Results
2009-18-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Evidence from development testing and flight test Trent 900 engines has identified cracking on some HP Turbine Nozzle Guide Vane (NGV) Convex Surfaces. Analysis of test data and review of the manufacturing process has revealed compounding effects that may contribute to a shortfall in component life and an increased likelihood of premature cracking in this region. Excessive cracking on the Convex Surface may lead to the release of NGV material or the blockage of Turbine gas flow. This results in a risk of fracture to the HP Turbine Blade. We are issuing this AD to prevent the release of a high-pressure (HP) turbine blade, which could result in an engine power loss or in- flight shut down of one or more engines, resulting in an inability to continue safe flight.
80-22-51: 80-22-51 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4080. Applies to DC-10-10, DC-10-30, and DC-10-40 airplanes certificated in all categories with Walter Kidde fire extinguisher systems installed. Compliance required as noted in the body of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the loss of fire fighting capability due to failure of the Walter Kidde fire extinguisher cartridge P/N 876296-01E to discharge the fire extinguishing agent container, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInspect and replace as necessary each cartridge installed in the engine, APU, and cargo fire extinguishing systems of aircraft with fuselage numbers 323 through 335, and fuselage number 337 in accordance with paragraphs C and D below prior to further flight unless already accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tFor all other DC-10 series airplanes, determine within 24 hours following the effective date of this AD, which aircraft have had Walter Kidde fire extinguishing systems repairs or replacements since January 1, 1980.For those aircraft on which repairs or replacements have been made, inspect and replace as necessary each cartridge installed in the engine, APU, and cargo fire extinguishing systems in accordance with paragraphs C and D below prior to further flight, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tC.\tIdentify date stamp and lot number located on the wrench flats of the cartridge. \n\n\t\t1.\tCartridges with date and lot number prior to calendar year 1980 (XX-80) are acceptable and need not be removed. Document the inspection by use of an inspection record such as Aircraft Log Book or in the maintenance records of the aircraft. No further action is required. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf either date is calendar year 1980 (XX-80), remove the cartridge and inspect for part number. If the part number indicated by rubber stamp on the inside shank is "01E,", remove from service and dispose of in a proper manner. If the part is identified as "D" on the shank or P/N 876296 (basic P/N), these cartridges may be reinstalledper maintenance procedures and returned to service. \n\n\tD.\tReplace defective cartridges with cartridges having acceptable part numbers. \n\n\t\t1.\tFor cargo installations, aircraft may be dispatched without cargo in affected compartment. Placard cargo compartment unusable if appropriate cartridges are not available. \n\n\t\t2.\tAPU installation may be placarded inoperative if appropriate cartridges are not available. \n\n\tE.\tAll P/Ns 876296-01E should be removed from stock and properly disposed of or returned to vendor. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 or Part 21 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\tG.\tAlternative means of compliance or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effectiveApril 20, 1981 to all persons, except those to whom it was made immediately effective by telegram dated October 18, 1980.
2021-20-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, and AS355F2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by multiple fatigue cracks in power turbine (PT) 3rd stage wheels. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter and installing a placard. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-16-15: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a revision of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to alert the flightcrew that both flight management computers (FMCs) must be installed and operational. That AD also requires an inspection to determine the serial number of the FMCs; and follow-on corrective actions, if necessary, which terminate the AFM revision. That AD also requires an inspection to verify if a certain modification is on the identification plates of the FMCs; and applicable follow-on and corrective actions. This new AD requires installation of upgraded FMC software, which would terminate the existing AD. This new AD also adds airplanes to the applicability, including adding Model MD-10-10F and MD-10-30F airplanes. This AD results from a report that the FMC does not acknowledge the pre-set glareshield control panel (GCP) altitude when profile (PROF)mode is engaged in descent mode. We are issuing this AD to prevent the un-commanded descent of an airplane below the selected level-off altitude, which could result in an unacceptable reduction in the separation between the airplane and nearby air traffic or terrain.
75-23-09: 75-23-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-2420. Applies to all Boeing 747-200C and 747-200F series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tIn addition to the door warning light procedures in Boeing B-747 Operations Manual Bulletin 74-13, the following procedures are required to provide assurance of latch system integrity. Before further flight, and thereafter following each nose cargo door operation, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tClose door electrically or manually until each latch pin is extended and the green, latches closed, light is illuminated on the nose door control panel at the loadmaster's station. \n\tB.\tPull and collar circuit breakers C1407/28V DC "control nose cargo door." Circuit breakers are located on the P15 panel on the right hand side of the electronics bay. Access to this area is either from the ground through the electronics bay hatch or through the main deck floor. Optional to pulling and collaring C1407 and C1572 circuit breakers, pull and collar C1629, C1630, C1631, C1632, C1633, and C1634 circuit breakers on the H122 cargo door power panel. \n\tC.\tPlacard the nose door control panel H121 and the nose wheel well control panel P37, "POWER REMOVED PER AD - CIRCUIT BREAKERS C1407 AND C1572 PULLED:" If optional circuit breakers procedure is used, placard the H122 cargo door power panel, "POWER REMOVED - CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED." \n\tD.\tVerify that all 16 latches are closed for dispatch by noting that each latch pin is fully extended into the latch fitting, per Boeing B-747 Dispatch Deviation Procedures Guide, Document D6-33391, page 2.52.6B, View B. \n\tBoeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2117 will be released in the near future which will give instructions for the modification of the nose cargo door latch and lock system. Incorporation of this FAA approved modification will constitute terminating action under the inspection provisions of this AD. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5. U.S.C. 552 (a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated October 23, 1975.
91-15-24: 91-15-24 BOEING: Amendment 39-7089. Docket No. 91-NM-14-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line positions 2 through 720 for Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) pneumatic ducts in body sections 44, 46, and 48; and line positions 721 through 734 for APU pneumatic ducts in body sections 44 and 48; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent damage to adjacent structure, pneumatic ducts, hydraulic lines, and/or electrical wiring as a result of failure of Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) pneumatic ducts, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 7,000 flight cycles, or within the next 3,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, conduct a penetrant inspection, proof pressure test, and penetrant inspection again to detect cracks or ruptures in the APU pneumatic ducts in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Items A. through G., K., O., and P.of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2081, dated November 29, 1990. If cracks or ruptures are detected, prior to further flight, repair or replace in accordance with the service bulletin. The stress relieving procedure specified in Accomplishment Instructions, Items H., I., and J. of the service bulletin may be accomplished in conjunction with the penetrant inspection and proof pressure test required by this paragraph, and constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph B. of this AD for all APU pneumatic ducts. \n\n\tB.\tPrior to the accumulation of 7,000 flight cycles after the accomplishment of the initial inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, conduct an additional penetrant inspection, proof pressure test, and penetrant inspection of the APU pneumatic ducts, and stress relieve the APU pneumatic duct assemblies, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, Items A. through K., O., and P. of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2081, dated November 29, 1990.If cracks or ruptures are detected, prior to further flight, repair or replace in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tC.\tReplacement of all APU pneumatic ducts in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions A., B., L. through O., and P. of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2081, dated November 29, 1990; or in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2092, dated June 28, 1990; constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order tocomply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tF.\tThe penetrant inspections, proof pressure testing, and stress relieving shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2081, dated November 29, 1990. APU pneumatic duct replacement shall be done in accordance with either Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 36-2081, dated November 29, 1990, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-36-2092, dated June 28, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-7089, AD 91-15-24) becomes effective on September 9, 1991.
93-21-08: 93-21-08 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8722. Docket 93-NM-66-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-8-72, -72F, -73, and -73F series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A57-99, dated December 10, 1992, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent reduced structural integrity of the pylon-to-wing main load path, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPerform an eddy current inspection of the front spar pylon support fittings (part numbers 5753054-501 and -502) on the number 2 and number 3 engines, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A57-99, dated December 10, 1992, and at the time specified in paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable. Thereafter, repeat this inspection at intervals not to exceed 720 landings. \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor the number 2 engine: Prior to the accumulation of 4,000 landings since installation of that engine, or within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished previously within the last 720 landings prior to the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor the number 3 engine: Prior to the accumulation of 4,000 landings since installation of that engine, or within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished previously within the last 720 landings prior to the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t(b)\tIf any crack is found, prior to further flight, repair it in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. After repair, continue to repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 720 landings, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A57-99, dated December 10, 1992. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspections shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A57-99, dated December 10, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 13, 1993.
47-47-14: 47-47-14 REPUBLIC: (Was Service Note 4 of AD-769-2.) Applies to Model RC-3 Aircraft with Engine Serial Numbers 23001 to 24065 Inclusive. Compliance required at each 25-hour inspection. Drain the oil from the engine and inspect the sump oil inlet screen assembly as follows: Insert a finger through the drain hole in the sump; locate the oil screen and with direct side pressure attempt to move the oil screen horizontally. If appreciable horizontal movement is caused by hard pressure or if the oil screen is not directly over the drain hole, the oil inlet assembly may be cracked and required replacement. The late type assembly includes a nonfloating oil screen. Until this late type float and assembly is installed fill with no more than 11 quarts of oil and mark the filler cap accordingly. When the late type parts have been incorporated, the above inspection is no longer required and 12 quarts of oil may be placed in the sump and the filler cap should be remarked accordingly. The above inspection should be made immediately when any unexplained oil pressure drop is apparent. (Franklin Service Bulletin No. 58 dated June 11, 1947, covers this same subject.)
86-10-10: 86-10-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-5318. Applies to all Model 747 series airplanes, line number 1 through 607, certificated in any category. To prevent failure of the engine thrust control cable and loss of control of an engine, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 10 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 3,000 hours, inspect and, if necessary, replace the engine thrust control cables in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-76A2065, dated February 28, 1986, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tInspections and replacement of thrust control cables accomplished in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 747-SL-76-15-A, dated December 19, 1985, are considered equivalent to accomplishing the procedures required by paragraph A., above, except that corroded cables, with or without broken strands, must also be replaced. \n\n\tC.\tReport results of inspections and the time intervals between the inspections to the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Propulsion Branch, Attention: Mr. Kanji K. Patel, ANM-140S, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168; telephone (206) 431-2973. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service bulletin from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 9, 1986.
2009-02-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During removal of forward and aft wing links, corrosion has been found on the wing links and the wing link attachment bolts in areas that are not readily accessible during the currently required Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) zonal inspections or Corrosion Prevention and Control Programme (CPCP) inspections. If left uncorrected, such corrosion could adversely affect the structural integrity of the wing to fuselage joint. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
49-27-01: 49-27-01 CONVAIR: Applies to All BT-13 Series Aircraft. Compliance required not later than November 1, 1949. Certain cases of engine failures at takeoff in these aircraft have been traced to fuel starvation as a result of accumulations of water or ice in a short segment of the fuel line, between the fuel selector valve and the emergency pump unit. The segment of fuel line from the valve outlet port to a point approximately 12 inches forward forms a water trap which cannot be drained without disconnecting the line. To preclude the possibility of engine malfunctioning from ice accumulation in this line, either of the following modifications must be accomplished: 1. Provide a new support bracket for the fuel selector valve which will raise the bottom of the valve, and the lowest point of the fuel line from the valve to the emergency fuel pump unit inlet port, to a height slightly above the level of the emergency pump unit inlet when the aircraft is in the 3-pointposition on level terrain, or 2. Provide a new selector valve, having the outlet port not lower than the inlet ports, and installed in such a manner that there will be a continuous up slope in the fuel lines from the fuel tank outlet to the emergency pump unit inlet when the aircraft is in the 3-point attitude.
92-12-03: 92-12-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-8263. Docket No. 91-NM-70-AD. Supersedes AD 90-06-16, Amendment 39-6545.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 airplanes, certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent cracking in the fuselage aft lower lobe frames between body stations (BS) 950 and BS 1166, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tConduct a detailed visual inspection of the fuselage frames in accordance with Part I of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, dated May 4, 1989; or Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991; prior to the time specified in subparagraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, whichever occurs first.\n\n\t\t(1)\tPrior to the time specified in subparagraph (a)(1)(i) or (a)(1)(ii) of this AD, whichever occurs later:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tWithin the next 3,000 flight cycles or 15 months after April 24, 1990 (the effective date of AD 90-06-16, Amendment 39-6545), whichever occurs first; or\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tPrior to the accumulation of 40,000 flight cycles.\n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to the time specified in subparagraph (a)(2)(i) or (a)(2)(ii) of this AD, whichever occurs later:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tWithin the next 3,000 flight cycles or 24 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first; or\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tPrior to the accumulation of 28,000 flight cycles.\n\n\t(b)\tRepeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 4,000 flight cycles or 36 months, whichever occurs first.\n\n\t(c)\tIf any cracks are detected, repair prior to further flight, in accordance with Part I of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, dated May 4, 1989; or Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991. Skin repairs must be accomplished in accordance with Section 53-30-3 of the Boeing 727 Structural Repair Manual.\n\n\t(d)\tAccomplishment of repairs in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, dated May 4, 1989; or Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991; constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD for the repaired areas only.\n\n\t(e)\tAccomplish the preventive modification in accordance with Part I, Paragraph B., of the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991, prior to the time specified in subparagraph (e)(1) or (e)(2) of this AD, whichever occurs later:\n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin the next 7,500 flight cycles or 45 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first; or\n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to the accumulation of 47,500 flight cycles.\n\n\t(f)\tAccomplishment of the preventive modification required by paragraph (e) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by this AD for the modified area only.\n\n\t(g)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(h)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(i)\tThe inspections, repairs, and modifications shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, dated May 4, 1989; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0195, Revision 1, dated September 19, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(j)\tThis amendment becomes effective on July 23, 1992.
92-22-09 R1: 92-22-09 R1 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8590. Docket No. 93-NM-59-AD. Revises AD 92-22-09, Amendment 39-8395. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, and -40F series airplanes; and KC-10A (Military) airplanes; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tNOTE 1: This AD references McDonnell Douglas Document Number MDC K4607, "DC-10/KC-10 Corrosion Prevention and Control Document," Revision 1, dated December 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the Document"), for corrosion tasks, definitions of corrosion levels, compliance times, and reporting requirements. In addition, this AD specifies inspection and reporting requirements beyond those included in the Document. Where there are differences between the AD and the Document, the AD prevails. \n\n\tNOTE 2: As used throughout this AD, the term "the FAA" is defined differently for different operators, as follows: For those operators complyingwith paragraph (a) of this AD, "the FAA" is defined as "the Manager of the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)." For those operators operating under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121 or 129, and complying with paragraph (b) of this AD, "the FAA" is defined as "the cognizant Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI)." For those operators operating under FAR Part 91 or 125, and complying with paragraph (b) of this AD, "the FAA" is defined as "the cognizant Maintenance Inspector at the appropriate FAA Flight Standards office." \n\n\tTo preclude structural failure due to corrosion, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tExcept as provided in paragraph (b) of this AD, complete each of the corrosion tasks specified in Section 4 of the Document in accordance with the procedures of the Document, and the schedule specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD. \n\n\tNOTE 3: A "corrosion task," as defined in Section 4 of the Document, includes inspections; procedures for acorrective action, including repairs, under identified circumstances; application of corrosion inhibitors; and other follow-on actions. \n\n\tNOTE 4: Corrosion tasks completed in accordance with the Document before the effective date of this AD may be credited for compliance with the initial corrosion task requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. \n\n\tNOTE 5: Where non-destructive inspection (NDI) methods are employed, in accordance with Section 4 of the Document, the standards and procedures used must be acceptable to the Administrator in accordance with FAR Section 43.13. \n\n\t\t(1)\tComplete the initial corrosion task of each "corrosion inspection area" defined in Section 4 of the Document as follows: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tFor aircraft areas that have not yet reached the "implementation age" (IA) as of one year after the effective date of this AD, initial compliance must occur no later than the IA plus the repeat (R) interval. \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tFor aircraft areas that have exceeded the IA as of one year after the effective date of this AD, initial compliance must occur within the R interval for the area, measured from a date one year after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tFor airplanes that are 20 years old or older as of one year after the effective date of this AD, initial compliance must occur for all areas within one R interval, or within six years, measured from a date one year after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. \n\n\t\t\t(iv)\tNotwithstanding paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), and (a)(1)(iii) of this AD, accomplish the initial task, for each area that exceeds the IA for that area, at a minimum rate of one such area per year, beginning one year after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tNOTE 6: This paragraph does not require inspection of any area that has not exceeded the IA for that area. \n\n\tNOTE 7: This minimum rate requirement may cause an undue hardship on some small operators. In those circumstances, requests for adjustments to the implementation rate will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRepeat each corrosion task at a time interval not to exceed the R interval specified in the Document for that task. \n\n\t(b)\tAs an alternative to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD: Prior to one year after the effective date of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance/inspection program to include the corrosion prevention and control program specified in the Document; or to include an equivalent program that is approved by the FAA. In all cases, the initial corrosion task for each "corrosion inspection area" must be completed in accordance with the compliance schedule specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tAny operator complying with paragraph (b) of this AD may use an alternative recordkeeping method to that otherwise required by FAR Section 91.417 or Section 121.380 for the actions required by this AD, provided it is approved by theFAA and is included in a revision to the FAA-approved maintenance/inspection program. \n\n\t\t(2)\tSubsequent to the accomplishment of the initial corrosion task, extensions of R intervals specified in the Document must be approved by the FAA. \n\n\t(c)\tTo accommodate unanticipated scheduling requirements, it is acceptable for an R interval to be increased by up to 10%, but not to exceed 6 months. The FAA must be informed, in writing, of any such extension within 30 days after such adjustment of the schedule. \n\n\tNOTE 8: Notwithstanding Section 2.1, paragraph 14, of the Document, any extension to an IA must be approved in accordance with paragraph (h) of this AD. \n\n\t(d)\t(1)\tIf, as a result of any inspection conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, Level 3 corrosion is determined to exist in any area, accomplish either paragraph (d)(1)(i) or (d)(1)(ii) of this AD within 7 days after such determination: \n\n\t\t\t(i)\tSubmit a report of that determination to the FAA and complete the corrosion task in the affected areas on all Model DC-10 series airplanes in the operator's fleet; or \n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tSubmit to the FAA for approval one of the following: \n\n\t\t\t\t(A)\tA proposed schedule for performing the corrosion tasks in the affected areas on the remaining Model DC-10 series airplanes in the operator's fleet, which is adequate to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner, along with substantiating data for that schedule; or \n\n\t\t\t\t(B)\tData substantiating that the Level 3 corrosion found is an isolated occurrence. \n\n\tNOTE 9: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1 of the Document which would permit corrosion which otherwise meets the definition of Level 3 corrosion (i.e., which is determined to be a potentially urgent airworthiness concern requiring expeditious action) to be treated as Level 1 if the operator finds that it "can be attributed to an event not typical of the operator's usage of other airplanes in the same fleet," this paragraph requires that data substantiating any such finding be submitted to the FAA for approval. \n\n\t\t(2)\tThe FAA may impose schedules other than those proposed, upon finding that such changes are necessary to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner. \n\n\t\t(3)\tWithin the time schedule approved under paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD, accomplish the corrosion tasks in the affected areas of the remaining Model DC-10 series airplanes in the operator's fleet. \n\n\t(e)\tIf, as a result of any inspection, after the initial inspection, conducted in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, it is determined that corrosion findings exceed Level 1 in any area, within 60 days after such determination a means approved by the FAA must be implemented to reduce future findings of corrosion in that area to Level 1 or better. \n\n\t(f)\tBefore any operator places into service any airplane subject to the requirements of this AD, a schedule for the accomplishment of corrosion tasks required by this AD must be established in accordance with paragraph (f)(1) or (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor airplanes previously maintained in accordance with this AD, the first corrosion task in each area to be performed by the new operator must be accomplished in accordance with the previous operator's schedule or with the new operator's schedule, whichever would result in the earlier accomplishment date for that task. After each corrosion task has been performed once, each subsequent task must be performed in accordance with the new operator's schedule. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor airplanes that have not been previously maintained in accordance with this AD, the first corrosion task for each area to be performed by the new operator must be accomplished prior to further flight or in accordance with a schedule approved by the FAA. \n\n\t(g)\tReports of Level 2 and Level 3 corrosion must be submitted at least quarterly to McDonnell Douglas Corporation in accordance with Section 5 of the Document. \n\n\tNOTE 10: Reporting of Level 2 and Level 3 corrosion found as a result of any opportunity inspection is highly desirable. \n\n\t(h)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through the cognizant Maintenance Inspector at the appropriate FAA Flight Standards office, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE 11: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(i)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(j)\tReports of corrosion inspection results required by this AD have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(k)\tThe completion of the corrosion tasks shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Document Number MDC K4607, "DC-10/KC-10 Corrosion Prevention and Control Document," Revision 1, dated December 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51, as of January 12, 1993 (57 FR 57901, December 8, 1992). Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at theFAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(l)\tThis amendment is effective on January 12, 1993.
2009-19-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive testing of the rudder pedal forces or repetitive detailed inspections of the inner spring of the rudder feel and centering unit, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires replacement of the spring assembly in the rudder feel and centering unit, which terminates the repetitive tests or inspections. This AD results from reports of low rudder pedal forces that were caused by a broken inner spring in the rudder feel and centering unit; a broken inner spring in conjunction with a broken outer spring would significantly reduce rudder pedal forces. We are issuing this AD to prevent reduced rudder pedal forces, which could result in increased potential for pilot-induced oscillations and reduce the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane.
92-06-15: 92-06-15 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8195. Docket No. 89-NM-43-AD. Supersedes AD 69-15-04, Amendment 39-1396.\n\n\tApplicability: Model DST, Super DC-3, DC-3, DC-3A, DC-3B, DC-3C, and DC-3D series airplanes; all military versions, C-41, C-41A, C-47, C-47A, C-47B, C-48, C-48A, C-49, C-49A, C-49B, C-49C, C-49D, C-49J, C-49K, C-50, C-50A, C-50B, C-50C, C-50D, C-51, C-52, C-52A, C-52B, C-52C, C-53, C-53B, C-53C, C-53D, C-68, C-117A, C-117D, and R4D series airplanes, including those modified for turbo-propeller power; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent structural failure of the wings, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes not modified with the repair or preventive doublers at both wing stations 94.250 and 127.750, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 229, any revision; or McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 263, any revision through Revision 8, dated December 15, 1971; or McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578003, dated April 6, 1988; accomplish the following:\n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 900 hours time-in-service after performing the last inspection in accordance with AD 69-15-04, Amendment 39-1396, or within one year after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish the following:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tInspect the wing in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578001, dated March 11, 1988; or McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578002, Revision A, dated September 26, 1988; for the applicable airplanes, using the visual and X-ray techniques specified. Repeat the visual inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time-in-service.\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tModify the airplane to incorporate access holes, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SRO3548001, Revision A, dated March 7, 1989. \n\n\tNOTE: Airplanes previously modified to incorporate access holes do not have to be remodified if visibility and access can be obtained.\n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 2,000 hours time-in-service or two years after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, modify the wing in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578003, dated April 6, 1988.\n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes modified to incorporate the repair or preventive doublers at both wing stations 94.250 and 127.750, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 229, any revision; or McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 263, any revision through Revision 8, dated December 15, 1971; or McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578003, dated April 6, 1988: Within 2,000 hours time-in-service after the last inspection in accordance with AD 69-15-04, Amendment 39-1396, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time-in-service, inspect the wing using the visual method specified in McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578001, dated March 11, 1988; and McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578002, Revision A, dated September 26, 1988; for the applicable airplanes.\n\n\t(c)\tCracked structure detected during the inspections required by paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD must be repaired or replaced prior to further flight, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawing SR03578003, dated April 6, 1988.\n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.\n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD may be accomplished.\n\n\t(f)\tThe inspections, repairs, and modifications shall be donein accordance with McDonnell Douglas Service Rework Drawings No. SR03578003, dated April 6, 1988; No. SR03578001, dated March 11, 1988; No. SR03578002, Revision A, dated September 26, 1988; and No. SR03548001, Revision A, dated March 7, 1989. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 98055-4056. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(g)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 28, 1992.
92-12-08: 92-12-08 BOEING: Amendment 39-8269. Docket No. 91-NM-233-AD. Supersedes AD 91-18-07, Amendment 39-8010.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 series airplanes; equipped with brake part numbers (P/N) identified in Tables 1 and 2 of this AD, and BFGoodrich brake P/N 2-873; certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent loss of main landing gear braking effectiveness, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 180 days after November 12, 1991 (the effective date of Amendment 39-8010, AD 91-18-07) inspect brakes having the part numbers shown in Table 1, below, for wear. Any brake worn more than the maximum wear limit specified must be replaced, prior to further flight, with either a brake within that maximum wear limit or one built in accordance with the applicable service bulletins specified in paragraphs (c), (d), or (e) of this AD, as applicable.\n\nTable 1\n\n\tBrake Mfr.\tBrake P/N\tBoeing P/N\tMaximum \t\t\t\t\tWear Limit\n\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-1147\t10-61287-10 1.6 inches\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-1147-1\t10-61287-12 1.6 inches\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-1147-3\t10-61287-18 1.6 inches\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-1147-4\t10-61287-25 1.6 inches\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-1190\t10-61287-13 1.6 inches\n\tBendix\t2601182-6\t10-61287-231.7 inches\n\n\t(b)\tWithin 180 days after November 12, 1991 (the effective date of Amendment 39-8010, AD 91-18-07), incorporate the maximum brake wear limits specified in paragraph (a) of this AD into the FAA-approved maintenance program.\n\n\t(c)\tThe allowable wear limits for BFGoodrich (BFG) brake part numbers 2-1147 and 2-1147-1, -3, and -4 may be established in accordance with BFG Service Bulletin No. 2-1147-32-13, dated December 21, 1990, and placed into the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program in lieu of those specified in paragraph (a) of this AD.\n\n\t(d)\tThe allowable wear limit for BFG brake part number 2-1190 may be established in accordance with BFG Service Bulletin No. 2-1190-32-13, dated December 21, 1990, and placed into the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program in lieu of that specified in paragraph (a) of this AD.\n\n\t(e)\tThe allowable wear limits for Bendix brake part number 2601182-6 may be established in accordance with Bendix (Allied Signal Aerospace Company) Service Bulletin No. 2601182-32-014, dated January 30, 1991, in lieu of that specified in paragraph (a) of this AD. Either that service bulletin or the wear limit specified in paragraph (a) of this AD shall be placed into the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program, but not both.\n\n\t(f)\tWithin 180 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect brakes having the part numbers shown in Table 2, below, for wear. Any brake worn more than the maximum wear limit specified must be replaced, prior to further flight, with a brake within that maximum wear limit:\n\nTable 2\n\n\tBrake Mfr.\tBrake P/N\tBoeing P/N\tMaximum \t\t\t\tWear Limit\n\n\tBendix\t2601182-510-61287-22\t1.8 \t \t\t\t\tinches\n\tBFGoodrich\t2-872-5\t10-60465-18\t0.50 \t\t\t\tinch\n\n\t(g)\tWithin 180 days after the effective date of this amendment incorporate the maximum brake wear limits specified in Table 2 of paragraph (f) of this AD into the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program. \n\n\t(h)\tFor airplanes equipped with brakes having BFGoodrich P/N 2-873: Within 180 days after the effective date of this amendment, incorporate the following into the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program:\n\n"Replace BFGoodrich P/N 2-873 brakes prior to or when the adjuster pin is flush with the adjuster bushing."\n\n\t(i)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to theManager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(j)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n\n\t(k)\tThe alternative maximum brake wear limits shall be established in accordance with BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 2-1147-32-13, dated December 21, 1990; BFGoodrich Service Bulletin No. 2-1190-32-13, dated December 21, 1990; or Bendix (Allied Signal Aerospace Company) Service Bulletin No. 2601182-32-014, dated January 30, 1991; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124; Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Bendix Wheels and Brakes Division, South Bend, Indiana 46628; or BFGoodrich Aerospace, Aircraft Wheels and Brakes, P.O. Box 340, Troy, Ohio 45373. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(l)\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 5, 1992.
88-17-06: 88-17-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-5988. Applies to Model 727 series airplanes, except Model 727-200F, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the structural integrity of the wing upper surface stringers, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tUsing eddy current, x-ray, or visual inspection techniques, inspect wing upper surface stringers for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 1, dated October 29, 1982, as follows: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor airplanes with 45,000 or more landings on August 16, 1983, inspect prior to the accumulation of 1,000 additional landings after August 16, 1983. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor airplanes with at least 40,000 and less than 45,000 landings on August 16, 1983, inspect prior to the accumulation of 2,000 additional landings after August 16, 1983. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor all other airplanes, inspect prior to the accumulation of 3,000 additional landings after August 16, 1983, or priorto accumulating 33,000 total landings, whichever occurs later. \n\n\tB.\tRepeat the inspections required by paragraph A., above, and, if applicable, paragraph C., below, at the following intervals: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the immediately preceding inspection was performed using eddy current methods, reinspect within the next 22,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf the immediately preceding inspection was performed using x-ray or visual methods, reinspect within the next 11,000 landings. \n\n\tC.\tIf cracks are detected during the inspections required by paragraph A. or B., above, unless previously accomplished, inspect the stringer-to-rib attachment at wing stations (WS) 519.0 and 546.5 for cracks, using eddy current, x-ray, or visual techniques, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 3, dated September 18, 1986, in accordance with the following schedule: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 4,500 landings after the effective date of this AD, for airplanes on which cracks have been detected prior to the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t2.\tPrior to further flight, for airplanes on which cracks have been detected after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAny cracked structure detected as a result of the inspections required by paragraphs A., B., C., E., or F. of this AD, must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with a procedure listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 3, dated September 18, 1986. Repair or modification in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 3, dated September 18, 1986, eliminates the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph B., above, and constitutes terminating action for only those attachments so repaired or modified. \n\n\tE.\tWithin the next 4,500 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 3, dated September 18, 1986, inspect and modify stringers (excluding stringer tabs)previously repaired utilizing the preventative modification in accordance with Figure 12 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-57A159, Revision 1, dated October 29, 1982, or Revision 2, dated March 30, 1984. \n\n\tF.\tFor airplanes with affected wing stringer rib attach locations previously repaired in accordance with Structural Repair Manual Subject 57-10-4 or any other FAA-approved method (except those identified in paragraph E., above), that have accumulated 22,000 landings prior to August 16, 1983, inspect in accordance with paragraph A., above, within the next 11,000 landings after August 16, 1983, or prior to the accumulation of 33,000 landings since repair, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals in accordance with paragraph B. of this AD. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tH.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes AD 83-13-03, Amendment 39-4673. \n\tThis amendment, 39-5988, becomes effective September 5, 1988.
82-16-08: 82-16-08 HELIO: Amendment 39-4427. Applies to all models H-250, H-295, HT-295, H-391, H-391B, H-395 and H-395A airplanes certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the integrity of the wing spar carry-thru assembly, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA)\tOn all models H-250, H-295 (except S/N 1436, 1443 thru 1479), H-391, H- 391B, H-395, and H-395A airplanes that have the 391-030-401 wing spar carry-thru assembly, and not modified in accordance with STC SA1590CE within the next 10 hours' time in service, on all land planes with 3000 or more hours' time in service, or upon accumulation of 3000 hours' time in service; and on all seaplanes with 1500 or more hours' time in service, or on airplanes operated in both landplane and seaplane configurations with 3000 or more equivalent landplane hours' time in service or upon accumulation of 3000 equivalent landplane hours' time in service, * and thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time-in-service, gamma ray inspect both the lower left and right, main spar, steel carry-thru fitting, P/N 391-030-4072, for cracks or corrosion in accordance with Helio Aircraft Company Service Bulletin No. 36. \n\n\t*NOTE (1):\tTo obtain equivalent landplane time in service, multiply seaplane time by two. \n\n\tNOTE (2):\tThe 295-030-401 wing carry-thru assembly has plates welded to the lower tube as detailed in figure 2. The 391-030-401 wing carry-thru assembly does not have these plates. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf indications of cracks or corrosion are found during any of the gamma ray inspections required herein, prior to further flight, install the kit detailed in STC SA159OCE. \n\n\tB)\tOn all models HT-295 airplanes, model H-295 (S/N's 1436, 1443 thru 1479) airplanes and those model H-250, H-295, H-391, H-391B, H-395 and H-395A airplanes on which the P/N 391-030-401 wing spar carry-thru assembly was replaced with the P/N 295-030-401 assembly, and not modified in accordance with STC SA1728CE within the next 10 hours time-in- service after the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time-in- service thereafter, perform a dye penetrant inspection on each end of the lower horizontal tube around the welds and the adjacent area on the inboard end of the four 1.25 x 4.56 x .188 pads (2 each side) as follows: \n\n\t\t1.\tInspect each side of the wing spar carry-thru assembly using Figures 1 and 2 to identify the areas to be inspected. On the side being inspected, jack up the wing at the wing tie-down ring. The wheel must clear the ground. On airplanes equipped with floats, jack the wing so that it is displaced upward 4.75 to 5.0 inches at the tie down ring. Access to the wing carry-thru assembly is gained by opening the head liner and removing the P/N 295-030-3047 guard assembly (if installed). Conduct the inspection in accordance with the instructions accompanying the dye penetrant inspection equipment. \n\n\tNOTE: Jacking of the wing is necessary to put a tension load on the lower horizontal tube of the wing spar carry-thru assembly to assist in exposing fatigue-type cracks that could exist in this component. \n\t\n\t\t2.\tThoroughly clean and remove the paint from all surfaces to be inspected before the required inspections. \n\n\t\t3.\tRemove all evidence of corrosion and renew the protective coatings after the inspection. Corrosion may be removed from the horizontal tube to a maximum depth of .005 inches. If indications of cracks or evidence of corrosion beyond the .005 inch maximum depth are found during the inspections required herein, prior to further flight, install the kit described in STC SA1728CE. \n\n\t\t4.\tClean and apply zinc chromate primer to all surfaces which were cleaned for the required inspections. \n\n\tC)\tOn or before August 1, 1984, install wing carry-thru assembly reinforcement on all P/N 295-030-401 wing carry-thru assemblies in accordance with STC SA1728CE and on all 391-030-401 wing carry-thru assemblies in accordance with STC SA1590CE. \n\n\tD)\tOn airplanes having wing carry-thru assembly reinforcements installed per STC's SA1590CE or SA1728CE accomplish the following inspection on or before 1500 hours time in service after installation of this reinforcement and each 1500 hours time in service thereafter: \n\n\t\t1.\tConduct a dye penetrant inspection in accordance with the instructions accompanying the dye penetrant inspection equipment. The critical areas to be inspected include the surfaces where the weld bead would be and around the three bolt holes. Use Figures 1 and 2 to identify these areas. On the side being inspected, jack up the wing at the wing tie-down ring in accordance with the instructions in Paragraph B)1. \n\n\t\t2.\tThoroughly clean and remove the paint from all surfaces to be inspected before the required inspections. \n\n\t\t3.\tRemove all evidence of corrosion and renew the protective coatings. Corrosion may be removed from the horizontal tube to a maximum depth of .005 inches. If indications of cracks or evidence of corrosion beyond the .005 inch maximum depth are found during the inspections required herein, prior to further flight, replace the carry-thru assembly with an airworthy part. \n\n\t\t4.\tClean and apply zinc chromate primer to all surfaces which were cleaned for the required inspections. \n\n\tE)\tAll non-destructive inspections required in this AD must be performed by an appropriately rated FAA repair station using technicians with recency of experience in performing dye penetrant and gamma ray inspections. \n\n\tF)\tAn equivalent method of compliance with this AD if used must be approved by Chief, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone number (316) 269-7005. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes ADs 71-21-11 and 81-26-07. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 3, 1982.
2009-18-10: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 707 airplanes, and Model 720 and 720B series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect cracks and corrosion on any existing repairs and at certain body stations (STA) of the visible surfaces of the wing to body terminal fittings including the web, flanges, and ribs; and applicable related investigative and corrective actions. This new AD retains the requirements of the existing AD and requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections to detect any stress corrosion cracks within the outboard flange of the left and right body terminal fittings at STA 820, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD also adds two airplanes to the applicability. This AD results from reports of cracks found in the wing to body terminal fittings during routine inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks and corrosion in the body terminal fittings above and below the floor, which could cause loss of support for the wing and could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
90-15-03: 90-15-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-6650. Docket No. 89-NM-248-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 and 737-400 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within three months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent a fire hazard associated with a fuel leak, due to the fuel tube assembly chafing against the adjacent wing/strut structural brace, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAccomplish one of the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tInspect the left engine fuel feed tube assembly for proper clearance and chafing in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1055 Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. If inadequate clearance is found, prior to further flight, replace the fuel tube with a serviceable fuel tube, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, and verify minimum clearance between support structure and fuel tube, in accordance with the above Service Bulletin 737-28-1055, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. \n\n\t\t2.\tReplace the left engine fuel feed tube in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28-1084, dated September 14, 1989, and verify minimum clearance between support structure and fuel tube in accordance with Service Bulletin 737-28-1055, Revision 1, dated October 27, 1988. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6650, AD 90-15-03) becomes effective on August 14, 1990.
90-13-07: 90-13-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6616. Docket No. 90-NM-21-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, -40F, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent total loss of aircraft hydraulic power and flight control systems, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor model DC-10-10 and -10F series airplanes: \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 6 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph a. or b., below: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tModify the Number 3 hydraulic system by installing flow rate sensing hydraulic fuses and check valves in accordance with paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-129, dated February 14, 1990; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tInstall an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor those airplanes modified in accordance with paragraph A.1.a., above, within 1 year after the effective date of this AD, install an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990. The modification required by paragraph A.1.a., above, may be removed after accomplishment of this subparagraph. \n\n\tB.\tFor Model DC-10-15, -30, -30F, -40, -40F, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, within one year after the effective date of this AD, install an electrically operated hydraulic system shutoff valve and return line check valve in the Number 3 hydraulic system. The shutoff valve must be activated by a hydraulic fluid level sensor in the Number 3 hydraulic system reservoir and annunciated in the cockpit. The installation must be made in a manner which is approved by Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, or in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 29-128, dated February 22, 1990 \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Douglas Aircraft Company, P. O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801, ATTN: Manager, Service Change, Mail 73-30. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6616, AD 90-13-07) becomes effective on July 20, 1990.
47-35-02: 47-35-02\tSIKORSKY: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-7L-1.) Applies to Model R-4B AAF Helicopter Serial Numbers 43-46500 and 43-46504 to 43-46567 Inclusive. \n\nCompliance required prior to November 15, 1947. \n\nTo compensate for an increased overhang of the tail rotor gearbox, a diagonal brace that changes the aft boom load distribution shall be installed in accordance with the following instructions: \n\n(a)\tFit the two tube brace assemblies, Sikorsky P/N S38566 and S38567, in telescopic position, to lower right longeron and upper left longeron. (See Figures 2 and 3.) \n\n\nAD 47-35-02 \n\n(1)\tInsert bolts, P/N AN 4-13, into halves of clamp of each section of brace; attach washers, P/N AN 960-416, and nuts, P/N AN 310-4. \n\n(2)\tLocate brace so that its center and that of vertical tube, P/N S38505-23, forward of it, are a maximum of 1 1/8 inches apart. (See Figure 2.) \n\n(3)\tTighten securely four bolts, P/N AN 4-13, which hold subject brace in position. \n\n(4)\tSecure nuts, P/N AN 310-4, with cotter pins. \n\n(b)\tMark with a pencil the overlap of tube brace assembly, P/N S38566, on assembly P/N S38567. (See Figure 3.) \n\n\n\nAD 47-35-02 \n\n(c)\tFashion a wedge, using a piece of wood 1 x 3 x 14 inches, and "V" notch both ends. (See Figure 4.) \n\n(d)\tInsert wedge approximately parallel to telescopic brace. \n\n(1)\tTap alternately the ends of wedge forcing the subject assembly to extend 1/16 inch beyond the pencil line requested in paragraph (b). (Extra extension of 1/16 inch permits brace to assume the desired stress load.) \n\n(2)\tWrap longerons with friction tape at point of wedge contact, or insert cardboard or any suitable material at ends of wood wedge to prevent paint abrasion. \n\n(e)\tWith wedge securely in position, using drill No. 40 (0.098-inch), drill two holes through brace at 90 degrees to each other. (See Figure 3.) \n\n(1)\tEnlarge holes, using drill No. C (0.242 inch) and ream to 0.250 inch. \n\n(f)\tBolt two sections of brace together with bolts, P/N AN 24-17, nuts, P/N AN 320- 4, and secure with cotter pins. \n\n(g)\tRemove the wood wedge. \n\n(h)\tIf paint on longerons of tail fuselage has been damaged, touch up with paint. \n\n(Sikorsky Service Bulletin R-4B No. 8 and Army Technical Order 01-230HA-11 also cover this same alteration.)
2009-18-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Four aircraft have experienced a dual AC [alternating current] generator shutdown, caused by a broken propeller de-ice bus bar which short-circuited with the backplate assembly.* * * A short circuit can cause a dual AC generator shutdown that, particularly in conjunction with an engine failure in icing conditions, could result in reduced controllability of the aircraft. * * * * * Reduced controllability of the airplane in certain operating conditions affects continued safe flight and landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
70-16-04: 70-16-04\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-1052. Applies to Boeing Model 707/720 Series Airplanes. (Effectivity listed on Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2986 dated May 15, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions). \n\n\tCompliance required within 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished.\n \n\tTo prevent fire caused by failure of the Main Cabin Cove Light Ballast Capacitors deactivate the main cabin cove light circuits until one of the following items has been accomplished: \n\n\t(1)\tRelocate all main cabin ballast capacitors to the inboard side of the cove light race way as described in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2986 dated May 15, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t(2)\tPerform an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective on August 1, 1970.
2009-04-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The heating capability of several Angle Of Attack (AOA) transducer heating elements removed from in-service aircraft have been found to be below the minimum requirement. Also, it was discovered that a large number of AOA transducers repaired in an approved maintenance facility were not calibrated accurately. Inaccurate calibration of the AOA transducer and/or degraded AOA transducer heating elements can result in early or late activation of the stall warning, stick shaker and stick pusher by the Stall Protection Computer (SPC). * * * * * The unsafe condition is reduced controllability of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.