Results
2019-15-08: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-07- 05, which applied to all Airbus Model A300 B2, A300 B4, A300 B4-600, and A300 B4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 F4-605R airplanes. AD 2002-07-05 required repetitive inspections for cracking of certain fittings, corrective action if necessary, and, for certain airplanes, a modification. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of certain fittings, corrective actions if necessary, and, for certain airplanes, a modification; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a determination that, for certain airplanes, the existing inspection compliance times were not sufficient to address the unsafe condition and needed to be reduced. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-03-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Schempp-Hirth K.G. (Schempp-Hirth) Models Standard-Cirrus, Nimbus-2, JANUS, and Mini-Nimbus HS-7 sailplanes. This AD requires installing a safety device for the tailplane locking hook. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the locking hook on the tailplane attachment bracket from disengaging, which could result in the horizontal tailplane coming loose from the fin with possible loss of longitudinal control of the sailplane.
2005-26-12: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2004-08-13, which applies to certain BURKHARDT GROB LUFT-UND RAUMFAHRT GmbH & CO KG (Burkhardt Grob) Models G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, G103 TWIN III ACRO, and G103 C Twin III SL sailplanes. AD 2004-08-13 currently requires you to replace the center of gravity (CG) release hook attachment brackets with brackets of improved design. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. This AD retains all the actions required in AD 2004-08-13 and adds Model G103A TWIN II ACRO sailplanes to the applicability. We are issuing this AD to prevent abnormal or uncontrolled sailplane release due to cracked CG release hook attachment brackets. This condition could result in reduced or loss of sailplane control. DATES: This AD becomes effective on February 6, 2006. On June 4, 2004 (69 FR 21402, April 21, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Grob Service Bulletin No. MSB315-62, dated January 21, 2002, and Grob Service Bulletin No. MSB869-22, dated January 22, 2002. As of February 6, 2006, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Grob Service Bulletin No. MSB315-62/2, dated March 9, 2005.
2000-22-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40, and -50 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive radiographic and ultrasonic or eddy current inspections, and modification of the upper cap of the front spar of the left and right engine pylons, if necessary. This amendment requires new, improved x-ray and eddy current inspections to detect cracks of the upper cap of the front spar of the left and right engine pylons, and repetitive inspections or corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires modification of the subject area, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. This amendment is prompted by additional reports of fatigue cracking in the subject area of these airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the upper cap of the front spar of the engine pylons due to fatigue cracking, and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
70-18-06: 70-18-06\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-1077. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 52-1034, dated July 24, 1970, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the separation of the overwing emergency hatch handle cover from the hatch handle assembly causing confusion and possible blockage during an emergency egress, rework the hatch handle cover in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 52-1034, dated July 24, 1970, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent rework procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 10, 1970.
2019-15-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a cracked outboard spoiler actuator mounting bracket. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the outboard spoiler actuator mounting brackets, replacement of any cracked bracket, and eventual replacement of all brackets with a re-designed part that would terminate the repetitive inspections. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-06-03: 76-06-03 SCHEIBE FLUGZEUGBAU GmbH: Amendment 39-2552. Applies to SF 26A gliders, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent the possible loss of lateral control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the aileron bellcranks near the weld of the middle bearing bushing for cracks with a magnifying glass of at least 5 power, in accordance with Scheibe Technical Note No. 232-1/75 dated October 7, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If a crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, before further flight, repair the cracked aileron bellcrank, in accordance with FAR 43.13. This amendment becomes effective March 29, 1976.
72-22-04: 72-22-04 BEECH: Amendment 39-1546. Applies to Beech Models 60 series (Serial Numbers P-1 thru P-200 and P-210) airplanes which have a moisture barrier at fuselage station 306.421. Compliance: Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible interference with elevator movement, accomplish the following: A) Starting at the cut out for the elevator bell crank, slit the moisture barrier vertically upward utilizing a knife, razor blade or other similar tool. Extend this cut through the Velcro strip which attaches the moisture barrier to the front spar of the horizontal stabilizer. NOTE: In making the slit do not damage the spar. B) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be submitted and approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective October 31, 1972.
2019-14-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A320-251N and -271N airplanes; and Model A321- 251N, -253N, -271N, and -272N airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that during a calibration check, some torqueing tools used on the final assembly line have been found out of tolerance. This AD requires retorqueing each affected connection of sense and fire extinguishing lines within the pylon area to a correct torque value, as specified in an European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-26-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D-7R4 turbofan engines. This AD requires inspection of the blade root thickness of 1st stage fan blades identified by part number (P/N) and serial number (SN) in this AD, by a repair station approved by PW to perform the inspection. This AD results from a report that a repair station created their own repair and performed it on 520 1st stage fan blades, without approval from PW. We are issuing this AD to prevent 1st stage fan blade fracture and uncontained engine failure, resulting in possible damage to the airplane.
2001-24-27: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40, and -50 series airplanes; Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes; Model MD-88 airplanes; and C-9 airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the rudder pedal adjuster hub assembly, and replacement of the assembly, if necessary. That AD also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment requires accomplishment of a new terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by that FAA's determination that further rulemaking is necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to \nprevent loss of rudder pedal control and reduction of braking capability.
78-14-04: 78-14-04 BURKHART GROB: Amendment 39-3254. Applies to Model "G102" Astir CS gliders, serial numbers 1180 through 1536, certificated in all categories, that have rudder control levers with lightening cutouts. Compliance is required with in the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To reduce the possibility of failure of the intermediate rudder control lever and subsequent loss of rudder control, replace the rudder control lever in accordance with Burkhart Grob, Technical Information TM 102-8, dated November 28, 1977, or equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. This amendment becomes effective July 11, 1978.
82-06-06: 82-06-06 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4346. Applies to Model CL-600 airplanes serial numbers 1012 thru 1024 certificated in all categories. To prevent damage to the flap drive shafts, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 100 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 150 hours time in service, inspect the left and right flap drive shafts for damage between WS220 and WS264, in accordance with paragraphs 2.A and 2.B of Canadair Alert Service Bulletin No. A600-0037, Revision 1, dated October 28, 1981. If either drive shaft is damaged beyond the service bulletin limits, replace the shaft prior to further flight. 2. Before the accumulation of 550 hours time in service or within the next 50 hours time in service, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished, install clamp supports for the left and right flap drive shafts at WS237.10, in accordance with paragraph 2.D of the Canadair Alert Service Bulletin. 3. The inspections required by paragraph (1) are terminated by incorporation of the clamp support in accordance with paragraph (2) of this AD. 4. Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for accomplishment of the inspection required by this AD. 5. Alternate methods of compliance with this AD may be used when they provide an equivalent level of safety and are approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). This amendment becomes effective March 22, 1982.
2005-26-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318-100, A319-100, A320-200, A321-100, and A321-200 series airplanes; and Model A320-111 airplanes. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual by incorporating new procedures to follow in the event of a fuel leak. This AD results from a determination that, once a fuel leak is detected, fuel management procedures are a critical factor in limiting the consequences of the leak. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is advised of appropriate procedures to follow in the event of a fuel leak, such as isolating the fuel tanks, stopping any fuel transfers, and landing as soon as possible. Failure to follow these procedures could result in excessive fuel loss that could cause the engines to shut down during flight.
2019-14-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200 Freighter series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked flexible hoses of the oxygen crew and courier distribution system (OCCDS) on A330 freighter airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections, including functional testing, of the OCCDS and replacement of affected part(s) if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-26-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires limiting the payload on the main cargo deck by revising the Limitations Sections of all Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM), AFM Supplements, and Airplane Weight and Balance Supplements for these airplanes. This amendment also provides for the submission of data and analyses that substantiate the strength of the main cargo deck, or modification of the main cargo deck, as optional terminating action for these payload restrictions. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that under certain conditions unreinforced floor structure of the main cargo deck is not strong enough to enable the airplane to safely carry the maximum payload that is currently allowed in this area. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the floor structure, which could lead to loss of the airplane.
2019-14-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain B/E Aerospace Fischer GmbH (B/E Aerospace Fischer) Common Seats 170/260 H160. This AD was prompted by the discovery during testing that the energy absorber (EA) may not function as intended during emergency landing. This AD requires removing and replacing the EA assemblies on the affected seats. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-26-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-45A, CF6-50A, CF6-50C, and CF6-50E series turbofan engines. This AD requires removing from service pre-GE Service Bulletin (SB) No. CF6-50S/B 72-1268 configuration low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 2 interstage seal assemblies and stage 3 interstage seal assemblies. This AD also requires installing new or reworked configuration stage 2 interstage seal assemblies and stage 3 interstage seal assemblies. This AD results from reports of fan mid shaft separation, leading to separation of the LPT stage 1 disk, disk overspeed, and uncontained engine failure. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2019-13-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. This AD was prompted by fatigue analysis indicating stress concentrations, as well as the discovery of a helicopter with a crack in the station (STA) 362 frame and skin. This AD requires inspecting the main transmission forward and aft frame assemblies and adjacent skins for a crack and loose fasteners, and establishing life limits for certain frame assemblies. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-12-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.A. (type certificate previously held by Finmeccanica S.p.A., AgustaWestland S.p.A.) Model AW139 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting and altering the number 1 driveshaft (driveshaft). This AD was prompted by reports of scratches that were found on the driveshaft. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
82-07-01: 82-07-01 VICKERS-SLINGSBY: Amendment 39-4352. Applies to Model T.65A Vega gliders certificated in all categories which do not have Vickers-Slingsby Modification No. 12 incorporated. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent inadvertent extension of the airbrakes during high speed, low level flight conditions in turbulent air, which could result in loss of control of the glider, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished or until the modification required by paragraph 2 of this AD has been accomplished, install a placard on the flap/airbrake control in accordance with Vickers- Slingsby Technical Instruction No. 82, Issue 1, dated June 11, 1979. The placard must read as follows: "TEMPORARY RESTRICTION Maintain contact with flap handle during high speed in -8 degree flap position." 2. Modify the flap/airbrake control system in accordance with the instructions under "PROCEDURE" of Vickers-Slingsby Technical Instruction No. 85 by September 17, 1982, unless already accomplished. The placard required by paragraph 1 may be removed when this modification is accomplished. An equivalent means of compliance may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, C/O American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium, or the Chief, Boston Aircraft Certification Branch, ANE-150, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment becomes effective March 25, 1982.
79-12-05: 79-12-05\tLEARJET: Amendment 39-3488 as amended by Amendment 39-3614. Applies to the following (1) model and serial number airplanes on which "reduced approach speed system kit" AAK 76-4 has been installed and, (2) model and serial number 24E, 24F, 24F-A, 25D and 25F airplanes, certificated in all categories: \n\n\nMODELS\nSERIAL NUMBERS \n24, 24A\n24-100 through 24-180 \n24B, 24B-A\n24-181 through 24-217, 24-219 through 24-229 \n24C, 24D, 24D-A\n24-218, 24-230 through 24-328 \n24E, 24F, 24F-A\n24-329 through 24-357 \n25, 25A\n25-003 through 25-060 \n\n25-062 through 25-066 \n25B, 25C\n25-061, 25-067 through 25-201, 25-204, 25-205 \n25D, 25F\n25-206 through 25-278 \n\nCOMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\nA)\tEffective immediately, temporarily insert the following information in the FAA-Approved Airplane Flight Manual and operate the airplane in accordance with these insertions: \n\n1.\tIn Section I, adjacent to the heading STALL WARNING SYSTEM Limitation, add the following: \n\nBoth stall warning systems must be ON and operating for all Normal Flight Operations. The systems may be turned off for Emergency Operations per Airplane Flight Manual Section III Procedures and for stall warning system maintenance per the Maintenance Manual Procedures: \n\nNOTE: Warning lights for both stall warning systems are inoperative when the generator and battery switches \n\nTo assure proper stall warning system operation, the BEFORE STARTING and AFTER TAKEOFF stall warning system operational and comparison checks in Section II of this Airplane Flight Manual must be completed on each flight. are OFF. \n\n2.\tIn Section II, under the heading BEFORE LANDING, add the following: \n\tLANDING APPROACH IN TURBULENCE: \n\tLanding Approach Speed - Computed and bug set. Refer to Section IV.\n\nNOTE: It is recommended that if turbulence is anticipated due to gusty winds, wake turbulence, or wind shear, the approach speed be increased. For gusty wind conditions,an increase in approach speed of one-half of the gust factor is recommended. \n\n3.\tIn Section II, under the heading ANTI-ICE SYSTEM, add the following: \n\tANTI-ICE SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATIONS \n\tObserve Airplane Flight Manual's recommendations for normal use of all anti-ice systems.\tWARNING: Even small accumulations of ice on the wing leading edges can cause aerodynamic stall prior to activation of the stick shaker and/or pusher. \n\n4.\tIn Section II, under the heading AFTER TAKEOFF, add the following: \n\tSTALL WARNING SYSTEMS COMPARISON CHECK \nAs a final step in the AFTER TAKEOFF procedures, the following stall warning system comparison shall be observed: \nANGLE-OF-ATTACK Indicators - Cross-check pilot's and copilot's indicators for agreement. \n\n5.\tIn Section II, adjacent to the ICE DETECTION procedures, add the following: \n\tVISUAL ICE DETECTION \n\tA visual inspection may be used to check for ice accumulations on the wing leading edges. \n\nFor night operation, the optional wing inspection light located on the right side of the fuselage may be turned on by setting the WING INSPECTION switch ON and checking for ice accumulations on the wing. It should be noted that the wing inspection light in itself is inadequate for detecting the presence of ice near the wing tips. \n\nIf the presence of wing leading edge ice is suspected during operations at night, in atmospheric conditions conducive to icing, the normal approach speeds must be increased per the APPROACH AND LANDING WITH ICE ON WING LEADING EDGES procedures of Section III of the Airplane's Flight Manual. \n\n6.\tIn Section III, under the heading ANTI-ICE SYSTEM FAILURE, add the following: \n\tAPPROACH AND LANDING WITH ICE ON WING LEADING EDGES \n\tWARNING: Even small accumulations of ice on the wing leading edges can cause aerodynamic stall prior to activation of the stick shaker and/or pusher. If approach and landing must be made with any ice (or suspected ice during night operations) on the wing leading edges: \n\n1.\tFinal Approach Speed - 15 knots above normal \n\n2.\tTouchdown Speed - 15 knots above normal \n\n3.\tLanding distance - Increase by 20% Anti-Skid ON or OFF. \n\n7.\tIn Section IV, adjacent to the heading TAKEOFF DISTANCE, FLAPS 8 DEGREES add the following: \n\tIncrease all chart Takeoff Distances by: \n\tModel 24 with Century III wings + 4% \n\tModel 25 with Century III wings + 6% \n\n8.\tIn Section IV, adjacent to the heading CRITICAL ENGINE FAILURE SPEED, V1, FLAPS - 8 DEGREES; ROTATION SPEED, VR, FLAPS - T.O. -8 DEGREES; AND ENGINE OUT SAFETY SPEED V2 FLAPS - T.O. - 8 DEGREES charts, add the following: \n\tIncrease all chart V1, VR and V2 speeds by: \n\tModel 24 with Century III wings + 2 KNOTS INDICATED AIRSPEED \n\tModel 25 with Century III wings + 3 KNOTS INDICATED AIRSPEED \n\n9.\tIn Section IV, adjacent to the LANDING APPROACH SPEEDS chart, add the following: \n\tIncrease all chart Landing Approach Speeds (V REF) by: \n\t+ 6 KNOTS INDICATED AIRSPEED \n\n10.\tIn Section IV, adjacent to the LANDING DISTANCE chart add the following: \n\tIncrease all Chart Actual and Scheduled and Alternate Stops Field Lengths by: +8% \n\n11.\tIn Section IV in place of the current STALL SPEEDS file the following charts: \n\nNOTE: In order to comply with the requirements of paragraph A) of this AD, this airworthiness directive, or a duplicate thereof, may be used as a temporary amendment to the Airplane Flight Manual and carried in the aircraft as part of the Airplane Flight Manual until replaced by the permanent revisions to the Airplane Flight Manual provided by the manufacturer and approved by the FAA. \n\nB)\tWithin the next 300 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, or December 15, 1979, whichever occurs first, adjust the stall warning system and inspect the systems and components that may affect aircraft stall speed in accordance with the procedures provided by Gates Learjet Service Bulletin SB 24/25- 294 dated May 25, 1979. \n\nC)\tWhen Gates Learjet Airplane Accessory Kit Number AAK 79-10A (including insertion of the applicable Airplane Flight Manual changes in FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual) is installed, paragraphs A)7. through A)11. and paragraph B) of this AD are no longer applicable. \n\nD)\tAny equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\nAmendment 39-3488 became effective June 18, 1979. \nThis Amendment 39-3614 becomes effective November 6, 1979.
98-26-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires limiting the payload on the main cargo deck by revising the Limitations Sections of all Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM), AFM Supplements, and Airplane Weight and Balance Supplements for these airplanes. This amendment also provides for the submission of data and analyses that substantiate the strength of the main cargo deck, or modification of the main cargo deck, as optional terminating action for these payload restrictions. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that under certain conditions unreinforced floor structure of the main cargo deck is not strong enough to enable the airplane to safely carry the maximum payload that is currently allowed in this area. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the floor structure, which could lead to loss of the airplane.
99-01-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that requires installation of a placard that warns the cabin crew not to put the selector valve for the forward lavatory water supply in the "DRAIN" position during flight. This amendment also requires installation of an isolation valve in the drain line downstream of the selector valve, which would terminate the requirement for the placard installation. This amendment is prompted by reports of damage to the horizontal stabilizer, and engine flameout caused by ice formed from water drained inadvertently through a mispositioned selector valve. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to the engines, airframe, or horizontal stabilizer, and/or to prevent a hazard to persons or property on the ground, as a result of ice that could dislodge from the airplane.
80-22-54: 80-22-54 ROCKWELL: Amendment 39-3990. Applies to Rockwell NA-265-60 airplanes modified in accordance with Raisbeck Group STC SA687NW and Rockwell NA-265-80 airplanes modified in accordance with Raisbeck STC SA847NW. To prevent failure of the lateral control system, accomplish the following: A. Before further flight visually inspect for nicks, burrs or other damage, the aileron cables, and the sector to which the cables attach, in the area of the sector, at approximately wing station 160. Inspect these parts in both wings. B. Cables found damaged are to be replaced. Sectors found damaged are to be replaced or repaired, as necessary, in accordance with FAR Part 43, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. C. Airplanes may be ferried in accordance with FAR 21.199 to a Maintenance Base, for the purpose of complying with this AD. D. This Airworthiness Directive is not applicable to airplanes inspected in accordance with the above if the inspections were accomplished after October 20, 1980. This amendment becomes effective December 24, 1980, and was effective earlier to those recipients of telegraphic AD T80-22-54 dated October 24, 1980.