Results
83-01-04: 83-01-04 DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON: Amendment 39-4539. Applies to Detroit Diesel Allison (DDA) Model 250-C28B and -C28C series engines with turbine assembly serial numbers CAT 70001 thru 70186, 70188, and 70191. Compliance required, as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible damage to the first stage turbine wheel due to oil fires caused by the improper U-ring gasket or the proper U-ring gasket incorrectly installed at the No. 8 bearing retainer plate, accomplish the following: a. Within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, inspect and pressure test the No. 8 bearing sump area, in accordance with Detroit Diesel Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB- A-72-2082, dated January 3, 1983, or later FAA approved revisions, on affected turbine assemblies that meet either of the following conditions: 1. Turbine Assemblies with less than 500 hours time since new. 2. Turbine Assemblies that are experiencing or have experienced oil consumption in excess of one quart (0.9 liter) per hour. NOTE: Turbine Assemblies that have been overhauled and have had the pressure check accomplished or have been operated for more than 500 hours time since new, and have less than one quart (0.9 liter) per hour oil consumption are not required to have the inspection and pressure test. b. Inspect and pressure test, before initial flight, uninstalled affected turbine assembly No. 8 bearing sump area per Detroit Diesel Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-2082, dated January 3, 1983, or later FAA approved revisions. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FARs 21.197 and 21.199 to operate aircraft to a base where compliance with this AD can be accomplished. Upon request of the operator, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines,Illinois 60018. This amendment becomes effective January 24, 1983.
2023-06-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-401 and - 402 airplanes. This AD was prompted by an investigation of incorrectly manufactured sleeves that were potentially installed in the main landing gear (MLG) forward door linkage assembly. This AD requires review of technical records and inspections to determine if a discrepant sleeve is installed, replacement of any discrepant sleeve and re-identification of the MLG forward door linkage assembly. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-25-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas airplane models, that requires an inspection of the retract cylinder support fitting and the cylinder bore of the support fitting of both main landing gear (MLG) for corrosion, and corrective action if necessary. This action also requires replacing cadmium-plated retract cylinder support bushings and bearings of both MLG. This action is necessary to detect and correct corrosion to the retract cylinder support fitting of the MLG and the cylinder bore in the support fitting, which could result in compromised integrity of the retract cylinder support fitting of the MLG and possible damage to the hydraulic system. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
97-01-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-100 and -200 series airplanes, that requires replacing the aileron (lateral) control transfer mechanism with a new modified mechanism, or reworking the existing mechanism. This amendment is prompted by a review of the design of the flight control systems on Model 737 series airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent unexpected, significant control wheel forces and reduced travel of a control wheel due to mechanical interference within the lateral control system transfer mechanism during a jam override condition.
82-12-01: 82-12-01 BRITISH AEROSPACE (formerly Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd.): Amendment 39-4391. HS/BH/DH-125 series airplanes certificated in all categories up to and including series 700 which have not been modified in accordance with Modification 252837. Compliance is required within 100 flight hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent blocking of the main landing gear restrictor valves, accomplish the following: 1. Disassemble the main landing gear restrictor valves and inspect for debris contamination, reassemble, and install in-line filters in accordance with British Aerospace Aircraft Group 125 Series Aircraft Service Bulletin 32-190 dated August 28, 1981. 2. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of this AD. 3. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). This amendment becomes effective June 8, 1982.
2023-06-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc., Model CL-600-1A11 (600), CL-600-2A12 (601), and CL- 600-2B16 (601-3A, 601-3R, and 604 Variants) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that, due to a lack of flightcrew awareness, smoke hoods with a certain part number installed throughout the airplane could be mistaken for protective breathing equipment (PBE). This AD requires an inspection or records review to determine if any smoke hood with a certain part number is installed in any location on the airplane and, depending on the results, removing the smoke hood and associated placards and installing new placards. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
81-06-02: 81-06-02 FROST ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-4059. Applies to emergency descent devices installed on Boeing 747, Lockheed L-1011, and Airbus Industrie A-300 airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of emergency descent devices accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect Frost Engineering descent devices for broken handle straps in accordance with paragraph 2, steps (1), (2), and (4) of Frost Engineering Development Corporation Service Bulletin 379103-25-002 dated September 29, 1980, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tB.\tDescent devices found to have a broken handle strap must be modified in accordance with paragraph 2, steps (6) through (9) of Frost Engineering Development Corporation Service Bulletin 379103-25-002 dated September 29, 1980, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 120 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the descent devices found to have a magnetic handle strap in accordance with paragraph 2, steps (5) through (9) of Frost Engineering Development Corporation Service Bulletin 379103-25-002 dated September 29, 1980, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 120 days from the effective date of this AD, replace descent devices P/N 379103-1, serial numbers 1 through 0134, with other FAA approved descent devices. \n\n\tE.\tUpon the request of the operator, and subject to prior approval by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region, an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector may adjust the compliance times if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specification and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Frost Engineering Development Corporation, P.O. Box 1294, Englewood, Colorado 80150. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 19, 1981.
2004-25-17: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain LETECKE ZAVODY Model L 23 SUPER--BLANIK sailplanes. This AD requires you to do a repetitive, non-destructive magnetic test (NDMT) inspection on the elevator rocker lever (part number A 730 201 N) for cracks. If cracks are found, this AD also requires you to return the part to the manufacturer. The manufacturer will send you a replacement part for installation. Installing the improved replacement part terminates the need for the repetitive inspections. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the Czech Republic. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the elevator rocker lever caused by cracks that resulted from a defect in prior manufacturing procedures. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the sailplane.
67-32-04: 67-32-04 PILATUS: Amdt. 39-525, Part 39, Federal Register December 12, 1967. Applies to Model PC-6 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. (a) To prevent the possibility of stabilizer trim control cable clamps jamming with the cable guide tubes at bulkhead No. 8, accomplish the following: (1) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect guide tubes, P/N 6232.208, for signs of movement or wear in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 72, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (2) If signs of movement or wear are detected during the inspection required by paragraph (a)(1), before further flight incorporate the modification required by paragraph (a)(3). (3) If no signs of movement or wear are detected during the inspections required by paragraph (a)(1), within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify guide tubes, P/N 6232.208, and install an additional support, P/N 6232.468, in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 72, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. (b) To prevent excessive rubbing of the rudder control cable with its fairlead at bulkhead No. 2, accomplish the following: (1) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rudder cable phenolic fairlead for signs of wear in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 74, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (2) If signs of wear are detected during the inspection required by paragraph (b)(1), within the next 25 hours' time in service replace worn fairlead with a serviceable fairlead. (3) Within the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace the pulley and fairlead assembly with a double pulley assembly in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 74, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. (c) To prevent excessive rubbing of the stabilizer trim control cable with its pulley at bulkhead No. 11, accomplish the following: (1) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect the cable and its pulley for signs of wear, in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 74, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision or an FAA-approved equivalent. (2) If signs of wear are detected during the inspection required by paragraph (c)(1), within the next 25 hours' time in service replace worn cable or pulley with a serviceable cable or pulley. (3) Within the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify the double pulley in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 74, dated June 1967, or later Swiss Federal Air Office-approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. (d) The repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1) may be discontinued following the incorporation of the applicable modification in accordance with paragraphs (a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(3), respectively. This amendment effective December 17, 1967.
2011-23-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Gulfstream Aerospace LP (type certificate previously held by Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd.) Model Galaxy and Gulfstream G150 airplanes; and Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Gulfstream 200 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A broken aileron servo actuator centering spring rod was discovered on a model G100 aircraft during a routine scheduled maintenance inspection. * * * This latent failure of a centering spring rod, if not detected and corrected, in conjunction with the disconnection of the normal mechanical control system of the same servo actuator would lead to loss [of] control of the flight control surface [aileron or elevator]. This condition would reduce the control capability of the airplane and imposes a higher workload on the flight crew reducing their ability to cope with adverse operating conditions. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.