Results
76-11-05 R1: 76-11-05 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-2630, as amended by Amendments 39-2667 and 39- 2708, is further amended by Amendment 39-6234. \n\n\tApplicability: Boeing Model 737 series airplanes, line number 001 through 491, certificated in any categories. \n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent hazardous flutter of the elevator/horizontal stabilizer, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tUpon receipt of a pilot report of vibration in the longitudinal control system, prior to further flight, accomplish the inspection required by paragraph C., below. If the relative deflections are less than specified in paragraph C., below, prior to further flight, investigate for the cause of vibration in accordance with existing procedures. \n\tB.\tIn addition to paragraph A., above, within the next 300 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 700 hours time-in-service, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 1,000 hours time-in-service, conduct the inspection required by paragraph C., below. \n\tC.\tInspect for excessive deflection of the elevator tab, right and left hand, in accordance with the inspection procedures specified in Section III, Part I, paragraphs C. and D., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-55A1020, Revision 1, dated August 20, 1976; Revision 2, dated February 11, 1977; or Revision 3, dated December 22, 1988. If the elevator tab-to-elevator relative deflection exceeds 1/10 inch, prior to further flight, modify the elevator in accordance with paragraph D., below. \n\tD.\tInstallation of one of the modifications specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-55A1020, Revision 1, dated August 20, 1976; Revision 2, dated February 11, 1977, or Revision 3, dated December 22, 1988; Section III, Part II, including installation of the bolt retainer clips or the preventive modification specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-55-1022, Section III, Part II, dated April 15, 1987, is considered terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD.\n \tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes having cracked parts to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The application for a special flight permit must contain a limitation stating that the airplane must be operated within limits specified in Boeing Operation Manual Bulletin 76-2. \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD revises AD 76-11-05 (Amendment 39-2630) as amended by Amendments 39- 2667 and 39-2708. \n\tThis amendment (39-6234, AD 76-11-05 R1) becomes effective on July 24, 1989.
68-13-03: 68-13-03 PIPER: Amdt. 39-727. Applies to Piper Models PA-24 and PA-24-250 aircraft S/N 24-1 through 24-3529 inclusive. Compliance required as indicated below until Piper fuel cell vent and drain tube modification kits are installed (Kit No. 760277 for main tanks and Kit No. 760281 for auxiliary tanks if installed) in accordance with Piper Service Letter No. 516 or a later approved revision or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. To prevent fuel exhaustion caused by fuel cell collapse and loss of fuel through the tank filler caps accomplish the following: 1. Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and every 100 hours' time in service thereafter perform the following inspections: (a) Visually inspect the main fuel cells and the auxiliary fuel cells if installed for indications of fuel cell collapse. Inspect the upper and lower fasteners of the main fuel cells and theupper fasteners of the auxiliary fuel cells which retain the bladder cells to assure security in accordance with Section VIII of Piper Comanche Service Manual No. 753516 or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. The fuel cells shall be empty when performing this inspection. Also, with the tank filler caps removed, inspect the tank vent tubes under the wing for dirt or ice blockage. Apply suction to each vent tube outlet to assure that there is no blockage. (b) Inspect all fuel cell filler caps for secureness and assure installation of proper part number cap. If the rubber portion of the "thermos" type filler caps (S/N 24-581 and up) shows indications of dryness or hardness which can cause the cap to gradually loosen, the cap must be replaced. (c) Accomplish a fuel quantity gauge sending unit check in accordance with Section VIII of Piper Comanche Service Manual No. 753516 or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. 2. Within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished on aircraft S/N 24-581 through 24-3495 inclusive, alter the fuel cell drain tubes in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin No. 216 dated June 21, 1963, or an equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. (Piper Service Bulletins Nos. 216 and 231A and Service Letter No. 367 and 516 pertain to this subject.) Effective May 29, 1968. Revised March 5, 1969.
2018-20-19: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-16-07, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-200 Freighter, A330-300, A340-500, and A340-600 series airplanes; and Model A340-313 airplanes. AD 2017-16-07 required inspection of the fuselage bulk cargo door frames at specific locations, and corrective action if necessary. This AD requires new inspections of certain attachment holes for residual surface treatment and cracking, and corrective action if necessary; and provides an optional terminating action for the inspections. This AD also revises the applicability to add certain airplanes and remove others. This AD was prompted by a determination that only airplanes having certain manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs) are affected by tartaric sulfuric anodizing (TSA)/chromic acid anodizing (CAA) surface treatment in the door fitting attachment holes, and that airplanes having certain MSNs were excluded. This AD is intended to complete certain mandated programsintended to support the airplane reaching its limit of validity (LOV) of the engineering data that support the established structural maintenance program. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-23-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A319-100, A320-200, and A321-100 and -200 series airplanes. That AD currently requires modification of the telescopic girt bar of the escape slide/raft assembly, and follow-on actions. This new AD requires a new modification of the telescopic girt bar and the installation of placards on the modified girt bars, which terminates the repetitive functional tests required by the existing AD. This AD results from development of a new, improved modification. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the escape slide/raft to deploy correctly, which could result in the slide being unusable during an emergency evacuation and consequent injury to passengers or airplane crewmembers. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 19, 2005. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 19, 2005.On August 31, 2001 (66 FR 42939, August 16, 2001), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Airbus Industrie All Operators Telex A320-52A1111, Revision 01, dated July 23, 2001, including Airbus Industrie Technical Disposition 959.1492/01, Issue C, dated July 17, 2001.
2000-13-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2000-13-51 that was sent previously to certain U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 737-200 and -300 series airplanes by individual notices. This AD requires repetitive special detailed inspections to detect cracking of the main deck cargo door frames, their existing reinforcing angles (where applicable), and the attach holes of the latch fittings between frame station (FS) 361.87 and FS 498.12, and between water line (WL) 202.35 and WL 213.00, in the area where the main deck cargo door latch fittings attach to the frames, and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is prompted by a report indicating that three of the subject airplanes had multiple cracks in the lower portion of the main deck cargo door frames and, in some cases, the reinforcing angles. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracking of the lower portion of the main deck cargo door frames, which could result in sudden depressurization, loss or opening of the main deck cargo door during flight, and loss of control of the airplane.
68-20-04: 68-20-04 PIPER: Amendment 39-660. Applies to Piper PA-31 and PA-31-300 type aircraft. Serial Numbers: 31-2 to 31-74 inclusive; 31-76 to 31-131 inclusive; 31-133 to 31-144 inclusive; 31-146 to 31-184 inclusive; 31-186 to 31-247 inclusive; 31-249 to 31-299 inclusive. To detect cracks in the elevator torque tube P/N 40070-02 in elevator torque tube assembly P/N 40070-00 accomplish the following on aircraft with 100 hours or more total time in service: (a) Prior to next flight, unless already accomplished, remove the fuselage tail fairing and visually inspect the elevator torque tube P/N 40070-02 for any deformation or cracking. (b) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours' time in service, remove the torque tube assembly P/N 40070-00 from the aircraft. Remove the horn assembly and two (2) brackets and inspect the torque tube P/N 40070-02 for evidence of cracks using the dye penetrant method in conjunction with a glass of at least 10 power, or magnetic particle Inspection or x-ray or an FAA approved equivalent inspection. Inspections must be repeated within 100 hours time in service from the last inspection. (c) If no cracks are found at the inspection at 500 hours' time in service, visually inspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection for any deformation or cracking. (d) Prior to further flight, replace any cracked or deformed torque tube with a new part, which if P/N 40070-02 then such new part must be inspected in accordance with paragraph (b) and (c). Any other part number would not be covered by this Airworthiness Directive. This amendment is effective September 27, 1968, and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of the telegram dated July 31, 1968, which contained this amendment. This Airworthiness Directive supersedes the referenced telegram.
2018-21-09: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2006-07-26, which applied to all ATR-GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 airplanes. AD 2006-07-26 required a one-time inspection to detect discrepancies (e.g., cracking, loose/sheared fasteners, distortion) on the left-hand and right-hand wings, of the outer wing box upper skin and upper rib feet, and repair if necessary. Since we issued AD 2006- 07-26, after initial findings had suggested the cracking was isolated to a few airplanes, we received reports of cracking in these same areas on other Model ATR42 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies on the left-hand and right-hand wings, of the outer wing box upper [[Page 52144]] skin and upper rib feet, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
94-09-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires an eddy current inspection to detect defects in the upper and lower lock links on the nose landing gear (NLG), and rework or replacement of any defective link found. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking and subsequent failure of certain lock links on these airplanes, which have been attributed to forging defects in the lock links. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent collapse of the NLG.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 5, 1994.\n\n\tComments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before June 20, 1994.
56-04-02: 56-04-02 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240 and 340 Aircraft. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than February 1, 1957, for Model 240 and August 1, 1957, for Model 340. As a result of a recent accident involving a nacelle fire, additional fire protection for the nacelle is required. The following changes or equivalent must be made to accomplish the above: 1. Replace aluminum alloy engine fuel supply lines, and sleeves, nuts and tube unions, with steel lines in the wheel well area (zone 3), except for lines and fittings outboard of the main landing gear beam. This does not apply to lines and fittings between cross-feed valves. 2. Replace present flexible hose assemblies in the engine fuel supply system in the wheel well area (zone 3), including AN fittings, with steel tubing and/or fireproof flexible lines, except for lines and fittings outboard of the main landing gear beam. Flexible lines qualifying as fireproof may incorporate either steel or aluminum fittings. 3. (a) CV-340 airplanes only. Replace aluminum alloy propeller pump suction line in left-hand nacelle wheel well (zone 3) with a steel line. (b) CV-240 airplanes only. Replace aluminum alloy propeller pump suction line in wheel well area (zone 3) with a steel line. (Both nacelles.) (Original flexible hose connections will be satisfactory if provided with a steel liner.) 4. Protect existing oil hose assemblies in wheel well area (zone 3) with asbestos sleeves or equivalent. 5. Replace all micarta pulleys in wheel well area (zone 3) with aluminum alloy pulleys. (Convair Service Bulletins Numbers 240-467 and 340-167 cover items 1 through 4. Convair Service Bulletins Numbers 240-468 and 340-166 cover item 5. These bulletins also contain some items which are not mandatory but are recommended.
53-19-01: 53-19-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-4 and C54-DC Series Aircraft Utilizing Eclipse-Pioneer Type 901 Generators. \n\n\tTo be accomplished by the next engine overhaul, but not later than April 1, 1954. \n\n\tIn view of the fire hazard existing in the use of the magnesium cooling fan in the Eclipse Type 901 generator in the DC-4 and C-54 Series aircraft installations, the magnesium fan as a unit must be removed and Eclipse-Pioneer spacer P/N 866570 installed in its place. \n\n\t(Eclipse-Pioneer Service Bulletin No. 505 covers the above subject.)