Results
67-11-02: 67-11-02 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-385 Part 39 Federal Register April 5, 1967. Applies to Model F-27 Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 19 Except Serial Numbers 7, 10, 13 and 17. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the lower fuselage exterior skins, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 350 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the fuselage skins between stringers 7 and 8 left and stringers 44 and 45 right from Fuselage Station 198 to Station 510, or use an equivalent inspection approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. If cracks are found, comply with (b) before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed. (b) Repair cracked parts in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin No. 53-48 dated February 7, 1967, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or equivalent approved by an FAA maintenance inspector, or replace them with an unused part of the same part number or an equivalent part approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. (c) The repetitive inspection required by (a) may be discontinued on those skin panels replaced in accordance with Fairchild-Hiller Service Bulletin No. 53-48, dated February 17, 1967, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, or an equivalent modification approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the initial compliance time and the repetitive inspection interval specified in this AD if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective April 5, 1967.
2018-23-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a close gap between the wing lower cover (WLC) and wing rib feet. This AD requires revising the operator's minimum equipment list (MEL) to change certain MEL items. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies and structural damage of certain wing rib foot locations, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-15-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Superior Air Parts and Lycoming (formerly Textron Lycoming) fuel- injected engines. This AD requires removing from service, certain fuel servos. This AD was prompted by an accident involving a Piper PA32R- 301. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
82-20-52: 82-20-52 BOEING VERTOL: Amendment 39-4480. Applies to Boeing Vertol Model 234 series helicopters, Manufacturer's Serial Numbers MJ001 through MJ006, equipped with forward transmission, P/N 234D1200-2, aft transmission, P/N 234D2200-2M, and combiner transmission, P/N 234D5200-5, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required prior to further flight, after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible hazards in flight associated with transmission drive component failure, due to lubrication system contamination, accomplish the following: a. Remove the forward transmission, aft transmission and combiner transmission, disassemble, inspect and repair in accordance with the accomplishment instructions of Boeing Vertol Bulletin 234-65-1027, Revision 2 contained in Boeing Vertol TWX Nos. 8-1420-3-4264, - 4267, and 4273, respectively dated September 23, 24, and 25, 1982, or FAA approved equivalent. b. An equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. This amendment becomes effective November 5, 1982.
84-24-04: 84-24-04 BF GOODRICH: Amendment 39-4960. Applies to BF Goodrich Emergency Evacuation Slide/Rafts P/N's 7A1340 series, 7A1342 series, 7A1371 series, and 7A1373 series installed on Boeing Model 747-100 and 747-200B airplanes in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA574GL, and on Boeing Model 747-100B, 747SR, and 747-300 airplanes in accordance with STC SA575GL; and BF Goodrich Emergency Evacuation Slide/Rafts P/N's 7A1437 series, 7A1439 series, 7A1447 series, and 7A1448 series installed on Boeing Model 747-100 and 747-200B airplanes in accordance with STC SA744GL, and on Boeing Model 747-100B, 747SR, and 747-300 airplanes in accordance with STC SA745GL. \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tInspect and replace, as required, the girt bar attachment assemblies in accordance with the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 15 days after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), inspect the applicable slide/rafts and replace the girt bar attachment assemblies in accordance with the procedures contained in BF Goodrich Alert Service Bulletin 25-093, Revision 1, dated November 21, 1984, or subsequent FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tDestroy the replaced girt bar attachment assemblies to preclude their installation at a later date. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to BF Goodrich Company, Attn: Mr. David Smith, Dept. 1809, Bldg. 17F, 500 South Main Street, Akron, Ohio 44318; telephone (216) 374-2886. These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective December 17, 1984.
2005-23-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Learjet Model 23, 24, 24A, 24B, 24B-A, 24D, 24D-A, 24E, 24F, 25, 25A, 25B, 25C, 25D, and 25F airplanes. This AD requires removing the thrust reverser accumulator, and making the thrust reverser hydraulic system and the thrust reversers inoperable. This AD results from reports of the failure of two thrust reverser accumulators. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the thrust reverser accumulators, due to fatigue cracking on the female threads, which could result in the loss of hydraulic power and damage to the surrounding airplane structure.
98-19-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Aerospatiale Model ATR72-212A series airplanes, that requires installation of bushings on the lower attachment fittings of the flap support beam. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent rupture of the lower attachment fittings of the flap support beam due to fatigue, and consequent damage to the flaps; these conditions could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2017-23-10: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-19-17, which applied to certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 900EX and FALCON 2000EX airplanes. AD 2017-19-17 required revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to include procedures to follow when an airplane is operating in icing conditions. AD 2017-19-17 also required a detailed inspection of the wing anti-ice system ducting for the presence of a diaphragm, and follow-on actions (replacement of ducting or re- identification of the ducting part marking). This new AD retains the actions required by AD 2017-19-17, and corrects the follow-on actions for certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that the follow-on actions specified in AD 2017-19-17 were incorrect for certain airplanes. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-23-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80E1A1, -80E1A2, -80E1A3, -80E1A4, and -80E1A4/B turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive fluorescent-penetrant inspections (FPI) of certain areas of high pressure compressor (HPC) cases, part number (P/N) 1509M97G07 and P/N 2083M69G03. This AD results from the discovery that HPC cases, P/N 1509M97G07 and P/N 2083M69G03, were inadvertently left out of the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS), Chapter 05-21-02, of GE Engine Manual, GEK 99376, Revision 17. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HPC case aft mount flange, due to cracking.
2005-23-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Hamilton Sundstrand Power Systems (formerly Sundstrand Power Systems) auxiliary power units (APUs) models T-62T-46C2, T-62T-46C2A, T-62T- 46C3, T-62T-46C7, and T-62T-46C7A, with compressor impeller assembly, part number (P/N) 4502020 or 4502020A, installed. This AD requires removal from service of those compressor impeller assemblies at reduced service life limits. This AD results from two reports of uncontained failures of compressor impeller assemblies. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontained APU failure and damage to the airplane.
2011-15-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting the wings for internal and external damage, repairing any damage, reinforcing the wings, installing operational limitation placards in the cockpit, and adding limitations to the airplane flight manual supplement. This AD was prompted by a review of installed Flint Aero, Inc. wing tip auxiliary fuel tanks, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA5090NM. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the wings and to prevent overload failure of the wing due to the installation of the STC. Damage in the wing or overload failure of the wing could result in structural failure of the wing, which could result in loss of control.
54-24-02: 54-24-02 LOCKHEED: Applies to 1049C, Serial Numbers 4520 Through 4548; Model 1049E, Serial Numbers 4549 Through 4556, 4558 Through 4560, and 4563 Through 4565; Model 1049D, Serial Numbers 4163 Through 4166. Compliance required as indicated. 1. Perform a visual inspection of the outer wing main beam web between Stations 551 and 637, left and right, for cracks as soon as practical, and reinspect at intervals of approximately 125 hours until this area is reinforced as outlined in paragraph 2. If cracks are found repair and reinforce as per paragraph 2 immediately. Inspection for fuel stains alone as an indication of a crack is not sufficient due to the presence of sealant on the inside of the tank surface. 2. Reinforce the main beam web between wing Stations 551 and 637, left and right as soon as possible, convenient with aircraft check periods, but not later than 1,000 hours after receipt of parts from the manufacturer or March 1, 1955, whichever occurs first. This may beaccomplished by the addition of extruded aluminum alloy (75ST6) stiffeners (LS347-3), one between each of the original stiffeners in this area. (Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 1049/SB-2559 describes this reinforcement.)
64-18-04: 64-18-04 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 778 Part 507 Federal Register July 29, 1964. Applies to Models 240, 340 and 440 Series Aircraft Incorporating Nose Landing Gear Retract Fork, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L. Compliance required as indicated. In order to detect cracks and prevent the failure of the nose landing gear retract fork, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L, accomplish the following: (a) Within 800 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 1,000 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect all nose landing gear retract forks, Menasco P/N 523526 R/L, for cracks in the 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius at the upper end of the fork shank diameter using dye penetrant, magnetic particle, or an FAA approved equivalent inspection, and dimensionally inspect for a 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius. Any fork having less than 0.160 inch minimum radius shall havethe radius hand reworked to a 0.190 (+0, - .030) inch radius. (Care should be taken that the adjacent 1.2500/1.2495 inch diameter is not undercut.) Refinish the reworked area in accordance with the instructions contained in Convair Service Airgram No. 179, dated June 18, 1956, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division approved equivalent. If cracks are found in either half of the fork assembly, remove and replace the complete fork assembly with a new fork assembly before further flight. (b) The repetitive inspections specified in (a) may be discontinued when the fork assembly has been reworked to the 0.190 (+0, -.030) inch radius, and has been shot peened and refinished in accordance with the instructions contained in Convair Service Airgram No. 179, dated June 18, 1956, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division approved equivalent. (c) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Convair Service Airgram No. 179 dated June 18, 1956, covers this same subject.) This directive effective August 28, 1964.
98-19-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Pratt & Whitney PW4000 series turbofan engines, that requires fluorescent penetrant and eddy current inspections of 2nd stage high pressure turbine (HPT) rotating airseals for cracks, removal from service of cracked parts, incorporation of improved 2nd stage HPT rotating airseals, and modification of 2nd stage ring segments and vane clusters to increase cooling flow and reduce stress as terminating action to the inspection requirements. This amendment is prompted by reports of 2nd stage HPT rotating airseal cracking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent 2nd stage HPT rotating airseal cracking, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 9, 1998.
2011-13-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some operators reported slow operation of the MLG [main landing gear] door opening/closing sequence, leading to the generation of ECAM [Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitoring] warnings during the landing gear retraction or extension sequence. * * * * * This condition, if not corrected, could prevent the full extension and/or downlocking of the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG collapse during landing or rollout and consequent damage to the aeroplane and injury to occupants. * * * * * After in-service introduction of the new MLG door actuator, P/N 114122012, several operators reported failures of internalparts of the MLG door actuator. Investigations confirmed that these failures could result in slow extension of the actuator rod, delaying the MLG Door operation, or possibly stopping just before the end of the stroke, preventing the door to reach the fully open position. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
61-03-04: 61-03-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 244 Part 507 Federal Register January 27, 1961. Applies to All Model 1649A Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. One of the following modifications to the vent system must be accomplished within 400 hours of time in service after the effective date of this directive. (a) Modify only the right-hand vent float valve of the No. 7 tank (LAC P/N 634024- 3, Aero Supply Mfg. Co. P/N 22-1845-002) to a combination pressure relief and suction relief valve by removing the float assembly so that only the pressure and suction relief features remain operational. Replace the valve spring (P/N 22-0228-1) with spring (P/N 22-0337-1) having a higher cracking pressure. (b) Replace only the original right-hand side valve assembly on No. 7 fuel tank with a new valve assembly LAC P/N 634024-5 (Aero Supply Mfg. Co. P/N 22-1845-003). (Lockheed Letter dated August 22, 1960, directed to all 1649 operators completely covers the details of this modification.)This directive effective February 13, 1961.
2017-22-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rockwell Collins, Inc. TSS-4100 Traffic Surveillance System Processing Units that incorporate TSSA-4100 Field Loadable Software (FLS) Rockwell Collins part numbers 810-0052-002/-003/-010/-011/-012/-100/-101 and are installed on airplanes. This AD was prompted by five instances of air traffic control observing coasting (extrapolated stale data) of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data (position/velocity data). This AD requires installing the TSSA-4100 FLS upgrades on the TSS-4100 units. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-18-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the actuator attach bolts of the elevator load feel (ELF) located under the forward cockpit floor, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, during manufacture of an airplane, an actuator attach bolt of the ELF was installed improperly. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that the actuator attach bolts are installed properly. Improper installation of such bolts could result in disconnection of the ELF mechanism, and consequent loss of pitch control of the airplane.
2017-23-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-13-14, which applied to certain Bombardier, Inc., Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. AD 2016-13-14 required an inspection to determine if certain left and right main landing gear (MLG) retract actuator rod ends were installed, repetitive liquid penetrant inspections (LPIs) of affected left and right MLG retract actuator rod ends, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD retains the actions specified in AD 2016-13-14 and also requires replacement of the left and right MLG retract actuator rod ends. This AD was prompted by a report of a cracked MLG retract actuator rod end. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-23-03: We are superseding Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-21-51 for all Engine Alliance (EA) GP7200 series turbofan engines. AD 2017-21-51 was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of GP7200 series turbofan engines. AD 2017-21-51 required visual inspections of all fan hubs for damage. This AD retains the same required actions as AD 2017-21-51 and clarifies the compliance requirements. This AD was prompted by the failure of a GP7200 fan hub. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
81-12-03: 81-12-03 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON (BHT): Amendment 39-4125. Applies to all Model 214 series helicopters certified in all categories (Airworthiness Docket No. 81-ASW- 24). To prevent possible failure of main rotor spindle attachment pin retention bolts, P/N EWB26-10H90, accomplish the following: (a) Unless Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin 214-81-17 has been previously complied with, within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD: (1) Remove and inspect each of the four main rotor spindle attachment pin retention bolts, P/N EWB26-10H90, for evidence of corrosion. (2) Replace all bolts exceeding 1,200 hours' time in service or showing evidence of corrosion. (3) When installing the bolts, assure that each bolt is installed using corrosion prevention compound MIL-C-16173 grade 1 or 2 or equivalent on the shank of the bolt. Wipe threads clean prior to installing the nuts. Torque the nut to 150 foot-pounds. (b) Bolts, P/N EWB26-10H90, now have a 1,200 hour retirement. Record the 1,200 hour retirement life in the aircraft records. (c) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. (d) In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the inspection and repairs required by this AD may be accomplished. This amendment becomes effective June 11, 1981.
2005-22-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80E1 series turbofan engines installed on Airbus Industrie A330 series airplanes. This AD requires a check of the holding torque of the thrust reverser actuation system (TRAS) locks, and if necessary a visual inspection of the TRAS lock flexible drive shafts, within 10 flight cycles after all aborted takeoffs in which the thrust reverser was deployed. This AD results from reports of operators finding several damaged TRAS lock flexible drive shafts during inspections and checks of the drive shafts. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent in-flight deployment of the thrust reverser, which can result in loss of control of the airplane.
2011-09-51: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that will supersede an existing AD. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of PIAGGIO AERO INDUSTRIES S.p.A (Piaggio) Model PIAGGIO P-180 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Prompted by reports of water accumulated in the lower part of the fuselage on a number of Piaggio Model P.180 aeroplanes, which resulted in jamming of the flight controls, on 17 December 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the authority of the State of Registry of the affected aeroplanes, issued Emergency AD 2011-01-51 to require an immediate functional test of the fuselage drain holes and a report of the results to the FAA. That AD was later superseded, on 20December 2010, by FAA Emergency AD 2011-01-53. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could, when the aeroplane reaches and holds an altitude where the temperature is below the freezing point, cause the flight controls to freeze and jam, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane. Since these AD actions were taken, Piaggio Aero Industries, the type design approval holder and manufacturer of these aeroplanes, have published Alert Service Bulletin (SB) 80-0324, which describes the same inspection, testing and correction instructions as contained in the FAA Emergency AD. EASA AD 2010-0269-E required the inspection and functional testing of the fuselage drain holes, corrective actions depending on findings, and reporting of the findings to Piaggio Aero Industries. Following issuance of EASA AD, another event of in-flight blockage of flight controls was reported by an operator. The aeroplane was already compliant with EASA AD 2010-0269-E, and during accomplishment of the AD required inspection no discrepancies had been noted, nor water or ice accumulation were reported. As a consequence, additional drain holes were not drilled. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
98-18-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Schweizer Aircraft Corporation and Hughes Helicopters, Inc. Model 269A, 269A-1, 269B, 269C, 269D, and TH-55A helicopters, that requires a visual inspection of the bond line between the main rotor blade abrasion strip (abrasion strip) and the blade for voids, separation, or lifting of the abrasion strip; a visual inspection of the adhesive bead around the perimeter of the abrasion strip for erosion, cracks, or blisters; a tap (ring) test of the abrasion strip for evidence of debonding or hidden corrosion voids; and removal of any blade with an unairworthy abrasion strip and replacement with an airworthy blade. This amendment is prompted by four reports that indicate that debonding and corrosion have occurred on certain blades where the abrasion strip attaches to the blade skin. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the abrasion strip from the blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
98-18-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd. (PBN) BN-2, BN-2A, BN-2B, and BN-2A MK. 111 series airplanes that are equipped with a PBN Modification NB/M/256, 50A generator system. This AD requires inspecting the airplanes that are equipped with a 50A generator system for a 70A generator. If a 70A generator is installed, this AD requires replacing the 70A generator with a 50A generator, or (for the BN-2, BN-2A, and BN-2B series only) upgrading the airplane generator system to a 70A system to match the 70A generator. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct damage to the components of the electrical system, which could result in electrical system failure during critical phases of flight.