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88-14-07: 88-14-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-5966. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes, line numbers 001 through 1425, equipped with non-modular aft lavatories, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tNOTE: "Non-modular" refers to lavatories which are not stand-alone components, and are assembled on the airplane. \n\n\tTo prevent accumulation of combustible materials behind the airplane sidewall, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 3 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the area behind the towel and cup dispenser for the presence of a shroud enclosing the dispenser back. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the dispenser is equipped with a shroud which prevents material from falling behind the lavatory sidewall and is acceptable to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, or an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf an acceptable existing shroud has not been installed, inspect the area behind the towel and cup dispenser in the aft lavatories and remove all foreign material. Repeat this inspection at intervals not to exceed 3 months, until the requirements of paragraph B., below, are accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 15 months after the effective date of this amendment, install a shroud behind the towel and cup dispenser in the aft lavatories, which encloses the dispenser back and prevents material from falling behind the sidewall, in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment, 39-5966, becomes effective August 11, 1988.
85-12-10: 85-12-10 SLINGSBY SAILPLANES: Amendment 39-5079. Applies to Slingsby T.53.B gliders certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent structural failure due to fatigue cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a placard on the instrument panel in full view of the pilot reading: "CLOUD FLYING AND AEROBATIC MANEUVERS PROHIBITED." (b) (1) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 hours time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the welded frame P/N T53B-1079, which joins the forward spar member with the rear spar member of the fuselage center section, for cracks at the forward extremity of the lower two tubes where they are welded to the thin vertical channels. (2) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effectivedate of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the two aft brackets (welded brackets - P/N T53B-10-168, Issue 1-4; riveted brackets - P/N T53B-10-168, Issue 5) that attach the wing center section to fuselage frame No. 6 for fatigue cracks using the dye penetrant crack detection method in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (c) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b)(1), prior to further flight, modify the tubular structure in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 68, dated August 14, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b)(2), prior to further flight, replace the aft two brackets in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 70, dated September11, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (e) The placard required by paragraph (a) may be removed, and the inspections required by paragraph (b) may be discontinued, after the modification of the tubular structure, in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 68, dated August 14, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, has been accomplished, and when the aft two brackets have been replaced in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 70, dated September 11, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (f) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the past 75 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service from the last inspection, comply with the following: (1) Dye penetrant inspect the metal lugs P/N T53B-10-115, and channel section P/N T53B-10-118, on fuselage frame No. 6, in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (2) If cracks are found as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, prior to further flight, replace the metal lugs and/or channel section in accordance with Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction No. 100/T53, Issue 1, dated October 20, 1981, or FAA-approved equivalent. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, telephone 513.38.30 ext. 2710. Slingsby Sailplane Technical Instruction No. 70 dated September 11, 1974, Slingsby Sailplane Technical Instruction No. 68 dated August 14, 1974, and Slingsby Engineering Limited Technical Instruction dated October 20, 1981, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Slingsby Engineering Limited, Ings Lane, Kirbymoorside, York, Y06, 6EZ, England. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This AD supersedes Amendment 39-2308 (40 FR 32318), AD 75-17-07. This Amendment 39-5079 becomes effective on July 22, 1985.
2005-08-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections of the electrical connectors of the explosive cartridge wiring of the engine fire extinguisher containers to verify if the identification number labels are installed and legible; repetitive electrical tests of all explosive cartridge wiring of the engine fire extinguisher containers to verify proper installation and function; and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection of the emergency shut off wire assembly; installation of lanyards on the electrical connectors for the engine fire extinguishing agent containers and for the auxiliary power unit fire extinguishing agent containers if applicable; and related investigative/corrective actions, as applicable. This AD is prompted by reports of cross-wired electrical connectors of the engine fire extinguishing agent containers. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cross-wired electrical connectors of the fire extinguishing system, which could release fire extinguishing agent into the incorrect engine nacelle in the event of an engine fire.
2024-10-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that reliance on design assurance level (DAL) D software for flight-critical fly-by-wire (FBW) rigging functions may result in undetected inaccurate positioning of the primary flight control surfaces. This AD requires the use of specific issues of the aircraft maintenance publication (AMP) for electrical rigging procedures, and an electrical rigging confirmation check of primary flight control surfaces for certain airplanes, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-09-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW169 helicopters. This AD was prompted by manufacturing defects in certain forward and aft float assemblies. This AD requires replacing certain aft float assemblies or, as an alternative, deactivating the emergency flotation system (EFS). This AD also prohibits installing certain forward and aft float assemblies. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-26-02: 85-26-02 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM: Amendment 39-5226. Applies to Model BO-105 series helicopters, through serial No. 750, certificated in any category that are equipped with one of the following tandem hydraulic units: Part Numbers (P/N) 105-45021, 105- 45023, 105-45028, 105-83001, 105-83011, D133-3073, and DSK1-30142. Compliance is required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To detect or prevent possible jamming of the helicopter main rotor control system, accomplish the following: (a) Before the first flight of each day after the effective date of this AD, operate the System II hydraulic actuators to detect binding of the control. If binding is detected, clean and seal the System II hydraulic actuators in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, clean and seal the System II hydraulic actuators in accordance with MBB BO-105, ASB No. 26, Part 2B, dated December 12, 1985, or with an equivalent approved in accordance with paragraph D of this AD. After sealing, the operational check in paragraph (a) is no longer required. (c) The operational check in paragraph (a) may be performed by the pilot. NOTE: For the requirements regarding recording compliance and method of compliance with this AD in the aircraft's permanent maintenance records, see FAR Section 91.173. (d) Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium, APO NY 09667-1011. (e) The aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the actuators may be sealed in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to MBB Helicopter Corp., P.O. Box 2349, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region, Room 158, Building 3B, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. This amendment becomes effective February 25, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 85-26-02, issued December 23, 1985, which contained this amendment.
86-21-11: 86-21-11 EMPRESA BRASILEIRA DE AERONAUTICA S.A.: Amendment 39-5535. Applies to Embraer Model EMB-120 series airplanes; serial numbers 12004, 12006 through 120028, 120033, and 120034; equipped with engine oil coolers, part numbers 160282-1 or 160282-2, which have accumulated more than 200 hours time-in-service; certificated in any category. Compliance is required within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent oil loss and in-flight engine shutdown, accomplish the following: A. Fabricate and install on the instrument panel near the altimeter, in full view of the pilot, a placard that reads: "MAXIMUM OPERATING LIMITATION 10,000 FEET MSL." B. Installation of engine oil cooler part number 160282-3 or subsequent, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. This amendment becomes effective February 17, 1987, as to all persons, except those persons to whom it was made immediatelyeffective by Priority Letter AD 86-21-11, issued October 22, 1986.
2005-08-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glaser-Dirks Flugzeugbau GmbH (DG Flugzeugbau) Model DG-800B sailplanes equipped with a SOLO 2625 engine or a Mid-West AE 50T engine. This AD requires you to modify the coolant pump and fuel pump electrical circuits, remove the non-resettable digital engine indicator (DEI) circuit breaker (4-ampere) and replace with a resettable 5-ampere circuit breaker, secure (for sailplanes with a SOLO 2625 engine) the choke butterfly valve axis, install edge protection at the sharp edges of the resettable 5-ampere DEI circuit breaker, and incorporate changes in the FAA-approved sailplane flight manual. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical failure of the fuel and coolant pumps if a non-resettable circuit breaker trips. This could result in power loss with the inability to restart the fuel pump during a critical phase of flight (for example, takeoff under own power).
2024-08-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Model Trent 1000-A, Trent 1000-A2, Trent 1000-AE, Trent 1000-AE2, Trent 1000-C, Trent 1000-C2, Trent 1000-CE, Trent 1000-CE2, Trent 1000-D, Trent 1000-D2, Trent 1000- E, Trent 1000-E2, Trent 1000-G, Trent 1000-G2, Trent 1000-H, Trent 1000-H2, Trent 1000-J2, Trent 1000-K2, and Trent 1000-L2 engines. This AD was prompted by reports of wear in the combining spill valve (CSV) assembly of certain hydro-mechanical units (HMUs). This AD requires removing certain HMUs from service and replacing with a serviceable part. This AD also prohibits the installation of certain HMUs unless the HMU is a serviceable part or the CSV assembly has been replaced, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-07-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a design review that identified the fixed emergency locator transmitter (ELT) lithium batteries would not be sufficiently cooled by the outside air in the event of a thermal runaway event. This AD requires replacing the ELT with a new ELT with redesigned batteries, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-20-06: 89-20-06 HONEYWELL, INC.: Amendment 39-6335. (Docket No. 89-NM-97-AD) Applicability: Sperry FMZ-800 Flight Management Systems (FMS), Model NZ-600, NZ-800, and NZ-900 series Navigation Computers, part numbers 7004402-653, -654, -801, -803, -804, -805, -806, -811, -812, -813, -823, -824, -832, -833, -834, -843, -844, -845, -901, -902, -903, -904, -905, and -906, if installed with two or more inertial reference systems and one or more omega/VLF sensors. These FMS navigation computers are known to be or have been installed in, but not limited to, Avions Marcel Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900, British Aerospace Model BAe 125-800A, Canadair Model CL-601-3A, and Gulfstream Model G-IV series airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent FMS navigation errors caused by an erroneous omega/VLF sensor, accomplish the following: A. Within 15 days after the effective date of this AD, add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) or FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM or AFMS. ON ALL FLIGHT EXTENDING OFFSHORE ONE HOUR OR MORE BEYOND VOR/DME RANGE: (1) WHEN NAVIGATING WITH TWO FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (FMS), AND WITH ONE OR MORE OPERATIONAL INERTIAL REFERENCE SENSORS AND WITH A SINGLE OPERATIONAL OMEGA/VLF SENSOR, THE OMEGA/VLF SENSOR MUST BE DESELECTED FROM ONE OF THE FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTERS. (2) IF NAVIGATING WITH ONLY ONE FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTER, (BECAUSE OF AN IN-FLIGHT FMS FAILURE), AND WITH TWO OR MORE INERTIAL REFERENCE SENSORS AND WITH A SINGLE OPERATIONAL OMEGA/VLF SENSOR, THE OMEGA/VLF SENSOR MUST BE DESELECTED FROM THE OPERATING FMS NAVIGATION COMPUTER. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. This amendment (39-6335, AD 89-20-06) becomes effective on October 10, 1989.
86-16-51: 86-16-51 DEHAVILLAND: Amendment 39-5433. Applies to DeHavilland Model DHC-8 airplanes, certificated in any category, serial numbers 003, 005, and subsequent. Compliance is required before further flight, unless previously accomplished. To preclude the uncommanded retraction of the main landing gear, accomplish the following: A. Insert a copy of this AD in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and advise all flight crew members. For takeoff, landing, and while on the ground, isolate the main landing gear actuation hydraulics by complying with the following revised flight manual procedures: OPERATING LIMITATIONS (A) Nosewheel steering switch must be selected OFF. (B) Takeoff or landing in cross winds exceeding 20 knots is not permitted. NOTE: Information presented in Supplement 12 of the Airplane Flight Manual (Operation with Inoperative Nose Wheel Steering) is in error and will be amended in the next AFM revision. 2. NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES:- Flight Compartment Check - POWER ON. - (ADD) Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. Check 3 green lights ON. All door and gear unlocked lights OUT. Selector lever light OUT. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - INSERT IN HAND PUMP SOCKET AND OPERATE UNTIL HAND PUMP MOVEMENT BECOMES STIFF. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - STOW. Pre-Taxi Checks: 11. (CHANGE) Nosewheel Steering Switch - OFF. Steer the airplane on the ground by means of differential braking and power lever adjustment. After Takeoff: 1. (CHANGE) Upon Achieving Positive Rate of Climb: - Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors - CLOSE FULLY. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - NORM. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - UP. Check all gear and door lights and gear selector lever light OUT. NOTE: Should landing gear selector lever be selected UP prior to closing Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors and prior to selecting Landing Gear Inhibit Switch to NORMAL, reselect Landing Gear Selector Lever DOWN and accomplish gear retraction as per revised procedure. NOTE: Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors and Landing Gear Inhibit Switch are not within reach of captain when secured in left-hand seat in normal flying position. Approach: 1. (CHANGE) Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. - Check 3 green lights ON. - All door and gear unlocked lights OUT. - Selector lever light OUT. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - INSERT IN HAND PUMP SOCKET AND OPERATE UNTIL HAND PUMP MOVEMENT BECOMES STIFF. - Hydraulic Pump Handle - STOW. - (ADD) Nosewheel Steering Switch - OFF. Go-around from final approach: 5. (CHANGE) Upon achieving positive rate of climb: - Landing Gear Alternate Release and Landing Gear Alternate Extension Doors - CLOSE FULLY. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - NORMAL. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - UP. Check all gear and door lights and gear selector lever light OUT. 3. EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES: Engine Failure or Fire After V1: 2. (CHANGE) Gear retraction procedures as above for go- around from final approach. One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing: 1. (CHANGE) Landing Gear: If No. 1 Engine Inoperative: - Gear extension procedure as above for approach. If No. 2 Engine Inoperative: - Airspeed - 140 KT IAS MAXIMUM. - Landing Gear Inhibit Switch - INHIBIT. - Landing Gear Selector Lever - DOWN. - Landing Gear Alternate Release Door - OPEN FULLY. - Main Landing Gear Release Handle - PULL FULLY DOWN. - Landing Gear Alternate Extension Door - OPEN FULLY. Insert pump handle in hand pump socket and operate until main landing gear locks down (left and right green lights ON, and left door and right door amber lights ON) and handpump movement becomes stiff. - Nose Gear Alternate Release Handle - PULL FULLY UP. Check nose green light and nose door amber light on. If any of the gear locked down (green) lights fail to illuminate: - Gear Locked Down Indicator Light Switch - ON. Check for illumination of appropriate gear down lock alternate light. - Anti-skid Switch - TEST. - PTU Manual Switch - PTU MANUAL. One Engine Inoperative Approach Climb (Overshoot): 3. (CHANGE) Gear retraction procedure as above for go- around from final approach. 4. PERFORMANCE DATA: (A) Takeoff Distance Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. (B) Takeoff Run Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. (C) Accelerate-Stop Distance Required - INCREASE BY TWO PERCENT. B. No later than November 1, 1986, incorporate DHC Modification 8/0567 in accordance with DHC Service Bulletin 8-32-35, dated July 31, 1986. Remove the copy of this directive from the AFM. C. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., Garrett Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York. This airworthiness directive becomes effective October 20, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T86-16-51, issued August 15, 1986.
2005-08-07: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pilatus Aircraft Limited (Pilatus) Models B4-PC11, B4-PC11A, and B4- PC11AF sailplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the control-column support for cracks and, if any cracks are found, replace the control-column support with a new support. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the control-column support, which could result in failure of the support. This failure could lead to loss of the primary flight control system.
2024-08-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an electrical contactor that failed with contacts in the intermediate position, causing the airplane to lose power to multiple electrical systems. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the affected part, and, depending on findings, accomplishment of applicable corrective action, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
87-11-06: 87-11-06 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-5607. Applies to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Model 214ST helicopters, S/N's 28101 through 28159, and Models 214B and 214B-1, S/N's 28001 through 28070, certificated in any category, equipped with upper and lower locking plates, P/N's 214-010-231-101 and 214-010-232-101. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. (a) To prevent failure of the collective hub locking plate, on the Model 214ST, 214B, and 214B-1 helicopters, replace the P/N 214-010-232-101 lower locking plate and the P/N 214-010-231-101 upper locking plate with locking plate P/N 214-010-569-101 in accordance with Part I of BHTI ASB 214-86-36, dated October 8, 1986, or ASB 214ST-86-37, Rev. A, dated November 3, 1986, within the next 50 hours' time in service or within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first. (b) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after completing the requirements of paragraph(a) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the hub and lower hub nut assembly for slippage in accordance with Part II of BHTI ASB 214-86-36, dated October 8, 1986, or ASB 2145T-86-37, Rev. A, dated November 3, 1986. (c) Within the next 500 hours' time in service after completing the requirements of paragraph (a) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection, perform the following in accordance with Part III of BHTI ASB 214-86-36, dated October 8, 1986, or ASB 214ST-86-37, Rev. A, dated November 3, 1986: (1) Inspect the hub locking plate, P/N 214-010-569-101, for cracks. (2) If a crack is found during this inspection, replace the hub locking plate with a serviceable part. (3) Retorque the lower hub nut and install locking plate, P/N 21 4-010-569- 101, as detailed in paragraph (a). (d) Installation instructions for the scissors and sleeve may be found in the BHTI- 214ST Maintenance Manual, Chapter 62-21-00, and 214B Maintenance Manual, Chapter 65-20- 00. (e) Upon compliance with this airworthiness directive, the inspections and actions required by priority letter Airworthiness Directive No. 86-12-01, issued June 6, 1986, may be discontinued. (f) An alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. The procedure shall be done in accordance with BHT1 ASB 214-86-36, dated October 8, 1986,or ASB 214ST-86-37, Rev. A., dated November 3, 1986. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). Copies may be obtained upon request to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101, Attention: Customer Support. Copies maybe inspected at the Office of Regional Counsel, FAA, Southwest Region, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1987.
85-14-08: 85-14-08 BRITISH AEROSPACE VISCOUNT: Amendment 39-5095. Applies to Model 700 and 800 series airplanes, certificated in any category. To prevent failure of Alternators Part Number N0505 or 0505/1 which are or have been installed at the Number 2 position on Model 800 Series airplanes accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: A. Replace with a serviceable unit or overhaul in accordance with the Lucas overhaul manual reference 24-20-02 prior to the accumulation of 1250 flying hours or within the next 150 flying hours, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1250 flying hours. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective August 16, 1985.
87-07-06: 87-07-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-5588. Applies to all Model 747 and 757 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure proper passenger door operation during emergency evacuation, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, in order to find defective passenger door emergency power reservoirs, inspect the serial numbers of those reservoirs installed on airplanes in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52A2201 (for Model 747 airplanes) or 757-52A0022 (for Model 757 airplanes), both dated September 15, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions or check the applicable airplane records for those passenger door emergency power reservoir serial numbers listed in H. R. Textron Service Bulletin 803300-52-05 dated September 15, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the serial number is not one listed in H. R. Textron Service Bulletin referenced above, no further action is necessary. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor any reservoir on which the serial number matches one listed in the H. R. Textron Service Bulletin referenced above, determine if the reservoir is fully charged. If any discharged emergency power reservoir is found, replace or modify before further flight in accordance with the applicable Boeing Service Bulletin referenced above. \n\n\tNOTE: These units may have been installed on Boeing Models 747 and 757 series airplanes other than those listed in the Boeing Service Bulletins referenced above. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor each emergency power reservoir installed on an airplane with a serial number listed in H. R. Textron Service Bulletin 803300-52-05, dated September 15, 1986, determine on a daily basis that the reservoir is fully charged. This daily procedure may be discontinued once the reservoir is modified in accordance with the applicable Boeing Service Bulletin referenced above. If any discharged emergency power reservoir is found, replace or modify before further flight in accordance with the applicable Boeing Service Bulletin referenced above. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 15 months after the effective date of this AD, modify all emergency power reservoirs listed in H. R. Textron Service Bulletin 803300-52-05, dated September 15, 1986, in accordance with the applicable Boeing Service Bulletin referenced above. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 1, 1987.
2024-06-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-700-2A12 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports from the supplier that some overheat detection sensing elements of the bleed air leak detection system were manufactured with insufficient salt fill, which can result in an inability to detect hot bleed air leaks. This AD requires maintenance records verification, and if an affected part is installed, prohibits the use of certain Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) items under certain conditions by requiring revising the operator's existing Minimum Equipment List (MEL). This AD also requires testing the overheat detection sensing elements, marking each serviceable sensing element with a witness mark, and replacing each nonserviceable part with a serviceable part. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts under certain conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-08-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires doing a general visual inspection for sealant at the interface of the upper spar fittings, strut side skins, and the fittings of the thrust reverser strut fairing on the engine struts; and applying an injection seal or silicone sponge rubber with fillet seal if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report that an injection seal in the engine strut area may not have been properly completed or installed during production. We are issuing this AD to prevent flammable fluid (such as fuel or hydraulic fluid) from leaking onto a hot engine exhaust nozzle or into the engine core fire zone, and consequently causing an uncontrolled fire or explosion.
2024-07-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2010-18- 06, which applied to all GA8 Airvan (Pty) Ltd Model GA8 and GA8-TC320 airplanes. AD 2010-18-06 required inspections and a minor design change to the forward slide of the cargo door with corrective action as necessary. Since the FAA issued AD 2010-18-06, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), which is the aviation authority for Australia, superseded the previous CASA Australia AD to incorporate more detailed inspections and additional modifications as specified in updated service information published by the manufacturer. This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight cargo door separation. This AD requires inspections and rework (modifications) of the cargo door with corrective action as necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-19-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model BAe ATP series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the airframe pneumatic deicing boots. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight incidents and an accident that occurred in icing conditions where the airframe pneumatic deicing boots were not activated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that flightcrews activate the pneumatic wing and tail deicing boots at the first signs of ice accumulation. This action will prevent reduced controllability of the aircraft due to adverse aerodynamic effects of ice adhering to the airplane prior to the first deicing cycle.
2024-06-13: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-21-15 for certain Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH (DAI) Model DA 42, DA 42 NG, and DA 42 M-NG airplanes. AD 2022-21-15 required replacing the rudder T-yoke axle with an improved rudder T-yoke axle. Since the FAA issued AD 2022-21-15, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) superseded its mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) to correct an unsafe condition on these products. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, inspecting the rudder steering bracket edge distance and depending on the inspection results, inspecting the T-yoke bolt hole for wear and play, and corrective action if necessary. For certain airplanes this AD requires replacing the rudder T-yoke bolt (axle) with a serviceable part, installing a new self-locking nut, and applying torque seal marks on the rudder T-yoke bolt head and self-locking nut. For all airplanes this AD requires repetitively inspecting the torque seal marks on the rudder T-yoke bolt head for proper alignment and the self-locking nut for proper installation and corrective action if necessary. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-08-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for cracks in the crease beam and adjacent structure of the fuselage, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD is prompted by fatigue cracks found in the crease beam during a follow-on inspection of a previously installed modification. We are issuing this AD to find and fix fatigue cracking of the fuselage frame, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the frame and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
2024-06-10: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-25- 18, which applied to certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. AD 2022-25-18 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the main landing gear (MLG) side stay outer link and replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by additional investigations of the causes of the cracking being conducted. This AD requires a reduction of the repetitive visual inspection interval, provides optional repetitive special detailed inspections, and requires accomplishing a one-off dimensional tolerance check and performing a repetitive lubrication of the MLG side stay outer link pivot, as specified in United Kingdom (U.K.) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) (U.K. CAA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-23-04: 77-23-04 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT-BREGUET AVIATION (AMD-BA): Amendment 39-3075. Applies to Model Falcon 10 airplanes, S/N 1 through 56, certificated in all categories, and any other Model Falcon 10 airplane incorporating Badin Crouzet total-pressure probes, P/N 33790-10. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure of total-pressure probe accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the accumulation of 600 total airplane flights or within the next 100 flights after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, replace both total-pressure probes, P/N 33790-10, with new parts of the same part number, or with probes of improved design, P/N 33790-20, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Falcon 10 Service Bulletin No. F10.34.007, dated July 17, 1975, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff for Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, A.P.O. New York, N.Y. 09667. (b) Replacement probes P/N 33790-10 are hereby life limited to 600 flights. (c) For the purpose of this AD, a flight is defined as a single takeoff and landing. If records are not maintained of each takeoff and landing, the number of flights may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA airworthiness inspector. This amendment becomes effective December 10, 1977.