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2009-20-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Honeywell International, the manufacturer of the SPZ200 autopilot system installed on the EADS-CASA C-212 series aircraft, has identified a series of servo-motors * * * designed for use in the SPZ200 autopilot system, whose failure can lead to a potential unsafe flight condition. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is failure of the servo-motors, which could result in roll oscillations or possible hard-over failures when the autopilot is engaged. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
64-19-01: 64-19-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 787 Part 507 Federal Register August 7, 1964. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAs a result of several incidents involving loss of air conditioning bay access doors, accomplish the following:\n \n\t(a)\tWithin 550 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 2,500 hours' time in service, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 3,050 hours' time in service from the last inspection: \n\n\t\t(1)\tOn all Models 707 and 720 Series aircraft, inspect for lobe wear the five hinges on the left and right-hand air conditioning bay access doors and the mating hinges located on the bottom of the fuselage between fuselage Station 620 and 820.\n \n\t\t(2)\tRemove any hinges that have lobe wall thicknesses less than 0.030 inches and replace with new hinges of the same part number or an FAA approved equivalent hinge, before further flight.\n \n\t\t(3)\tOn aircraft Serial Numbers17586 through 17619, 17623 through 17626, 17628 through 17652, 17658 through 17673, 17675 through 17684, 17692 through 17706, 17718 through 17720, 17722 through 17724, 17903 through 17905, 17907 through 17909, 17925 through 17927 and 18013, visually inspect the air conditioning bay access doorframes and the hinges thereon for cracks around the rivets attaching the hinges to the door. Before further flight, replace cracked hinges with hinges of the same part number or an FAA-approved hinge, and if the doorframes are cracked, either replace the doors with new doors or repair them in accordance with the applicable Boeing Structural Repair Manual, or repair data approved by a Boeing Structural Designated Engineering Representative (DER). \n\n\t(b)\tThe inspections specified in (a)(3) may be discontinued when reinforcement plates and bolts are added to the access doors in accordance with Paragraph 3, Modification Data, of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 879, dated July 8, 1960, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division, approved equivalent. \n\n\t(c)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 879 pertains to this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective September 7, 1964.
85-09-02: 85-09-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-5057. Applies to all Model 767-200 airplanes, certificated in all categories, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005, dated March 29, 1985. This AD is required to detect or avert cracked horizontal stabilizer pivot pins which could fail during flight, resulting in a reduction in the controllability of the airplane. \n\n\tUnless already accomplished, accomplish the following prior to the accumulation of 6,000 total landings, or within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005, dated March 29, 1985, or later FAA approved revision: \n\n\tA.\tRemove the horizontal stabilizer inner pivot pins and ultrasonically inspect the outer pins for cracks. \n\n\tB.\tIf an outer pivot pin is found cracked, replace it with an improved outer pivot pin before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tReplace the inner pivot pins with improved inner pivot pins, whether or not cracks are found in the outer pin. \n\n\tD.\tIf no cracks are found in the outer pivot pin, the joint must be reassembled with a new inner pivot pin and the existing outer pivot pin must thereafter be reinspected at intervals not to exceed 12,000 landings. \n\n\tTerminating action for the repeat inspections of the outer pivot pin consists of replacing the existing outer pivot pin with an improved outer pivot pin, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005 dated March 29, 1985, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 20, 1985.
2009-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) O-470, IO-470, TSIO-470, IO-520, TSIO-520, IO-550, and IOF-550 series reciprocating engines with TCM EQ3 cylinders installed. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of TCM EQ3 cylinders for cracks. This AD also requires removal of all EQ3 cylinders as terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections. This AD results from reports of 35 EQ3 cylinders found cracked. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power due to cracks in the cylinder head, possible engine failure, and fire in the engine compartment.
62-12-01: 62-12-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 441 Part 507 Federal Register May 23, 1962. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft With DC Type Toilet Flushing Motor Installed. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been several cases of fires originating in the electrical system of the d.c. type toilet flushing motor. To eliminate this unsafe condition, rework of the toilet motor electrical circuit and added protection against moisture entering the circuit components in the toilet area are required. Within the next 360 hours' time in service for paragraph (a) and 1,000 hours' time in service for paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, the following shall be accomplished in accordance with Modification Instructions of Monogram Precision Industries' Service Bulletin No. 35 BAC, dated February 22, 1962, or an FAA approved equivalent. \n\n\t(a)\tReduce the exposure of the system to d.c. voltage by changing the wiring inside the timer so that voltage is applied to the flushing motor during the flushing operation only. \n\n\t(b)\tIncrease the protection from moisture of the connector attached to the pigtail of the flushing motor by moving the connector from the bracket on the flushing motor to a bracket mounted behind the vertical shroud support. \n\n\t(c)\tProvide an improved moisture seal where the wires enter the flushing motor by trimming back the shielding and installing thermo fit sleeving over the wires, and repotting. \n\n\t(d)\tReduce the susceptibility of moisture entering connectors by replacing the potting compound of the connectors attached to the harness and to the motor pigtail with resilient inserts and grommets and supporting the wires with cable clamps attached to the connectors. \n\n\t(Monogram Precision Industries' Service Bulletin No. 35 BAC, covers this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective May 23, 1962.
55-18-02: 55-18-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-6 Series Aircraft That Are Not Equipped With the New Douglas Type Propeller Reverse Thrust Mechanical Throttle Lockgate. \n\n\tCompliance required as soon as practicable but not later than January 1, 1957. \n\n\t1.\tBecause of instances of inadvertent propeller reversing due to malfunctioning of the solenoid operated throttle locks and improper operation of throttles at time of touchdown on landing, a more positive means of preventing inadvertent movement of the throttles into the reverse segment of the throttle quadrant must be installed. \n\n\t2.\tThis modification consists of the installation of a protective device which will require a separate and distinct motion by the flight crew member accomplishing the reversing, in order to place the throttles in reverse pitch range. It must also provide safeguards against disarming or unlocking of this protective device when the throttle levers are further forward than idle setting or, if it is possible to unlock at a forward power setting, movement of the throttles toward idle from slow cruise or landing gear warning positions shall reengage the lock prior to reaching the idle position. \n\n\t3.\tDouglas Service Bulletin DC-6 No. 557 revised October 15, 1954, covering this modification is an acceptable method of compliance. This bulletin also provides for the continuous operation of the feathering motors during reverse thrust, installs timers to control feathering pump operation during feathering, and deletes the propeller governor pressure cutout switch from the holding circuit. These latter changes, although desirable, are not mandatory. \n\n\t4.\tIt is possible that some aircraft have already been modified by installation of a protective device which differs in arrangement and detail from the provisions of the Douglas Bulletin. Such alternate designs may be acceptable if the objectives of this directive, as expressed in paragraph 2, have been met. However, because of the many technical considerations involved, all alternate methods of accomplishing this modification should be referred to FAA for engineering evaluation and approval.
72-25-03: 72-25-03 BOEING: Amdt. 39-1560 as amended by Amendment 39-1575 is further amended by Amendment 39-1596. Applies to main landing gear beams made from 7079-T6 material on all Model 727 Series Airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance required as indicated: \n\tTo detect cracks in the main landing gear trunnion support beam, accomplish the following: \n\t(a)\tInspect all beams in accordance with (c) below within 600 hours time in service or 90 days from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 90 days, whichever occurs first. \n\t(b)\tInspect all beams in accordance with (d) below within 1200 hours time service or 180 days, whichever occurs first, except parts nos. 65-16230-23, -24, -25 and -26, and those beams sleeved in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-122 dated October 15, 1971, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(c)\tUltrasonically inspect the bearing bore in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-119, Revision 2, dated 14 November 1972 or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t(d)\tEddy-current inspect inside the trunnion bore in accordance with Boeing nondestructive test document No. D6-7170, Part 6, 57-10-27 Figure 1, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Reinstall the bearing in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-120, Revision 1, dated 9 July 1971 or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(e)\tAny beam in which evidence of a crack in the bearing bore is found must, prior to further flight, be replaced with a beam inspected per this AD and found to be uncracked, or reworked in accordance with instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-120, Revision 1, dated 9 July 1971 or later FAA approved revisions, or in accordance with instructions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t(f)\t(1)\tLanding gear beams, part numbers 65-16230-23, -24, -25 and -26, and those beams sleeved in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-122 dated 15 October 1971 or later FAA approved revisions, must be replaced with the redesigned beam (P/N 65-62335) no later than 1 July 1974. \n\t\t(2)\tAll other beams must be replaced with the redesigned beam (P/N 65-62335) no later than 1 January 1974. \n\t(g)\tAirplanes having cracked landing gear beams which require replacement under this AD may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement of parts can be accomplished. \n\t(h)\tAs an alternative to the inspection required in paragraph (b) above, those beams which will be replaced prior to July 1, 1973 need not be inspected in accordance with paragraph (d) above. Those beams allowed to remain in service beyond the time intervals specified in paragraph (b) must be replaced by July 1, 1973. Operators must assurethemselves of parts availability prior to electing this alternative.\n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-1162 as amended by 39-1306 (AD 71-5-4). \n\tAmendment 39-1560 became effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated 10 November 1972. \n\tAmendment 39-1575 became effective 26 December 1972. \n\tThis Amendment 39-1596 becomes effective March 2, 1973.
2009-20-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking and corrosion of the upper link fuse pin of the nacelle struts, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from two reports of cracked upper link fuse pins. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking or corrosion of the upper link fuse pin, which could result in failure of the fuse pin and consequent reduced structural integrity of the nacelle strut and possible separation of the strut and engine from the airplane during flight.
2009-07-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain BEECH Model 400, 400A, and MU-300-10 airplanes. That AD currently requires installation of an improved adjustment mechanism on the flightcrew seats and replacement of the existing aluminum seat reinforcement assemblies with steel assemblies. This new AD would add airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. This AD results from reports of incomplete latching of the existing adjustment mechanism and cracked reinforcement assemblies, which could result in sudden shifting of a flightcrew seat. We are issuing this AD to prevent sudden shifting of a flightcrew seat, which could impair the flightcrew's ability to control the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective April 30, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of April 30, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication as of March 13, 1996 (61 FR 5275, February 12, 1996).
76-13-09: 76-13-09\tTELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS: Amendment 39-2655 as amended by Amendment 39- 2691. Applies to Teledyne Continental Motors Model TSIO-520-L, serial numbers 508000 through 508164, and serial numbers 508166 through 508261. \n\tCompliance required within the next ten hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. Inspections covered in steps 1, 2, 3 and 4 below must be repeated each 25 hours time in service from the initial inspection until replaced by a new elbow TCM Part Number 642067 and new exhaust flange TCM Part Number 642066. \n\tTo detect cracks in the left hand rear exhaust elbow, P/N 640708, and the left and right hand flanges on the exhaust to turbo adapter, P/N 640712, and to provide sufficient end clearance between the connector tube assembly, P/N 640711, and the connector tube, P/N 640710, inspect, repair or replace, as required, in accordance with the following procedure: \n\t1.\tRemove couplings, P/N 641284, from each side of the adapter. \n\t2.\tRemove the left hand elbow, (2-4-6 side), P/N 640708, and carefully inspect in the area of the weld closest to the flange, and the flange fillet radius (see illustration for cracks). \n\t3.\tCheck elbow (2-4-6 side), P/N 640708, for distortion in the area shown below (see illustration). \n\n\n\t4.\tIf any cracks are evident and/or distortion is readily discernible, replace the elbow (2-4-6), P/N 640708. (Replace with new elbow 642067 and flange 642066 when parts become available.) \n\t5.\tSlip the connector, P/N 640711, to the right on the elbow (1-3-5 side), P/N 640710, until it bottoms out. With the flanges aligned, the gap between the flange on the turbo adapter (P/N 640712) and the flange on the connector (P/N 640711) must exceed .250 inches but not exceed .500 inches all the way around as shown in illustration. If this gap is less than .250 inches, remove sufficient material from the end of the elbow (1-3-5 side), P/N 640710, to provide .250 to .380 inch gap. If thegap exceeds .500 inches, replace the elbow (1-3-5 side), P/N 640710, with one meeting this inspection requirement. \n\t6.\tRemove the turbo adapter, P/N 640712, from the engine. Carefully inspect the turbo adapter, P/N 640712, for cracks in the flange fillet radii (see illustration). If cracks are observed, replace. \n\t7.\tUsing suitable micrometers or dial indicator calipers, inspect the turbo adapter, P/N 640712, wall thickness in the machined area adjacent to the flange fillet radius on the entire circumference. The minimum allowable thickness is .075 inches (see illustration). If the wall thickness is less than .075 inches in any local area, replace the turbo adapter, P/N 640712, with one meeting this inspection requirement. \n\t8.\tReinstall couplings, P/N 641284. Insure flanges are symmetrically aligned. Tighten couplings to approximately 42 in. lbs. torque. Tap outer periphery of band to distribute tension, then tighten to 50 to 60 in. lbs. of torque. \n\tTCM Service Bulletin M76-14 covers this subject. \n\tAmendment 39-2655 became effective July 15, 1976. \n\tThis amendment 39-2691 becomes effective August 26, 1976.
58-05-02: 58-05-02 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. In accordance with British Air Registration Board's list of "Essential Modifications and Inspections" compliance with the following Vickers-Armstrong corrective measures is considered mandatory. The FAA concurs and considers compliance therewith mandatory. Compliance provisions are detailed in the Vickers publications referenced in each item. A. INSPECTION AND MODIFICATION OF ENGINE NACELLE ATTACHMENT FITTINGS AT WING STATION 257.75. Inspections for cracks in ribs and fittings as detailed in PTL No. 34, Issue 2 are required every 300 hours until the incorporation of modified nacelle attachment fittings, per Part (b) of Mod. D.1208, Issue 3. B. INSPECTION AND MODIFICATION OF TOP REAR INBOARD NACELLE STRUTS. Inspections for cracks of top rear inboard and outboard nacelle struts and inboard and outboard accessory gearbox stay tubes on Nos. 2 and 3 engine nacelles as detailed in PTL No. 87, issue 2 are require until the incorporation of Mod. D.1742. C. Superseded by AD 61-20-04. D. LIFE LIMITATION OF FLAP GEAR UNIVERSAL JOINT TRUNNIONS P/N's 60903-1655 and 70184-403. Flap gear universal joint trunnion P/N 60903-1655 is limited to a life of 1,500 flights due to the possibility of fatigue cracks developing. Trunnions P/N 60903-1655 exceeding this life should be replaced within the next 50 flights with replacement parts to Mod. D.2188 standard, or removed and inspected for cracks in accordance with PTL 153, issue 3, and if found serviceable may be replaced provided they are inspected at intervals not exceeding 200 flights. When a universal joint trunnion to Mod. D.2188 standard is used as a replacement, it is essential to use a universal joint block to the same modification standard. The safe life of the revised universal joint trunnion P/N 70184-403 to Mod. D.2188 standard is now limited to 3,000 flights. (Vickers-Armstrong PTL153, issued 3, and Mod. D.2188 cover this subject.) E. Superseded by AD 61-20-04.
T98-26-51: T98-26-51 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: TELEGRAPHIC AD ISSUED ON DECEMBER 18, 1998. DOCKET NO. 98-NM-379.\t\n\n\tAPPLICABILITY: MODEL DC-8 SERIES AIRPLANES THAT HAVE BEEN CONVERTED FROM A PASSENGER-CARRYING TO A CARGO-CARRYING ("FREIGHTER") CONFIGURATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATE (STC) SA1802SO.\n\n\tNOTE 1: THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD APPLIES TO EACH AIRPLANE IDENTIFIED IN THE PRECEDING APPLICABILITY PROVISION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT HAS BEEN OTHERWISE MODIFIED, ALTERED, OR REPAIRED IN THE AREA SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD. FOR AIRPLANES THAT HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, ALTERED, OR REPAIRED SO THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD IS AFFECTED, THE OWNER/OPERATOR MUST REQUEST APPROVAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF COMPLIANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH (E) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD. THE REQUEST SHOULD INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF THE MODIFICATION, ALTERATION, OR REPAIR ON THE UNSAFE CONDITION ADDRESSED BY THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD; AND, IF THE UNSAFE CONDITION HAS NOT BEEN ELIMINATED, THE REQUEST SHOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROPOSED ACTIONS TO ADDRESS IT. \n\n\tCOMPLIANCE: REQUIRED AS INDICATED, UNLESS ACCOMPLISHED PREVIOUSLY.\n\n\tTO DETECT AND CORRECT FATIGUE CRACKING IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE MAIN DECK CARGO DOOR, WHICH COULD RESULT IN CABIN DECOMPRESSION OF THE AIRPLANE AND LOSS OF THE MAIN DECK CARGO DOOR, AND CONSEQUENT REDUCED CONTROLLABILITY OF THE AIRPLANE, ACCOMPLISH THE FOLLOWING:\n\n\t(A) WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, REVISE THE LIMITATIONS SECTION OF THE FAA-APPROVED AIRPLANE FLIGHT MANUAL TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION. THIS MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INSERTING A COPY OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD INTO THE AFM.\n\n\t"IF ANY UNEXPECTED LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURE OCCURS, DO NOT INCREASE CABIN PRESSURE. IMMEDIATELY SELECT A HIGHER CABIN ALTITUDE AND, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DESCEND TO A LOWER FLIGHT ALTITUDE."\n\n\t(B) EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY PARAGRAPH (D) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, WITHIN 7 DAYS AFTERRECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD: PERFORM AN INTERNAL DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION TO DETECT CRACKING OR ANY DISCREPANCY OF THE MAIN DECK CARGO DOOR IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE BOLTS ATTACHING THE LATCH FITTINGS. INSPECT FOR CRACKING OR ANY DISCREPANCY OF THE SKIN IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF THE FASTENER HEADS, AND LOOSE OR MISSING FASTENERS. IN ADDITION, PRIOR TO THE INTERNAL DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION, CLEAN AND DEGREASE THE INSIDE STRUCTURE WHERE THE LATCH FITTING BOLTS ATTACH TO THE FRAMES, AND PERFORM A DETAILED VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE FRAMES TO DETECT CRACKING EMANATING FROM THE BOLT HOLES AND AT THE BEND RADIUS OF THE FRAMES.\n\n\tNOTE 2: REMOVAL OF THE INNER SKIN OF THE MAIN DECK CARGO DOOR IS NOT NECESSARY TO GAIN ACCESS AND INSPECT FOR CRACKING EMANATING FROM THE BOLT HOLES AND AT THE BEND RADIUS OF THE FRAMES.\n\n\t(C) PRIOR TO ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INSPECTION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, NOTIFY AN APPROPRIATE FAA PRINCIPAL MAINTENANCE INSPECTOR OF THE DATE AND TIME THE INSPECTION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD IS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.\n\n\t(D) FOR AIRPLANES ON WHICH THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION ANOMALIES OR ILLUMINATIONS OF THE MAIN DECK CARGO DOOR WARNING LIGHT WITHIN 30 DAYS PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD OR WITHIN 7 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD: PERFORM THE INSPECTION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD PRIOR TO FURTHER FLIGHT.\n\n\t(E) IF ANY DISCREPANCY IS DETECTED DURING THE INSPECTION REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, PRIOR TO FURTHER FLIGHT, REPAIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH A METHOD APPROVED BY THE MANAGER, ATLANTA AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION OFFICE (ACO), FAA, SMALL AIRPLANE DIRECTORATE.\n\n\t(F) WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH (B) OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, OR WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, WHICHEVER OCCURS LATER, SUBMIT A REPORT OF THE INSPECTION RESULTS (BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FINDINGS) TO THE MANAGER, ATLANTA ACO, FAA, SMALL AIRPLANE DIRECTORATE, ONE CROWN CENTER, 1895 PHOENIX BOULEVARD, SUITE 450, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30349; FAX (770) 703-6097. INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS REGULATION HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB) UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 ET SEQ.) AND HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED OMB CONTROL NUMBER 2120-0056.\n\n\t(G) AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF COMPLIANCE OR ADJUSTMENT OF THE COMPLIANCE TIME THAT PROVIDES AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SAFETY MAY BE USED IF APPROVED BY THE MANAGER, ATLANTA ACO. OPERATORS SHALL SUBMIT THEIR REQUESTS THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE FAA PRINCIPAL MAINTENANCE INSPECTOR, WHO MAY ADD COMMENTS AND THEN SEND IT TO THE MANAGER, ATLANTA ACO.\n\n\tNOTE 3: INFORMATION CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF APPROVED ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD, IF ANY, MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE ATLANTA ACO.\n\n\t(H) SPECIAL FLIGHT PERMITS MAY BE ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 21.197 AND 21.199 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS (14 CFR 21.197 AND 21.199) TO OPERATE THE AIRPLANE TO A LOCATION WHERE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS TELEGRAPHIC AD CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. \n\n\t(I) TELEGRAPHIC AD T98-26-51, ISSUED ON DECEMBER 18, 1998, BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT.\n\nFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: \nRANY AZZI, AEROSPACE ENGINEER, AIRFRAME AND PROPULSION BRANCH, ACE-117A, FAA, SMALL AIRPLANE DIRECTORATE, ATLANTA AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION OFFICE, ONE CROWN CENTER, 1895 PHOENIX BOULEVARD, SUITE 450, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30337-2748; TELEPHONE (770) 703-6080; FAX (770) 703-6097.
86-23-01: 86-23-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-5450. Applies to all Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in any category, line numbers 1 through 644. \n\n\tTo prevent separation of an engine due to failed H-11 bolts, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to accumulation of 10,000 flight hours, or within 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a visual inspection of the outboard attach fitting H-11 bolts of all nacelle struts for structural integrity to determine if any H-11 bolts have failed, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. Repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 7-1/2 months. \n\n\tB.\tPrior to accumulation of 10,000 flight hours, or within 600 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a visual inspection of the inboard attach fitting joints of all nacelle struts for structural integrity to determine if any H-11 bolts have failed, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. Repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 15 months. \n\n\tC.\tFailed bolts must be replaced prior to further flight. \n\n\tD.\tInstallation of the Inconel replacement bolts in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph A. and B., above. \n\n\tE.\tWithin 24 months after the effective date of this AD, replace all remaining H-11 bolts on the outboard attach fitting of all nacelle struts with Inconel bolts in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tF.\tWithin 48 months after the effective date of this AD, replace all remaining H-11 bolts on the inboard attach fitting of all nacelle struts with Inconel bolts inaccordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tG.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tH.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tI.\tFor the H-11 bolts that utilized the BACN10HR162 nuts, the accomplishment of the inspection requirements of AD 86-05-11 (Amendment 39-5255) is considered an acceptable alternate means of compliance for the initial inspection requirements of paragraph A. and B. of this AD. \n\n\tNOTE: Inspections performed in accordance with Boeing Service Letter Number 747- SL-57-47, dated April 24, 1986, are considered equivalent to those performed in accordancewith Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2235, dated June 27, 1986. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective December 1, 1986.
2009-20-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a pre-flight inspection of a DG-100 sailplane, a rod end of the aileron control push-rod at the control column was found broken. The investigation revealed that the broken rod end was made of machining steel as initially used in the first years at Glaser- Dirks. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-06-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [S]everal cases of wing anti-ice piccolo duct failure reported on CL-600-2B19 (CRJ) aircraft. Although there have been no failures reported on Challenger aircraft, similar ducts are installed on the above Challenger models. * * * * * Cracking of the wing anti-ice piccolo ducts could result in air leakage, with an adverse effect on the anti-ice air distribution pattern and a possible unannunciated insufficient heat condition. * * * The unsafe condition is anti-ice system air leakage with a possible adverse effect on the anti-ice air distribution pattern and anti-ice capability without annunciation to the flightcrew, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-20-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases of cracks on the main landing gear (MLG) door hinge fitting and MLG door actuator fitting on the keel beam were reported. Such failure could lead to the loss [of] the MLG door and could cause damage to the aircraft and/or hazard to persons or property on the ground. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757-200, 757-200PF, and 757-300 series airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, measuring the electrical bond resistance at certain stations and doing any applicable repair; installing support brackets for the hot short protector and new support clamps for the wire bundles; installing the equipment of the hot short protector; and modifying an existing wire bundle and installing a new wire bundle. This AD also requires, for certain other airplanes, measuring the electrical bond resistance at certain stations, measuring the electrical bonding resistance between the hot short protector and rear spar web, and doing any applicable repair. This AD also requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the center fuel tank densitometer fromoverheating and becoming a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
87-06-03: 87-06-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-5581. Applies to Boeing Model 707-300 series airplanes modified in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA2699NM, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent loss of engine cowl, within the next 50 hours time in service, or within 30 days, whichever occurs earlier after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect and rework as required, each engine nose cowl extension attach bolt, bolt spacer, aft flange of the nose cowl extension and the engine case in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of Tracor Service Bulletin Q707-71-016, Revision 1, dated January 2, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Tracor Aviation, Inc., 495 South Fairview Avenue, Goleta, California 93117, Attention: Customer Services. This information may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 30, 1987.
90-18-01: 90-18-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6709. Docket No. 90-NM-35-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model DC-10 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of a cargo door in flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this AD, install hinge pin retainers on each end of all cargo door hinges, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 52-129, Revision 1, dated July 23, 1975. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 18 months after the effective date of this AD, install a vent door-open indicating system on the main deck cargo door equipped with a vent door, which is approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, that will signal the appropriate flightcrew member when the main cargo door vent door is not fully closed and latched. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of thecompliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes unpressurized to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California, Attention Manager, Technical Publication Operation C1-L71 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport AirplaneDirectorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, S.W., Renton, Washington, or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6709, AD 90-18-01) becomes effective on September 30, 1990.
92-17-10: 92-17-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-8339. Docket No. 92-NM-30-AD. Supersedes AD 91-24-10, Amendment 39-8096. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes; line positions 001 through 408, inclusive; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent uncommanded spoiler deployments caused by failed spoiler Power Control Actuators (PCA), accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 10 days after December 2, 1991 (the effective date of AD 91-24-10, amendment 39-8096), incorporate the following procedures into the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM. \n\n\t\t"If, upon selection of flap 25 or 30, the SPOILERS EICAS message is \t\t observed, uncommanded airplane roll is encountered, or sustained control \t\twheel displacement is required, immediately retract flaps to 20 and use flaps \t\t20 and Vref 20 for landing. Select the ground proximity flap override switch to \t\toverride." \n\n\t(b)\tIf, upon selection of flap 25 or 30, the SPOILERS EICAS message is observed, the SPOILERS caution light illuminates, or uncommanded airplane roll is encountered, prior to further flight, determine if a spoiler PCA fault ball is displayed on any of the spoiler control modules. If a spoiler fault ball is displayed, prior to further flight, identify the failed spoiler PCA pair and replace both spoiler PCA's, unless the direction of the roll upset is known, in which case only the spoiler PCA in the wing of the roll direction must be replaced. Any spoiler PCA that has been removed in accordance with this paragraph must not be installed on any airplane until the spoiler PCA is modified in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0105, dated December 5, 1991. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin 24 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the PCA's on all outboard spoilers (positions 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, and 12), in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0105, dated December 5, 1991. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin 48 months after the effective date of this AD, replace the PCA's on all inboard spoilers (positions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9), in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0105, dated December 5, 1991. \n\n\t(e)\tReplacement of all spoiler PCA's, as required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this AD, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD for that airplane. Once replacement is accomplished, the operating limitations required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD may be removed. \n\n\t(f)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send itto the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(g)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(h)\tThe replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0105, dated December 5, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., 7th Floor, Suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(i)\tThis amendment becomes effective onSeptember 28, 1992.
2009-20-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires inspections for cracking of the left- and right-side shear ties and web posts of the kickload beam and the adjacent structure in the vertical stabilizer, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of cracking of the left- and right-side web posts and shear ties of the kickload beam. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the left- and right-side web posts and shear ties of the kickload beam, which, when coupled with failures in the adjacent structure, could result in structural failure of the vertical stabilizer, and loss of control of the airplane.
93-14-10: 93-14-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-8634. Docket 92-NM-161-AD. Supersedes AD 87-06-08 R1, Amendment 39-5763. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-200 and -300 series airplanes, line numbers 6 through 1204, inclusive; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tNOTE 1: Paragraph (a) of this AD restates the requirements of paragraph (a) of AD 87-06-08 R1, amendment 39-5763. As allowed by the phrase, "unless accomplished previously," if the requirements of paragraph (a) of AD 87-06-08 R1 have been accomplished previously, paragraph (a) of this AD does not require that they be repeated. \n\n\tTo prevent the development of undetected frame cracking, which could result in rapid loss of cabin pressure, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 20,000 landings, or within 1,000 landings after December 17, 1987 (the effective date of AD 87-06-08 R1, amendment 39-5763), whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 3,000 landings prior to December 17, 1987, conduct a close visual inspection to detect cracks of the forward and aft body frames adjacent to the aft lower cargo door, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, dated July 24, 1986; or Revision 1, dated April 2, 1987; or Revision 2, dated July 30, 1987; or Revision 3, dated February 8, 1990; or Revision 4, dated February 14, 1991; or Revision 5, dated January 16, 1992. Thereafter, repeat the detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings. \n\n\t(b)\tIf any crack is detected during any of the inspections required by this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD, as applicable: \n\n\t\t(1)\tModify or repair the crack in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 1, dated April 2, 1987; or Revision 2, dated July 30, 1987; or Revision 3, dated February 8, 1990; or Revision 4, dated February 14, 1991; or Revision5, dated January 16, 1992. After modification or repair, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (d) of this AD. \n\n\tNOTE 2: Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this AD constitutes compliance for the modification and crack repair recommendations of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, as mandated by AD 90-06-02, amendment 39-6489. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf any crack is found that does not exceed the limits specified in the Boeing 737 Structural Repair Manual (SRM), the crack may be temporarily repaired in accordance with the SRM. After such repair is accomplished, repeat the close visual inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings until modification or repair is accomplished in accordance with the service bulletins specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this AD. After such modification or repair, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (d) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tIf no crack is detected during any of the inspections required by thisAD, repeat the close visual inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings until modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 1, dated April 2, 1987; or Revision 2, dated July 30, 1987; or Revision 3, dated February 8, 1990; or Revision 4, dated February 14, 1991; or Revision 5, dated January 16, 1992. After modification, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (d) of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tFor any area that is modified or repaired in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, initial release, dated July 24, 1986; Revision 1, dated April 2, 1987; Revision 2, dated July 30, 1987; Revision 3, dated February 8, 1990; Revision 4, dated February 14, 1991; or Revision 5, dated January 16, 1992: Prior to the accumulation of 28,000 landings after the modification or repair has been accomplished, or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not toexceed 4,000 landings, conduct a detailed visual inspection to detect cracks of the forward and aft body frames adjacent to the aft lower cargo door, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t(e)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(f)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(g)\tThe inspections, modification, and repairs shallbe done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, initial release, dated July 24, 1986; or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 1, dated April 2, 1987; or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 2, dated July 30, 1987; or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 3, dated February 8, 1990; or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 4, dated February 14, 1991; or Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096, Revision 5, dated January 16, 1992, as applicable. Revision 2 of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1096 contains the specified effective pages: \n\n\n\nDate Page Number\nShown on Page\nShown on Page \n1-2, 4-18, 23\n2\nJuly 30, 1987 \n3, 19-22, 24\n1\nApril 2, 1987 \n\nThis incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.\n \n\t(h)\tThis amendment becomes effective on September 16, 1993.
67-31-01: 67-31-01 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-510, Part 39, Federal Register November 10, 1967. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of the flap secondary transmission shaft, Hobson P/N CHA561- 067, located between the Number 1 and Number 2 screw jacks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 350 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 1,500 landings, whichever occurs later, visually insect the flap secondary transmission shafts, Hobson P/N CHA 561-067, located between the Number 1 and Number 2 screw jack positions, for failure or signs of frettage deposit around each end and fitting and each fairlead sleeve, in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin No. 27-A-PM 3034, Issue 1, dated June 5, 1967, or later ARB-approved issue or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. (b) If a frettage deposit is detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a), repeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 70 landings from the last inspection. (c) If a frettage deposit is not detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a), repeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 350 landings from the last inspection. (d) Replace failure flap secondary transmission shafts, Hobson P/N CHA 561-067, before further flight with a new shaft of the same part number or with a shaft repaired in accordance with BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin No. 27-A-PM 3034, Issue 1, dated June 5, 1967, or later ARB-approved issue, or an equivalent repair approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. Continue the inspections required by paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) for the replacement or repaired shafts. (e) The inspections requiredby paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be discontinued when the airplanes are modified in accordance with BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin 27 PM 3034, Part (a), or later ARB-approved issue, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. (f) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. This amendment effective December 11, 1967.
68-18-04: 68-18-04 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-649. Applies to all Model DC-8 Series 62 and 63 Airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 35 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate possible intermittent brake release at high ground speed due to anti-skid control box inop light logic card malfunction, either deactivate the anti-skid inop light logic card as follows: \n\n\t(1)\tDisconnect wire No. G13AA24 from terminal 18 on terminal strip No. S3-192 and end cap coil and stow, and \n\n\t(2)\tAdd the following wires: \n\n\t\t(a)\tOne routed from terminal board No. S3-192, Terminal 18 to the anti-skid control relay No. R2-300, Terminal A3. \n\n\t\t(b)\tOne routed from anti-skid control relay No. R2-300, Terminal A2 to Terminal X2; or \n\n\tInstall a placard stating: "Operation Limitation - Anti-skid inop performance field lengths must be used for all aircraft operations," in view of the pilot, until the modification has been completed. \n\n\tReference McDonnell Douglas Wiring Diagram No. 32-3-0. The modification location is in the accessory compartment adjacent to the anti-skid control box. This modification replaces the function of the anti-skid control box inop light logic card by using available contacts on the existing aircraft anti-skid control relay No. R2-300 to accomplish the same function. \n\n\tThis limitation affects only the aircraft operation and does not require that the anti-skid system be made inoperative. The placard limitation may be removed upon completion of the modification described above. (McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin No. A32-135 DC-8 SC 2090, covers this same modification.) \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective immediately for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated August 22, 1968.
53-25-01: 53-25-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to Model DC-6 Series Aircraft as Indicated Below. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been several instances wherein cracks have been found in the aileron-cross upper pivot end. In order to preclude the occurrences of additional failures of this part, an inspection should be made as described below. The accomplishment of this directive is for inspection and/or replacement of the upper pivot end of the aileron-cross bellcrack tube located in the center wing fuselage section at Station 479. \n\n\t1.\tInspection (Fuselage Nos. 1 through 434). \n\n\t\tFollowing inspection must be conducted: \n\n\t\t(A)\tOn all DC-6A and DC-6B aircraft and on all DC-6 aircraft incorporating the DC-6B type dual flying tab installation, as soon as practicable but not later than the next 50 hours of operation, unless the inspection has already been accomplished. \n\n\t\t(B)\tOn all DC-6, -6A and -6B aircraft at each airplane overhaul period or after each 2,000 hours ofoperation, whichever occurs first and after each time the airplane is exposed to high ground gust conditions. This inspection is to be repeated at each 2,000-hour period until parts are replaced as described below. Using at least an 8-power magnifying glass and/or dye penetrant method or equivalent, make inspection for cracks at the shoulder corner radius of the aileron-cross upper pivot end P/N 4359401, that supports the bellcrank bearing. If cracks are found install new parts as indicated in item 2 before next scheduled flight. \n\n\t2.\tRework (Fuselage Nos. 1 through 434). \n\n\t\tIf cracks are found in the aileron-cross upper pivot end P/N 4339401, the part should be replaced with a new pivot end assembly P/N 4492248 and a new bellcrank arm assembly P/N 4492247 in accordance with the rework procedures outlined in Douglas Service Letter No. 153 Supplement No. 2 dated December 4, 1953. New parts will be installed in production effective on fuselage No. 435 and subsequent. \n\n\t3.\tPreventive Installation (DC-6 Series as Indicated). \n\n\t\tTo eliminate the tendency for the aileron control tabs to flap during high ground gust conditions, a preloaded centering spring mechanism P/M 3405566 may be installed on DC-6 Series aircraft as listed in Douglas Service Letter No. 159 dated May 28, 1953. A new trim tab mechanism will be installed in production effective on fuselage Nos. 420 and subsequent. \n\n\t4.\tOperations Information. \n\n\t\tDuring ground operation in high gust conditions with gust locks on, any tendency for the control wheel to move may be resisted by holding the wheel in neutral. Restraint should not be applied by holding wheel against the stops. The FAA-approved Airplane Operating Manual should be revised to include this information. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter No. 153 dated April 28, 1953, also covers this same subject.)