Results
84-12-01 R1: 84-12-01 R1 HUGHES HELICOPTERS, INC. (HUGHES HELICOPTERS): Amendment 39-4877 as amended by Amendment 39-4937. Applies to Model 369D and 369E helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance is required prior to further flight, unless already accomplished. To detect unapproved blades and prevent possible rotor blade failure in flight, accomplish the following: For Hughes Helicopters, Inc., Model 369D and 369E helicopters with main rotor blades installed which have been procured from any source. (a) To verify that the main rotor blades are of the proper Part Number (P/N) 369D21100 internal configuration, comply with the following: (1) A coin tap test or equivalent test shall be used to identify the number of ribs in each blade. Carefully tap along the length of the blade, aft of the spar, from the tip end, using a heavy coin; e.g., U.S. quarter, half dollar, or equivalent. Note the number of ribs in the blade by the difference in sound. The proper P/N 369D21100 blade has 20 ribs, 1.5 inches apart, beginning 1.5 inches from the blade tip. The unapproved 369A1100 series blade has only four ribs, beginning 3 inches from the blade tip. (2) The unapproved blade also has a painted over, flush plug installed to fill a 0.218- to 0.224-inch-diameter hole required in the trailing edge inboard end of all 369A1100 series blades. There is no such hole in the proper P/N 369D21100 blades. Inspect the blade for a filled hole in the trailing edge inboard end. (b) If a blade has four ribs and a filled hole, an improper blade is installed. Replace with an airworthy proper P/N 369D21100 blade prior to further flight. (c) Alternative inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety to this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, Hawthorne, California. The procedure specified in Hughes Service Information Letter DL-57 or EL-5, dated February 10, 1984, is an alternative. NOTE: Hughes Service Information Letter No. DL-57 or EL-5 dated February 10, 1984, pertains to identification of improper blades. Amendment 39-4877 became effective June 11, 1984. This Amendment 39-4937 becomes effective October 24, 1984.
2012-25-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747- 300, 747-400, 747-400F, and 747SR series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of broken and damaged latch pin retention bolts and subsequent migration of the latch pins of the main deck side cargo door (MDSCD). This AD requires various repetitive inspections of the MDSCD latch pin fittings, measuring the latch pin, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires modifying the latch pin fittings and installing new latch pins and latch pin fasteners. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of the cargo door and rapid depressurization of the airplane.
98-16-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection for cracking of the rear pressure bulkhead; and installation of a reinforcement angle on the rear pressure bulkhead; or repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the rear pressure bulkhead, which could result in sudden loss of cabin pressure and the inability to withstand fail-safe loads.
84-23-03: 84-23-03 ALEXANDER SCHLEICHER: Amendment 39-4945. Applies to Model ASK-21 sailplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To comply with the requirements of Federal Aviation Regulation 21.29(a)(3), accomplish the following: 1. Remove the one placard in the German language fitted in the front and rear cockpit, and replace with new placards in the English language, in accordance with Alexander Schleicher ASK-21 Technical Note No. 14, dated May 16, 1984. 2. Remove and replace the following manual pages in accordance with Alexander Schleicher ASK-21 Technical Note No. 14, dated May 16, 1984: a. In the Flight Manual, remove pages 2 (December 20, 1983) and 21 (March 9, 1983), and replace with pages 2 (May 16, 1984) and 21 (May 16, 1984). b. In the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness, remove pages 2 (December 20, 1983) and 59 (March 9, 1983), and replace with pages 2 (May 16, 1984) and 59 (May 16, 1984). 3. Paragraph 2 of this AD may be accomplished by the pilot with logbook entry. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-10O, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, telephone 513.38.30 extension 2710. The Alexander Schleicher ASK-21 Technical Note No. 14, dated May 16, 1984, identified and described in this directive is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C 552 (a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Alexander Schleicher Segelflugzeubau, D-6416 Poppenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New EnglandExecutive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment becomes effective on November 14, 1984.
98-16-25: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 and 200) airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of the shock strut end caps and attachment pins of the main landing gear (MLG), and replacement of discrepant parts with new parts. It also requires a check for and replacement of certain pins that currently may be installed on some airplanes. This amendment adds a requirement for the installation of new, improved MLG shock strut upper and lower attachment pins, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment also reduces the applicability of the existing AD by removing certain airplanes. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of attachment pins andthe attachment pin end caps, which could result in failure of the MLG.
98-16-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion or plating cracks of the pin assemblies in the forward trunnion support of the main landing gear (MLG), and replacement of the pin assembly with a new assembly, if necessary. Such replacement, if accomplished, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that these pin assemblies were found to have corroded as a result of plating cracks. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such corrosion and plating cracks, which could cause breakage of these assemblies, and consequent collapse of the MLG.
2012-27-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Model Tay 620-15 turbofan engines. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the low-pressure compressor (LPC) fan blades and if erosion is found their replacement before further flight. This AD was prompted by evidence of excessive leading edge erosion of the LPC fan blades on certain Tay 620-15 engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the LPC fan blade, which could result in uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
66-19-03: 66-19-03 MARTIN: Amdt. 39-272 Part 39 Federal Register August 10, 1966. Applies to Model 404 Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the main landing gear oleo cylinders, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect main landing gear oleo cylinders, Martin P/N SE997712, in accordance with (c) within the next 50 hours' in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 100 hours' time in service, and at intervals not to exceed 150 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (b) Inspect main landing gear oleo cylinders, except Martin P/N SE997712, in accordance with (c) within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. (c) Remove all grease, dirt, and loose paint in the area between the jury strut attach lugs of the right and left main landing gear oleo cylinders, and inspect each of these areas for cracks using an ultrasonic method or an FAA-approved equivalent method. (d) If a crack is found during the inspection specified in (c), replace the cylinder with a part of the same part number inspected in accordance with this AD and found free of cracks or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, before further flight except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed. (e) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in (a) to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This directive effective August 19, 1966.
98-16-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain SOCATA - Groupe AEROSPATIALE (Socata) Models TB9 and TB10 airplanes. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the wing front attachments on the wing and fuselage sides for cracks, and repetitively incorporating a certain modification kit (type of kit and time of incorporation depends on whether cracks are found during the inspection). This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the wing front attachments caused by fatigue cracking, which could result in the wing separating from the airplane if the airplane is operated with cracked wing front attachments over an extended period of time.
92-08-15: 92-08-15 MOONEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8266. Final copy of priority letter. Docket No. 92-CE-29-AD. Applicability: Model M20J airplanes, serial numbers 24-3201, 24-3218 through 24-3238, 24-3240 through 24-3250, and 24-3252 through 24-3256, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent rudder imbalance, which could lead to aerodynamic problems and loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) Fabricate a placard with the words "Maximum Gross Weight Reduced to 2,740 Pounds." Install this placard on the airplane instrument panel within the pilot's clear view. (2) Insert a copy of this AD into the limitations section of the Airplane Flight Manual and operate the airplane accordingly. (b) Within the next 15 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, inspect the airplane to ensure that the rudder static balance is within the required limits in accordance with paragraphs 1. through 3. of the INSTRUCTIONS section of Mooney Aircraft Corporation Service Bulletin (SB) M20-252, dated April 6, 1992. (c) If the rudder static balance falls outside the limits specified in Mooney Aircraft Corporation SB M20-252, prior to further flight, adjust the rudder balance weight in accordance with paragraphs 4. through 7. of the INSTRUCTIONS section of Mooney Aircraft Corporation SB M20-252, dated April 6, 1992. (d) The placard and Airplane Flight Manual limitation required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD are no longer required after compliance with paragraphs (b) and (c) of this AD as applicable. (e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Office, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0150. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office. (f) The inspection and possible modification required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Mooney Aircraft Corporation Service Bulletin M20-252, dated April 6, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from the Mooney Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 72, Kerrville, Texas 78029-0072. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room8401, Washington, DC. (g) This amendment becomes effective on June 30, 1992, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 92-08-15, issued April 9, 1992, which contained the requirements of this amendment.
2012-26-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Honeywell International Inc. air data pressure transducers as installed on various aircraft. This AD requires various tests or checks of equipment having certain air data pressure transducers, and removal of equipment if necessary. As an option to the tests or checks, this AD allows removal of affected equipment having certain air data pressure transducers. This AD was prompted by a report of a pressure measurement error in the pressure transducer used in various air data systems, which translates into air data parameter errors. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct inaccuracies of the pressure sensors, which could result in altitude, computed airspeed, true airspeed, and Mach computation errors. These errors could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight of the aircraft and could result in consequent loss of control of the aircraft.
2010-12-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International, S.A. models CFM56-3 and -3B turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive inspections for damage to the fan blades. This AD results from a report of a failed fan blade with severe out-of-limit wear on the underside of the blade platform where it contacts the damper. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of multiple fan blades, which could result in an uncontained failure of the engine and damage to the airplane.
75-10-02 R2: 75-10-02 R2 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-2194 as amended by Amendment 39-2237 is further amended by Amendment 39-3985. Applies to Lockheed-California Company Model L-1011-385-1 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, which incorporate the galley door type design configuration. To prevent possible unsafe condition to the flight attendants in the underfloor galley service area and possible damage to the underfloor galley service area interiors, accomplish the following: (a) Galley Door Inspections, Corrections and Visual Confirmation of Galley Door Safe Condition. (1) Within 250 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished within the last 2250 flight hours prior to the effective date of this AD, and at intervals not to exceed 2500 flight hours thereafter, perform the inspections and complete the necessary corrective adjustments to the door mechanical and electrical systems as specified in the Lockheed-CaliforniaCompany Alert Service Bulletin 093-52-A075, dated March 28, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions. (2) Within 250 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, on all flights thereafter conducted, (i) A visual check to confirm the proper engagement of the door ditch latches from inside of the galley must be performed by a member of the flight crew or flight attendants just prior to taxiing from the ramp, per instructions described on the applicable galley door decal. (Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin 093-52-A075, dated March 28, 1975, or later FAA- approved revisions, describes a procedure for accomplishment of the visual check and the decal.) (ii) If the check required by (i), above, is performed by other than the flight crew, the results of the check will be made known to the flight crew prior to each flight. (iii) Record the accomplishment of the check in a record maintained by the operator. (3) Modification of the door actuator mechanism and switchinstallation per Lockheed-California Company Service Bulletin 093-52-075 Revision 3 dated April 6, 1976, constitutes terminating action for the conduct of the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD. (b) Rework of galley door Link Arm Assemblies. (1) Within 250 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, perform the removal and rework of eight galley door link arm assemblies as specified in Part 1 of Lockheed-California Company Service Bulletin 093-52-038, Revision Number 2, dated May 10, 1974, or later FAA-approved revisions. (2) Within 2500 flight hours of the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, perform the rework of all spare galley door link arm assemblies specified in Part II of Lockheed-California Service Bulletin 093-52-038, Revision Number 2, dated May 10, 1974, or later FAA-approved revisions. Equivalent inspections, modifications and replacements may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Airplanes may be flown to a base for the accomplishment of the inspections and replacements required by this AD, per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, Post Office Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108 or 15000 Aviation Boulevard, Hawthorne, California 90261, Room 6W14. Amendment 39-2194 became effective May 8, 1975. Amendment 39-2237 was effective June 18, 1975 for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated May 23, 1975, which contained this amendment. This amendment 39-3985 becomes effective December 16, 1980.
93-01-07: 93-01-07 BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8461. Docket 92-NM-164- AD. Applicability: Model 400A series airplanes having serial numbers RK-1 through RK-32, inclusive; and Model 400T series airplanes having serial numbers TT-1 through TT-6, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent snagging of the end clevis fitting and kinking (and subsequent failure) of the emergency release cable of the main landing gear, which may prevent extension of the main landing gear, accomplish the following: (a) Within 100 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, replace the existing link assembly from the uplink mechanism of the main landing gear door with an improved link assembly, in accordance with Beechcraft Service Bulletin 2447, dated June 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used ifapproved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita ACO. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The replacement shall be done in accordance with Beechcraft Service Bulletin 2447, dated June 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Beech Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on March 2, 1993.
98-15-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to General Electric Company CF6-80A3 series turbofan engines. This action requires initial and repetitive on-wing borescope inspections of the left hand aft mount link assembly for cracks, bearing migration, and bearing race rotation, and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. This amendment is prompted by a report of a fractured left hand aft mount link discovered during a scheduled engine removal. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent left hand aft mount link failure, which can result in adverse redistribution of the aft mount loads and possible aft mount system failure.
69-15-02: 69-15-02 BELL: Amdt. 39-815. Applies to Model 206A helicopters equipped with magnesium cyclic bellcrank support assemblies. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the magnesium cyclic bellcrank support assemblies, P/N 206-001- 521, due to fatigue cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the right- and left-hand support assemblies, P/N 206-001-521, that have accumulated 25 hours' total time in service after April 15, 1969, before the first flight of each day as follows: (1) Remove the upper forward cowling, P/N 206-061-801, to expose the hydraulic power cylinders. (2) Inspect the attachment of the support assemblies to the fuselage for firmness by grasping with the fingers. If the support assembly is loose, torque the nut on the NAS 1304-9 bolt to 80 to 100 inch-pounds and the nut on the NAS 1305-9 bolt to 120 to 145 inch-pounds. If a nut is inaccessible, torque the bolt head in accordance with the method described in paragraph 4 ofBell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206A-11 Revision A, dated July 23, 1969, or in accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. (3) Inspect visually the right and left-hand support assemblies, P/N 206-001- 521, for cracks in the spotfaced areas around the attachment bolts and in the fillet radii between the base and vertical section of the supports, using a flashlight or equivalent. Both the forward and aft flange fillet radii and spotfaced areas must be inspected. (4) Smooth out any nicks or corrosion visible in the forward and aft flange fillet radii and the spotfaced areas, using a fine file and crocus cloth. (b) Remove and replace the support assembly before further flight if cracks are found. Inspect cyclic control rigging in accordance with paragraph 4-30 of the Model 206A Maintenance and Overhaul Instructions when the support assembly is replaced. (c) Remove and replace right- and left-hand magnesium support assemblies with new aluminum support assemblies, P/N 206-001-544, within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD in accordance with the procedures in Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin No. 206A-11 Revision A, dated July 23, 1969, or in accordance with a procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. (d) The inspections in paragraph (a) are no longer required when aluminum bellcrank supports are installed in accordance with paragraph (c). (Bell Model 206A Maintenance and Overhaul Manual Interim Revision No. 206A-69-16 pertains partially to this subject.) This supersedes Amendment 39-746 (34 F.R. 6472), AD 69-07-03. This amendment becomes effective August 16, 1969.
2012-26-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Thielert Aircraft Engines GmbH (TAE) TAE 125-02-99 and TAE 125-02-114 reciprocating engines. This AD requires inspection of the oil filler plug vent hole at the next scheduled maintenance or within 110 flight hours after the effective date of this AD. If chips are found to be blocking the vent hole, additional corrective action is required before next flight. This AD was prompted by an in-flight shutdown of an airplane equipped with a TAE 125-02-99 engine. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown or power loss, possibly resulting in reduced control of the airplane. [[Page 1729]]
98-15-24: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Model S10-V sailplanes. This AD requires replacing the propeller blade suspension forks with parts of improved design. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent propeller suspension fork failure caused by design deficiency, which could result in loss of a propeller blade and loss of sailplane controllability.
2012-26-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (BHTI) Model 205A, 205A-1, and 205B helicopters with certain starter/generator power cable assemblies (power cable assemblies). This AD requires replacing the power cable assemblies and their associated parts, and performing continuity readings. This AD was prompted by the determination that the power cable assembly connector (connector) can deteriorate, causing a short in the connector that may lead to a fire in the starter/generator, smoke in the cockpit that reduces visibility, and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
2012-26-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Burkhart GROB Luft- und Raumfahrt GmbH Models GROB G 109 and GROB G 109B sailplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as corrosion and/or cracking of the elevator control rod that could lead to failure of the elevator control rod with consequent loss of control. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-13-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus airplanes as listed above. This AD requires repetitively inspecting for cracking in the web of nose rib 7 of the inner flap on the wings, and performing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires eventual replacement of nose rib 7 with a new, improved rib, which would terminate the inspections. This AD results from reports of cracking in the web of nose rib 7 of the inner flap. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking in the web of nose rib 7, which could result in rupture of the attachment fitting between the inner flap and flap track 2, and consequent reduced structural integrity of the flap.
59-02-01: 59-02-01 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240 and 340 Aircraft, Serial Numbers 2 Through 188. Compliance required not later than December 31, 1960. Inflight fire experience with the Convair 240 engine nacelle has shown the zone three wheel well area vulnerable to the entrance of fire originating in the forward fire zones. While various improvements have been incorporated to contain fires in the forward zones by AD 56-20- 04, further improvements are necessary to either prevent the entry of fire into the zone three wheel well area or to supplement the requirements of AD 56-04-02 to cover remaining flammable fluid system lines, fittings and components in zone three. To accomplish the above, modifications must be made to the airplane in accordance with either Parts I or II of this airworthiness directive: Part I. Fireproof skin must be installed on the entire circumference of each nacelle from the firewall aft to Station 135 and on the forward portion of the wheel well doors aft to Station 150. Attachment of the skin to the structure must be made with fireproof fasteners. (Convair Service Bulletins 240-466 and 340-170 cover acceptable methods of accomplishing the above.) Part II. (1) Replace all existing nonfireproof flammable fluid system lines and fittings in each zone three wheel well area with similar lines and fittings constructed of fireproof material or otherwise qualified as fireproof. This extends to the following: a. The aircraft hydraulic system supply lines and fittings to the engine driven pump. b. The engine driven pump supply, return and control lines and fittings of those aircraft equipped with an integral oil supply for the cabin supercharger hydraulic system. c. The hydraulic supply lines and fittings from the reservoir to the shutoff valve of those aircraft equipped with a separate tank supply for the cabin supercharger compressor. (2) Provide additional fire protection to those components of flammable fluid systems in each zone three wheel well area as specified below: a. Shroud the fuel system firewall shutoff valve, the fuel strainer and boost pump body with fireproof material. As an alternate, shroud the fuel tank valve and motor with fireproof material, install fire-resistant electrical cable for this component in the wheel well area and revise the emergency procedures on page 42.0.1 of the FAA approved 240 Airplane Flight Manual to require fuel and cross-feed selector valves in the "off" position prior to release of extinguisher agent. Electrical cable complying with Military Specification MIL-C-25038 and appearing on Military Qualified Products List QPL-25038 meets fire-resistant requirements for this application. b. Shroud the firewall shutoff valves for the engine, cabin supercharger and hydraulic oil systems with fireproof materials. c. As an alternate to the fireproof shrouding required by items (2) a. and b., the components specified above maybe qualified as fireproof by test, in which case test proposals shall be submitted to the FAA Regional Office in Los Angeles for approval. In general, this test must subject the component to an enveloping fire of 2000 degrees F. under simulated operating pressure and vibratory conditions of the installation. Shutoff valves must remain operable for a 5-minute period and continue to withstand fire without leakage for an additional 10 minutes. Other components must withstand fire under similar environmental conditions for 15 minutes without leakage.
53-08-02: 53-08-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-6 Series Aircraft (Fuselage Numbers 1 to 213 Inclusive). \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThe following inspections and rework pertain to the center wing lower skin panel and stringers inboard of Station 60 at both sides of the two access doors (fore and aft). The accomplishment of this change is for repair of details which have failed due to fatigue and to make general reinforcement of the affected area. \n\n\t1.\tInspection. \n\n\t\t(a)\tConduct following inspection as soon as practical but not later than the next 50 hours of operation unless already accomplished and continuing thereafter at periodic intervals nearest to 500 flying hours from the time of initial inspection until permanent rework is accomplished as outlined in items (2) and (3). Using at least an 8-power magnifying glass and/or dye check method or equivalent, make inspection for cracks in the door doubler, bottom wing skin and stringers in the area of Station 52 between the front and center spars. If cracks are found in any of these details, make repairs as indicated in item 2 before next scheduled flight. \n\n\t\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found in any of the details mentioned in 1(a) install preventive reinforcements as outlined in item 3. \n\n\t2.\tRepair. \n\n\t\t(a)\tIf a crack is found in the lower skin panel at Station 52 greater than 2 1/2 inches long or if cracked stringers are found in the area of Station 52, make repair and modify the door doubler splice as per Douglas Drawing 5460214. (Refer to Kit A of Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521.) \n\n\tNOTE: This repair must be supplemented by reinforcing remaining areas of rework as outlined in part 3(c). \n\n\t\t(b)\tIf a crack is found in the skin less than 2 1/2 inches long (without stringers being cracked), in the area of Station 52, make repair as per Douglas Drawing 5460328-501. (Refer to Kit F of Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521.) \n\n\tNOTE: This repair must be supplemented by reinforcing remaining areas of rework as outlined in part 3(c). \n\n\t\t(c)\tIf a crack is found in the door doubler only in the area of Station 52, repair per Douglas Drawing 5460328-1. (Refer to Kit E of Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521.) \n\n\tNOTE: This repair must be supplemented by reinforcing remaining areas of rework as outlined in part 3(c). \n\n\t3.\tPreventive Reinforcement. \n\n\t\t(a)\tIf no cracks are found in the area of Station 52 on airplane fuselage Nos. 1-69 install reinforcements to the stringers and door doubler no later than May 1, 1953, as per Drawing 5460275-1 or Douglas Service Bulletin No. 440. (Refer to Kit B of Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521.) \n\n\t\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found in the area of Station 52 on airplane fuselage Nos. 70-213, install reinforcement to the door doubler as per Drawing 5460275-501 no later than September 1, 1953. (Refer to Kits C and D of Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521.) \n\n\t\t(c)\tIf cracks are found by inspection and repaired by reinforcements as outlinedin part 2(a), (b) or (c), these repairs must be supplemented by reinforcing the stringers and/or door doublers at all other areas outlined in 3(a) and (b). This should be accomplished no later than May 1, 1953, on airplanes having fuselage Numbers 1 through 69 and no later than September 1, 1953, or a period not to exceed 1,500 flying hours (whichever occurs first), on airplanes having fuselage numbers 70 to 213 inclusive. Airplanes incorporating local reinforcements shall be given an external inspection at periods not to exceed 35 flying hours in addition to the 500-hour inspection outlined in part 1 (a) until the complete rework has been accomplished. \n\n\t(See Douglas Service Bulletin No. 521 dated May 29, 1952, and Douglas Service Letter No. 128 dated June 27, 1952, for applicable models subject to the above-mentioned reworks.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 52-27-01.
2012-26-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350BA helicopters with certain AERAZUR emergency flotation gear container assemblies installed. This AD requires replacing each affected emergency flotation gear container assembly (container assembly) at specified time limits based on the date of manufacture. This AD was prompted because container assemblies with an intended operating limitation of 10 years may not have been replaced because the limit is no longer recorded in the Maintenance Program. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the emergency container assembly because of age and subsequent damage to the helicopter and injury to the occupants after an emergency water landing.
2004-13-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400D series airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect missing fasteners in the section 42 skin and internal doubler at the cutout for the ground exhaust valve of the electrical equipment; modification and rework of the doubler; repetitive inspections of the skin for cracks; and corrective actions if necessary; as applicable. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the section 42 skin at the cutout for the ground exhaust valve of the electrical equipment, which could result in rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.