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66-16-03: 66-16-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-255 Part 39 Federal Register July 1, 1966. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 Series Airplanes Equipped with Aluminum Alloy Rocking Lever, P/N CH504-008, in the Rudder Feel Simulator Unit. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent fatigue failure of the rocking lever in the rudder feel simulator unit, accomplish the following: (a) Replace aluminum alloy rocking levers, P/N CH504-008, with 2,900 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with an unused part of the same part number or with steel rocking lever, P/N CH504-020 or CH504-021, within the next 100 hours' time in service. (b) Replace aluminum alloy rocking levers, P/N CH504-008, with less than 2,900 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD with an unused part of the same part number or with steel rocking lever, P/N CH504-020 or CH-504-021, before the accumulation of 3,000 hours' time in service. (British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) One-Eleven Alert Service Bulletin 27-A-PM 1248 pertains to this subject.) This directive effective July 31, 1966.
2006-09-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of certain lower lobe fuselage frames, and repair if necessary. This new AD retains all the requirements of the existing AD, and adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD results from reports indicating that fatigue cracks were found in lower lobe frames on the left side of the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of certain lower lobe fuselage frames, which could lead to fatigue cracks in the fuselage skin, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. \n\n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective June 7, 2006. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of June 7, 2006. \n\n\tOn May 5, 1999 (64 FR 15298, March 31, 1999), the Director of the FederalRegister approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-53A2408, dated April 25, 1996.
47-42-11: 47-42-11 DOUGLAS: (Was mandatory Note 8 of AD-781-1.) Applies to the Following DC-6 Aircraft: Serial Numbers 42854 to 42894, Inclusive; 43000 to 43012, Inclusive; 43055, 43056, and 43062. \n\nRework to be accomplished not later than December 15, 1947. (See Note 47-42-19.) \n\nCracks have been found near the ends of the tail stub extension of the horizontal stabilizer front spar caps, top and bottom, just inboard of the stabilizer joint. In order to prevent cracks from traveling to a point which may impair the airworthiness of the aircraft, the rework described below shall be accomplished. Until such time as the rework is accomplished, inspect the area in question at every No. 2 inspection period according to instructions contained in Douglas Telegram A-214-529, 012/RLT, dated July 25, 1947. \n\nA.\tCut a 7/8-inch diameter hole through skin and doubler only, 1 5/16 inches inboard and 21/32 inch aft of inboard fitting attaching bolt. Use special tools furnished by Douglas Aircraft Co., being careful not to scratch the spar cap. Strip primer off 7/8-inch diameter area on spar cap and inspect for cracks with high-power lens (40 power). If cracks are found, make a record of the location and extent of crack. \n\nB.\tDrill 0.250-inch diameter stop hole through spar cap, 1 5/16 inches inboard and 21/32 inch aft of inboard fitting attaching bolt and burr, regardless of whether cracks are found. If cracks are found that will extend inboard beyond the location of the stop hole, do not operate airplane until further salvage rework instructions have been obtained. Cover holes in skin and doubler with sheet metal plug and fabric patch cemented in place. (Douglas E.O. No. 5339013 (Salvage E.O. Serial No. 375) describes the rework of installing the stop hole.)
96-11-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain IAI, Ltd., Model 1125 Westwind Astra series airplanes. This action requires a visual inspection for clearance between the hydraulic lines/vacuum lines and the electrical wire bundles, and repair or replacement of damaged lines or wire bundles with serviceable parts. This AD also requires installation of neoprene hose around the affected hydraulic lines and vacuum lines. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that chafing was found on a hydraulic line. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such chafing, which could result in leakage of hydraulic fluid and subsequent loss of one of the two hydraulic systems.
2006-09-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking in the skin, the bulkhead outer chord, and the strap of the bulkhead outer chord at station (STA) 1725.5; and repair if necessary. This AD also provides for repairs, which are optional for airplanes on which no cracking is found, that terminate certain inspections. This AD results from reports of cracking in the skin panel common to stringer 7R and aft of the STA 1725.5 butt splice, and in the strap of the bulkhead outer chord at STA 1725.5. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the skin, the bulkhead outer chord, or the strap of the bulkhead outer chord in this area, which could progress into surrounding areas and result in reduced structural integrity of the support structure for the vertical or horizontal stabilizer and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.
52-08-01: 52-08-01 LOCKHEED: Applies to Certificated Army and Navy Versions of the Model 18 Aircraft Designated C57, C57B, R50-1, R50-2, R50-3, R50-5, R50-6, C60, C60A and C59. Compliance required at next annual inspection, but in no event later than June 1, 1953. Inspect all Lockheed Model 18 Series aircraft which have been converted from a military version to civil status, for compliance with Lockheed Drawing No. 50829, change A, to provide seal at the inboard end of the integral fuel tanks (inside fuselage) to prevent gasoline fumes from accumulating in the passenger compartment in case of fuel tank leakage. Inspection of the area can be accomplished by removal of the overhead panels adjacent to the fuselage skin in the No. 3 and No. 4 baggage compartments or by removing floor panels in the cabin. Diaphragms and vents must be installed in accordance with Lockheed Drawing No. 50829 (or equivalent). (Drawing No. 50829, change A, covering the required installation may be obtained from Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Burbank, Calif.)
47-06-09: 47-06-09 BEECH: (Was Mandatory Note 1 of AD-2-582-2 and Mandatory Note 4 of AD-757-2.) Applies to All AT-11 and C18S Airplanes Equipped With 33-Inch Tires. Compliance required at next periodic inspection. To prevent collapse of the landing gear due to cracking of the shock cylinder retracting leg attachment lugs or failure of the retracting legs the following items should be complied with: (1) Check the rear leg and lug lengths to ascertain whether they have been previously modified. Rear legs (Beech P/N 18820) 22 7/8 inches between hole centers should be installed only with cylinders having original lugs (approximately 1 7/8 inches from centerline of holes to outside of cylinder wall). Rear legs 23 19/64 inches between hole centers should be installed only with cylinders having short modified lugs (approximately 7/8 inch from centerline of holes to outside of cylinder wall). Legs 23 19/64 inches long with a 1 3/4 inches diameter reinforcing tube welded to the original ends should be replaced with Beech P/N 804-188416. (2) Inspect the shock cylinder lugs for cracks. If cracks are found in the lugs either the cylinder must be replaced or the cracks repaired. Contact FAA, Kansas City, MO., for repair methods. (Beech Service Bulletin C18-6 covers this same subject.)
52-28-02: 52-28-02 BELLANCA: Applies to Models 14-13, 14-13-2, 14-13-3 Aircraft, Serial Numbers Up to Number 1584. Compliance required as soon as practicable, but not later than next engine overhaul after January 1, 1953. In order to eliminate possible hazard due to excessive pressure from the engine-driven fuel pump, install a high-pressure relief valve between the fuel pump outlet and the inlet side of the hand wobble pump. (Bellanca Service Bulletin No. 23 covers this same subject.)
2003-12-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes, that requires modification of the flight annunciator box. This action is necessary to prevent traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) aural messages and resolution advisories of the TCAS from being inhibited following a ground proximity warning system alert or test message, which could prevent the TCAS from providing attention- getting alerts, and could result in the consequent possibility of a mid-air collision or near mid-air collision. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2003-12-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80A1/A3 and CF6- 80C2A PMC series turbofan engines. This amendment requires performing either a directional pilot valve (DPV) pressure switch moisture purge procedure and an operational check of the fan reverser or replacing the DPV assembly with a serviceable assembly and performing an operational check of the fan reverser. Thereafter, this AD requires one of these actions on a repetitive basis. This amendment is prompted by a review of fan reverser safety analyses resulting from the discovery of an undetectable failure mode of the DPV pressure switch on certain GE CF6- 80C2A and CF6-80A1/A3 engine models. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent fan reverser deployment, which, if it occurred in-flight, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
2020-15-13: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-02-07 for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model MBB- BK 117 C-2 and Model MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. AD 2017-02-07 required a repetitive inspection and a one-time torque of each hydraulic module plate assembly attachment point (attachment point). This new AD retains the initial inspection and torque requirements of AD 2017-02-07 and requires replacing the attachment point hardware. This AD was prompted by a terminating action has been developed to address the unsafe condition. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2008-22-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During fatigue tests (EF3) on the A340-600, damages were found in longitudinal doubler at VTP [vertical tail plane] attachment cutout between Frame (FR) 80 and FR86. This damage occurred between 58341 and 72891 simulated Flight Cycles (FC). Due to the higher Design Service Goal and different design (e.g., doubler thickness) [of the] A330-200/-300 and A340-300 aircraft series, the damage assessment concluded [there was] potential impact on [the airplanes specified in the] applicability. * * * * * The unsafe condition is crack propagation in the VTP attachment cutout, which could reduce airplane structural integrity in the tail section. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
99-23-25: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 050 series airplanes. This action requires replacement of the lighting plates of the fuel control panel and the electrical power control panel with new, improved lighting plates. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent internal short circuits in the fuel control and electrical power control panels, which could result in burning of the panels and consequent smoke in the flight deck area.
95-21-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model ATP airplanes, that requires an inspection to ensure that various components of the retraction actuator of the nose landing gear (NLG) are secure, and an inspection of the bearing cap mounting holes for correct hole and thread length. This AD also requires a later inspection for certain discrepancies of the retraction actuator; installation of revised tolerance bushings; and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the attachment bolts of the bearing cap of the retraction actuator of the NLG. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the inability to raise or lower the NLG, or possible collapse of the NLG, due to failure of the attachment bolts of the bearing cap.
85-16-05: 85-16-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-5111. Applies to Model 727 and Model 737 series airplanes as specified in Boeing Service Bulletins 727-25-277 dated February 23, 1984, and 737- 25-1171 dated August 10, 1984, respectively, certificated in any category. To assure adequate lavatory fire protection, accomplish the following within one year after the effective date of this amendment, unless previously accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tFor Boeing Model 727 airplanes, modify lavatories in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-25-277 dated February 23, 1984, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tFor Boeing Model 737 airplanes, install lavatory placards in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25-1171 dated August 10, 1984, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may beissued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received Boeing Service Bulletins 727-25-277 and 737-25-1171 may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 6, 1985.
2006-09-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Model Falcon 900EX airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the number 2 engine left- and right-hand forward mounts for missing rivets, and installing rivets if necessary. This AD results from reports of two missing rivets in the front section of the central engine mast discovered on airplanes in service and in production. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct missing rivets in the front section of the central engine mast, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the central engine mast, possible separation of the engine from the airplane during flight, and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
2003-12-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-135 and -145 series airplanes, that requires replacing the four Gamah clamp/sleeve joints on an engine bleed air duct with new threaded coupling assemblies. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires replacing the two supports for the engine bleed air duct with two new supports. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent hot air leaks from the bleed air duct due to disconnection of the duct joint, which could result in heat damage to components near the duct, and consequent increased risk of fire in the rear baggage compartment. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
98-24-03 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH (BRR) Models BR700-710A1-10 and BR700-710A2-20 turbofan engines. The existing AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of the engine compressor and combustion core fairings (also referred to as the engine core fairings) and fasteners for correct installation and damage, and verification that the engine core fairing fasteners are torqued to a higher torque value. This amendment increases the repetitive inspection interval to 150 hours time-in-service (TIS) following an initial inspection and follow-on inspection at the current 50 hours TIS interval. This amendment also requires an initial inspection and follow-on inspection at a 50 hours TIS interval following any engine core fairing or fastener removal, repair, or replacement. Repair of engine core fairings has been added as an alternate to engine core fairing replacement, and an inspection for loose engine core fairing(s) has been included to verify correct installation on the engine. Finally, this amendment adds a new paragraph in the compliance section allowing the option to incorporate redesigned core engine fairings as the terminating action to the required repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by results of repetitive inspections that indicate that the inspection interval can be increased safely, and by introduction of redesigned engine core fairings. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine compressor or combustion core fairing detachment and damage to the engine bypass duct, resulting in engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2006-09-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757-200 and -200PF series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney engines. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect and correct any gap between the strut fitting and the forward engine mount assembly and applicable related investigative actions, corrective actions, and other specified actions. This AD results from a report indicating that gaps had been found between the strut fitting and the forward engine mount assembly. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct any gaps between the strut fitting and the forward engine mount assembly of both engines, which could result in separation of the engine from the wing and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.
2003-12-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 777 series airplanes, that requires either a one-time inspection or a review of the airplane maintenance records for both stabilizer trim control modules (STCM) of the trim system of the horizontal stabilizer to determine if STCMs having certain serial numbers are installed; and follow-on corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires eventual replacement of affected STCMs with new or reworked STCMs, which would terminate the follow-on actions. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded stabilizer trim due to simultaneous failure of two static seals on one STCM, combined with failure of the automatic shutdown function of the stabilizer trim system. Such failures could result in loss of pitch control and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-07-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10, -20, -30, -40, and -50 series airplanes; and C-9 airplanes; that requires repetitive visual and x-ray inspections to detect cracks of the upper and lower corners and upper center of the door cutout of the aft pressure bulkhead; corrective actions, if necessary; and follow-on actions. For certain airplanes, the amendment also requires modification of the ventral aft pressure bulkhead. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the corners and upper center of the door cutout of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid decompression of the fuselage and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
99-17-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A310 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections and tests to detect missing or damaged vespel bushes on the slat system universal joint assemblies of the left- and right-hand wings; and replacement of the universal joints with new joints, if necessary. This amendment also provides for an optional terminating modification for the repetitive inspection and test requirements. This amendment is prompted by a report of loose and migrated vespel bushes and partial cracking within unsupported bush areas found on the slat system universal joint assemblies. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent rupture of the universal joints, which could result in inadvertent movement of the slats, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
2008-12-12: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A complete loss of both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-3 Otter when the lock wire hole in the ignition connector plug on the firewall broke out, allowing the plug to vibrate loose. A maintenance safety feature grounds out both magneto systems through a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated into the Cannon plug. The DHC-2 system is similar in design. Subsequent to the issuance of AD CF-2001-36 a complete loss of both ignition systems occurred on a DHC-2 Beaver resulting in engine failure and subsequent forced approach and landing. Investigation by the Transportation Safety Board determined the internal failure of the magneto firewall connectorresulted in both magneto "P'' leads shorting to ground. A maintenance "safety'' feature through a spring-loaded safety pin incorporated in the firewall connector on many DHC-2 aircraft grounds out both magneto systems when the connector is disconnected. This connector type is readily identified when disconnected by the existence of three internal pins on the firewall and magneto harness side, one of which is shorted directly to ground. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective July 23, 2008. On July 23, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Viking DHC-2 Beaver Service Bulletin Number V2/0001, dated June 27, 2007; and Viking DHC-3 Otter Service Bulletin Number V3/0001, dated June 27, 2007, listed in this AD. As of December 6, 2004 (69 FR 61758, October 21, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference ofdeHavilland Beaver Alert Service Bulletin Number A2/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004; and deHavilland Otter Alert Service Bulletin Number A3/53, Revision B, dated May 28, 2004, listed in this AD.
85-25-55: 85-25-55 BOEING: Amendment 39-5326. Applies to all Model 747 series airplanes, line number 1 through 607, powered by General Electric CF6 or Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT9D-70A turbofan engines, certificated in any category. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the Engine Number 1 control cable which may cause loss of control of the engine, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: \n\n\t1.\tWithin 48 hours following receipt of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours, perform inspections and repair, if necessary, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-76A-2063, Revision 1, dated December 18, 1985, or later FAA- approved revisions. \n\n\t2.\tAlternate means of compliance which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t3.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a basefor the accomplishment of inspections and modifications required by this AD. \n\n\t4.\tModification of the Engine Number 1 engine control cable in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-76-2063, dated July 12, 1985, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD was effective earlier to all recipients of telegraphic AD T85-25-55 issued December 20, 1985. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 23, 1986.
2020-15-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model EC 155B and EC155B1 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the wiring of the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) connector. This AD was prompted by a report of wiring of the AHRS contrary to approved design specifications. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.