Results
94-25-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Raytheon Corporate Jets Model BAe 125-1000A series airplanes, that requires modification of the galley feeder cables and toilet services fuse. This amendment is prompted by a report that the gauge size of the existing galley feeder cable is not compatible with the rating of the currently used toilet services fuse. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the subject cables are compatible with the toilet services fuse in order to prevent overheating of the cables, which could result in smoke and fire in the cabin.
2008-10-10 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness by incorporating new limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. That AD also requires an initial inspection to phase in certain repetitive AWL inspections, and repair if necessary. This AD clarifies the intended effect of the AD on spare and on-airplane fuel tank system components. This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2020-26-01: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-03- 18, which applied to all Airbus SAS Model A318-111, -112, -121, and - 122 airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; and Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and - 233 airplanes. AD 2019-03-18 required repetitive general visual inspections for cracks, and replacement if necessary, of certain main landing gear (MLG) sliding tubes that were subject to improperly performed magnetic particle inspections. This AD continues to require repetitive general visual inspections of the affected MLG sliding tubes for cracks and replacement if necessary, and requires inspections, and replacement if necessary, of additional MLG sliding tubes; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by the identification of additional MLG sliding tubes that might have been subject to the same improperly performed magnetic particle inspection. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-10-05: 76-10-05 MOONEY: Amendment 39-2607. Applies to Models M20C (Serial Numbers 20-0010, 20-1147 through 20-1172), M20E (Serial Numbers 21-0038, 21-1161 through 21-1181, and M20F (Serial Numbers 22-1179 through 22-1272) airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next ten hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive unless already accomplished. To prevent fuel from leaking in the cabin as a result of a cracked diaphragm in the low fuel pressure switch, accomplish the following: (a) Remove the low fuel pressure warning system in accordance with Mooney Service Bulletin Number M20-193A dated April 1, 1976, or later FAA approved revision. A copy of this Service Bulletin can be obtained from Mooney Aircraft Corporation, Box 72, Kerrville, Texas 78028. (b) Any alternate equivalent method of compliance with this airworthiness directive must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight StandardsDivision, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. This amendment becomes effective May 19, 1976.
2003-26-09: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney PW4074, PW4074D, PW4077, PW4077D, PW4084, PW4084D, PW4090, PW4090D, PW4090-3, and PW4098 turbofan engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive visual and borescope inspections of the No. 3 bearing weep tube and turbine exhaust case (TEC), and removal of the high pressure turbine (HPT) assembly and replacement of any heat distressed HPT assembly hardware if oil wetting or staining is found. This ad requires the same actions. This AD results from the finding of a significant reference error in one of the borescope inspection compliance paragraphs. We are issuing this AD to prevent thermal distressed HPT assembly hardware from remaining in service, which could result in a cracked HPT stage 1 disk or HPT stage 1-2 air seal and an uncontained engine failure.
95-12-27: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, that currently requires a revision to the input wiring for the flap control unit (FCU). This amendment requires a new systems test for the wiring of the trailing edge flap, and also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include additional airplanes. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that a wiring error was not detected by the system test required by the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the possibility of an all-flaps-up landing due to the loss of control of all flap operations.
2003-26-06: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Anjou Aeronautique (ANJOU) (formerly TRW Repa S.A., formerly L'AIGLON) safety belts and restraint systems that are installed in aircraft. This AD requires you to inspect safety belts and restraint systems for defects and service life limits, and, if necessary, repair safety belts and restraint systems that have not reached service life limits; and replace safety belts and restraint systems that have reached service life limits. This AD is the result of reports of inadvertent unbuckling of the ANJOU seat belts and two safety recommendations to take AD action. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct defective safety belts and restraint systems, which could result in failure of the safety belts and restraint systems. This failure could lead to lack of occupant restraint during normal or crash loads.
76-12-09: 76-12-09 ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL: Amendment 39-2645. Applies to Model NA-265-70 airplanes, serial numbers 370-1 through 370-9, and Model NA-265-80 airplanes, serial numbers 380-1 through 380-42 and 380-44. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible in flight flutter due to an improper static balance of the rudder, accomplish the following: (A) Immediately upon receipt of this AD, notify the flight crewmembers by the most practicable means, of the maximum operating limit speed: 250K/0.8M. (B) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after receipt of this AD, effect the following operating limitations and install the following placards and markings in clear view of the pilots: (1) Install a placard adjacent to each airspeed indicator that reads: "MAXIMUM OPERATING LIMIT SPEED: 250/K0.8M" (2) Mark the face of each airspeed indicator with a red radial line at 250 knots. (C) Within 60 days after receiptof this AD accomplish the following: (1) Remove the rudder from the airplane and measure the rudder's static unbalance about the hinge line using a balance measuring procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, and (2) If the static unbalance measured exceeds the limits of 0 to 5 inch-lbs leading edge heavy, before further flight adjust the static balance to be within these limits by a modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. NOTE: Rockwell International intends to issue Sabreliner Service Bulletin No. 17 to provide the necessary instructions on rebalance. (D) The operating limitations, placards, and markings required by paragraph (B) may be removed after accomplishment of paragraph (C). (E) The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the placards and markings required by paragraph (B) can be installed or the balance inspection and rebalance procedure of paragraph (C) can be accomplished, provided the operating limitations of paragraph (B) are not exceeded. This amendment is effective June 23, 1976 for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by airmail letter dated May 21, 1976, which contained this amendment.
2009-26-14: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * As a consequence of cracks [that were originally] detected on some CN-235 aircraft, in flap fittings P/N 35-15501-0101, -0102, -0201 and -0202, attaching the structure of the outer flaps to their rear supports and, in the adjacent structure, DGAC Spain issued AD Nr. 01/97[.] * * * Since AD 1/97 Rev.1 was published, similar cracks have been detected in flaps longerons. * * * * * * * * Fatigue cracking of the rear internal support fittings and longerons of the outer flap structure could result in failure of the outer flaps, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correctthe unsafe condition on these products.
2009-26-12: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Lycoming Engines (formerly Textron Lycoming) models 320, 360, and 540 series, "Parallel Valve" reciprocating engines, with certain Engine Components, Inc. (ECi) cylinder assemblies, part number (P/N) AEL65102 series "Titan," installed. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and compression tests to detect cracks at the head-to-barrel interface, replacement of cylinder assemblies found cracked, and replacement of certain cylinder assemblies at new, reduced times-in-service. This AD requires the same actions, but for an expanded population of cylinder assemblies. This AD results from reports of 10 additional cylinder head separations since issuing AD 2008-19-05, on cylinder serial numbers not listed in that AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power due to cracks at the head-to-barrel interface and possible engine failure caused by separation of a cylinder head, which could result in loss of control of the aircraft.