Results
2018-23-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, and A330-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of dual flight management system (FMS) resets with the loss of flight plan (F-PLN) data. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit required navigation performance-authorization required (RNP-AR) operations using flight management guidance envelope computer (FMGEC) standard P5H3. This AD would also require modifying the FMS software of airplanes equipped with FMGEC standard P5H3. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as an excessive lateral play caused by a nonconforming washer that might lead to the deterioration of the elevator trim tab bearing fatigue resistance. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is prompted by several reported cases of rupture of the (hydro-mechanical metering unit (HMU)) constant delta pressure valve diaphragm on Arriel 2B1 engines, due to the wear of the delta P diaphragm fabric. Rupture can result in the loss of the automatic control mode of the helicopter, accompanied with a deterioration of the behavior of the auxiliary back-up mode (emergency mode). The loss of automatic control mode coupled with the deteriorated performance of the backup mode can lead to the inability to continue safe flight, forced autorotation landing, or an accident. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
69-25-04: 69-25-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-886. Applies to Fairchild Hiller F-27 and FH-227 type Airplanes, except FH-227D and FH-227E, certificated in all categories. To prevent the hazards associated with the flaps driving off the ends of the screw jacks due to a single failure of the drive system which actuates the normal flap control limit switches and the emergency power cutoff switches, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 125 hours' in service, until incorporation of the modification noted in (b). (1) Inspect the universal joint at each end of the wing flap connecting shaft assembly P/N 27-727994-11 located between the flap motor gearbox at wing station 141 left (installed in the wheel well of the left nacelle) and the gearbox at wing station 121 left, to assure some freedom of movement in all axes. (2) Inspect the universal joint of the actuator shaft P/N 27-727920-7, -9, or -13, as applicable, also located on the gearbox at wing station 121 left, noted in (a)(1) above, to assure some freedom of movement in all axes. (3) If freedom of movement is not determinable, remove and replace deficient universal joint pin or bolt before further flight. (4) Lubricate the three universal joints, noted in (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, in accordance with applicable maintenance manual instructions. (b) Within the next 1000 hours' in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished, separate the existing flap "up and down" limit switches from the emergency flap power cutoff switches by complying with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin F-27-27-64, Revision 3, dated 1 October 1969, for F-27 type airplanes with pre-select flap control, and Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin FH-227-27-22, Revision 1, dated 2April 1969 for FH-227 type airplanes, or later revisions thereto, or equivalent modification both approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (c) Upon request with substantiation data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, compliance time may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective December 6, 1969.
2007-03-07: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 737 airplanes. The existing AD currently requires installation of a new rudder control system and changes to the adjacent systems to accommodate that new rudder control system. For certain airplanes, this new AD adds, among other actions, repetitive tests of the force fight monitor of the main rudder power control unit (PCU), repetitive tests of the standby hydraulic actuation system, and corrective action; as applicable. For those airplanes, this new AD also adds, among other actions, replacement of both input control rods of the main rudder PCU and the input control rod of the standby rudder PCU with new input control rods, as applicable, which ends the repetitive tests. For certain other airplanes, this new AD adds installation of an enhanced rudder control system in accordance with new service information. This AD results from a report of a fractured rod end of an input controlrod of the main rudder PCU and a subsequent report of a fractured rod end of the input control rod of the standby rudder PCU. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of one of the two input control rods of the main rudder PCU, which, under certain conditions, could result in reduced controllability of the airplane; and to prevent failure of any combination of two input control rods of the main rudder PCU and/or standby rudder PCU, which could cause an uncommanded rudder hardover event and result in loss of control of the airplane.
84-21-02: 84-21-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-4936. Applies to Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, listed in Section 3.0 of Boeing Document No. D6-35022, "Supplemental Structural Inspection Document" (SSID), Revision A, dated April 1984. Compliance is required as indicated in the body of the AD.\n\n\tTo ensure the continuing structural integrity of the total Boeing Model 747 fleet accomplish the following on the candidate fleet, unless already accomplished:\n\n\tA. Within one year after the effective date of the AD, incorporate a revision into the FAA approved maintenance inspection program which provides no less than the required Damage Tolerance Rating (DTR) for each Structural Significant Item (SSI) listed in Boeing Document D6-35022, Revision A, dated April 1984, or later FAA approved revisions. The required DTR value for each SSI is listed in the document. The revision to the maintenance program shall include and be implemented in accordance with the proceduresin Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of the SSID.\n\n\tB. Cracked structure must be repaired before further flight in accordance with an FAA approved method. \n\n\tC. Aircraft may be ferried to a maintenance base for repair in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199.\n\n\tD. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tE. Operators who have acceptably incorporated Boeing Document No. D6-35022, Revision A, dated April 1984, or later FAA approved revisions, into their approved maintenance program are exempt from the provisions of this AD.\n\n\tNOTE: Acceptable incorporation is considered to include the reporting requirements of Section 6.0 of the SSID.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington.\n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1).\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 23, 1984.
2000-17-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France Model EC120B helicopters. This action requires adjusting the clearance of the cabin sliding door if necessary. This amendment is prompted by an in-flight loss of a cabin sliding door, which had been locked in the fully opened position. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent in-flight loss of a cabin sliding door, impact with the horizontal stabilizer, main rotor, or fenestron tail rotor, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2018-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD- 500-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of dislodged cargo compartment blowout panels. This AD requires repetitive inspections for any dislodged blow-out panel in the forward and aft cargo compartments, reporting of the inspection findings, and reinstallation if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-19-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports of spurious in-flight disconnections of the automatic flight control system (AFCS). This AD requires updating certain ''Primus Epic'' system software, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as executive seats equipped with pedestal legs that were produced using a material that deviates from the approved design data. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.