Results
71-01-04: 71-01-04 PIPER AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-1139. Applies to Model PA-31 and PA-31-300 S/Nos 31-2 to 31-591. Compliance required within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the hazards associated with toxic fumes from the battery being drawn into the cabin, accomplish the following: (a) Relocate the battery drain in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 325 dated November 10, 1970 or equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective January 14, 1971.
2018-03-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the main rotor blade (MRB) tip cap for disbonding. This AD is prompted by a report of the in-flight loss of an MRB tip cap. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
70-18-05: 70-18-05 PIPER: Amendment 39-1076. Applies to the following models: PA-28-140, /- 150, /-160, /-180, /-235, and PA-32-260, /-300. The following are affected serial numbers: PA- 28-140, 28-20001 through 28-22354; PA-28-150, /-160, /-180, 28-1 through 28-3782; PA-28-235, 28-10001 through 28-10806; PA-32-260, 32-1 through 32-853; PA-32-300, 32-40001 through 32-40057. Compliance required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To preclude the possibility of failure of the main landing gear torque link bolts accomplish the following: The bolt and lock nut attaching the upper torque link to the main landing gear housing assembly must be replaced with an AN5-23 bolt, AN310-C5 nut, and AN381-2-8 cotter pin. The bolt and lock nut attaching the lower torque link to the main landing gear housing assembly must be replaced with an AN5-22 bolt, AN310-C5 nut, and AN381-2-8 cotter pin. The bolt or grease boltand lock nut attaching the torque links at the scissor joint must be replaced with a grease bolt, Piper part number 65788-00, (hole in threaded end of bolt for cotter pin safety), AN944-101 lubricator fitting, AN 310-C5 nut, AN381-2-8 cotter pin, and appropriate washers. Piper Kit 757-123 contains the necessary hardware and instructions to accomplish this modification. Equivalent replacement parts approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region, may be used. Piper Service Bulletin No. 248 dated 12 May 1967 pertains to this same subject. This amendment becomes effective 7 September 1970.
2000-26-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-1159A (G-III) series airplanes, that requires modification of the master caution panel by installing an additional legend labeled "BATT ON BUS" and associated wiring to indicate when the airplane batteries are powering the direct current (DC) essential bus. This action is necessary to ensure that the flight crew is aware that an electrical system failure has occurred and that the main airplane batteries are powering the essential DC bus. If the flight crew is unaware of this situation, action to stop the depletion of the airplane batteries will not be taken and critical equipment, such as communications and navigation equipment, could fail. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-26-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Models S10 and S10-V sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the eyebolts on the airbrake, inspect the airbrake sheets for proper clearance and adjust as necessary, and inspect for damage to the landing gear doors and replace any damaged parts. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent aerodynamic flutter of the upper covering straps on the airbrake cover caused by the current design airbrake eyebolts, which could result in damage to the airbrake system and landing gear doors. Continued operation with such damaged components could result in loss of control of the sailplane.
2019-11-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks in the skin and a certain chord at three fastener locations common to the drag link assembly at the chord. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the skin under the drag link assembly for any cracks, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-26-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Beech Models A36, B36TC, and 58 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for missing rivets on the right hand side of the fuselage and, if necessary, install rivets. Raytheon has identified several instances of missing rivets on these airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to install missing rivets in the right hand fuselage panel assembly in the area above the right wing and below the cabin door threshold. These rivets must be present for the fuselage to carry the ultimate load and prevent critical structural failure with loss of airplane control.
2007-11-08: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Boeing Model 727 airplanes. The existing AD requires a boost pump dry bay inspection to detect leakage of fuel through an arced-through conduit, and corrective action as necessary. The existing AD also requires repetitive inspections of the in-tank fuel boost pump wiring to detect chafing of the wire insulation, evidence of electrical arcing, or arc-through of the conduit wall, and applicable corrective action; and installation of sleeving over the in- tank fuel boost pump wires as a method to protect the wiring from chafing. This new AD removes certain inspection requirements from the existing AD. This new AD adds new repetitive inspections for damage of the electrical wire and sleeve that run to the fuel boost pump through a conduit in the fuel tank, and arcing damage of the conduit and signs of fuel leakage into the conduit; applicable investigative and corrective actions; and a new repetitive engine fuel suction feed operational test. Initiation of the new inspections terminates the requirements of the existing AD. This AD results from reports of a fuel tank explosion on a Model 727-200F airplane on the ground; and of chafed wires and a damaged power cable sleeve of a fuel boost pump that were discovered during an inspection required by an existing AD on a Model 737-300 airplane. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing of the fuel boost pump electrical wiring and leakage of fuel into the conduit, and to prevent electrical arcing between the wiring and the surrounding conduit, which could result in arc-through of the conduit, and consequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank. \n\n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective June 6, 2007. \n\n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of June 6, 2007. \n\tOn June 28, 1999 (64 FR 33394, June 23, 1999), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0126, dated May 24, 1999. \n\n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by July 23, 2007.
2010-03-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several events of uncoupling of the low-pressure (LP) fuel pump impeller and the high-pressure (HP) fuel pump shaft have been reported on Arriel 2 engines which do not incorporate Modification TU 147. In most cases the "low fuel pressure switch'' enlightened, the pilot activated the aircraft booster pump in accordance with the Flight Manual Instructions and landed safely with no other incident. One case, on a single-engine helicopter, led to a sudden engine power loss. The uncoupling of the LP fuel pump impeller and the HP fuel pump shaft may lead to a limitation of engine power or, at worst, an uncommanded in-flight shutdown. On a single-engine helicopter,the result may be an emergency autorotation landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent a forced autorotation landing or an accident.
2000-26-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes that are equipped with a certain windshield configuration. This AD requires you to incorporate pilot's operating handbook (POH) information that prohibits the operation of the windshield heating system in the "LIGHT" mode, and requires you to modify the windshield deicing system wiring and circuit breakers. You can remove the POH information after accomplishing the modification. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of electrical power to the windshield deicing system due to operation in the "LIGHT" mode, which could result in icing of the windshield and loss of control of the airplane.