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67-12-06: 67-12-06 PIPER: Amdt. 39-386 Part 39 Federal Register April 4, 1967. Applies to Models PA-28 and PA-32 Series Airplanes as follows: GROUP I - PA-28-140, Serial Nos. 28-20000 through 28-20622; PA-28-150-160-180, Serial Nos. 28-2 through 28-35; 28-37 through 28-497; 28-499 through 28-543; 28-545 through 28-1307; 28-1309 through 28-2136; PA-28-235, Serial Nos. 28-10000 through 28-10590. GROUP II - PA-28-140, Serial Nos. 28-20623 through 28-21383; PA-28-150-160-180, Serial Nos. 28-2137 through 28-3021; PA-28-235, Serial Nos. 28-10591 through 10719; PA-32-260, Serial Nos. 32-1 through 32-307. GROUP III - PA-28-140, Serial Nos. 28-21384 through 28-21764; 28-21767 through 28-21786; 28-21788 through 28-21807; 28-21809 through 28-21835; 28-21837 through 28-21856; 28-21858 through 28-21877; 28-21879 through 28-22003; 28-22005 through 28-22010; 28-22012 through 28-22026; 28-22028 through 28-22032; 28-22035 through 28-22040; 28-22043 through 28-22050; 28-22052 through 28-22056; 28-22058, 28-22059, 28-22061 through 28-22064; 28-22066, 28-22071, 28-22074, 28-22080, 28-22082, 28-22088. PA-28-150-160-180, Serial Nos. 28-3022 through 28-3499; 28-3501 through 28-3503; 28-3505 through 28-3508; 28-3510; 28-3512 through 28-3528; 28-3530 through 28-3537; 28-3541, 28-3543, 28-3545 through 28-3549; 28-3552; 28-3555 through 28-3557; 28-3562. PA-28-235, Serial Nos. 28-10720, 28-10721, 28-10732. PA-32-260, Serial Nos. 32-308 through 32-540; 32-542 through 32-558; 32-560 through 32-570, 32-572 through 32-677; 32-679 through 32-683; 32-685, 32-689, 32-690; 32-692 through 32-698; 32-700 through 32-702; 32-704 through 32-711; 32-714, 32-716, 32-717, 32-719 through 32-722; 32-725, 32-727, 32-730, 32-733; 32-740 through 32-742; 32-744 through 32-746; 32-749. Compliance required as follows: Group I - Prior to but not later than July 31, 1967. Group II - Prior to but not later than July 31, 1968. Group III - Prior to but not later thanJuly 31, 1969. At the option of the local FAA General Aviation District office inspector, these compliance times may be extended, for a period not to exceed 30 days, to coincide with the annual inspection for the aircraft involved. Due to the possibility of internal corrosion resulting from inadequate corrosion protection of certain open end steel tube assemblies, accomplish the inspections described below on the following parts: PART NO. NOMENCLATURE MODELS AFFECTED 62369-0 Aileron Balance Weight PA-28-140-150-160-180-235 62369-1 Aileron Balance Weight PA-32-260 63546 Rudder Horn Assembly PA-28-140-150-160-180-235 PA-32-260 63578 Balance Weight Assembly-Stabilator PA-28-140-150-160-180 65310 Balance Weight Assembly-Stabilator PA-28-235 68432 Balance Weight Assembly-Stabilator PA-32-260 (a) Conduct a close visual inspection of the interior of the open end tubes specified above for a protective coating and evidence of corrosion,in accordance with Inspection Procedure, Piper Service Bulletin No. 240, dated December 13, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or by a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. Inspect both right and left aileron balance weight assemblies in accordance with Inspection of Aileron Balance Weight assembly provision of this Service Bulletin. (b) If there is evidence of a protective coating on the interior of the tube, and there is no evidence of corrosion, further inspection is not required. (c) If there is no evidence of a protective coating on the interior of the tube and evidence of corrosion, or if there is a protective coating, and evidence of corrosion, accomplish the following: (1) Remove all corrosion from the interior of the tube in accordance with the instructions in Piper Service Bulletin No. 240, dated December 13, 1966, or later FAA-approved revision, or by a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. (2) Replace all corroded parts with a new part of the same part number if the corrosion cannot be removed as provided for in (c) (1). If doubt exists as to whether or not the corrosion involved can be removed without replacing the part, the matter must be referred to the local FAA General Aviation District office for assistance in making a determination. (3) If the extent of corrosion does not require replacement of the part in accordance with (c)(2), and the corrosion has been removed in accordance with (c)(1), apply a zinc chromate primer, Spec. MIL-P-8585, or an FAA-approved equivalent, to the inside of the tube to prevent further corrosion. (d) Further inspection is not required after accomplishing (c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(3).
2008-24-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Three instances have occurred in which the aircraft took off with pre-mod 6/1676 flight control gust locks still installed, sometimes with disastrous results. Based on investigation, the FAA and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) believe that an attempted takeoff with the gust locks installed could be the cause of a recent accident in Hyannis, Massachusetts. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
71-14-03: 71-14-03 INTERNATIONAL INFLATABLES COMPANY: Amdt. 39-1239. Applies to aircraft incorporating International Inflatables Company Regulator, P/N 68240. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent unwanted bottle and regulator separation of P/N 68240, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 days after the effective date of this A.D., unless already accomplished within the last 30 days, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 60 days from the last inspection, inspect the International Inflatables Company Regulator, P/N 68240, if installed in an aircraft, in accordance with International Inflatables Company Service Bulletin No. 33-102, Volume 1, No. 101, dated June 11, 1971, or later FAA approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. If there is any evidence of corrosion, replace the regulator prior to further flight with a previously inspected (per this A.D.) and corrosion-free regulator. Do not return any regulator exhibiting evidence of corrosion to service. (b) After the effective date of this AD, and prior to the installation of an International Inflatables Company Regulator, P/N 68240 on an aircraft, inspect that regulator per (a) above. NOTE: An improved regulator is under development. If and when approved by FAA, this AD will be amended to require installation within a prescribed time period. This amendment becomes effective July 2, 1971.
95-13-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Grob Luft Und Raumfahrt (Grob) Models G102 Astir CS, Club Astir IIb, Twin Astir, Speed Astir, Standard Astir II, and Speed Astir IIb sailplanes. This action requires inspecting all elevator and rudder hinges for damage (delamination, cracks, corrosion, or buckling), and repairing any damaged parts. Several occurrences of inner elevator hinges separating during flight operation prompted this AD action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent these hinges from separating, which could result in sailplane flutter and eventual loss of control of the sailplane.
67-03-02: 67-03-02 CHAMPION: Amdt. 39-343 Part 39 Federal Register January 18, 1967. Applies to Models 7ECA, 7GCAA, 7GCBC, and 7GCB Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. (a) Until the lower bracket supporting the fuel shutoff valve is modified in accordance with Champion Service Letter No. 73, acrobatic maneuvers in aircraft of these models may not be performed. (b) Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, the lower bracket supporting the fuel shutoff valve must be modified by the installation of Champion P/N 1-9863 in accordance with the instructions contained in Champion Service Letter No. 73 dated January 13, 1967. This directive effective January 18, 1967.
67-05-02: 67-05-02 DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-346 Part 39 Federal Register February 10, 1967. Applies to Model DC-9 Airplanes Serial Numbers 45696 to 45707 inclusive, 45711 to 45732 inclusive, 45735 to 45749 inclusive, 45770 to 45773 inclusive, 45785, 45794, 45795, 45798, 45799, 45825, 45829, 45841 to 45844 inclusive, 47048, and 47049. \n\n\tCompliance required as follows: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes having fitting P/N 9958161-39(LH) or fitting P/N 9958161-40(RH), with 4,000 or more cycles accumulated on the effective date of this AD, perform the inspection required by (d) on that fitting (or fittings, as the case may be) prior to completing the next 100 cycles and thereafter within periods not to exceed each successive 100 cycles. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes having fitting P/N 9958161-39(LH) or fitting P/N 9958161-40(RH), with less than 4,000 cycles accumulated on the effective date of this AD, perform the inspection required by (d) on that fitting (or fittings, as the case may be) prior to completing 4,100 cycles total, and thereafter within periods not to exceed each successive 100 cycles. \n\n\t(c)\tOperators who have kept records of cycles of individual fittings shall substitute cycles of the airplane in lieu thereof. Each takeoff, including a takeoff accomplished during flight training, constitutes one cycle. In addition, every 30 minutes of flight training constitutes one cycle. For operators who do not keep a record of takeoffs, the number of takeoffs may be determined, subject to the approval of the assigned FAA air carrier maintenance inspector, by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing computed from the time of the operator's first operation of a DC-9 aircraft type to the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tInspect the fittings P/N's 9958161-39(LH) and -40(RH) for cracks by means of fluorescent penetrant, or by magnetic particle inspection, or by a procedure previously approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tNOTE: During the inspection required by (d), particular attention should be directed to the aft edge of the fitting and the aft portion of the lower surface of the fitting. \n\n\t(e)\tReplace before further flight (except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be accomplished), all fittings found cracked with new parts of the same part number or with redesigned parts, fittings P/N's 5923937-501(LH) and -502(RH). \n\n\t(f)\tIf the cracked fittings are replaced with fittings of the same part number, the provisions of this AD are again applicable. The inspections must be accomplished at the compliance time indicated. \n\n\t(g)\tThe required inspections of fitting P/N 9958161-39(LH) may be discontinued when that fitting is replaced by fitting P/N 5923937-501(LH). The required inspections of fitting P/N 9958161-40(RH) may be discontinued when that fitting is replaced by fitting P/N 5923937-502(RH). \n\n\t(h)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Regional Director, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\t(Douglas Model DC-9 Service Bulletin 54-4 and telegrams dated January 11, 1967, and January 13, 1967, to all DC-9 operators cover essentially this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective February 10, 1967.
94-11-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes, that requires modification of the aileron drive quadrant support structure. This amendment is prompted by results of a stress analysis check, which revealed that the factor of safety of the aileron drive quadrant support structure on Model 4101 airplanes does not meet the tail-to-wind gust load design case strength requirements specified in the Federal Aviation Regulations. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the support structure, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2008-24-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine the part and serial numbers of the windshield wiper motors for the pilot's and first officer's windshields, and doing applicable corrective actions. This AD results from two reports that the left and right windshield wipers stopped working in flight. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the windshield wipers in wet weather, which could result in decreased visibility for the flightcrew.
94-07-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Jetstream Model ATP series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect fatigue-related cracking and loose rivets in the subframe yoke assemblies of the quick engine change units (QECU) on both wings; replacement of rivets; and repair or replacement of yoke assemblies, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by in-service and fatigue test reports of cracking in the yoke of a QECU subframe. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of structural integrity of the engine mount.
95-12-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes, that requires replacement of a certain pressure switch with a certain new pressure switch in the fuel system for the engines. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the current design of a certain pressure switch in the fuel system for the engines does not meet current fire resistant properties, which could result in the failure of the pressure switch during a fire in the engine compartment. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the existing pressure switch in the fuel system for the engines, which, during an engine fire, could result in fuel leakage that could add fuel to the fire.