Results
2013-16-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all Alexander Schleicher GmbH & Co. Segelflugzeugbau Models AS - K13, Ka2B, Ka 6, Ka 6 B, Ka 6 BR, Ka 6 C, Ka 6 CR, K7, K8, and K 8 B sailplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority [[Page 53631]] of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as misalignment of the automatic elevator control connection. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
75-22-01: 75-22-01 ENSTROM: Amendment 39-2384 as amended by Amendment 39-2651. Applies to Enstrom Model F-28A helicopters certificated in all categories, as indicated in the following tables: Table I - Improper Machining of the Tapered Bore of Main Rotor Spindle P/N 28- 14282. Helicopter S/N's 203, 205, 209, 216, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 240 and all other helicopters which received replacement main rotor spindles between June 18, 1974 and October 1, 1974 inclusive. Table II - Bore of Main Rotor Spindle P/N 28-14282 Machined Too Deep. Helicopter S/N's 116, 117, 160, 177, 178, 179, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 204, and 217. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To detect main rotor spindles with machining deficiencies accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, inspect all helicopters listed in Table I above for improper machining of the tapered spindle bore in accordance with the information contained in Enstrom Service Note No. 0020A dated August 11, 1975, or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Great Lakes Region. All spindles that have been machined with a straight internal bore shall be identified in the log book as a life limited spindle. (See paragraph (c) for retirement life of these spindles.) (b) Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, inspect all helicopter main rotor spindles listed in Table II above for an excessive bore depth in accordance with the information contained in Enstrom Service Note 0021B dated, August 11, 1975, or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Great Lakes Region. All spindles that have been machined with an improper bore depth shall be identified in the log bookas life limited spindles. (See paragraph (c) for the retirement life of these spindles.) (c) Main rotor spindles which have machining deficiencies indicated in paragraphs (a) and (b) above are considered to be life limited parts and must be replaced with a new part of the same part number no later than at 4,500 hours total time in service and the life depleted part is to be rendered unserviceable. Spindles which are determined to be machined correctly may be returned to service and do not have a life limit imposed on them. Amendment 39-2384 became effective October 20, 1975. This amendment becomes effective July 1, 1976.
2013-05-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 and A330-300 series airplanes, and Model A340-200 and A340-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of an elevator blocked in the down position due to two independent failures; first, the inability of a servo control to switch to active mode because it was not detected by a flight control computer; and second, an internal hydraulic leak due to the deterioration of an O-ring seal on a solenoid. This AD requires, depending on airplane configuration, modifying three flight control primary computers (FCPCs); modifying two flight control secondary computers (FCSCs); revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to include certain information; replacing certain O-rings; and checking part number and replacing certain O-ring seals if needed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct O-rings with incorrect part numbers whose deterioration could lead to improper sealing of solenoid valves; and to correct FCPC and FCSC software to allow better control of elevator positioning; both conditions, if not corrected, could lead to the loss of elevator control on takeoff, and potentially reduce the controllability of the airplane.
2000-15-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to McCauley Propeller Systems 4HFR34C653/L106FA-0 model propellers that are installed on Jetstream Series 3200 airplanes. This action is also applicable to 4HFR34C653/L106FA-0 model propellers that are installed on Ayres S2R-G5 and S2R-G10 airplanes if the propeller was previously installed on Jetstream Series 3200 airplanes or if installation history of the propeller is unknown. This action requires one-time and repetitive eddy current inspections of the camber side of the blade surface. This amendment is prompted by a report of a crack on the camber side of the blade surface. The crack was found during a dye penetrant inspection as part of a normal overhaul process. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracks that could cause failure of the propeller blade, which can result in loss of control of the airplane.
74-19-04: 74-19-04 SIKORSKY: Amendment 39-1953. Applies to all HRS/H-19 Series Helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance with each of the following Airworthiness Directives for the Sikorsky S-55 Series Helicopters is required, except that the effective date of each will be the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive: 54-1-3, 54-13-1, 54-16-1, 54-19-2, 54-20-2, 55-25-4, 56-16-3, 56- 23-3, 60-13-4, 63-5-2 (AD 63-5-2 extended service life to 1200 hours when operating in the Restricted Category and over sparsely populated areas), 65-8-2, 66-4-3 (AD 66-4-3 extended service life to 3500 hours, when operating in the Restricted Category and over sparsely populated areas), 67-17-6, 67-29-7 and 71-26-3. This amendment becomes effective September 10, 1974.
51-08-03: 51-08-03 TEMCO: Applies to Models GC-1A and GC-1B Aircraft - All Serial Numbers. Compliance required at next periodic inspection but not later than May 1, 1951. Inspect the horizontal stabilizer front spar attachment to the fuselage bulkhead for looseness. First remove all fairing or interfering items. Support the horizontal stabilizers on the fuselage so that their position cannot change; remove the four AN 3 bolts which attach the front stabilizer spar to the fuselage bulkhead. If there is no deformation or elongation of these bolt holes and if the holes in the stabilizer spar and the fuselage bulkhead are in correct alinement the AN 3 bolts should be reinstalled, torquing them to 25-30 inch-pounds. If there is deformation or elongation of the attach bolt holes, a repair can be accomplished by reaming these 3/16-inch holes to 1/4-inch diameter with the stabilizers firmly blocked in the proper position with the fuselage. The AN 3 bolts, nuts, and washers are to be replaced with AN 4 bolts, nuts, and washers, and they should be torqued to 80-90 inch-pounds in reassembling the stabilizer front spar attachment. The empennage and fairing which were removed for this inspection and repair are then reassembled on the airplane. If the AN 3 attachment bolts are retained, this inspection should be repeated at each periodic or annual inspection. If the AN 4 attachment bolts are installed, only the normal inspections of this attachment need be made.
2013-15-18: We are superseding an airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Model L-1011 series airplanes. AD 2005-15-01 required repetitive inspections to detect corrosion or fatigue cracking of certain structural elements of the airplane, corrective actions if necessary, and incorporation of certain structural modifications. This new AD reduces certain compliance times for the initial inspection and the repetitive inspection interval for certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of small cracks in additional areas outside those addressed in AD 2005-15-01, prior to the inspection threshold required by the AD 2005-15-01. We are issuing this AD to prevent corrosion or fatigue cracking of certain structural elements, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2000-15-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Models S10-V and S10-VT sailplanes. This AD supersedes AD 98-15-24, which currently requires replacing the propeller blade suspension forks with parts of improved design on Stemme S10-V sailplanes. This AD requires you to remove the propeller blade suspension forks, exchange them with the manufacturer for improved design forks, and install the improved design propeller blade suspension forks. This AD is the result of analysis that shows that the existing propeller blade suspension forks are currently cracking more rapidly than originally projected. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent certain propeller blade suspension forks from cracking, which could result in the loss of a propeller blade during flight with possible lateral imbalance and loss of thrust.
2000-14-16: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters. That AD requires installing a tail rotor pitch-limiting left-pedal stop (pedal stop), installing an airspeed limitation placard, marking a never-exceed velocity (Vne) placard on all airspeed indicators, and revising the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This AD requires installing a redesigned tail rotor system and modifying the vertical fin and horizontal stabilizer to allow restoring the Vne to 140 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). This AD is prompted by design changes to the tail rotor system and modification of the pedal stop for airspeed actuation to eliminate a tail rotor strike to the tailboom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the tail rotor blades from striking the tailboom, separation of the aft section of the tailboom with the tail rotor gearbox and vertical fin, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2018-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes; all Model A330-200 Freighter, -200, and -300 series airplanes; and all Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of false traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories. This AD requires modifying the software in the TCAS computer processor or replacing the TCAS computer with a new TCAS computer. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.