Results
96-04-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A320-231 series airplanes, that requires modification of the fire wall of each engine. This amendment is prompted by a report of a fire in the engine of an in-service airplane due to the fire wall being improperly sealed during production. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent propagation of a fire through a gap (opening) in the fire wall in the event of an engine fire, as a result of improperly sealed fire wall.
2010-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Two incidents [of near mid-air collision] have occurred on Airbus A320 Family aircraft during [a] Resolution Advisory with Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). One of the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) factors was the lack of visibility of relevant information on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). This condition, if not corrected, could result in erroneous interpretation of TCAS Resolution Advisories, leading to an increased risk of mid-air collision. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-19-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect cracking of the Hi-lok bolt holes in the main hinge fittings of the horizontal stabilizer, and repair, if necessary. The amendment also requires modification of the main hinge fitting, modification or replacement of rib connecting angles, and modification of ribs. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that cracking was found in the main hinge fittings of the horizontal stabilizer during fatigue testing. The cracking was a result of higher-than-anticipated loads induced during operation of the thrust reverser. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent deterioration of the fatigue life of the main hinge fittings of the horizontal stabilizer and reduced structural integrity of the horizontal stabilizer due to higher induced loads.
2010-05-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Model MD-90-30 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the overwing frames at stations 883, 902, 924, 943, and 962, left and right sides, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracked overwing frames. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could sever the frame, increase the loading of adjacent frames, and result in damage to adjacent structure and loss of overall structural integrity of the airplane.
93-01-19: 93-01-19 BOEING: Amendment 39-8473. Docket 92-NM-130-AD. Supersedes AD 89-08-07, Amendment 39-6186. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes with entry or service doors equipped with slide rafts; line positions 002 through 409, inclusive; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo ensure opening of entry/service doors when required for emergency evacuation, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes having line positions 132, 136, and 140 through 409, inclusive: Within 350 flight hours after May 9, 1989 (the effective date of AD 89-08-07, Amendment 39- 6186), perform an operational check on each entry/service door to detect a broken counterbalance inner torsion spring, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-52A0053, dated August 25, 1988; or Revision 1, dated December 22, 1988. \n\n\t\t(1)\tRepeat this operational check thereafter at intervals not to exceed 350 flight hours, until the requirements of paragraph (b) of this AD are accomplished. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf any broken counterbalance inner torsion spring is detected during an operational check, prior to further flight, replace it with an airworthy part in accordance with the service bulletin. After replacement of any counterbalance inner torsion spring, continue to perform the operational checks at intervals not to exceed 350 flight hours until the requirements of paragraph (b) of this AD are accomplished. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes having line positions 002 through 409, inclusive: Within 425 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, or within 425 flight hours after the last operational check accomplished in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD, whichever occurs first, determine if the entry/service doors are equipped with a counterbalance assembly using a titanium inner torsion spring, a counterbalance assembly rated for escape slides, an improved counterbalance assembly, or an improved graphite-composite innertorsion spring; and if further action is necessary; in accordance with Section III, paragraphs A. through F., of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52A0053, Revision 2, dated April 30, 1992. The airplane records may be reviewed in order to make this determination. \n\n\tNOTE: The part numbers of the "improved" parts referred to in this AD are specified in Section III, paragraphs A. through F., of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52A0053, Revision 2, dated April 30, 1992. \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor those doors equipped with a counterbalance assembly using titanium inner torsion springs, a counterbalance assembly rated for escape slides, an improved counterbalance assembly, or an improved graphite-composite inner torsion spring, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor those doors not equipped with a counterbalance assembly using a titanium inner torsion spring, a counterbalance assembly rated for escape slides, an improved counterbalance assembly, or an improved graphite-composite inner torsion spring: Prior to further flight, perform an operational check to detect the existence of a broken inner torsion spring, in accordance with Section III, paragraph G., of the Boeing service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tIf any broken inner torsion spring is found, prior to further flight, accomplish the procedures specified in either paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) or (b)(2)(i)(B) of this AD: \n\n\t\t\t\t(A)\tReplace the spring with an airworthy part in accordance with Section III., paragraph G., of the Boeing service bulletin, and repeat the operational check at intervals not to exceed 425 flight hours; or \n\n\t\t\t\t(B)\tInstall an improved counterbalance assembly or an improved graphite-composite inner torsion spring, in accordance with Section III, paragraph H., of the Boeing service bulletin. Such installation constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tIf no broken inner torsion spring is found, accomplish the procedures specified in either paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(A) or (b)(2)(ii)(B) of this AD: \n\n\t\t\t\t(A)\tRepeat the operational check at intervals not to exceed 425 flight hours; or \n\n\t\t\t\t(B)\tInstall an improved counterbalance assembly or an improved graphite-composite inner torsion spring, in accordance with Section III, paragraph H., of the Boeing service bulletin. Such installation constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tInstallation of a counterbalance assembly using a titanium inner torsion spring, a counterbalance assembly rated for escape slides, an improved counterbalance assembly, or an improved graphite-composite inner torsion spring, in accordance with Section III, paragraph H., of Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52A0053, Revision 2, dated April 30, 1992, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(f)\tThe operational checks and replacement procedures shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-52A0053, Revision 2, dated April 30, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(g)\tThis amendment becomes effective on March 10, 1993.
96-02-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. This action requires installation of locking plates at the guide bushings in the area of the spigot bolt for certain aft flap track attachments. This amendment is prompted by reports of these guide bushings migrating out of position and resulting in a partial transfer of loads from the main attachment spigot bolt to two fail-safe bolts. Since the fail-safe bolts can withstand such loads for only a limited time, they can eventually fail and allow the wing flap to separate from the airplane. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent separation of the wing flap, which can lead to reduced controllability of the airplane and injury to persons or damage to property on the ground.
2010-04-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Augustair, Inc. Models 2150, 2150A, and 2180 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the vertical stabilizer front spar for cracks and loose fasteners, repair any cracks and loose fasteners found, and reinforce the vertical stabilizer spar regardless if cracks are found. This AD results from six reports of airplanes with a cracked vertical stabilizer front spar. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the vertical stabilizer front spar, which could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane. This failure could lead to loss of control.
95-15-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Jetstream Aircraft Limited (JAL) HP137 Mk1 and Jetstream series 200 airplanes. This action requires incorporating operating limitations that revise the maximum flap operating speed for DOWN flaps to 120 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and prohibit extending the flaps beyond the take-off position if ice is visible on the airplane. An incident where an airplane of similar type design to the affected airplanes experienced sudden pitch down because of the accumulation of over one inch of ice prompted the proposed action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent sudden pitch down of the airplane during icing conditions, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
96-15-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 and 0070 series airplanes, that requires modification of the wheel brake assembly on the main landing gear. This amendment is prompted by reports of aluminum brake pistons that have ballooned and failed. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such failure of the pistons, which could result in leakage of the hydraulic fluid, resultant loss of braking capability, and a possible brake fire.
2010-03-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An operator reported a short circuit between a generator power cable and an anti-ice shutoff valve, which was caused by chafing between the cable and the valve; the insulation of the cable and surrounding sleeve were worn off. An investigation revealed that a scarce clearance between the cables and adjacent parts, together with vibrations of generator power cables favoured by insufficient clamping, was the root cause of the damage. If left uncorrected, this situation could lead to short circuits with possible fire and/or loss of important aircraft systems. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.