Results
2021-17-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-04-06 for all Safran Helicopter Engines, \n\n((Page 49905)) \n\nS.A. (Safran Helicopter Engines) Arrius 2B1, 2B1A, 2B2, and 2K1 model turboshaft engines. AD 2014-04-06 required initial and repetitive inspections of the hydro-mechanical metering unit (HMU) high-pressure pump drive gear shaft splines, cleaning and inspections of the sleeve assembly splines, and replacement of the sleeve assembly on the affected high-pressure pump drive gear shaft or replacement of the HMU if the HMU fails inspection. This AD was prompted by in-flight shutdowns caused by interrupted fuel supply at the HMU. This AD requires revised inspections and continues to require cleaning of the sleeve assembly splines, and replacement of the sleeve assembly on the affected high-pressure pump drive gear shaft or replacement of the HMU if the HMU fails an inspection. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
94-26-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 series airplanes, that requires accomplishment of certain structural modifications. This amendment is prompted by reports of incidents involving fatigue cracking and corrosion in transport category airplanes that are approaching or have exceeded their economic design goal. These incidents have jeopardized the airworthiness of the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent degradation in the structural capabilities of the affected airplanes. This action also reflects the FAA's decision that long term continued operational safety should be assured by actual modification of the airframe rather than repetitive inspections.
93-07-03: 93-07-03 AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39-8535. Docket 92-NM-163-AD. Applicability: All Model ATR42-300 series airplanes, and all Model ATR72-100 and - 200 series airplanes; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent failure of the pressurization valves to close in the event of ditching, and to prevent interruption of electrical power to certain electrical equipment used during approach and landing, accomplish the following: (a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, remove the electrical switches, part numbers 9PD and 12HM, and identify the date codes in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-31-0023, dated May 15, 1992 (for Model ATR42-300 and -320 series airplanes); or Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR72-31-1006, dated May 15, 1992 (for Model ATR72-100 and -200 series airplanes); as applicable. (1) If the date code is identified as A6, A7, A8, A9, AO, AN, AD, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, or B7, prior to further flight, replace the currently-installed switch with a serviceable switch marked with a date code other than those listed above. (2) If the date code is other than those listed in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD, reinstall the switch. No further action is necessary. (b) As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install an electrical switch, part numbers 9PD and 12HM, having a date code of A6, A7, A8, A9, AO, AN, AD, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, or B7, on any airplane. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The removal and identification shall be done in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-31-0023, dated May 15, 1992 (for Model ATR42-300 and -320 series airplanes); or Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR72-31-1006, dated May 15, 1992 (for Model ATR72-100 and -200 series airplanes); as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Aerospatiale, 316 Route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse, Cedex 03, France. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on May 10, 1993.
2021-18-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bell Textron Canada Limited Model 429 helicopters. This AD was prompted by three reports of unexpected forces or uncommanded inputs to the directional (yaw) control system. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight \n\n((Page 49910)) \n\nManual (RFM) for your helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-08-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires a review of airplane maintenance records and an inspection of the nose landing gear (NLG) to determine the part number of the steering pinion, and follow-on/corrective actions as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the steering pinion in the NLG, which could result in loss of steering and possible damage to the airplane during takeoff and landing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-19-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Robinson Helicopter Company Model R44 and R44 II helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports of cracked tail rotor blades (blades). This AD requires checking each blade for any crack and removing any cracked blade from service. This AD also requires removing all affected blades from service and prohibits installing any affected blade on any helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-09-05: 76-09-05 TURBOMECA: Amendment 39-2593. Applies to Turbomeca Astazou IIAd engines installed on, but not necessarily limited to, Aerospatiale Alouette II Models SA3180, SA318B, SA318C helicopters. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent axial compressor wheel failure due to corrosion and fatigue, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, or before the accumulation of 1000 hours' time in service since new, whichever occurs later, remove the axial compressor wheels, P/Ns 0.236.15.014 Index A and 0.268.15.004, from the engine and inspect for a crack or evidence of corrosion. (b) If a crack is found, before returning the engine to service, comply with paragraph (d) of this AD. (c) If no crack is found but evidence of corrosion is found, before returning the engine to service, either - (1) Rework the wheel and reinstall in the engine in accordance with Turbomeca MOD TU 196 (Turbomeca Service Bulletin Astazou II, No. 72.205.0203, dated August 19, 1974), or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, and Middle East, FAA, c/o American Embassy, APO New York 09667; or (2) Comply with paragraph (d) of this AD. (d) Replace the wheel with a new wheel, P/N 0.236.15.016, 0.268.15.011, or 0.268.15.010, modified in accordance with Turbomeca MOD TU 196 (Turbomeca Service Bulletin Astazou II, No. 72.205.0203, dated August 19, 1974), or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Europe, Africa, and Middle East, FAA, c/o American Embassy, APO New York 09667. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1976.
2021-17-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent XWB-75, Trent XWB-79, Trent XWB-79B, and Trent XWB-84 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks in the intermediate-pressure compressor (IPC) rotor 1 (R1) blades installed on certain Trent XWB model turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections (BSIs) of the affected IPC R1 blades and, depending on the results of the inspections, replacement of all 34 IPC R1 blades. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-13: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a routine inspection, cracks have been found on an aeroplane at the lower wing panel rear trailing edge inboard of flap lever arm 1 (rib 5). A subsequent inspection of the other aeroplanes in that operator's fleet revealed several more aeroplanes with cracks at the same location. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to structural failure of the affected wing panel, possibly resulting in the wing separating from the airplane with consequent loss of control. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-21-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/ 12. The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker F27 and F28 type designs in response to these regulations revealed that, under certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid. Such a short circuit may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. * * * ** We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
77-17-12: 77-17-12 MARTIN: Amendment 39-3022. Applies to all Martin 404 Aircraft certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. (a) For airplanes without wing spar chord splice joint fittings at wing station 187, accomplish the following: (1) Within the next three months or 500 hours in service, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within five years or 10,000 hours in service preceding the effective date, remove the left and right outer wing panels and visually inspect the wing spar chord splice joints for corrosion at wing station 187. (2) Repeat the inspection specified in (a)(1) at intervals not to exceed 10,000 hours in service or five years, whichever occurs first, for left wings, and 12,000 hours in service or six years, whichever occurs first, for right wings. (b) For airplanes with wing splice fittings installed in accordance with STC SA328SO, accomplish the following without wing removal:(1) Visually inspect the left and right wing panels at wing station 187 for corrosion within the next 12 months or 2000 hours in service, whichever occurs first, after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within 48 months or 8000 hours in service preceding the effective date by (i) Stripping all sealant from the spar splice joints. (ii) Removing any two vertical large attachment bolts and the two end horizontal tension bolts from each "Hayes" fitting. (2) Perform a dye penetrant inspection or an FAA approved equivalent inspection for cracks at the same time as the corrosion inspection specified in (b)(1). (i) At the accessible areas of the spars and (ii) In the four bolt holes of each "Hayes" fitting as noted in (b)(1)(ii) (3) Perform the inspection in (b)(1)(ii) which requires removal of the horizontal bolts even though any two vertical large attachment bolts have been removed for bolt hole inspection within the past 48 months or 8000 hours in service. (4) Repeat the inspection specified in (b)(1) at intervals not to exceed 10,000 hours in service or five years, whichever occurs first. (5) Remove both wing outer panels; conduct a corrosion inspection of the wing structure and fittings, and a dye penetrant inspection for cracks on all affected parts at intervals not to exceed 20,000 hours in service or ten years, whichever occurs first, beyond the inspection in (b)(1). (c) Repair corroded parts before further flight in accordance with an FAA approved repair or replace cracked parts before further flight with serviceable or equivalent parts approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (d) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, may adjust the inspection interval specified in this AD. Amendment 39-3022 revokes AD 75-26-08. This amendment is effective August 30, 1977.
89-20-11: 89-20-11 EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE AERONAUTICA S.A. (EMBRAER): Amendment 39-6325. Applicability: Models EMB-110P1 and EMB-110P2 (all serial numbers (S/N)) airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated in the body of the AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the right forward emergency exit from opening during flight which could damage the propeller, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 15 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the Pilot's Operating Handbook and CTA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, EMBRAER Publication No. TP-110P1/176, Section 4, Pre-Flight Check, by making a pen and ink change to add the following check on the following airplanes: (1) On Model EMB-110 airplanes, S/N 110146, 110153, 110156, 110157, 110161, 110165, 110184, 110186, 110189, 110190, 110192 thru 110283, 110285 thru 110346: "Check for proper installation of the safety restraining cable on the right forward emergency exit."(2) On all Model EMB-110 airplanes except S/N 110146, 110153, 110156, 110157, 110161, 110165, 110184, 110186, 110189, 110190, 110192 thru 110283, 110285 thru 110346: "Check for proper installation of the safety restraining cable on the right forward emergency exit." and, "Visually insure that the locking pins are properly engaged on the right forward emergency exit." (b) Within the next 5 calendar months after the effective date of this AD for Model EMB-110 airplanes, S/N 110146, 110153, 110156, 110157, 110161, 110165, 110184, 110186, 110189, 110190, 110192 thru 110283, 110285 thru 110346: (1) modify the right forward emergency exit in accordance with EMBRAER Service Bulletin 110-52-030, dated November 30, 1981, and (2) revise the Pilot's Operating Handbook and CTA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, EMBRAER Publication No. TP-110P1/176, Section 4, Pre-Flight Check, by making a pen and ink change which follows the previous pen and ink change specified in paragraph(a)(1) above, to add the following check: "Visually insure that the locking pins are properly engaged on the right forward emergency exit." (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the initial compliance times, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, at the above address. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document referred to herein upon request to Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER), P.O. Box 343-CEP, 12.225 Sao Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo, Brazil; or may examine this document at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment (39-6325, AD 89-20-11) becomes effective on October 24, 1989.
2004-08-15: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-13-08, which currently applies to all Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. (Goodrich) TAWS8000 terrain awareness warning systems (TAWS) that are installed on airplanes. AD 2003-13-08 currently requires you to inspect the TAWS installation and remove any TAWS where both the TAWS and any other device are connected to the same baro set potentiometer. AD 2003- 13-08 also prohibits future installation of any TAWS8000 TAWS that incorporates hardware "Mod None", "Mod A", or "Mod B". This AD is the result of omitting from AD 2003-13-08 a provision that prohibits reconfiguring an installed TAWS8000 TAWS after it passes the inspection unless it incorporates hardware "Mod C". This AD retains the actions of AD 2003-13-08 and prohibits future installation or reconfiguration of any TAWS8000 TAWS that does not incorporate hardware "Mod C". We are issuing this AD to prevent the loading of the baro set potentiometer, which could result in an unacceptable altitude error. That condition could cause the pilot to make flight decisions that put the airplane in unsafe flight conditions. DATES: This AD becomes effective on June 7, 2004. On July 21, 2003 (68 FR 38586, June 30, 2003), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. Service Memo SM 134, dated May 2, 2003. As of June 7, 2004, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. Service Memo SM 134, revised July 9, 2003; and Goodrich Avionics Systems, Inc. Alert Service Bulletin SB A117, dated July 9, 2003.
2011-14-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Model 767 airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive detailed and high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections of the station (STA) 1809.5 bulkhead for cracking, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD expands the inspection area to include the vertical inner chord at STA 1809.5. This AD results from reported fatigue cracking in the vertical inner chord and the forward outer chord while doing the detailed inspection of the horizontal inner chord at STA 1809.5. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in the bulkhead structure at STA 1809.5 and the vertical inner chord at STA 1809.5, which could result in failure of the bulkhead structure for carrying the flight loads of the horizontal stabilizer, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane.
2021-17-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A321-211, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of false drill starts found around the latch hook mounting holes of certain door frames of the fuselage due to erroneous manufacturing processes. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the area around the latch hook mounting holes of the forward and aft door frames to detect damage from false drill starts, and repair if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-08-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) models 520 and 550 series engines with certain ECi cylinders installed. This AD requires replacing certain serial-numbered (SN) cylinders supplied by ECi before further flight. This AD results from reports of 34 failures of cylinder heads marketed by ECi. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power due to cracks in the cylinder head and possible engine failure caused by separation of a cylinder head.
2004-08-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes, that requires a general visual inspection to detect corrosion of the left- and right-hand horizontal stabilizer hinge fitting bolts, barrel nuts, and the associated holes in the horizontal stabilizer structure, and to detect corrosion of the left- and right-hand elevator sector pinch bolts and associated holes, as applicable; and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct corrosion of the left- and right-hand horizontal stabilizer hinge fitting bolts, barrel nuts, and associated holes in the horizontal stabilizer structure, and the left- and right-hand elevator sector pinch bolts and associated holes, which could lead to loss of a hinge fitting and reduced structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-20-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 series airplanes; Model A310 series airplanes; and Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model C4- 605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes). This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * A recent analysis conducted by the manufacturer showed a particular risk for explosive failure of the * * * hydraulic accumulator. This condition, if not detected and corrected, might, for some aeroplane installations, lead to damage to all three hydraulic circuits, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane or could, for certain other aeroplane installations, lead to an undetected fire in the wheel bay. * * * * * We are issuing thisAD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-16-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of in-production findings of missing or incorrect application of the lightning strike edge glow sealant protection at specific locations in the wing tanks. This AD requires an inspection for missing or incorrect application of the lightning strike edge glow sealant protection at certain locations in the wing tanks, and corrective action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-16-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-19-11 for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters. AD 2020-19-11 required repetitive borescope inspections of the 90-degree tail rotor gearbox (TGB) and depending on the inspection results, removing the TGB from service. This AD was prompted by the determination that additional parts may be susceptible to the unsafe condition. This AD retains \n\n((Page 46960)) \n\nthe inspection requirements of AD 2020-19-11, and revises the compliance time and applicability. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-07-22: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), applicable to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently require that the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program be revised to include inspections that will give no less than the required damage tolerance rating for each structural significant item, and repair of cracked structure. Those ADs were prompted by a structural re-evaluation that identified additional structural elements where, if damage were to occur, supplemental inspections may be required for timely detection of fatigue cracking. This amendment requires additional and expanded inspections, and repair of cracked structure. This action also expands the applicability of the existing ADs to include additional airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the continued structural integrity of the entire fleet of Model 747 series airplanes. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2011-20-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of an A319 and an A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were as a result of de-bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. Such reworks were also performed on some rudders fitted on A310 and A300-600 aeroplanes. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane.* * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-19-04: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One case of elevator servo-control disconnection has been experienced on an aeroplane of the A320 family. Investigation has revealed that the failure occurred at the servo-control rod eye-end. Further to this finding, additional inspections have revealed cracking at the same location on a number of other servo-control rod eye-ends. In several cases, both actuators of the same elevator surface were affected. The root cause of the cracking has not yet been determined and tests are ongoing. A dual servo-control disconnection on the same elevator could result in an uncontrolled surface, the elevator surface being neither actuatednor damped, which could lead to reduced control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
77-10-11: 77-10-11 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amendment 39-2905. Applies to Models 240, 340/440 airplanes, including those modified for turbopropeller power per STC's SA1054WE, SA1096WE and SA4-1100, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To detect stress corrosion to the aluminum uplock quadrant lug in the nose landing gear and prevent possible failure of the lug, accomplish the following: a. Within the next 60 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 60 hours time in service thereafter, until (c), below, is performed: (1) Remove the AN 3-21 bolt attaching the nose landing gear uplatch release cable clevis and the emergency release cylinder to the uplock assembly. (2) Inspect P/N 240-5250109-6 nose landing gear uplock quadrant for cracks in the AN3 bolt attach lug using a 2X or stronger magnifier, or dye penetrant method. (3) If cracks are found, prior to further flight, replace the quadrant with either a new aluminum quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-6, or a steel quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-9. If a new aluminum quadrant is installed, perform steps (1) through (4) at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service. (4) Reinstall the AN3 bolt attaching release cable and emergency release cylinder and check rigging of the nose landing gear uplock installation per the applicable maintenance manual. b. After the effective date of this AD, all aluminum quadrants, P/N 240-5250109-6, must be replaced before accumulating 1,200 hours time in service. c. Installation of a steel quadrant, P/N 240-5250109-9, constitutes terminating action for this AD, and normal maintenance practices may be observed. d. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 to authorize operation of the aircraft to a base for the accomplishment of the inspections required by this AD. e. Equivalent inspections and replacement parts may be used when approved by the Chief,Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Note: General Dynamics Service Bulletins 600 (240D) Service Bulletin No. 32-3 and 640 (340D) Service Bulletin No. 32-2 pertain to this same subject. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1977.
2021-17-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model A109C, A109K2, A109E, A109S, and AW109SP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack on the tail rotor (TR) mast. This AD requires an inspection of certain TR sleeve assemblies for discrepancies, an inspection of certain TR shaft assemblies for discrepancies, a repetitive measurement of the position of the bushing of the TR sleeve assembly in relation to the pitch change slider assembly, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.