Results
2014-16-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of ``BLEED 1(2) LEAK'' messages displayed on the engine indication and crew alert system (EICAS), and indirect damage to components of the electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS) in the engine pylon area. This AD requires inspecting the EWIS components for damage, and repair if necessary. This AD also requires installing pre-cooler deflectors on the left- and right-hand pylons, and applying silicone sealant. We are issuing this AD to prevent indirect damage to EWIS components near the engine bleed air pre-coolers, which could result in a dual engine roll back to idle and consequent dual engine power loss and reduced controllability of the airplane.
75-01-04: 75-01-04 BEECH: Amendment 39-2062. Applies to Models A23-19, 19A, M19A and B19 (Serial Numbers MB-1 through MB-520); Model B19 Sport 150 (Serial Numbers MB-521 through MB-616); Models 23, A23, A23A, B23 and C23 (Serial Numbers M-1 through M-1361); Model C23 Sundowner 180 (Serial Numbers M-1362 through M-1485); Models A23-24 and A24 (Serial Numbers MA-1 through MA-368); Model A24R (Serial Numbers MC-2 through MC-95); and Models A24R and B24R Sierra 200 (Serial Numbers MC-96 through MC-180) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. A) To reduce the possibility of improper or unintentional movement of the fuel selector valve, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace the existing fuel selector valve guard with a P/N 169-920001-43 or P/N 169-920000-165 as applicable to the airplane. B) To prevent binding and assure complete shutoff of the P/N 169-920000-61-127 or -131 selector valve in the "Off" position, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at each annual, progressive or 100-hour inspection interval as required by Federal Aviation Regulation 91.169, check this valve for binding and shutoff characteristics in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0364-289, Rev. III, or later FAA-approved revision. If the valve does not meet the criteria contained in this Service Instruction, prior to further flight, replace it with an improved selector valve, P/N 169-380086-1, in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0622-289 or later FAA-approved revision. The above inspections are not applicable to the P/N 169-380086-1 selector valve and may be discontinued when it is installed. C) Equivalent methods of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region, Kansas City, Missouri. This amendment becomes effective January 7, 1975.
2014-16-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes and Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking of the main fitting of the nose landing gear (NLG). This AD requires revising the maintenance program by incorporating a new safe- life limitation for the NLG main fitting. We are issuing this AD to prevent collapse of the NLG, which could lead to degradation of direction control on the ground or an un-commanded turn to the left, and a consequent loss of control of the airplane on the ground, possibly resulting in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.
2014-12-52: We are superseding emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2014-12-52 for all Honeywell International Inc. TFE731-4, -4R, -5AR, - 5BR, -5R, -20R, -20AR, -20BR, -40, -40AR, -40R, -40BR, -50R, and -60 turbofan engines. Emergency AD 2014-12-52 was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these engines. AD 2014-12-52 required, before further flight, a review of the engine logbook maintenance records to determine if any affected engines are installed. AD 2014-12-52 also prohibited operation of an airplane with two or more affected engines that have 2nd stage low-pressure turbine (LPT2) blades with less than 250 operating hours since new. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2014-12-52 and clarifies the intent of the mandatory requirements. This AD was prompted by reports of LPT2 blade separations. We are issuing this AD to prevent LPT2 blade failure, multiple engine in-flight shutdowns, and damage to the airplane.
2014-16-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the pintle pins installed on a certain number of airplanes may be incorrectly protected against corrosion. This AD requires replacing certain pintle pins on the left- and right-hand main landing gear (MLG) with a serviceable part. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct pintle pins that have been incorrectly corrosion-protected, which could cause the pintle pins to shear under normal load and lead to the collapse of the MLG during take-off or landing.
72-16-06: 72-16-06 SIKORSKY: Amendment 39-1496. Applies to all S61A, S61L, S61N and S61R type helicopters. Compliance required as indicated after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. To assure the proper electrical feeder wiring gage in the A.C. circuit breaker panel, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of the Airworthiness Directive comply with Sikorsky Service Bulletin 61B55-27A, Paragraph 2A or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. 2. Within 250 hours time in service from the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. (a) Conduct a conformity inspection in accordance with the aircraft drawing effectivity list shown in Sikorsky Service Bulletin 61B55-27A, Paragraph 2.B(5) or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. (b) Conduct an inspection of all alterations performed on, or affecting the A.C. circuit breaker panel and substantiate feeder wire sizes affected are adequate for the alterations performed. Changes required as a result of this Airworthiness Directive must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. (Ref. Sikorsky S.B. 61B55-27A dated 9 May 1972 for list of Sikorsky Service Bulletins which modified drawings all listed in Paragraph 2.B(5)). Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Compliance times specified in this Airworthiness Directive may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. This amendment is effective 10 August 1972.
2010-24-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: On two occurrences on Mystere-Falcon 50 aeroplanes in service, it was detected that two pipes of the emergency brake system 2 located near the nose landing gear bearing were swapped. The swapping of these two pipes implies that when the Left Hand (LH) brake pedal is depressed, the Right Hand (RH) brake unit is activated, and conversely, when the RH brake pedal is depressed, the LH brake unit is actuated. This constitutes an unsafe condition, which may go unnoticed as the condition is latent until the emergency brake system 2 is used. This condition, if not corrected, could ultimately lead to a runway excursion of the aeroplane. * * * * * ThisAD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2020-22-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as movement of the aft fuel pipe within the coupling, which can cause damage to the O-rings and lead to a fuel leak, fuel fire or explosion, and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires replacing and prohibits installing affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-14-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400, and - 500 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections for cracking of certain lap splices, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the lap joints and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2010-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several power loss events have been reported, due to rail pressure control failures. Analyses have shown that high pressure (HP) fuel pumps failed as a result of pressure oscillations in the fuel supply line. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine power loss or in-flight shutdown, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.