Results
2011-24-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A helicopter experienced an inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator speed) back up control mode. The subsequent technical investigations carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 (power turbine speed) sensor harness wire crimping discrepancy was at the origin of this event. Further quality investigations performed with the supplier led to the conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive are potentially concerned by the same manufacturing discrepancy. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 back up mode and consequently to significant power loss on one or more or both engines installed on the same helicopter, potentially resulting in an emergency landing of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent activation of the backup control mode, which could result in engine power loss and emergency landing of the helicopter.
52-28-01: 52-28-01 AERONCA: Applies to All Model 11AC and S11AC Aircraft Equipped With the Auxiliary Fuel Tank Installation. Compliance required not later than January 31, 1953. Accidents have occurred in the above model aircraft due to misuse of the fuel transfer system. These accidents have been caused by pilots attempting to transfer fuel while taking off or in a climb attitude. To preclude the possibility of pilot error with regard to the foregoing, the following placard, or its equivalent, shall be displayed near the fuel transfer system shutoff valve and in view of the pilot: "Transfer fuel in level flight or glide only and when main tank is half full or less. Valve is to be closed except while transferring fuel."
2011-23-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Seven cases of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap/end cap failure have been experienced on CL-600-2B19 aeroplanes, resulting in the loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. * * * * * * * * A detailed analysis of the calculated line of trajectory of a failed screw cap/end cap for each of the accumulators has been conducted, resulting in the identification of several areas where systems and/or structural components could potentially be damaged. Although all of the failures to date have occurred on the ground, an in-flight failure affecting such components could potentially have an adverse effect on the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
70-03-02: 70-03-02 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-929. Applies to Viscount Models 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the fuselage pressure shell in the area under the dorsal fin structure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 90 days after the effective date of this airworthiness directive or within eight years after the date of manufacture, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months from the last inspection, visually inspect the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin for corrosion and breakdown of the protective paint. These inspections may be accomplished through the leading edge access panel for the anti-icing duct connection at the base of the fin and through new inspection holes installed in the dorsal fin in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of the British Aircraft Corporation Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 278, Issue 1, for Model 744 and 745D airplanes; orPreliminary Technical Leaflet No. 143, Issue 1 for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If skin corrosion is found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight: (1) Repair the corroded area in accordance with the Viscount Repair Manual, or 2) Remove the complete dorsal fin (segments or all at once), repair the corroded skin, and reseal, and repaint the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin in accordance with the Airframe Corrosion Section of Viscount Overhaul Manual, for Model 744 airplanes; the Instruction Manual, for Model 745D airplanes; the Aircraft Manual, for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued when all segments of the dorsal fin have been removed and the corrective action required by paragraph (b)(2) has been accomplished. This amendment becomes effective February 22, 1970.
2003-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. (Piaggio) Model P-180 airplanes. This AD requires you to install a placard on the inside of the lavatory door that prohibits occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. This AD also requires you to incorporate a temporary revision into the Limitations Section of the pilot operating handbook/airplane flight manual (POH/AFM). This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent passengers from occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. The lavatory/cabin partition could fail and lead to passenger injury in an emergency situation.
98-04-28: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Cessna Aircraft Company Models T303, 310R, T310R, 335, 340A, 402B, 402C, 404, F406, 414, 414A, 421B, 421C, 425, and 441 airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. The proposed AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2003-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all SOCATA--Groupe AEROSPATIALE (Socata) Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the aileron control gimbal joint for correct alignment and correct operation, and replace any misaligned or defective gimbal joint. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the aileron control gimbal joint. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
2003-04-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R44 helicopters that requires inspecting the tail rotor pitch control assembly for roughness or binding of the pitch control bearings (bearings) by hand-rotating the pitch control bearing housing (housing). If the housing does not rotate freely, the AD requires replacing the unairworthy pitch control assembly with an airworthy unit. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the tail rotor pitch control assembly due to improperly lubricated bearings on the RHC Model R22 helicopters. Although there have been no reported failures on the RHC Model R44 helicopters, the design of the tail rotor pitch control assembly makes it susceptible to the same failures as have occurred on the Model R22 helicopters. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect corrosion of the bearings and to prevent bearing failure and subsequent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
52-18-01: 52-18-01 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 aircraft equipped with Curtiss Drawing P/N S20-480-1101-2 Carburetor Adapter Gasket. Compliance required not later than December 1, 1952. Several instances of splitting and tearing of the neoprene carburetor adapter gasket, P/N S20-480-1101-2, permitting portions of gasket material to block the carburetor air passage has resulted in abrupt engine cutout. To eliminate the occurrence of this hazardous condition, either of the following changes or an approved equivalent shall be accomplished: (a) Install new gasket and clamping assembly per USAF T.O. 01-25LA-79. (b) Install carburetor adapter flange, Slick Airways P/N 00391-2. As a precautionary measure, the subject gaskets shall be inspected for signs of looseness and splitting during each periodic inspection until accomplishment of the above.
98-04-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HMAC) Model Y12 IV airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2011-24-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. Model P-180 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some lock sleeves (part number (P/N) 114146681), which were installed in some Main Landing Gear (MLG) actuators, had been incorrectly manufactured. If left uncorrected, this condition could lead to failure to lock the MLG actuator or to its unlock from the correct position, with subsequent possible damage to the aeroplane and injuries to occupants during landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
58-24-04: 58-24-04 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount Models 745D and 810 Series Aircraft. Compliance required by May 15, 1959. 1. In order to provide a means of checking the electrical continuity of the stall warning system, install a switch in the cockpit and associated wiring for the nose gear oleo switch and Safe Flight wing detector vane. Revisions to the airplane flight manuals for Models 745D and 810 include instructions to the pilot for making the necessary checks. (Vickers Modification Bulletin No. D.2858 for 745D and FG.1487 for 810 cover the same subject.) 2. Periodic checking to assure proper calibration of the detector vane and correct functioning of the deicing heater are also required. (Technical News Sheet No. 212 for 745D and 69 for 810 cover the same subject.)
98-04-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Rolls-Royce Limited (R-R) Dart series turboprop engines, that currently establishes a life limit for propeller low torque switches. This amendment adds two propeller low torque switch part numbers and two R-R Dart engine models that were omitted from the current AD, and establishes a calendar end-date for removal of propeller low torque switches from service. This amendment is prompted by the need to add omitted part numbers and engine models to the AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the snap diaphragm in the propeller low torque switch, which could delay propeller auto-feathering and thereby adversely affect aircraft controllability. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 24, 1998.
89-18-02 R1: 89-18-02 R1 SCHWEIZER (GRUMMAN): Amendment 39-6300 as revised by Amendment 39-6369. Applicability: All G-164 series (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated in the body of the AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent the failure of the forward and aft elevator control system push-pull rods and end fittings, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 calendar days after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months, visually inspect the forward and aft elevator push-pull rod assemblies and end fittings for corrosion and cracks in accordance with the Procedure Section in Schweizer Service Bulletin No. 85, dated June 1, 1989. (b) If corrosion or cracks are found, prior to further flight, replace or repair the defective assembly in accordance with the Procedures Section of Schweizer Service Bulletin No. 85, dated June 1, 1989, utilizing the replacement parts specified in Figure 1 or 2 therein, as applicable, and continue the repetitive inspections specified in paragraph (a) of this AD. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times which provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office. All persons affected by this directive, may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Schweizer Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 147, Elmira, New York 14902, or may examine these documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This AD revises AD 89-18-02, Amendment 39-6300, which became effective on September 15, 1989. This amendment (39-6369, AD 89-18-02 R1) becomes effective on November 24, 1989.
2011-23-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One ATR operator has experienced in-flight elevator travel limitations with unusual effort being necessary on pitch axis to control the aeroplane, while the ``pitch mistrim'' message appeared on the ADU [advisory display unit] display. The elevators seemed to be jammed. During the post-flight inspection, it was discovered that the LH [left-hand] elevator lower stop assembly was broken at the level of the angles, which may have prevented the elevator to respond normally to the flight control input. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to reduced control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD torequire actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-23-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Thielert Aircraft Engines GmbH (TAE) Models TAE 125-01 and TAE 125- 02-99 reciprocating engines. That AD currently requires replacement of certain part numbers (P/Ns) and serial numbers (S/Ns) of clutch assemblies due to clutch failure. The failures identified above could lead to engine in-flight shutdown and loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires the same actions, but applies the corrective action to an additional 244 affected clutch assemblies. This AD was prompted by TAE identifying additional clutch assemblies with nonconforming disc springs. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-04-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to Hartzell Propeller Inc. HD-E6C-3B/E13890K propellers. This amendment requires the reduction of the original hub certified service (fatigue) life from unlimited hours to 37,400 flight hours. This amendment is prompted by a reevaluation by Hartzell Propeller Inc. of the D-5108-( ) original hub service life certification calculations. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue failure of D-5108-( ) hubs, which may result in loss of airplane control.
84-23-06 R1: 84-23-06 R1 PILATUS BRITTEN-NORMAN LTD.: Amendment 39-10172; Docket No. 84-CE-18-AD; Revises AD 84-23-06, Amendment 39-4942 which superseded AD 83-07-18, Amendment 39-4620. Applicability: BN-2A MK. 111 Series Airplanes (all serial numbers), certificated in any category. NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. NOTE 2: The paragraph structure of this AD is as follows: Level 1: (a), (b), (c), etc. Level 2: (1), (2), (3), etc. Level 3: (i), (ii), (iii), etc. Level 2 and Level 3 structures are designations of the Level 1 paragraph they immediately follow. Compliance: Required initially upon the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service (TIS) or within the next 50 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished (compliance with AD 84-23-06), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours TIS. To prevent failure of the upper mounting brackets on both wing mounted engines, which could possibly cause structural failure of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the following areas in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 6 of the "Inspection" section of the Pilatus Britten-Norman (Pilatus) Service Bulletin (SB) No. BN- 2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981:(1) The upper engine to wing mounting brackets for: (i) Minimum lug bolt hole-to-edge distance, elongation of the bolt holes, distortion, delamination, cracks, flaking, and corrosion; (ii) The bolts for correct bearing length; and (iii) Loose and fretted bushings. (2) Prior to further flight, correct defects in accordance with the following: (i) If the lug bolt hole-to-edge distance is less than the specified minimum (0.2625-inches), correct in accordance with paragraph 3 of the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981; (ii) If the bolt holes are elongated, or if any bushings are loose or fretted, modify and correct in accordance with paragraph 4 of the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981; (iii) If any mounting bracket is cracked, modify both brackets on the same engine installation (left side engine or right side engine) concurrently (even if only one bracket is defective) in accordance with paragraph 1 of the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981; (iv) If any lug is distorted or delaminated, replace the deficient part in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981; (v) If any inspected part is corroded or flaking, replace the part in accordance paragraph 1 with the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981; and (vi) If any of the bolts are of incorrect length or damaged, replace with new units of the correct length in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the "Rectification/Modification" section of Pilatus SB No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue 5, dated December 9, 1981. (b) The intervals between the repetitive inspections required by this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow for accomplishing these inspections concurrent with the other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate. NOTE 3: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the SmallAirplane Directorate. (e) The inspections, modifications, and replacements, required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Pilatus Britten-Norman Service Bulletin No. BN-2/SB.61, Issue: 5, Date: December 9, 1981. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained Pilatus Britten-Norman Limited, Bembridge, Isle of Wight, United Kingdom PO35 5PR. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on November 24, 1997.
89-11-06 R1: 89-11-06 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-6219 as corrected by Amendment 39-6515. Docket No. 88-NM-117-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the forward lower cargo compartment frames, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tExcept as provided by paragraph B., below, accomplish one of the following prior to the accumulation of 29,000 total landings or within the next 100 landings after June 22, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6219), whichever occurs later: \n\n\t\t1.\ta.\tUnless previously accomplished within the last 200 landings, conduct a close external visual inspection of the fuselage skin for cracks in the region of the frames specified by Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983. Reinspect at intervals not to exceed 300 landings until the frames are inspected in accordance with paragraph A.1.b., below. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair fuselage skin in accordance with an FAA-approved method and visually inspect the fuselage frames specified by the aforementioned service bulletin for cracks. Frames found cracked must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPrior to the accumulation of 31,400 total landings, or within 100 landings after June 22, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6219), whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 6,600 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 9,000 landings, conduct a visual inspection for cracks of the fuselage frames specified in paragraph A.1.a., above. If cracks are found, repair fuselage frames, prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983. \n\n\t\t2.\tUnless previously accomplishedwithin the last 1,900 landings, conduct an x- ray inspection for cracks of the fuselage frames specified in paragraph A.1.a., above, in accordance with procedures described in the Boeing Model 737 Nondestructive Test Manual D6- 37239, Part 2, Subject 53-10-16. Reinspect at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. If cracks are found, repair fuselage frames prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983. \n\n\t\t3.\tUnless previously accomplished within the last 8,900 landings, perform an internal visual inspection for cracks of the fuselage frames specified in paragraph A.1.a., above. Reinspect at intervals not to exceed 9,000 landings. If cracks are found, repair fuselage frames prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983. \n\n\t\t4.\tUnless previously accomplished within the last 8,900 landings, conduct a low frequency eddy current inspection for cracks of the fuselage frames specified in paragraph A.1.a., above, in accordance with procedures described in Boeing Model 737 Nondestructive Test Manual D6-37239, Part 6, Subject 53-10-01. Reinspect at intervals not to exceed 9,000 landings. If cracks are found, repair fuselage frames prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983. \n\n\tB.\tFor those airplanes that have been modified in accordance with Part III of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983, or the terminating modification described in AD 81-13-08: Prior to the accumulation of 15,600 landings after modification or within the next 1,000 landings after June 22, 1989, (the effective date of Amendment 39-6219), whichever occurs later, perform the inspection described in paragraph A.3., above, and repeat thereafter at intervals not to exceed 15,600 landings. As an alternate to this repetitive inspection, the external inspection described in paragraph A.1.a., above, may be performed at intervals not to exceed 6,600 landings. If cracks are found, repair fuselage skins and frames prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 53A1027, Revision 3, dated December 2, 1983, or in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. These repairs do not constitute terminating action and are subject to the repetitive inspection requirements of this paragraph. \n\n\tC.\tFor the purposes of complying with this AD, the number of landings may be determined to equal the number of pressurization cycles where the cabin pressure differential was greater than 2.0 PSI. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: Therequest should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tNOTE: Inspection and modification in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1027, Revision 4, dated July 13, 1984; Revision 5, dated February 1, 1985; and Revision 6, dated August 25, 1988; are acceptable alternate means of compliance for this AD. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 89-11-06 superseded AD 81-13-08, Amendment 39-4141, which became effective on July 1, 1981. \n\tThe effective date of the requirements of this amendment remains June 22, 1989, as specified in Amendment 39-6219. \n\tThis correction (Amendment 39-6515, AD 89-11-06 R1) becomes effective on February 21, 1990.
2011-22-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Rolls- Royce Corporation (RRC) AE 3007A, AE 3007A1/1, AE 3007A1, AE 3007A1/3, AE 3007A1E, AE 3007A1P, and AE 3007A3 turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive eddy current inspections (ECI) of certain 6th-through-13th stage compressor wheel knife edge seals, and initial and repetitive ECIs of the compressor wheel outer circumference, for cracks. This AD was prompted by reports of low-cycle fatigue cracks found during shop visits, in the 6th-through-13th stage compressor wheels having chrome-carbide coated or uncoated knife edge seals. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the 6th-through-13th stage compressor wheel, leading to damage to the airplane.
88-04-05: 88-04-05 PIPER: Amendment 39-5848. Applies to Model PA-34-200 (S/Ns 34-7250001 through 34-7450220), PA-34-200T (S/Ns 34-7570001 through 34-8170092), and PA-34-220T (S/Ns 34-8133001 through 34-8633031, and 3433001 through 3433088) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service from the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent the forward baggage compartment door from opening in flight, accomplish the following: (a) For Model PA-34-200 (S/N 34-7250001 through 34-7450220) and Model PA- 34-200T (S/N 34-7570001 through 34-7970075, 34-7970077 through 34-7970105, 34-7970107 through 34-7970109, 34-7970111, 34-7970113 through 34-7970117, 34-7970120, 34-7970121, 34-7970123 through 34-7970135, 34-7970137, 34-7970141, 34-7970143, 34-7970145, and 34- 7970164), unless previously accomplished per AD 79-23-01, modify the forward baggage door in accordance with the instructions in Part III of Piper Service Bulletin No. 633A, dated September 20, 1979. (b) For Model PA-34-200 (S/N 34-7250001 through 34-7450220) and Model PA- 34-200T (S/N 34-7570001 through 34-8070367), unless previously accomplished per AD 81-10- 03, modify the forward baggage door in accordance with Part IV of Piper Service Bulletin No. 633B, dated October 3, 1980. (c) For all affected airplanes, visually inspect, repair as necessary, and modify the forward baggage compartment door and latching mechanism in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 872, dated November 9, 1987. (d) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (e) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager of the Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region, Suite 210, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document(s) referred to herein upon request to Piper Aircraft Corporation, 2926 Piper Drive, Vero Beach, Florida, 39360, or may examine the documents at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, 64106. This AD 88-04-05, Amendment 39-5848, supersedes AD 79-23-01 (Amendment 39- 3601, 44 FR 62882, November 1, 1979, as amended by Amendment 39-3701, 45 FR 12213, February 25, 1980) and AD 81-10-03 (Amendment 39-4100, 46 FR 24932, May 4, 1981). This amendment 39-5848 becomes effective on February 16, 1988.
73-13-05: 73-13-05 SLINGSBY: Amdt. 39-1672. Applies to Model Glasflugel T.59.D "Kestrel" gliders. NOTE: This AD does not apply to Glasflugel manufactured "Kestrel" Model gliders. To prevent possible wing flutter due to aileron unbalance, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the ailerons from the glider and measure the aileron mass balance hinge Moment in accordance with Section 1 of Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instructions No. 54, Issue 2, dated February 1973, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If during the inspection required by paragraph (a), it is found that, either the average balance hinge moment of both ailerons exceeds 8.5 lb.-ins. or the balance hinge moment of either aileron exceeds 9.5 lb.-ins., before further flight, install balance weight on the leading edge of both ailerons in accordance with Section 2 of Slingsby Sailplane Technical Instructions No. 54,Issue 2, dated February 1973, or an FAA-approved equivalent such that the balance hinge moment of each aileron does not exceed 8.0 lb.-ins. This amendment is effective upon publication in the Federal Register as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective upon receipt of the airmail letter dated May 21, 1973, which contained this amendment.
2011-21-51: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Model 525C airplanes. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain lithium-ion batteries installed as the main aircraft battery with either a Ni-Cad or a lead acid battery. This AD was prompted by a report of a battery fire that resulted after an energized ground power unit was connected to one of the affected airplanes equipped with a lithium-ion battery as the main aircraft battery. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-03-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. (Piaggio) Model P-180 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect and determine whether any firewall shutoff or crossfeed valve with a serial number in a certain range is installed and requires you to replace any valve that has a serial number within this range. This AD allows the pilot to check the logbook and does not require the inspection and replacement requirement if the check shows that one of these valves is definitely not installed. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a faulty firewall shutoff or crossfeed valve from developing cracks and leaking fuel. This could result in an engine fire.
57-15-01: 57-15-01 AERO COMMANDER: Applies to All Models 560A, 560E and 680 Serial Numbers 231 Through 559. Compliance required as indicated. A. Failures have occurred on the upper retaining pins on the main landing gear. These pins react the rebound loads when the main gear lower piston reaches its limit of extension with respect to the upper cylinder. 1. Until Item 2 has been accomplished the following inspections should be performed daily. (a) With aircraft on ground remove center scissor bolts right and left main gears and inspect for evidence of shearing. These bolts normally carry zero shear load and evidence of shearing is an indication of upper bearing retaining pin failure. (b) Inspect center scissor bushings for evidence of cracking or elongation due to shear loads being applied on center scissor bolts. (c) Check area where scissors attach to strut and housing for evidence of scissor to strut or scissor to housing contact due to overextensionof strut assembly. This is further evidence of upper bearing retaining pin failure. If any of these indications are present, the upper bearing retaining pins must be replaced at once. Contact the Service Department, Aero Design & Engineering Co. for parts and detailed instruction to accomplish replacement. 2. To be accomplished by October 1, 1957. The present design incorporating two 1/4 inch retaining pins should be modified to incorporate four 3/8 inch retaining pins. Four pin kits and drill fixtures for installing the pins, as well as information as to where the modification can be accomplished, may be obtained from the Service Department, Aero Design & Engineering Co. (Aero Design & Engineering Co. Service Bulletin No. 43, dated June 18, 1957, also covers this subject.)