Results
96-03-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) 90, 99, 100, and 200 series airplanes. This action requires inspecting the main landing gear drag leg lock link to ensure that the hole for the roll pin is drilled completely through both walls of the main landing gear drag leg lock link and, if not drilled completely through both link walls, replacing any main landing gear drag leg lock link. An incident in which the left main landing gear collapsed on one of the affected airplanes prompted this action. Investigation revealed that the roll pin hole was not completely drilled through both walls of the drag leg lock link. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent main landing gear collapse caused by drag leg lock link failure, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
93-13-09: 93-13-09 CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY: Amendment 39-8622. Docket No. 92-CE-61-AD. Applicability: The following model airplanes (all serial numbers) equipped with a Continental TSIO-520R engine and intercooler installation in accordance with the applicable supplemental type certificate (STC), certificated in any category: Model Modified by STC T210K SA2231CE T210L SA2231CE T210M SA3203NM T210N SA3203NM Compliance: Required within the next 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent air induction hose failure, which could result in loss of engine power, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect between the turbocharger and intercooler to determine whether a Gates air induction hose, part number (P/N) 20987 or P/N 21370, is installed. If a Gates hose is installed, prior to further flight, accomplish the following: (1) Loosen the two AN737-TW clamps and remove the Gates hose.(2) Install The Aircraftsman hose, P/N MW1118, and tighten the two AN737-TW clamps. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. (d) All persons affected by this directive may examine any information referred to herein upon request to the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Parts needed as a result of this action may be obtained from The Aircraftsman, 7000 Merrill Avenue, Hangar/Box P100, Chino, California 91710. (e) This amendment becomes effective on August 13, 1993.
2010-26-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the fuselage skin at lap joints, the splice strap at certain butt joints, the skin or doubler at certain approved repair doublers, and the skin at decal locations; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of scribe line damage found adjacent to the skin lap joints, decals, and wing-to-body fairings. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.
73-13-10 R2: 73-13-10 R2 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION, LTD: Amendment 39-1676 as amended by Amendment 39-3133 is further amended by Amendment 39-3797. Applies to all Model DH-125 and BH-125 airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible in-flight failures of the outer flap hinge assembly fittings, accomplish the following: (a) On airplanes, S/N's 25014, 25074, 25104, 256002, and 256004, before further flight, unless already accomplished within the last 3 months, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR Section 21.197 to a base where the work can be performed. (1) Remove the flap outer hinge assembly, including the fittings, P/N's 25WF89A and either 25WF87-8A or 25WF187-8A, and extract the pivot bolt, P/N 25WF91, or the pivot pin, P/N 25WF/Z47/1, as applicable; (2) Inspect the pivot bolt or pivot pin, as applicable, for cracks, using dye penetrant or an FAA-approved equivalent process; and (3) If cracks are found during an inspection performed in accordance with paragraph (a)(2), before further flight, as applicable: (i) Replace cracked pivot bolts, P/N 25WF91, with new parts of the same part number, or with pivot pins, P/N 24WF/Z47/1, of HSA Modification No. 25/2300, Part B, or an FAA-approved equivalent, and thereafter comply with paragraph (e)(5). (ii) Replace cracked pivot pins with new parts of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent, and thereafter comply with paragraph (e)(5). NOTE: When inspecting a bolt, particular attention should be paid to the bolt shoulder, adjacent to the threaded end. (b) On airplanes, S/N's 25014, 25074, 25104, 256002, and 256004, before further flight, unless already accomplished within the last 3 months, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR Section 21.197 to a base where the work can be performed, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3 months from the last inspection (1) Remove all dirt, grease, paint, and other substances from the external surface of the lugs on the outer flap hinge assembly fittings, P/N's 25WF89A and either 25WF87- 8A or 25WF187-8A. (2) Using a magnifying glass of not less than 10X, inspect the external surface of the lugs on the fittings for cracks; and xcept that a cracked fitting may be retained in service provided the requirements of paragraph (c) are met, replace the cracked part with a serviceable part of the same part number or an FAA- approved equivalent. NOTE: During inspection, particular attention should be paid to the crown of the lugs. (c) A cracked fitting may be retained in service, if - 25WF187-8A - (i) The fitting is one of a pair incorporating fail-safe links of HSA Modification No. 25/2300, Part A, or an FAA-approved equivalent; (ii) The mating lugs of the fittings are not cracked; (iii) The forward lug of the fitting is not cracked; and (iv) Any cracks in the aft lug of the fitting are in a single plane, parallelto the plane of the fitting. (2) For upper fittings, P/N 25WF89A, that are installed as one of a pair incorporating fail-safe links of HSA Modification No. 25/2300, Part A, or an FAA-approved equivalent - (i) The mating lugs of the fitting are not cracked; (ii) No more than one lug of the forward pair of lugs and no more than one lug of the aft pair of lugs is cracked; and (iii) Any cracks in a forward or aft lug of the fitting are in a single plane, parallel to the plane of the fitting. (3) For upper fittings, P/N 25WF89A, that are not installed as one of a pair incorporating fail-safe links - (i) The mating lugs of the fitting are not cracked; (ii) No more than one lug of the forward pair of lugs of the fitting is cracked; and (iii) Any cracks in a forward lug of the fitting are in a single plane, parallel to the plane of the fitting. (d) On all Hawker Siddeley Model DH-125 and BH-125 airplanes, other than those five airplanes coveredby paragraph (b), within the next 6 weeks after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 6 weeks, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3 months from the last inspection, comply with paragraphs (b)(1), (2), and (3). (e) Replace pivot bolts, P/N's 25WF91, and pivot pins, P/N's 25WF/Z47/1 in accordance with the following: (1) For pivot bolts which are in place on airplanes, S/N's 25014, 25074, 25104, 256002, and 256004, on the effective date of this AD and are subsequently found to be uncracked at the initial inspection required by this AD, and refitted, before the accumulation of 200 flights or within 3 months after refitting, whichever occurs sooner. (2) For pivot bolts on Hawker Siddeley Model DH-125 and BH-125 airplanes, other than those five airplanes covered by paragraph (e)(1) which were found to be uncracked at the initial inspection voluntarily conducted in accordance with the applicable HSA Service Bulletins, and refitted, before the accumulation of 200 flights or within 3 months after refitting, whichever occurs sooner. (3) For new pivot bolts fitted as replacements for uncracked pivot bolts, before the accumulation of 500 flights after such replacement. (4) For new pivot pins fitted as replacements for uncracked pivot bolts or pivot pins, before the accumulation of 1,200 flights after such replacement. (5) For new pivot bolts or pivot pins fitted as replacements for cracked pivot bolts or pivot pins, before the accumulation of 200 flights or within 3 months after such replacement, whichever occurs sooner, except that such service life limit may be extended to 1,200 flights, without time limit, if fail-safe links of HSA Modification No. 25/2300, Part A, are installed, or if prior to the accumulation of 200 flights or within 3 months after such replacement, whichever occurs sooner, the fail-safe links of HSA Modification No. 25/2300, Part A are incorporated. (f) Paragraphs (b), (c), and(d) of this AD do not apply to airplanes required to comply with AD 80-12-10. Amendment 39-1676 became effective June 27, 1973. Amendment 39-3133 was effective February 16, 1978, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by the telegram dated December 1, 1977, which contained this amendment. This Amendment 39-3797 becomes effective June 23, 1980.
2006-17-07R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-1, -1A, -1B, -7, -7A, -7B, -9, -9A, -11, -15, -15A, -17, -17A, -17R, -17AR, -209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires either replacing high pressure compressor (HPC) front hubs and HPC disks that have operated at any time with PWA 110-21 coating and that operated in certain engine models, or, visually inspecting and fluorescent penetrant inspecting (FMPI) for cracking of those parts and re-plating them if they pass inspection. This AD requires the same actions, but makes necessary corrections to inadvertent reference errors and omissions found in AD 2006-17-07, and relaxes some of the compliance times in Table 5. This AD results from our finding reference errors and omissions in AD 2006- 17-07, from determining that the AD as drafted imposed an unnecessary burden on operators if they have to immediately remove engines, and from requests to clarify compliance paragraphs. We are issuing this AD to prevent a rupture of an HPC front hub or an HPC disk that could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective November 2, 2006. The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of October 4, 2006 (71 FR 51459, August 30, 2006).
49-05-03: 49-05-03 NAVION: Applies to Airplanes Equipped With Continental Model E185-3 Engines Having Serial Numbers 4289-D to 5110-D Inclusive, and Engines Which Have Been Equipped at Overhaul With Tri-Metal Front Main Bearing Inserts and Bronze Thrust Washers in Accordance With Continental Bulletin No. M48-7. To be accomplished as soon as possible but not later than the first major engine overhaul. Because of unsatisfactory service experience with Continental E185-3 engines equipped with No. 530497 Tri-Metal front main bearing inserts, and with Nos. 530494, 530495, 530544 thrust washers and 530545 dowel pins, these parts must be replaced with the original silver main thrust bearing inserts, Continental No. 40644. Continental Service Bulletin M48-30 covers this same subject. (Ryan Navion Field Service Bulletin No. 5 outlines the interim precautions to be taken on airplanes equipped with the unsatisfactory thrust washers until silver main thrust bearings are installed in accordance with this note.)
2010-26-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires a detailed inspection of the entryway door movable ceiling panel for pin migration at either end of the hinge assembly and damage to the pin; a detailed inspection for correct crimp at both ends and damage to hinge stock; a detailed inspection of the ceiling area for any visible cosmetic and/or tie-rod chafing that could be caused by a migrated hinge pin; a detailed inspection for wire damage and/or breakage; and other specified and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of fault messages caused by improperly crimped hinge pins coming into contact with wires and causing damage. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improperly crimped hinge pins, which could damage tie rods and \nwire bundles, causing shorts in many systems, including the spar fuel shut-off valve, oxygen mask deployment, and burned wires, which could be an ignition source in a hiddenarea of the airplane.
96-19-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection of the spring bungee assembly of the nose landing gear (NLG) to ensure proper torque of the collar and correct clearance between the collar and the body of the bungee, and replacement of the spring bungee assembly with a serviceable unit, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the NLG to extend when the landing gear selector was placed in the "DOWN" position, and failure of the NLG doors to open when the NLG door switch was set in the "SAFETY/DOOR OPEN" position; these conditions may have been caused by a reduced stroke of the spring bungee. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent improper operation of the NLG door and consequent inability to extend the NLG due to a reduced stroke of the spring bungee.
88-06-01: 88-06-01 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5870. Applies to all Model H.S. 748 series airplanes, on which Modification 6175 has been accomplished (post Mod 6175), certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To detect cracks and prevent collapse of the main landing gear, accomplish the following: A. Prior to accumulating 25,000 landings or within the next 750 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,500 landings, perform an inspection of inboard main pivot bracket assemblies in accordance with paragraph 2A of the British Aerospace H.S. 748 Service Bulletin 57/59, Revision No. 1, dated April 1984. Any assembly found to exhibit corrosion, loose bolts, and/or cracks must be repaired in accordance with paragraph 2D of the above mentioned service bulletin. If corrosion to a depth greater than 0.060-inch is found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the FAA. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety and which has the concurrence of an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414 Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective April 18, 1988.
96-04-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200 and -200C airplanes, that currently requires installation of fail-safe straps onto the engine inlet attach ring of the nose cowl. This amendment requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the attach ring of the nose cowl, and replacement of cracked attach rings. Replacement with an improved attach ring, if accomplished, would terminate the requirement to inspect the attach ring repetitively. This amendment is prompted by the development of an improved attach ring that eliminates the need for repetitive inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the attach ring of the nose cowl, which could result in separation of the nose cowl from the engine following failure of a turbine blade.
92-03-10: 92-03-10 SAAB-SCANIA: Amendment 39-8165. Docket 91-NM-139-AD. Applicability: Model SAAB 340B series airplanes, Serial Numbers 160 through 226, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent reduced structural integrity of the wings, accomplish the following: (a) Within 250 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection of the inner-wing fuel tanks for foreign objects that could block or restrict the flow of fuel between the outer and inner fuel tanks, in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991. (b) If foreign objects are found as a result of the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, remove the foreign objects; submit a report of such findings to SAAB Aircraft Product Support, in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991; and perform additional inspections in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-511) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM- 113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. (e) The inspection required by this AD shall be done in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin 340-28-013, dated March 14, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from SAAB-Scania AB, Product Support, S-581.88, Linkoping, Sweden. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (f) This amendment (39-8165, AD 92-03-10) becomes effective on March 16, 1992.
2010-23-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Surface defects were visually detected on the rudder of one A319 and one A321 in-service aeroplane. Investigation has determined that the defects reported on both rudders corresponded to areas that had been reworked in production. The investigation confirmed that the defects were a result of de- bonding between the skin and honeycomb core. An extended de-bonding, if not detected and corrected, may degrade the structural integrity of the rudder. The loss of the rudder leads to degradation of the handling qualities and reduces the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-03-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to American Champion Aircraft Corporation (American Champion) Models 8KCAB, 8GCBC, 7GCBC, and 7ECA airplanes that are equipped with metal spar wings. This action requires inspecting (one-time) the wing front strut fittings for cracks or scratches, replacing any wing front strut fittings found cracked or scratched, and reporting the inspection results to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Fatigue cracks found on the wing front strut fittings on two Model 8KCAB airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of a wing assembly caused by cracked or scratched wing front strut fittings, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
96-03-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes and Model DC-10-30, DC-10-40, and KC-10A (military) airplanes. For Model MD-11 series airplanes, the AD requires an inspection to determine the serial number of the forward trunnion bolts on the main landing gear (MLG), and rework or replacement of the bolts, if necessary. For Model DC-10-30, DC-10-40, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, the AD requires an inspection for evidence of missing chrome and for corrosion on the chrome surfaces, or verification that the forward trunnion bolts have been chrome plated in a specific manner; and rework or replacement of the bolts, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of chrome flaking on the bearing surface of the trunnion bolts due to improper cleaning of the base material prior to chrome plating. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent premature failure of the trunnion bolts and subsequent collapse of the MLG as a result of severe corrosion on the bearing surface and in the mechanical fuse due to chrome flaking.
80-19-14: 80-19-14 PIPER (Ted Smith): Amendment 39-3915. Applies to Aerostar Model 600, 601 and 601P airplanes Serial Nos. 0001 through 0807 certificated in all categories. To prevent possible loss of control due to structural failure of the vertical and horizontal stabilizer aft attach fittings, accomplish the following. (a) Within 100 hours' time in service since the last dye penetrant or visual inspection or within 5 hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD, if no dye penetrant or visual inspection previously accomplished, visually inspect the aft horizontal and vertical stabilizer attach fittings for cracks per part I.A. of Piper Service Bulletin 600-88A dated July 29, 1980. (b) If any crack extends into the web area of the fitting, replace cracked part with like serviceable part and replace fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59 600-88 or Kit 59 600-88A. (c) If more than 3 cracks are found in the flange area, replace cracked part withlike serviceable part and replace attach fitting flange fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59 600-88 or Kit SB 600-88A. (d) If three (3) or less cracks are found in the flanges in any one fitting and do not extend into the web area of the fitting, within 200 hours' time in service or 180 days whichever occurs sooner from discovery of cracks, replace the fitting and fitting fasteners using fasteners specified in Piper Kit 59600-88 or Kit 59600-88A. (e) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This supersedes Amend. 39-3835 (45 FR 46346), AD 80-12-08. This amendment becomes effective September 25, 1980.
2010-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200 series airplanes. This AD requires installing a new insulation blanket on the latch beam firewall of each thrust reverser (T/R) half. This AD results from an in-flight shutdown due to an engine fire indication; an under-cowl engine fire was extinguished after landing. The cause of the fire was uncontained failure of the starter in the engine core compartment; the fire progressed into the latch beam cavity and was fueled by oil from a damaged integrated drive generator oil line. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fire from entering the cowl or strut area, which could weaken T/R parts and result in reduced structural integrity of the T/R, possible separation of T/R parts during flight, and consequent damage to the airplane and injury to people or damage to property on the ground.
96-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A and SAAB 340B series airplanes, that requires repetitive operational tests of the valve limit switch of the propeller brake. This amendment also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive tests. This amendment is prompted by a report that when the propeller brake was not properly engaged the crew did not receive a "PROP BRAKE" warning due to a faulty valve limit switch. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a valve limit switch from failing to send input to the warning system; absence of a "PROP BRAKE" warning could result in the crew being unaware that the propeller brake is not properly engaged and the propeller may turn without warning.
52-14-02: 52-14-02 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers Except as Otherwise Indicated. Item IV Also Applies to All 340 Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers. Items I through IV are to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than August 1, 1952, and shall be completed no later than August 1, 1953. I. The following changes to the electrical circuits are to be accomplished: (NOTE: These changes apply to airplanes which have not been modified since they were manufactured. (See item II for modified airplanes): A. Insulate exposed terminals at unfeathering relay, install insulating separator between throttle microswitches, and secure wires as specified in Convairogram No. 4, dated March 7, 1951. II. To prevent inadvertent actuation of the reversing solenoid valves, the following changes to the electrical circuits are to be accomplished toprotect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other circuits and to protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other: (NOTE: These changes are known to apply to some aircraft which were modified by operators so that they differ from the originally manufactured configuration. Other airplanes which have design features in the reversing solenoid circuits which are similar to those outlined below, but which are not specifically referred to in this list, should have these points protected in a manner equivalent to that described herein.) A. Modify the following multiple pin connector assemblies as specified in item 2 of attachment A (see 52-13 for attachment A): 1. Connector at wing-fuselage disconnect. 2. Connector at Hamilton Standard Reversing box No. 80340 (covered by change specified in item C.) B. Modify the following terminal strips as specified in item 1 of attachment A: 1. Terminal strip at firewall junction box. 2. Terminal strip in junction box at fuselage Station No. 109. C. Hamilton Standard reversing relay box: Reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., to be shielded from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. If reversing relay boxes are used which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits, it shall not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors in the two relay boxes. D. Reversing solenoid circuit wiring: Modify in accordance with item 4 of attachment A. E. Protect the exposed terminals of the secondary throttle lock relays, (if used), as specified in item 3 of attachment A. F. Install insulating separator between throttle microswitches, and secure wires as specified in Convairogram No. 4, dated March 7, 1951. III. Other circuit modification: All airplanes are to be modified to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 221. IV. Reverse solenoid lock assembly on all airplanes which do not have "lift up" throttles, either (a) Install a warning light system as described in Convair Service Bulletin No. 240-381 except that the system shall be so arranged that it will indicate to the crew when the solenoid lock has just started to move to the open position, or (b) adjust the lock actuating handles so that not less than 1 inch of movement is required before the lock opens. V. Maintenance practices (to be instituted not later than August 1, 1952): A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: 1. Inspect all points specified in items I and IIB. The inspections of item IIB may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in item 1(a) or 1(b) of attachment A. B. At any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to be replaced as necessary. C. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. D. At any time that operations are performed which may affect the relative position of the solenoid lock and throttle switches, but in anyevent at intervals not to exceed 1,500 hours: Check the relationship between the position of the pedestal strikers when they are: (a) In contact with the solenoid latch; (b) at the point where the detent roller contacts the first detent cam, and (c) when the reversing microswitches are actuated. It shall not be possible for the switches to be actuated before the latch and the detent engage the striker and the cam. This determination shall be made by positive measurements rather than observation of engine r.p.m. at which these actions take place. VI. Operating instructions: Comply with item 5 of Attachment A, AD 52-13-02 Lockheed. VII. (NOTE: Propeller governor design changes which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a further directive.)
2022-02-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW1500G and PW1900G model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by an analysis of an event involving an International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2533-A5 model turbofan engine, which experienced an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling. This AD requires removing certain HPT 1st-stage and HPT 2nd-stage disks from service and replacing with parts eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-24-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Damage to the lower lateral fittings of the 80VU rack, typically elongated holes, migrated bushes [bushings], and/or missing bolts have been reported in-service. In addition damage to the lower central support fitting (including cracking) has been reported. In the worst case scenario a complete failure of the 80VU fittings in combination with a high load factor or strong vibration could lead to failure of the rack structure and/or computers or rupture/disconnection of the cable harnesses to one or more computers located in the 80VU. This rack contains computers for Flight Controls, Communication and Radio-navigation. These functions are duplicated across other racks but during critical phases of flight the multiple system failures/re-configuration may constitute an unsafe condition. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-03-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Fairchild Aircraft SA226 and SA227 series airplanes. This action requires replacing the nuts that attach the power control cable to the lever attach point clevis with nuts that have safety wire holes, safety-wiring the power control cable to the lever attach point clevis, inspecting to assure that the power cable is securely attached to the power control cable bracket, and correcting any attachment problems. Reports of power control cable attaching hardware failure on two of the affected airplanes prompted this action. In one of these instances, the power control cable disconnected from the lever attach point clevis, resulting in engine shutdown. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such power control cable disconnection, which could result in engine shutdown and subsequent loss of control of the airplane.
77-23-08: 77-23-08 HUGHES HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3081. Applies to Hughes Models 269A, 269A-1, 269A-2, and 269B helicopters equipped with main rotor blade P/N 269A1125, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131-1, all blade Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145-1, all blade Serial Numbers; and P/N 269B1145-25, all blade serial numbers. Compliance required as indicated. Small cracks have been discovered on several main rotor blades under the blade root fittings, radiating from the outboard bolt hole on the upper and lower side of the blade. To prevent main rotor blade failure due to extension of these cracks under the fittings, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: (a) For main rotor blade P/N 269A1125, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269A1131, all Serial Numbers; and P/N 269B1145, Serial Nos. 0001 through 1313 - (1) Prior to the accumulation of 210 hours' time in service for main rotor bladeshaving less than 200 hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, and within the next 10 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having between 200 and 1000 hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, unless already accomplished within the last 390 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 400 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection, until a total of 1000 hours' time in service is reached, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (2) For main rotor blades accumulating a total of 1000 hours' time in service, subsequent to January 16, 1967, and for main rotor blades having 1000 or more hours' time in service on January 16, 1967, within the next 10 hours time in service, unless already accomplished within the last 90 hours' time in service, and thereafter at periods not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection until themain rotor blade is retired from service, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (b) For main rotor blade P/N 269A1131-1, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145-1, all Serial Numbers; P/N 269B1145, Serial Nos. 1314 and subsequent; and P/N 269B1145-25, all Serial Numbers. Prior to the accumulation of 1025 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having less than 1000 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, and within the next 25 hours' time in service for main rotor blades having 1,000 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection until the main rotor blade is retired from service, inspect in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-9.2, dated October 3, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. (c) Cracked blades must be removed before further flight, marked conspicuously to avoid inadvertent return to service, and replaced with new or serviceable used blades in accordance with (1), (2), or (3) below. Blades listed in (1), (2), and (3) are different types. Do not intermix types (1), or (2) or (3) blades. Main rotor blades, either those originally installed or replacement blades, must meet the requirements of this AD and must be retired from service before they exceed their maximum service life of 1366 hours' time in service. (1) Main rotor blade P/N 269B1145 and/or P/N 269B1145-1 and/or P/N 269B1145-25. (2) Main rotor blade P/N 269A1131 and/or P/N 269A1131-1. (3) Main rotor blade P/N 269A1125. This supersedes Amendment 39-642 (33 FR 12085), AD 68-17-07. This amendment becomes effective December 27, 1977.
2010-25-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires changing the emergency open doors procedure by incorporation of a temporary revision into the FAA- approved airplane flight manual (AFM) for all airplanes. This AD also requires replacement of the passenger door retaining bracket with an improved design retaining bracket for certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by several reports of the rear passenger door departing the airplane in flight. We are issuing this AD to change the emergency open doors procedure and retrofit the rear passenger door retaining bracket, which if not corrected could result in the rear passenger door departing the airplane in flight.
2010-06-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) model MD-900 helicopters that currently requires applying serial numbers to certain parts, increasing the life limit for various parts, maintaining a previously established life limit for a certain vertical stabilizer control system (VSCS) bellcrank assembly and bellcrank arm, and correcting the part number for the VSCS bellcrank arm. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD, except it reduces the life limit of the swashplate spherical slider bearing (slider bearing). It further corrects what was described as a ''bellcrank arm'' life limit in the current AD and correctly describes it as another ''bellcrank assembly'' life limit. This amendment is prompted by two reports of cracks in the slider bearing that occurred well before the previously increased retirement life of 2,030 hours time-in-service (TIS) was reached. The actions specified by this AD are intendedto establish appropriate life limits for various parts, and to prevent fatigue failure of those parts and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
96-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8 series airplanes, that requires modification of a certain battery temperature monitor. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the battery temperature monitor, which resulted in smoke in the flight compartment. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the battery monitor, which could result in smoke in the flight compartment.