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77-16-05: 77-16-05 CESSNA: Amendment 39-2998. Applies to Models 210-5(205), 206, P206/TP206, U206/TU206, 207/T207, and 210/T210 series airplanes of the serial numbers specified below. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent malfunction of the P/N C291503-0101 or P/N 1216100-1 fuel selector valve, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn Model 210-5(205) series (serial numbers 205-0481 thru 205-0577), Model 206 series (serial numbers 206-0001 thru 206-0275), Model P206/TP206 series (serial numbers P206-0001 thru P20600647), Model U206/TU206 series (serial numbers U206-0276 thru U20603123), Model 207/T207 series (serial numbers 20700001 thru 20700322), Model 210/T210 series (serial numbers 21058221 thru 21061154, and T210-0001 thru T210-0454) airplanes, examine the aircraft maintenance records to determine whether the fuel selector valve has been changed subsequent to December 19, 1975.If the valve has not been changed, make an entry in the maintenance record indicating this AD is not applicable to the airplane and no further action is necessary. Examination of the records and the record entry may be accomplished by the owner/operator. \n\n\tIf the valve has been changed subsequent to December 19, 1975, accomplish a fuel valve inspection and, if indicated, replacement in accordance with paragraph C. below. \n\n\tB.\tOn Model U206/TU206 series (serial numbers U20603124 thru U20603712, U20603714 thru U20603791, U20603793 thru U20603797, U20603799 thru U20603803, U20603805, U20603808 thru U20603812, U20603814 thru U20603846, U20603848, U20603850, U20603851, U20603853 thru U20603857, U20603861, U20603862, U20603867 thru U20603871, U20603875, U20603876, U20603882 and U20603886), Model 207/T207 series (serial numbers 20700323 thru 20700373, 20700375 thru 20700394), and Model 210/T210 series (serial numbers 21061155 thru 21061731, 21061733 thru 21061766, 21061768 thru 21061860, 21061862 thru 21061881, 21061883 thru 21061987, 21061990 thru 21061993, 21061995 thru 21062005, 21062007 thru 21062009, 21062012 thru 21062017, 21062020 thru 21062022, 21062024 thru 21062027, 21062029, 21062033 thru 21062037, 21062043) airplanes, accomplish a fuel selector valve inspection and, if indicated, replacement in accordance with paragraph C. below. \n\n\tC.\t1.\tPlace fuel selector valve in OFF position. \n\n\t\t2.\tRemove selector valve handle and associated parts. Obtain access to the valve by removal of the control valve pedestal and selector valve access plate from the floor. \n\n\t\t3.\tCheck the selector valve serial number. If the serial number is 1421 thru 3269 inclusive, accomplish the pull test inspection described in paragraph C.4. below. If the serial number is not within this block, the valve is not affected, and the aircraft may be returned to service after reassembly. \n\n\t\t4.\tUsing tools fabricated in accordance with Figure 1, or an equivalent test arrangement, accomplish a pull test on the selector valve in accordance with the following procedures: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tRemove safety wire, roll pin, and valve handle shaft from valve control yoke. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tFeed cable through hole in yoke and crimp cable securely. Place bar in loop in other end of cable. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tRemove four screws securing selector valve cover. Break the seal between the cover and body and rotate the cover to positively assure it is free. \n\n\t\t\td.\tAttach a tensiometer to the cable in the section between loops and from a seated or squatting position, with one foot on each side of the valve, using the legs and arms to lift, apply an upward force of 130 pounds minimum to 150 pounds maximum directly in line with the shaft while observing the shaft for movement. Exert upward force gradually. If any upward movement of valve shaft is noted, release force immediately. Drain fuel from airplane and install a new valve in accordance with the aircraft's Service Manual Instructions. \n\nCAUTIONIf the shaft pulls out of the valve body, fuel spillage may result. Therefore, all precautions applicable to working with or around open fuel should be observed. \n\n\t\t\te.\tIf no upward movement of the valve shaft is noted or evident, reassemble the valve and aircraft and return to service. \n\n\n\n\nAD 77-16-05 \n\n\tD.\tAny equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tCessna Service Letter SE77-22, dated June 27, 1977, or later approved revisions pertain to the subject matter of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 11, 1977.
79-09-01: 79-09-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-3452. Applies to Model 727-100 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing 727 Service Bulletin No. 24-30, revised May 18, 1966, that complied with FAA AD 66-30-02 by having been modified to Option No. 2 in said service bulletin. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent generator electrical lead damage and possible hydraulic fire from cable clamp failure allowing the electrical leads to chafe against hydraulic lines or components, accomplish the following: \n\t1.\tWithin the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, and every 2,000 hours time-in-service thereafter, inspect the No. 1 generator electrical leads from the pressure feed through fittings (below the floor level) to the engine strut feed through, all generator electrical lead clamps, hydraulic systems, and airframe for routing separation and insulation chafing. Repair or replace any electrical lead, hydraulic line, airframe part or clamp damage as required in accordance with approved maintenance procedures. \n\tThe repetitive 2,000 hour inspection interval may be adjusted by FAA air carrier maintenance inspectors to the nearest scheduled maintenance inspection period. \n\t2.\tIf the generator electrical leads are not routed with at least three (3) inches separation from hydraulic lines or components, provide additional physical protection with aircraft quality Skydrol resistant insulation wrap and clamp as required. \n\t3.\tIf generator electrical leads are routed with at least three (3) inches separation from hydraulic lines or components, no further action is required under this AD. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 8, 1979.
78-03-04: 78-03-04 BOEING: Amendment 39-3136. Applies to all Boeing 707-100/-100B/-200 series airplanes, certificated in all categories upon the accumulation of 20,000 landings. \n\tAccomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin the next 750 landings, unless accomplished within the last 750 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1500 landings, X-ray inspect the upper rear spar chord horizontal leg and adjacent wing skin from the side of the body at BBL 70.5 to WS274 in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 3304, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Wing skins or rear spar chords found cracked are to be repaired prior to further flight in accordance with paragraph B. \n\tB.\tRepair in accordance with 1 or 2 below as applicable, prior to further flight except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed: \n\t\t1.\tAirplanes with skin cracks near the rear spar which do not extend beyond the fastener pattern of stringer No. 1 may continue in service for a maximum of 750 additional landings, subject to the following conditions: \n\t\t\ta.\tCrack ends must be stop drilled per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304. \n\t\t\tb.\tIf crack ends in a fastener hole, the hole must be inspected per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304 to assure there is no crack progression beyond fastener hole, then an additional 1/16" oversize must be made and an oversize fastener installed. \n\t\t\tc.\tEddy current inspection per Boeing Service Bulletin 3304 of crack ends must be conducted at intervals not to exceed 50 landings. Any crack progression requires repair in accordance with 2 below prior to further flight. \n\t\t\td.\tCracks must be permanently repaired within 750 landings in accordance with 2 below. \n\t\t2.\tRepair in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tC.\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time-in-service by the operator's fleet average from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 77-06-03. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 1, 1978.
2010-26-52: We are publishing in the Federal Register an amendment which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators that supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (BHT) Model helicopters with certain tail rotor blades (blades). The superseded AD requires, before further flight, replacing certain blades with airworthy blades. This AD retains the requirements of the superseded AD but adds new blade part numbers (P/Ns) and serial numbers (S/Ns) to the applicability. This AD was prompted by another incident in which the blade tip weight separated from a blade during flight, causing vibration. This incident led to the determination that additional blades could be affected, and should be added to the applicability. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the blade tip weight, loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
65-06-03: 65-06-03\tBOEING: Amdt 39-49 Part 39 Federal Register March 17, 1965. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Aircraft with the Serial Numbers Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2029. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tCracks have recently been discovered on two airplanes in the aft elevator control quadrant, P/N 50-3119, around the upper two bolts, P/N NAS 1105, which attach the quadrant to the elevator control torque tube. In both instances, Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1259 had not been accomplished, and an interference fit existed between the quadrant and torque tube. As a result of these cracks, the following or an equivalent approved by the Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, shall be accomplished: \n\t(a)\tWithin the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 600 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect by eddy current or fluorescent dye penetrant the aft elevator quadrant, P/N 50-3119, in accordance with paragraph 3.c. of Service Bulletin No. 2029 or later FAA-approved revisions for evidence of cracks in the upper hub and in the vicinity of the two upper bolts which attach the quadrant to the elevator control torque tube. \n\t(b)\tIf a crack is found, replace the elevator control quadrant with one of the same part number before further flight. The inspections in (a) also apply to the replacement part. \n\t(c)\tWithin the next 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish rework and dimensional checks in accordance with paragraph 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin 2029 or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\t(d)\tWhen the rework and dimensional checks required by (c) are accomplished, the repetitive inspections specified in (a) may be discontinued. \n\t(e)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2029 covers this same subject.) \n\tThis directive effective April 16, 1965.
97-05-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 737 series airplanes. This action requires removal of the main rudder power control unit (PCU) and replacement with a serviceable unit. This amendment is prompted by a report of the installation of an incorrect bolt on the main rudder PCU. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the bearing of the main rudder PCU due to installation of an incorrect bolt; such cracking could result in seizure of the bearing and resultant uncommanded rudder movement.
97-05-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-200, -300, and -400 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the front spar web of the center section of the wing, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of fatigue cracking found in the front spar web. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the leakage of fuel into the forward cargo bay, as a result of fatigue cracking in the front spar web, which could result in a potential fire hazard.
94-05-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires modification or replacement of designated passenger cabin floor panels. This amendment is prompted by a report that, during manufacture, the inserts that attach the floor panels to the seat tracks and floor beams were installed using sealant rather than required adhesive. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the passenger cabin floor capability to support the airplane interior inertia loads under emergency landing conditions.
89-21-02: 89-21-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-6342. (Docket No. 89-NM-171-AD) \n\tApplicability: All Model 727 and Model 737-100, -200, and -200C series airplanes certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent engine separation, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 5 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to indicate that only FAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nuts specified in the table below shall be installed on the engine mount cone bolt on Boeing Models 727 and 737-100, -200, - 200C airplanes. \n\n\n\nBoeing Model 727: \n\nLine No.\nFAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nut \n1 - 193\nBACN10B-10L or BACN10GW-10 or NAS1804-10\nor LHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1 \n194 - 692\nLHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1 \n693 - 1832\n69-59074-1 \n\n\n\nBoeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C: \n\nLine No.\nFAA-approved engine mount cone bolt nut \n1 - 124\nLHEB220-108 or 69-59074-1\n125 -1585\n69-59074-1\n\t\t\t \n\tNo substitute shall be used for the LHEB220-108 or Boeing 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 60 days after the incorporation of paragraph A., above, conduct an inspection to verify that each installed engine mount cone bolt nut conforms to the approved type design as described in paragraph A., above, and, if the 69-59074-1 is installed, verify its authenticity. If the authenticity of the engine mount cone bolt nut 69-59074-1 cannot be verified, replace it with an authentic 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut prior to further flight. The authenticity of the FAA-approved 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nut is determined by the following method: \n\n\t\tThe only FAA-approved sources for the 69-59074-1 engine mount cone bolt nuts are The Boeing Company and Standard Press Steel. The authentic part markings of the engine mount cone bolt nuts are labeled on the vertical rim of the nut base at the largest diameter; nuts produced prior to 1969 may have the part marking on the sloping surface in lieu of the vertical rim. The authentic cone bolt nut is identified as "-SPS 69-59074-1-" with a single space between the "S" and "6" and absolutely no other markings. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 10 days after completion of the inspection required by paragraph B., above, for each airplane, submit a report of findings of counterfeit engine mount cone bolt nuts installed on the airplane to the Manager, Manufacturing Inspection Office, ANM-108, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168. This report must include the model of the airplane inspected, the date of inspection, and the number of cycles flown since the last engine maintenance where engine mount cone bolts were installed. \n\n\tNOTE: The report should be forwarded through the assigned air carrier Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will then send it to the Manager, Manufacturing Inspection Office, ANM-108. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternatemeans of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6342, AD 89-21-02) becomes effective on October 16, 1989.
50-04-01: 50-04-01 BRIGGS AND STRATTON: Applies to All Aircraft Equipped With Army Air Force Type A-8 Ignition Switches Manufactured by Briggs and Stratton. \n\n\tInitial compliance required not later than March 1, 1950, and every 100 hours operation thereafter. \n\n\tA serious hazard may exist on this type switch after considerable use has worn the internal switch lever stops, allowing overtravel past the "OFF" position. Such overtravel may allow the magneto ground to be broken and permit the engine to fire when the switch is in the "OFF" position. \n\n\tType A-8 ignition switches manufactured by Briggs and Stratton can be identified by the name Briggs and Stratton stamped on the rear of the switch case. Another distinguishing feature of this switch is a formed sheet metal lever which is not found on other makes of type A-8 switch. \n\n\t1.\tInspection should consist of the following: Check switch lever for overtravel past the "OFF" position. Figure 1 shows the location of the switch lever in the "OFF" position. The pointer projecting from the lever points to the middle "F" in the word "OFF". When the lever can be turned to a point beyond the centerline of the "O" in the word "OFF", the rotation stops have becomes worn and the switch should be replaced. \n\n\n\n\n\t2.\tThis inspection must be repeated at 100-hour intervals. \n\n\t3.\tInspection may be discontinued if switch is replaced by Type A-8 of another make or by some other satisfactory type ignition switch.