Results
2007-04-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of each main tank fuel boost pump for the presence of a pump shaft flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor is missing, replacement of that pump with a pump having a pump shaft flame arrestor. This AD also requires repetitive measurements of the flame arrestor's position in the pump, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires the replacement of the pump with a new or modified pump, which ends the repetitive measurements. This AD results from reports that certain fuel boost pumps may not have flame arrestors installed in the pump shaft and reports that the pin that holds the flame arrestor in place can break due to metal fatigue. We are issuing this AD to prevent the possible migration of a flame from a main tank fuel boost pump inlet to the vapor space of that fuel tank, and consequent ignition of fuel vapors, which could result in a fire or explosion.
2000-18-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Sikorsky Aircraft-manufactured Model CH-54A helicopters. That AD currently requires initial and recurring inspections and rework or replacement, if necessary, of the second stage lower planetary plate (plate). This AD requires the same actions as the existing AD but would add two additional type certificate (TC) holders to the applicability of the AD and change one TC holder who has transferred ownership of the affected helicopters since the issuance of the existing AD. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that the applicability section of the existing AD is incomplete. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the plate due to fatigue cracking, which could result in failure of the main gearbox, failure of the drive system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2019-01-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes powered by Rolls-Royce plc (RR) Trent 1000-A (including -A/01 and -A/01A), Trent 1000-AE (including - AE/01A), Trent 1000-C (including -C/01 and -C/01A), Trent 1000-CE (including -CE/01A), Trent 1000-D (including -D/01 and -D/01A), Trent 1000-E (including -E/01 and -E/01A), Trent 1000-G (including -G/01 and -G/01A), and Trent 1000-H (including -H/01 and H/01A) turbofan engines. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to limit extended operations (ETOPS). This AD was prompted by a report from the engine manufacturer indicating that after an engine failure, prolonged operation at high thrust settings on the remaining engine during an ETOPS diversion may result in failure of the remaining engine before the diversion can be safely completed. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-10-04: 97-10-04 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Priority Letter issued on April 30, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-11-AD. Applicability: Model S-61A, D, E, L, N, NM, R, and V helicopters, certificated in any category, equipped with a main rotor blade assembly (blade), part number (P/N) S6115-20501 or P/N 61170-20201, having one of the following four-digit or eight-digit serial numbers: 1282-1554 2721 3016-2850 3305-3106 3517-3311 4787-4793 2183 2751 3019 3317-3115 3525-3310 4800-4794 2380-2498 2781-2644 3138 3343-3147 3637-3459 4835-4790 2495 2800-2671 3168-3585 3343-3648 3694-3481 5484-5363 2500 2817 3192-2999 3364-3180 3748-3543 5974-5816 2520 2819 3215-3012 3451-3239 3752-3527 5981-5813 2521 2839 3216-3023 3491-3278 3753-3528 7096-6583 2644 2883 3242-3044 3499-3936 3840-3620 7779-7083 2673 2919-2771 3249-3052 3511-3293 3966-3737 8099-8054 2716-2683 3008 3250-3043 3512-3292 4216-4392 NOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously. To prevent disbonding and separation of portions ofthe blade, subsequent excessive vibrations, and loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect each blade having one of the affected serial numbers in accordance with Section 2A of the Accomplishment Instructions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 61B15-29, dated April 25, 1997, to determine the anodizing date for all blade trailing edge pocket assemblies (pocket assemblies) installed on the blade in locations as specified in the Planning Information Section, paragraph 1D(3) of the ASB, that were anodized by Poly-Metal Company. Remove any blade having a pocket assembly anodized by Poly-Metal Company during the period from October 1, 1996 through December 31, 1996, and replace the blade with an airworthy blade. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit theirrequests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Boston Aircraft Certification Office. (c) A one-time only special flight permit may be issued to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished, after inspecting all pocket assemblies for disbonding. (d) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Tech Support, 6900 Main Street, P.O. Box 9729, Stratford, Connecticut 06497-9129. This information may be examined at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas. (e) Priority Letter AD 97-10-04, issued April 30, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.
93-08-12: 93-08-12 BOEING: Amendment 39-8559. Docket 92-NM-36-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent loss of the structural integrity of the fuselage, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 22,000 total flight cycles, or within 1,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 2,000 flight cycles; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles: Perform a detailed visual internal inspection to detect cracks in the areas of the fuselage internal structure listed below, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; and prior to further flight, repair any cracks detected, in accordance with FAA- approved procedures. \n\n\t\t(1)\tSections 41 and 42 upper deck floor beams. \n\t\t(2)\tSection 42 upper lobe frames. \n\t\t(3)\tSection 46 lower lobe frames. \n\t\t(4)\tSection 42 lower lobe frames. \n\t\t(5)\tMain entry door cutouts. \n\t\t(6)\tSection 41 body station 260, 340, and 400 bulkheads. \n\t\t(7)\tMain entry doors. \n\n\t(b)\tPrior to the accumulation of 25,000 total flight cycles, or within 1,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished previously within the last 2,000 flight cycles; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles: Perform a detailed visual internal inspection to detect cracks in the Section 46 upper lobe frames, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; and prior to further flight, repair any cracks detected, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspections shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on June 11, 1993.
94-09-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes. This action requires inspections to determine the serial numbers and to detect defects in the upper and lower lock links on the nose landing gear (NLG), and rework or replacement of any defective link found. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking and subsequent failure of certain lock links on these airplanes, which have been attributed to forging defects in the lock links. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent collapse of the NLG.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 20, 1994.\n\n\tComments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 5, 1994.
2007-04-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sicma Aero Seat, passenger seat assemblies. This AD requires modifying the aft track fittings on these passenger seat assemblies by installing new tab locks, and then torquing the aft track fitting locking bolts. We are issuing this AD to prevent detachment of passenger seat assemblies, especially during emergency conditions, leading to occupant injury.
2007-04-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2004-11-04, which applies to all CTRM Aviation Sdn. Bhd. (Formerly Eagle Aircraft (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.) Model Eagle 150B airplanes. AD 2004-11-04 currently requires you to inspect certain canard inboard flap hinge support brackets (initially before further flight and repetitively before the first flight of each day) and perform any necessary follow-up action. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Malaysia to require the installation of improved design inboard flap hinge brackets as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. Consequently, this AD retains the requirement that you inspect certain canard inboard flap hinge support brackets (initially before further flight and repetitively before the first flight of each day) and then requires that you replace the parts with new design inboard flap hinge brackets as terminating action for the repetitive inspections or if cracks are found. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the canard inboard flap hinge support brackets, which could result in loss of retention of controls and consequently, loss of airplane control.
2019-01-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Aspen Avionics, Inc. (Aspen), Evolution Flight Display (EFD) EFD1000 Primary Flight Display (PFD), EFD1000 Multi-Function Display (MFD), EFD1000 Emergency Backup Display (EBD), and EFD500 MFD units installed on various aircraft. This AD requires disabling the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In function and revising the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). This AD was prompted by reports of flight displays repetitively resetting. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-17-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Rolls-Royce plc. (RR) models RB211-535E4-37, RB211- 535E4-B-37, and RB211-535E4-B-75 turbofan engines, with certain part number (P/N) low pressure (LP) turbine stage 2 discs installed. That AD currently requires establishing new reduced LP turbine stage 2 disc cyclic limits. That AD also requires removing from service affected discs that already exceed the new reduced cyclic limits, and removing other affected discs before exceeding their cyclic limits, using a drawdown schedule. This amendment requires changing certain cyclic limits, changing the effective date of certain disc cyclic lives, and would allow intermix of Flight Plan A and Flight Plan B intermix calculations. This amendment is prompted by a reassessment of the thermal and stress data from recent operational experience and comments received from operators on the current AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent LP turbine stage 2 disc failure, which could result in uncontained engine failure and possible loss of the airplane.