Results
2011-24-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he FAA published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88) [(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001)]. [[Page 73487]] By mail referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296 of March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of February 3rd, 2003 the JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA) the application of a similar regulation. The aim of this [EASA] regulation is to require * * * a definition review against explosion hazards. * * * * * This AD requires inspections to verify electrical bonding to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
74-24-01: 74-24-01 BELL: Amendment 39-2011. Applies to Bell Models 206A, 206B, 206A-1 and 206B-1 helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible failure of certain main rotor blade grips, conduct the following: a. Within five hours' time in service after September 23, 1974, inspect the serial numbers of both main rotor grips and replace the following grips, P/N 206-010-102-9, before further flight: S/N JI1-5824, JI1-5861, JI1-5875 through and including 5878; JI1-5880 through and including 5903; JI1-5906 through and including 5912; JI1-5914 through and including 5938; JI1-5940 and 5941; and JI1-5944 through and including 5953. b. Within five hours' time in service after November 15, 1974, inspect the serial numbers of both main rotor grips and replace the following grips P/N 206-010-102-9, before further flight: S/N JI1-5393 through and including 5413; JI1-5417; JI1-5420 through andincluding 5439; JI1-5469; JI1-5516 through and including 5519; JI1-5521 through and including 5531; JI1-5533 through and including 5544; JI1-5546 through and including 5550; JI1-5552 through and including 5587; JI1-5589 through and including 5594; JI1-5595 through and including 5632; JI1-5634 through and including 5636; JI1-5638 through and including 5642; JI1- 5644 through and including 5646; JI1-5648 through and including 5654; JI1-5656 through and including 5695; JI1-5697 through and including 5710; JI1-5712 through and including 5759; JI1 5761 through and including 5785; JI1-5787; JI1-5789 through and including 5794; JI1-5796 through and including 5803; JI1-5805 through and including 5823; JI1-5825 through and including 5860; JI1-5862 through and including 5874; JI1-5972; JI1-5993 and 5994; JI1-6045 and 6046; JI1-6160. c. Main rotor grips that have been inspected by the manufacturer and found airworthy will be given a new serial number by Bell Helicopter Company and may be returned to service. (Telefax messages dated September 6, and October 10, 1974 from Bell Helicopter Company to all 206 operators pertains to this subject.) This supersedes Amendment 39-1973 (39 F.R. 33790), AD 74-20-3. This amendment becomes effective November 15, 1974.
2011-23-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Honeywell International Inc. LTS101-600A-2, -3, -3A, and LTS101-700D-2 turboshaft engines with certain power turbine governors (PTG) model AL- AB1, installed, that are marked with compliance symbol N or P, or with no compliance symbol, on the PTG identification plate. This AD requires initial and repetitive replacements of the affected PTGs. This AD was prompted by reports of two accidents where the engines suddenly lost power and the helicopters had to make emergency autorotation landings, leading to substantial damage to the helicopters. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power, leading to emergency autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.
2011-23-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pacific Aerospace Limited Model FU24 Airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Investigation of a recent Cresco 08-600 accident identified a risk of the hopper lid interfering with the opening of the canopy in the event of an emergency landing. The pilot was prevented from opening the canopy by the hopper lid in the fully forward open position. This AD is issued due to the fact that the hopper lid installation on the accident aircraft was an unapproved modification and the Fletcher FU24 hopper installation is a similar design to the Cresco 08-600. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
75-24-06: 75-24-06 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION LIMITED: Amendment 39-2427. Applies to Hawker Siddeley DH-104 "Dove" airplanes, Serial Numbers 04465 and below certificated in all categories, except those that incorporate "Dove" Modification 870. Compliance is required within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To detect spanwise cracks in the upper and lower wing main spar joint, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the upper and lower wing main spar joints for cracks in accordance with the X-ray technique specified in Appendix I, Issue 2 as amended June 16, 1975, of Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet (T.N.S.) No. 134, Issue 5, dated March 17, 1975, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (b) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, a crack is found in a wing main spar joint, before further flight modify the joint in accordance with Appendix 2 of Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet (T.N.S.) No. 134, Issue 5, dated March 17, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This supersedes AD 57-05-02 that was contained in Supplement 2 to Part 507 of the Regulation of the Administrator (22 FR 6046) and that was transferred to Section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations upon the adoption of Part 39 (29 FR 14403). NOTE: Copies of X-rays or of the results of the equivalent inspections as required by paragraph (a) of this AD are requested to be transmitted to DOT/FAA, Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, Africa, and Middle East Region, c/o American Embassy, APO New York, N.Y. 09667. (Reporting approved by the Bureau of the Budget under B.O.B. No. 04-R0174). This amendment becomes effective November 28, 1975.
2011-21-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for ECD Model MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters. This action requires revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) by inserting certain temporary pages into the Emergency and Performance Data sections of the RFM to alert the operators to monitor the power display when a generator is deactivated and provides appropriate actions. This amendment is prompted by reports of too high a current flow when one generator is deactivated. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the remaining generator when one generator is deactivated, loss of electrical power, loss of systems necessary for flight safety, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-23-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sicma Aero Seat Model 9401, 9402, 9404, 9405, 9406, 9407, 9408, and 9409 series passenger seat assemblies, installed on, but not limited to, ATR-GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several occurrences of cracked central and lateral spreaders on passenger seats models 9401 and 9402 * * *. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to further cracking of the seat spreaders, causing injury to passengers or crew members during heavy turbulence in flight or in the event of an emergency landing. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
74-18-16: 74-18-16 AIRESEARCH MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF ARIZONA: Amendment 39-1949. Applies to AiResearch Model TFE731-2-1C and TFE731-2-2B engines installed in, but not limited to, the Lear-Gates Learjet model 35/36 and the AMD Falcon 10 aircraft, certificated in all categories. (A) Before further flight, unless previously accomplished, and prior to the installation of replacement fuel control computers internally inspect the fuel control computer, P/N 949572-5, in accordance with AiResearch campaign wire TFE731-A76-3005, dated August 7, 1974, or later FAA-approved revisions. (B) Equivalent procedures may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, upon submission of adequate substantiation data. (C) Aircraft may be flown to a base for performance of maintenance required by this AD per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199. This amendment is effective September 6, 1974, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated August 7, 1974.
2011-23-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain SOCATA Model TBM 700 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A TBM700 operator reported an occurrence where, as a result of handling the standby compass lighting bulb cover in flight, both essential bus bars (ESS BUS 1 and ESS BUS 2) failed, leading to loss of a number of instruments and navigation systems. The technical investigations carried out by SOCATA have shown that the cause of this occurrence was that the electrical protection of some TBM 700 aeroplanes is insufficient to allow in-flight handling of the standby compass lighting cover when energized. This condition, if not corrected, may compromise the ability of the pilot to safely operate the aeroplane under certain flight conditions dueto the increase of workload. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
75-07-06: 75-07-06 DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON: Amendment 39-2141. Applies to Detroit Diesel Allison Model 501-D22A engines with turbine assemblies having the following serial numbers: 750137, 750138, 750139, 750140, 750142, 750143, 750145, 750146A, 750147A, 750149, 750150, 750151, 750154, 750158, 750160, 750166, 750176, 750177, 750179, 750181, 750182A, 750184, 750194, 750195, 750201A, 750204, 750205, 750208, 750212, 750213, 750214, 750229, 750230, 750231, 750235, 750241A, 750263A, 750266, 750272, 750301, 750305, 750309, 750312 Within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished, remove the part number 6852228 second stage turbine blades and replace with part number 6890508 second stage turbine blades. Detroit Diesel Allison Commercial Overhaul Information Letter Number COIL-1019 pertains to this subject. This amendment is effective April 7, 1975.
74-19-07: 74-19-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-1961. Applies to Boeing Model 747 Series aircraft certificated in all categories with more than 2,000 flights. Compliance required as noted: \n\n\t(A)\tWithin the next 100 flights, determine the thickness of the flap control handle detent pin in accordance with FAA approved Boeing Service Bulletin 747-27-2121, Revision 1, dated June 14, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Flap control handle detent pins with more than .110 inch thickness remaining are to be inspected at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flights. Pins with .110 or less but more than .070 inch thickness are to be inspected at intervals not to exceed 750 flights. Pins with .070 or less but more than .050 inch thickness remaining are to be inspected at intervals not to exceed 250 flights. Pins with .050 or less but more than .045 inch thickness must be replaced within 100 flights. Pins with .045inch or less thickness remaining are to be replaced with an approved flap control handle prior to further flight. \n\t(B)\tOn or before September 1, 1975, relocate the bias spring in accordance with FAA approved Boeing Service Bulletin 747-27-2121, Revision 1, dated June 14, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Northwest Region. \n\t(C)\tRework of the flap control handle detent pin, refinish of the detent plate and relocation of the bias spring, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-27-2121, Revision 1, dated June 14, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Northwest Region, constitutes terminating action under the provisions of this AD. \n\t(D)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Northwest Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the adjustment period. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective 30 days after September 20, 1974.
56-20-03: 56-20-03 BELL: Applies to All Models 47B, 47B3, 47D, 47D1, 47G, 47G2 and 47H1. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than October 20, 1956. Failure of the tail rotor hub retention bolts P/N 47-641-052-1 has occurred in service. The probable cause of the bolt failures experienced to date has not been determined and this problem is currently being investigated. At the conclusion of this investigation Bell anticipates supplying a newly designed hub retention bolt as a replacement for the present bolts. In the interim it is mandatory that a service life of 300 hours be established for the subject bolt. At this time it is necessary to remove the two tail rotor retention bolts and replace them with new retention bolts of the same part number. (Bell Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 112 dated August 8, 1956, covers this same subject.)
74-19-03: 74-19-03 BELL: Amendment 39-1954. Applies to Bell Model 206A and 206B helicopters as noted herein, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this A.D., unless already accomplished. To prevent possible failure of the inboard ribs with possible loss of a stabilizer on Model 206A and 206B helicopters, serial numbers 1 through 913 equipped with horizontal stabilizer, P/N 206-020-119, replace any cracked inboard ribs and modify all inboard ribs by installing a doubler specified in and using the applicable procedures described in Items 3 through 24, Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206-01-73-7, Revision A, dated December 11, 1973 or later FAA approved revision. To prevent excessive movement of the horizontal stabilizer install Horizontal Stabilizer Stop Kit, P/N 206-704-096-3, on Model 206A and 206B helicopters, Serial Numbers 1 through 1251, in accordance with Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206-01-74-1, Revision A, dated May 6, 1974, or later FAA approved revision. This amendment becomes effective October 13, 1974.
2011-21-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sicma Aero Seat 88xx, 89xx, 90xx, 91xx, 92xx, 93xx, 95xx, and 96xx series passenger seat assemblies, installed on various transport category airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\n\tCracks have been found on seats (with) backrest links P/N (part number) 90-000200-104-1 and 90-000200-104-2. These cracks can significantly affect the structural integrity of seat backrests. \n\nFailure of the backrest links could result in injury to an occupant during emergency landing conditions. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-09-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During manufacture of a number of HP Compressor Stage 1 and 2 discs with axial dovetail slots, anomalies at the disc post corners have been found. Fatigue crack initiation and subsequent crack propagation at the disc post may result in release of two blades and the disc post. This may potentially be beyond the containment capabilities of the engine casings. Thus, these anomalies present at the disc posts constitute a potentially unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks in the high-pressure compressor (HPC) Stage 1 and 2 disc posts, which could result in failure of the disc post and release of HPC blades, release of uncontained engine debris, and damage to the airplane.
76-04-02: 76-04-02 BEECH: Amendment 39-2518. Applies to Models C90 (Serial Numbers LJ- 654 and LJ-674 thru LJ-676), E90 (Serial Numbers LW-134 and LW-157 thru LW-163), A100 (Serial Numbers B-178 thru B-221, B-224 and B-225), 200 (Serial Numbers BB-6 thru BB-87, BB-89 thru BB-99 and BB-101 thru BB-106) and A200 (Serial Numbers BC-1 thru BC-8, and BD-1 thru BD-8) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude inadvertent disengagement of the seat locking pins, within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace Beech P/N 50-534436-127 seat locking pins (3.38 inch length) with Beech P/N 101-530412-1 seat locking pins (3.69 inch length) in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0789-314 or C-12A-0001 (military airplanes), or later approved revisions, or any equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effectiveFebruary 26, 1976.
74-18-10: 74-18-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-1945. Applies to all model 707/720 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tTo prevent potential oscillatory longitudinal flight on Boeing models 707/720 series airplanes, accomplish the following: \n\tBy September 1, 1976, unless already accomplished, inspect and adjust the contour mismatch of the upper surfaces between the horizontal stabilizer and elevator in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3151, or later FAA approved revisions or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Federal Register.
57-20-01: 57-20-01 CHAMPION: Applies to Model 7FC, Serial Numbers 2 to 56, Inclusive. Compliance required at next periodic airplane inspection but not later than November 15, 1958. To prevent the entry of fire and fumes into the cabin compartment in the event of a powerplant fire, install Champion fireproof steering link boot assembly P/N 2-1523 to the firewall with suitable fireproof screws. (Champion Service Letter No. 31 covers this same subject.)
2011-21-04: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During structural testing of the cockpit door, it was observed that the door lower hinge block rotated which resulted in disengagement of the mating hinge pin and excessive door deflection. The lower hinge block rotated because it was attached to its support structure with only one attachment bolt, which prevented it from reacting to any moment force. This condition, if not corrected, could result in breakage and uncontrolled release of the cockpit door under certain decompression situations. After incorporation of Modsum 8Q900267 * * *, an operator reported a failure to complete the cockpit door removal function test. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the inability to remove the cockpit door for emergency egress. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
65-14-04: 65-14-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-94 Part 39 Federal Register June 26, 1965. Applies to Model 1329 Aircraft Serial Numbers 5001 through 5057. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent further failures in the rudder cable turnbarrel lockwire, accomplish the following: (a) Gain access to the JE-99 torque tube assembly through the JF214-79 doors, left and right, on fuselage-to-empennage fairing. (b) Inspect pivot joint of each JE-99 torque arm for installation of NAS43HT4-6 spacer. (c) Check for freedom of movement of JC300-14 lockwire plates. If installed, the NAS43HT4-6 spacer provides freedom of movement of JC300-14 lockwire plate. (d) If NAS43HT4-6 spacers are installed and JC300-14 lockwire plates move freely, secure JF214-79 doors and return aircraft to service. (e) If inspection reveals missing spacer, install NAS43HT4-6 spacer, secure JF214- 79 doors, and returnaircraft to service. (Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 329-203, dated May 13, 1965, covers this subject.) This directive effective June 26, 1965.
75-11-07: 75-11-07 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: Amendment 39- 2210 as amended by Amendment 39-2551. Applies to Grumman G-1159 airplanes, S/N's 1 thru 156 and S/N 775, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 1200 hours' time in service after May 22, 1975, or before October 31, 1976, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished. To prevent unnecessarily high longitudinal stick forces due to an inadvertent excessive increase of nose down electric trim, reduce the elevator trim nose down authority from 8.5 + 0.5 degrees to 4.5 + 0.5 degrees in accordance with Grumman Aircraft Service Change 182, Amendment 1, or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southern Region. Amendment 39-2210 became effective May 22, 1975. This amendment 39-2551 becomes effective March 22, 1976.
73-26-03: 73-26-03 AIRESEARCH MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF ARIZONA: Amdt. 39-1758. Applies to Model TSE331-3U-303N engines. Compliance required as indicated. To detect abnormal wear of the fuel control drive consisting of the external splines of the fuel pump output shaft, P/N 868484; internal splines of the coupling, P/N 893646; and, the fuel control input shaft external splines, Woodward P/N 3499-034, accomplish the following after the effective date of this AD: (a) Within 25 hours additional time in service, or before accumulating 400 hours total time in service, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 375 hours time in service, and at intervals not to exceed 400 hours time in service thereafter, inspect the fuel control drive per the instructions of paragraph 2.c of AiResearch Service Bulletin TSE331-73-5006, dated October 26, 1973, or later FAA-approved revisions. (b) Within the next 25 hours time in service, unless already accomplished, adjust the fuel control overspeed governor minimum flow stop screw per instructions of paragraphs 2(H), and (I) of AiResearch Service Bulletin TSE331-73-5005, dated July 20, 1973, or later FAA-approved revisions. (c) Prior to installation of spare fuel controls, verify the accomplishment of the actions required by this AD per the instructions of the referenced Service Bulletins. (d) Equivalent procedures may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, Western Region, upon submission of adequate substantiating data. This amendment becomes effective December 28, 1973.
75-23-06: 75-23-06 SLINGSBY SAILPLANES: Amendment 39-2417 as amended by Amendment 39-2606. Applies to T59D Kestrel gliders certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible rudder cable failure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rudder cables for broken wires of any strand at the points the cables leave the top of the rudder pedals throughout the maximum to minimum rudder pedal adjustment range, and also immediately aft of the cable ferrules. (b) If a broken wire of any strand is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, before further flight, replace the defective cable with a serviceable cable of the same specification or an FAA- approved equivalent cable and continue to comply with paragraph (a). (c) The repetitive inspections required by this AD may be discontinued after a rudder pedal stop, P/N 59A-45-445, or an FAA approved equivalent is installed as follows: (1) Remove the instrument panel. (2) Remove the two screws (self tapping type) retaining the pedal assembly cover (channel section) and remove this cover. (3) Position the stop to the upper guide tube and push it firmly up against the forward tube support; tighten the bolts. (4) Replace the pedal assembly cover and instrument panel. (5) Check controls for full and free operation. NOTE: Vickers-Slingsby Technical Instruction No. 78, dated March 15, 1976, also covers the installation of the rudder pedal stop. Amendment 39-2417 became effective November 19, 1975. This amendment 39-2606 becomes effective May 27, 1976.
2011-03-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Rudder Travel Limiter (RTL) return spring, part number (P/N) E0650-069-2750S, failed prior to completion of the required endurance test. In addition, the replacement RTL return spring, P/N 670-93465-1 * * * was found to be susceptible to chafing on the primary actuator, which could also result in eventual dormant spring failure. There are two return springs in the RTL and if both springs failed, a subsequent mechanical disconnect of the RTL components would result in an unannunciated failure of the RTL. This, in turn, would permit an increase of rudder authority beyond normal structural limits and, in the event of a strong rudder input, controllabilityof the aeroplane could be affected. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
74-12-04: 74-12-04 R2 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: Amendment 39- 1851 Applies to Grumman G-1159 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent operation of the pitch trim at a greater rate when an additional signal in the opposite direction is selected, modify the Automatic Flight Control System junction box in accordance with Grumman American Aviation Corporation, Aircraft Service Change 143, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. This amendment becomes effective May 30, 1974.