by Amendment 39-1597 is further amended by Amendment 39-1959. Applies to Model 24 (Serial Numbers 24-178 thru 24-268) and Model 25 (Serial Numbers 25-020 thru 25-114) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of spoiler actuator attachment bolts, accomplish the following: A) On aircraft with 500 or more hours' time in service, within 25 hours' time in service after the effectiveness of this AD, replace the spoiler actuator pivot bolts (P/N NAS 464P4-32), nuts (P/N AN320-4), and cotter pins (P/N MS24665-7), in accordance with procedures in Gates Lear Jet Service Bulletin SB No. 24/25-237 dated July 7, 1972. B) On aircraft with less than 500 hours' time in service upon the effectiveness of this AD, the spoiler actuator pivot bolts, nuts and cotter pins identified in Paragraph A must be replaced in accordance with the Gates Lear Jet Service Bulletin identified above, upon the accumulation of 500 hours' time in service. (If the aircraft has between 475 and 500 hours' time in service upon effectiveness of this AD you must replace the specified parts within the next 25 hours' time in service.) C) The spoiler actuator pivot bolts, nuts and cotter pins identified in Paragraph A of this AD must be replaced upon accumulation of each 500 hours' time in service thereafter. D) When the spoiler actuator installation is modified per Gates Learjet Aircraft Modification Kit AMK 73-1 and Service Bulletin 24/25-237B dated January 15, 1973, further compliance with this AD is no longer required. Any equivalent modification must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. Amendment 39-1489 became effective July 28, 1972, to all persons except those to whom it was made effective earlier by telegram or letter issued July 11, 1972. Amendment 39-1597 became effective March 2, 1973. This Amendment 39-1959 becomes effective September 19, 1974.
2006-15-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes); and Model A310-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA), corrective actions if necessary, and follow-on repetitive tasks. This AD results from reports of THSAs that have reached their design operational life. We are issuing this AD to extend the operational life of the THSA to prevent a possible failure of high- time THSAs, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2018-16-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B54, -1B58, -1B64, -1B67, -1B70, - 1B54/P1, -1B58/P1, -1B64/P1, -1B67/ [[Page 36725]] P1, -1B70/P1, -1B54/P2, -1B58/P2, -1B64/P2, -1B67/P2, -1B70/P2, -1B70C/ P1, -1B70/72/P1, -1B70/75/P1, -1B74/75/P1, -1B75/P1, -1B70C/P2, -1B70/ 72/P2, -1B70/75/P2, -1B74/75/P2, -1B75/P2, -1B76/P2, -1B76A/P2, -1B78/ P2, -2B67, -2B67B, and -2B67/P turbofan engines. This AD requires removal of affected high-pressure turbine (HPT) stator cases (HPT cases) from service and their replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
70-04-04: 70-04-04 AIRESEARCH: Amendment 39-944. Applies to Model TPE331-1 and -2 S/N engines: 90005, 90009, 90010, 90011, 90014, 90016, 90017, 90018, 90019, 90022, 90023, 90024, 90027, 90028, 90029, 90030, 91003, 91004, 91005, 91006, 91009, 91011, 91013 thru 91021, 91023, 91024, 91025, 91027, 92001, 92002, 92003, 92004, 92005, 92007, 92010, 92012, 92013, 92014, 92016, thru 92027, 93007, 93008, 93009, 93010; installed in but not limited to Mooney MU-2, Merlin 2B, Volpar Turboliner and Short Skyvan aircraft is effective upon receipt of this telegram. This directive necessary because of a serious engine failure caused by backing off of the high speed pinion retaining nut. To detect and prevent engine failure from this cause, the following is required: (A) Within 10 hours time in service unless previously accomplished within the last 15 hours time in service, and at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service thereafter, remove the engine oil filter and inspect the filter for metal particles. If an abnormal quantity of metal particles is found, accomplish Item (C) before further operation of the engine. At each inspection a replacement filter must be installed and the filter which was removed shall be returned for laboratory examination to AiResearch or to a facility approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, Western Region. Any finding of unacceptable metal contamination by AiResearch or other approved facility will be communicated to the owner or operator and the FAA. Upon receipt of such notice the engine shall then not be operated until Item (C) is accomplished. 25 hours oil filter special inspections may be discontinued upon completion of Item (C). (B) Within 10 hours time in service, install a placard in full view of the pilot to read: 'If abrupt and complete loss of torque indication occurs, shut down the engine and determine the cause.' This placard may be removed when Item (C) is accomplished. (C) Within 150 hours time in service unless previously accomplished, rework or replace the high speed pinion gear shaft assembly, P/N 869337-2, -3, or -4, in accordance with AiResearch Service Bulletin No. 587, dated 5 February 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all person except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated February 5, 1970.
2006-15-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 airplanes and Model A310 airplanes, and for certain Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of the wing and center fuel tanks to determine if certain P-clips are installed and corrective action if necessary. This AD also requires an inspection of electrical bonding points of certain equipment in the center fuel tank for the presence of a blue coat and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires installation of new bonding leads and electrical bonding points on certain equipment in the wing, center, and trim fuel tanks, as necessary. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to ensure continuous electrical bonding protection of equipment in the wing, center, and trim fuel tanks and to prevent damage to wiring in the wing and center fuel tanks, due to failed P-clips used for retaining the wiring and pipes, which could result in a possible fuel ignition source in the fuel tanks.
59-04-02: 59-04-02 CONVAIR: Applies to All Model 240/340/440 Series Aircraft Through Serial Number 485. Compliance required as indicated. Several instances have been reported wherein the pilot's direct-vision window has swung inward beyond the normal stop and has interfered with the movement of the control column. One such instance resulted in a crash landing and a fire which destroyed the aircraft. (1) Within the next 50 hours of operation inspect the DV window and ascertain that the stop is secure. Also,install a placard in the vicinity of the DV window cautioning the pilots against deliberately opening the window past the stop as an interim measure pending compliance with item (2). (2) Not later than September 1, 1959, the following must be accomplished to provide a positive stop for restricting the amount of travel of the DV window to eliminate possible interference between the window and the control column. For model 240 aircraft install a secondary DV window stop such as the safety chain described in Convair Service Engineering Report No. 26/440-28 dated 16 January 1959 or equivalent. For models 340 and 440 aircraft, install either the redesigned positive stop P/N 340-3110303-65 and -66 described in Convair Service Newsletter No. 411 or the secondary DV window stop safety chain described in Convair Service Engineering Report No. 26/440-28 dated 16 January 1959 or equivalent.
2006-15-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CASA Model C-212-CC airplanes. This AD restricts the operation of the airplane to carrying either passengers or cargo (but not both) in the same compartment, unless the airplane is modified to include an approved protective liner between the passengers and the cargo. This AD results from our determination that affected airplanes, when carrying both cargo and passengers in the same compartment, cannot achieve the required level of performance. We are issuing this AD to prevent a hazardous quantity of smoke, flames, and/or fire extinguishing agent from the cargo compartment from entering a compartment occupied by passengers or crew.
2021-02-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that certain retaining rings could cause damage to frame forks, brackets and edge frames, and their surface protection; subsequent investigation showed that the depth of the frame fork spotfacing on structural parts is inadequate to accommodate the retaining ring. This AD requires repetitive inspections of certain areas of each cargo door for damage and corrective action. This AD also provides an optional terminating modification, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires you to incorporate text from the service information into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This AD results from a recent safety evaluation that used a data-driven approach to analyze the design, operation, and maintenance of the MU-2B series airplanes in order to determine their safety and define what steps, if any, are necessary for their safe operation. Part of that evaluation was the identification of unsafe conditions that exist or could develop on the affected type design airplanes. Field reports indicate an unsafe condition of improper rigging and/or adjustment of the propeller feathering linkage. Service centers found the unsafe condition during inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper rigging of the propeller feathering linkage. The above issue, if uncorrected,could result in degraded performance and poor handling qualities with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
54-09-01: 54-09-01 RANGER: Applies to All 6-440-C Series Engine Models. To be accomplished as indicated. To preclude the failure of carburetor hotspot heater assembly P/N 7683, 7697, 7699 or 7708, due to corrosion from accumulations of exhaust products which in some instances have been found to completely close the inner passages, the following inspection should be accomplished by July 31, 1954, and additionally, as indicated below: 1. Remove the manifold pipes and inspect the hotspot casting for cracks on both the outside surfaces and the inside carburetor air passages, particularly at the bottom. 2. If no cracks are evident, the hotspot may be replaced with the hot air supply blocked off, per Ranger Engine Service Bulletin No. 91. Since no appreciable benefit in icing protection is provided by the use of the hotspot, it will be permissible to operate the engine with the hotspot blocked off. If the hotspot is blocked off, it is suggested that hot lubricating oil be applied to coatthoroughly the internal passage walls formerly used for exhaust gas circulation through the hotspot; this will tend to retard further corrosion. 3. If it is desired to continue to use a heated hotspot, it should be checked initially, and at 400-hour intervals to ascertain that the hot air passages are unobstructed with carbon or other exhaust gas products. This can most easily be accomplished by blocking off one hot air boss with a plate and pouring into the other hot air passage, 120 cc's of oil or gasoline. If this will not all be contained in the hotspot casting, a new hotspot casting should be utilized since no satisfactory method is known whereby all of the deposits can be removed. 4. If the hotspot has been used unheated since the last overhaul, only the initial inspection in 1. need be performed before normal overhaul.
2021-02-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-02- 03, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. AD 2019-02-03 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2019-02-03 and requires incorporation of an airworthiness limitation that applies only to certain airplanes. This AD also requires replacing or modifying certain engine fire control panels, which terminates the revised airworthiness limitation added in this final rule when a certain condition is met. Since the FAA issued AD 2019-02-03, the manufacturer has developed a new fire handle design that will eliminate the need for the airworthiness limitations required by AD 2019-02-03. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a center vent tube (CVT) failure leading to a loss of oil pressure and subsequent in-flight engine shutdown. This AD requires removal of an affected extension duct and replacing it with a part eligible for installation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-15-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A300 series airplanes and all Model A300-600 and A310 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the pitch trim system to detect continuity defects in the autotrim function, and follow-on corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this new AD requires replacing the flight augmentation computers (FACs) with new improved FACs. This AD also revises the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from the development of a final action intended to address the unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent a sudden change in pitch due to an out-of-trim condition combined with an autopilot disconnect, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
57-16-02: 57-16-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-7 Series Aircraft Prior to Fuselage No. 697. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAn operator recently experienced a failure in the threaded area of the forward end of the rudder tab push-pull tube P/N 3483231, which resulted in a declared emergency and unscheduled landing due to loss of rudder control. Investigation reveals that tubes reamed to accommodate the end fittings are unsatisfactory. Also, it has been determined that many rudder tab push tube assemblies, P/N's 3593396, 3593396-501, as well as 3483231, have been reamed in order to accommodate the end fittings. \n\n\tOn all aircraft on which the above-mentioned assemblies have 5,000 hours of operation or more an inspection must be conducted within the next 300-hour operation, unless already accomplished, to determine whether the rods have been reamed and for signs of failure of the tube and end fittings. All assemblies found cracked and those reamed in excess of the limits outlined in Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 181 reissued February 8, 1957, must be replaced. Unless disassembled, x-ray is believed to be the only reliable means of verifying whether the tubes have been reamed in excess of the limits specified by Douglas. \n\n\tAll assemblies not cracked and are not reamed in excess of the limits specified in the Douglas Service Bulletin must be visually reinspected at periods not to exceed 300 hours of operation until they are replaced with new push-pull tube assembly, P/N 3593396, which have been manufactured without resorting to reaming. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-7 No. 68, reissued February 8, 1957, describes the modifications required to install P/N 3593396 on those aircraft that presently incorporate P/N 3483231.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 56-24-3.