Results
69-20-04: 69-20-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-849. Applies to F-27 and FH-227 type airplanes certificated in all categories and incorporating rear passenger door spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, -5, -7, or -9. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide a more positive retention of the passenger door locking mechanism accomplish the following: (a) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-3, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section D(1) through D(8) of Revision 1 of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27 dated June 17, 1969. In place of Step "D(5)", rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (b) For F-27 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with Section E(1) through E(8) of Revision 1- of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-27, dated June 17, 1969. Rig the door mechanism in accordance with Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. F-27-52-19, dated June 17, 1969. (c) For FH-227 type airplanes with spindle, P/N 27-313006-5, 27-313006-7, or 27-313006-9, installed in the door lock mechanism, comply with the "Accomplishment Instructions" of Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin No. FH-227-52-13, dated June 17, 1969. (d) An equivalent alteration approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may be used in lieu of the foregoing methods. (e) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment effective November 3, 1969.
2003-22-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce (RR) plc RB211 Trent 556-61 turbofan engines. This AD requires a gauge inspection of the space between the high pressure (HP) fuel tubes adaptor face and seals, and a gauge inspection of the space between the fuel flow transmitter and seals, for evidence of permanent distortion of the face of the fuel tube connecting flanges, and replacement of parts if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report of fuel leaking from the engine fan cowl during an aircraft taxi. We are issuing this AD to prevent in-flight fuel leaks, which could result in an engine fire.
2020-22-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C1 and AS332L1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that the affected helicopters use the same ''flight/ground'' logic signal, instead of independent redundant signals. This AD requires amending the emergency procedures of the existing rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) for your helicopter, a wiring modification of the ''flight/ground'' logic signal source of the attitude and heading reference system (AHRS) 1, and then removal of the amendment to the existing RFM for your helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-15-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 427 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by the aviation authority of Canada to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. Transport Canada, the aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states that it has been determined that the existing hardware connecting the vertical fin to the tail rotor gearbox needs to be upgraded to prevent the vertical fin from becoming loose. BHTC has received reports of loose vertical fins discovered during inspections. Investigation revealed that the current vertical fin attachment hardware may not provide adequate clamp-up. If not corrected, the vertical fin could become loose and cause vibration, which could lead to subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition.
2020-22-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bell Textron Inc. (Type Certificate previously held by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.) Model 412, 412CF, and 412EP helicopters. This AD requires revising the existing Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) for your helicopter. This AD was prompted by an accident and multiple reports of a cracked main gearbox (MGB) support case. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
67-19-03: 67-19-03 CANADAIR: Amdt. 39-431, Part 39, Federal Register June 6, 1967. Applies to CL-44D4 Type airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. To detect cracks in the horizontal stabilizer front spar web, accomplish the following: (a) For horizontal stabilizers with 13,500 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD inspect in accordance with (c) within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (b) For horizontal stabilizers with less than 13,500 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, inspect in accordance with (c) before the accumulation of 13,525 hours' time in service unless accomplished after the accumulation of 13,275 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (c) Remove the horizontal stabilizer leading edge access panels, P/N 912-2 and P/N 913-2 (Station 52 to 59), and visually inspect the front spar web for cracks from Station 56 to 77, or use an FAA-approved equivalent inspection. If a crack is found comply with (d) before further flight. (d) Repair cracked parts with an FAA-approved repair or replace the cracked part with a part of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with (c) and found free of cracks, or with an FAA-approved equivalent part. (e) The repetitive inspection required by (a) and (b) may be discontinued when the horizontal stabilizer front spar web is modified in accordance with an FAA-approved modification. (f) Equivalent inspections may be approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. Equivalent repairs, parts, and modifications must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (g) Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAAmaintenance inspector, the compliance times specified in this AD may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment effective June 10, 1967.
2003-22-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that currently requires measuring the tail rotor pitch control rod (control rod) outboard spherical bearing (bearing) for radial and axial play. This amendment revises the requirement to measure control rod play. This amendment also adds the Eurocopter France Model AS350B3 helicopter and an additional control rod to the applicability, a daily check of the control rod bearing, a larger axial play limit, a more frequent AD compliance interval, and makes editorial changes for clarification. This amendment is prompted by additional service information and comments resulting in the FAA determination that the inspection interval should coincide with the normal maintenance interval, that the AD should apply to the ECF Model AS350B3 helicopter and an additional control rod, that the daily inspection should be a daily check, and that certain editorial changes are needed for clarification. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the bearing ball from its outer race, rubbing of the body of the control rod against the tail rotor blade pitch horn clevis, failure of the control rod, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
63-20-04: 63-20-04 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 622 Part 507 Federal Register September 26, 1963. Applies to All Models 22 and 22M Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Due to failures of flap actuator screwjacks, accomplish the following: (a) Within 1,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, replace all flap actuator screwjack end cap assemblies P/N 1162D53 and P/N 1162D54, with end cap assemblies reworked to provide additional lateral movement in accordance with General Dynamics/Convair 880 Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-68 dated March 22, 1963, or 880M Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-36 dated March 22, 1963, as applicable, or an FAA, Western Region, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch approved equivalent modification. (b) Within 3,500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, conduct a magnetic particle inspection or an FAA approved equivalent inspection of all flap actuatorscrewjack shafts paying particular attention to the section of the screwjack shaft that is above the main thread. Replace a cracked flap actuator screwjack shaft with an uncracked screwjack shaft before further flight. (General Dynamics/Convair 880 Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-68 dated March 22, 1963, and 880M Alert Service Bulletin No. A27-36 dated March 22, 1963, pertain to this same subject.) This directive effective October 28, 1963.
69-18-01: 69-18-01 BEECH: Amdt. 39-830. Applies to all Model 35, A35, B35 and C35 (Serial Numbers D-1 through D-2900) airplanes equipped with Beech P/N 35-924065 fuel unit. Compliance: Required as indicated. Within the next 100 hours' time-in-service, but not to exceed August 30, 1970, unless already accomplished, accomplish either A or B: A) Replace Beech P/N 35-924065 fuel unit with Beech P/N 35-924230 fuel unit having separate selector valve and pump controls or with any other modification of this portion of the fuel system approved by Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, Central Region, FAA. B) Install Beech fuel selector valve disengagement warning light, Kit No. 35-5030, in accordance with Beech Service Instructions No. 0243-289, or any other modification of this portion of the fuel system approved by the Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, Central Region, FAA. This AD supersedes AD 53-20-02. This amendment becomes effective August 30, 1969.
2020-21-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the vinyl grommets on the upper panel assembly on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) emergency exits becoming rigid after exposure to low temperatures, which could result in failure of the emergency exits to open during an evacuation. This AD requires replacing the grommets. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
76-07-02: 76-07-02 AIR CRUISERS COMPANY: Amendment 39-2564. Applies to emergency evacuation systems having P/Ns 19D22368-2 through -9 inclusive, with serial numbers prior to 161261275, and designed for use on DC-9 aircraft, and to emergency evacuation systems having P/Ns 22D30022-1 through -4 inclusive, with serial numbers prior to 161261275, and designed for use on Convair 240, 340, 440, 580, and 600 aircraft. Compliance is required within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To detect girt bars having material strength below the minimum specified value, accomplish the following: (a) For DC-9 aircraft, comply with paragraph 2 Accomplishment Instructions, of Air Cruisers Company Service Bulletin 114-75-2, dated December 18, 1975, or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (b) For Convair 240, 340, 440, 580 and 600 aircraft, comply with paragraph 2 AccomplishmentInstructions, of Air Cruisers Company Service Bulletin 114-76-1, dated January 12, 1976, or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. This amendment is effective April 6, 1976.
94-04-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 727 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the slat track roller bearing bolts, and replacement, if necessary. This amendment adds an inspection of the positional plates installed on certain airplanes, and replacement, if necessary; reduces the compliance time for the initial inspection; and cites the latest revision to the service bulletin as the appropriate service information source. This amendment is prompted by a report that certain positional plates may not stop rotation of the roller bearing bolts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent jamming of the affected slat or separation of the slat from the airplane.
61-05-04: 61-05-04 HILLER: Amendment 507-261, as amended, is further amended by Amendment 39-1863. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12D and UH-12E helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. To minimize failures of the main transmission: (a) Prior to next flight: (1) Inspect the planet spur gear, bevel ring gear and tail rotor bevel gear shaft for part number and heat treat lot number. NOTE: The heat treat lot number, if any, is etched on the parts. The 1962 series parts do not bear heat treat lot numbers. (2) Remove any planet spur gear, Part No. 23527, that does not have one of the following lot numbers: (i) For Model UH-12D only - 35, 59, 71, 125, 171, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 196, 217, 245, 275, 309 and subsequent prefaced by "VHI", or any number prefaced by "HA". (ii) For Model UH-12E only - 180, 185, 186, 196, 275, 309 and subsequent prefaced by "VHI", or any number prefaced by "HA". (3) Replace with planet spur gears Part No. 1962C171 or 23527-3, or with Part No. 23527 having one of the above heat treat lot numbers specified in subparagraph (a)(2) above. NOTE: Part No. 23527-3 gears must not be intermixed with Part No. 1962C171 or Part No. 23527 gears in the same transmission. (4) Remove any bevel ring gear, Part No. 23528, that does not have one of the following lot numbers - 40, 40R, 277, 279, 286, 288, 293, 293A, 295, 309 and subsequent prefaced by "VHI", or any number prefaced by "HA". (5) Replace with bevel ring gear Part No. 1962D58, 23528-5 or 23633, or with Part No. 23528 having one of the heat treat lot numbers specified in subparagraph (a)(4) above. (6) Remove any tail rotor bevel gear shaft, Part No. 23522, that does not have one of the following lot numbers - 291, 292, 309 and subsequent prefaced by "VHI", or any number prefaced by "HA". (7) Replace with tail rotor bevel gear shaft Part No. 23634-3or 1962D65. NOTE: Airworthiness Directive 64-11-02 applicable to Model UH-12E helicopters further requires the replacement of all tail rotor bevel gear shafts Part Nos. 23522 and 23634 with Part No. 23634-3 within the time period specified in that AD. (8) For any bevel ring gear not replaced in accordance with subparagraph (5) above and any tail rotor bevel gear shaft not replaced in accordance with subparagraph (7) above or AD 64-11-02, inspect for proper gear tooth pattern. NOTE: Refer to earlier transmission overhaul manual for description of acceptable pattern. (9) Replace any bevel ring and tail rotor bevel gear shaft found to have improper gear tooth pattern in accordance with subparagraphs (5) and (7) above. (b) For all Model UH-12D and UH-12E, Serial Numbers 942, 954, and 2001 through 2198, inclusive, accomplish the following prior to next flight and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with paragraph (d) of Airworthiness Directive 62-06-03: (1) Remove and check the oil nozzle orifice, P/N 23607, located at lower right-hand side of main transmission for obstruction. If this nozzle is obstructed, inspect the Borg Warner clutch for evidence of lack of lubrication. If such evidence is found, replace the clutch with a serviceable clutch of the same or FAA-approved equivalent Part Number. (2) Using a piece of 0.020-inch wire, check for obstruction in oil orifices located at forward topside of upper case, forward side of tachometer drive cover, and (if generator is installed on transmission) upper outboard side of generator drive housing. If any of these orifices are found obstructed, inspect the first stage planetary gear system for abnormal wear or overheating. If signs of such wear and/or overheating are noticed, overhaul or replace the first stage planetary system with a serviceable first stage planetary system of the same or FAA-approved equivalent Part Number. (c) For all Model UH-12D and UH-12E Serial Nos. 942, 954 and 2001 through 2198 inclusive, accomplish the following prior to next flight and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 10 hours' (Model UH-12D) or 25 hours' (Model UH-12E) time in service from the last inspection until modified in accordance with paragraph (d) of Airworthiness Directive 62-06-03: Remove, disassemble, and inspect the engine oil filter and transmission oil filter for the presence of metallic particles. If aluminum, bronze, or steel particles are found in either or both of these filters, inspect the first stage planetary system for abnormal wear or overheating. If signs of such wear and/or overheating are noticed, overhaul or replace the first stage planetary system with a serviceable first stage planetary system of the same or FAA-approved equivalent Part Number. (d) Within the next 150 hours' time in service, incorporate Part Nos. 23549-3 and 23549-5 bushings and Part No. 23578 planet gear shafts in the first stage planetary gear system of Model UH-12D helicopters with main transmission Part No. 23500, 23500-3 or 23500-7. This directive Amendment 507-261 became effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated February 21, 1961. Revised May 9, 1961. This amendment 39-1863 becomes effective June 4, 1974.
2020-21-22: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) Models 180, 180A, 180B, 180C, 180D, 180E, 180F, 180G, 180H, 180J, 180K, 182, 182A, 182B, 182C, 182D, 185, 185A, 185B, 185C, 185D, 185E, A185E, and A185F airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks found in the tailcone and horizontal stabilizer attachment structure. This AD requires inspecting the tailcone and horizontal stabilizer for corrosion and cracks and repairing or replacing damaged parts as necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-21-08: 77-21-08 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3062 as amended by Amendment 39-3129. Applies to BAC 1-11 airplanes certificated in all categories incorporating auxiliary fuel tanks per supplemental type certificate SA2971WE. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent possible fuel leakage into the cargo compartment which may result in a fire or explosion accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight after the effective date of this AD, do not add fuel to the auxiliary fuel tanks installed per STC SA2971WE. (b) Within 12 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, accomplish either (1) or (2): (1) Deactivate the auxiliary fuel system as follows: (i) Purge all auxiliary fuel tanks. (ii) Close all auxiliary fuel tanks and fuel vent valves. (iii) Disconnect auxiliary tank electrical connectors and secure wiring. (iv) Pull all auxiliary fuel tank circuit breakers in thecockpit to the off position and lock out with a positive device. (v) Make entry in the log book. (vi) Placard cockpit auxiliary fuel panel inoperative. NOTE: National Aircraft Leasing Report TA 4-2 dated September 1, 1977 is an acceptable procedure for deactivation. (2) Remove the auxiliary fuel system in accordance with National Aircraft Leasing Report NA 3-1060 dated September 5, 1975. (c) Equivalent procedures and modifications may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (d) The limitation required by Paragraph (a) may be removed and the deactivation or removal required by Paragraph (b) may be reactivated or reinstalled, after the auxiliary fuel system is modified in accordance with National Aircraft Leasing Service Bulletin TA-4-8 Revision "A" dated November 22, 1977 or later FAA approved revision. Amendment 39-3062 became effective November 25, 1977 for all persons except those to whom it was madeeffective by telegram dated September 2, 1977, which contained this amendment. This amendment 39-3129 becomes effective January 31, 1978.
2003-22-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Aerostar Aircraft Corporation (Aerostar) Models PA-60-600, PA-60-601, PA-60-601P, PA-60-602P, and PA-60-700P airplanes that incorporate supplemental type certificate (STC) SA1608NM (Machen Inc. Kit No. 76-1 Auxiliary Fuel Tank). This AD requires you to repetitively inspect all auxiliary fuel transfer pumps for leaks, seeping, or any sign of staining. This AD also requires you to replace any pump found with leaks, seeping, and any sign of staining. This AD is the result of reports of fuel leaking from the fuel transfer pumps installed below the auxiliary fuel tank. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct leaks in the auxiliary fuel transfer pumps, which could result in fire or explosion in the cargo/passenger compartment. Such a condition could result in loss of the airplane.
2009-15-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During scheduled maintenance inspection, a bolt which connects the PCU (power control unit) to the elevator surface was found fractured in the assembly. Further inspection of the assembly revealed that the bearing on the PCU rod end had seized, which resulted in damage to the attachment fitting bushing and fracture of the bolt. Inspection of other in-service airplanes revealed two more seized PCU attachment joints. However, except seizure, no fractured bolt was found on these airplanes. Failure of the bolts in both PCUs on one side could result in disconnection of the elevator control surface which would lead to flutter and loss of the aircraft.* * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-21-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, and SA- 365N1 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor gearbox (TGB) housing recess, and depending on the inspection results, performing more in-depth inspections and removing certain parts from service. This AD also prohibits installing a TGB unless it has passed certain inspections and has a new TGB control rod bearing installed. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a foreign object obstructing the oil duct of a TGB control bearing. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2009-14-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following the discovery of hot air leaks when operating the wing anti-icing system. The seals Part Number (P/N) MS29513-325, near the de-icing valves (12H1) and (12H2) in frame 33 area, do not have the proper temperature rating. The consequences, in the area of the hot air leak, are risks of ignition of potential hydraulic leaks. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
93-24-02 R1: 93-24-02 R1 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8810 which revises Amendment 39-8751. Docket No. 93-CE-57-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: PA31, PA31P, and PA31T series airplanes (all models and serial numbers), certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 30 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent elevator control problems, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tEnsure that the elevator control tube assembly area is not damaged by accomplishing the following inspections and procedures: \n\n\t\t(1)\tGain access to the elevator controls in the tail by removing the bottom half of the tailcone and the fuselage side panels. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the long pushrod that connects the bellcrank and the elevator horn. \n\n\t\t(3)\tSecure the aft end of the bungee link to the elevator horn with safety wire for removal and installation of the bungee attach bolt.(4)\tInspect, using FAA-approved magnetic procedures, the rod end shank and threads for cracks. If found cracked, prior to further flight, replace the rod end with part number (P/N) 49261-02 or P/N 452-658. \n\n\t\t(5)\tVisually inspect the bearing in the rod end for wear and free movement. If wear is found or the bearing will not move, prior to further flight, replace the rod end with P/N 49261-02 or P/N 452-658. \n\n\t\t(6)\tInspect, using a 10X magnifying glass, the forward attach holes in the pushrod for cracks, corrosion, or elongation. If cracks, corrosion, or elongation is found, prior to further flight, replace the pushrod with P/N 40847-00, 40847-04, or 40847-07, as applicable. \n\n\t\t(7)\tVisually inspect the forward and aft attach area to ensure that both a forward bolt, P/N 402 311 (AN 174-12A), and an aft bolt, P/N 402 317 (AN 174-11A), are installed. If either one of these bolts is not installed, prior to further flight, install the applicable bolt or replace the existing boltwith one of the applicable part number. \n\n\t\t(8)\tRemove the safety wire, reinstall the pushrod, check to ensure that the elevator rigging is correct, and reinstall the bottom half of the tailcone and the fuselage side panels. \n\n\tNOTE 1: Figure 1 of this AD illustrates the elevator assembly and the specific areas that are to be inspected. \n\n\t(b)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tInformation related to this AD may be examined at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment (39-8810) revises AD 93-24-02, Amendment 39-8751. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on February 15, 1994. \n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t93-24-02 \n\n\t\t\t\t\t FIGURE 1
2009-14-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An inspection of a PZL-104 aeroplane that had a relatively long operational background revealed a severe corrosion of the steel front fuselage structural elements. It is likely that such corrosion can also be present on other aeroplanes of similar design and operational history. If left uncorrected, this condition could lead to loss of strength of the structural front posts elements and consequent reduction of the structural strength of the aeroplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 12, 2009. On August 12, 2009, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of PZL-104 Wilga 80 Maintenance Manual, pages 5-4 and 25-10, dated April 7, 2009, listed in this AD. As of May 18, 2009 (74 FR 18979; April 27, 2009), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of EADS- PZL "Warszawa-Ok]cie'' S.A. Mandatory Bulletin No. 10409036, dated March 18, 2009, listed in this AD.
2009-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: P&WC has determined that the Post-Service Bulletin (SB) PW300- 72-24287 High Pressure Compressor (HPC) drum rotor assemblies P/N 30B2478 and 30B2542 on PW 305A and 305B engines with single stage coated labyrinth seals, are susceptible to developing significant cracks in the region of the labyrinth seal. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks in the HPC drum rotor assembly, which could lead to an uncontained failure of the drum rotor assembly and damage to the airplane.
2020-21-19: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-24- 11, which applied to certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 900EX airplanes. AD 2019-24-11 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD continues to require those maintenance or inspection program revisions, and also requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate additional new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
95-01-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Terra Corporation TRT 250 series transponders, that requires removing the transponder from the aircraft, inspecting it to determine if the AD applies, and replacing any affected transponder with a modified Terra Corporation transponder or another transponder that responds properly to Mode S interrogations from both an Air Traffic Control Radio Beacon System (ATCRBS)/Mode S ground station and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II airborne equipment. This amendment is prompted by FAA tests that show that the transponder does not respond properly to certain interrogations by a Mode S or TCAS II signal. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the transponder to respond properly to Mode S interrogations from both Mode S ground stations and TCAS II airborne equipment, which could result in loss of airspace separation.
82-16-12: 82-16-12 BELL: Amendment 39-4431. Applies to Bell Model 206 helicopters with Chadwick C-22 Auxiliary Fuel System installed per Supplemental Type Certificate SH139WE. Compliance is required as indicated. To provide early warning of auxiliary fuel transfer pump malfunction and the associated decrease in usable auxiliary fuel, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: 1. Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, install a placard, in accordance with Chadwick Service Bulletin 20-81-01 dated October 6, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent limiting usable auxiliary fuel to half the amount in the auxiliary tanks at takeoff. 2. Within 300 hours time-in-service or 6 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, install the C-22-FM Flow Monitoring Kit in accordance with Chadwick Service Bulletin 20-81-01 dated October 6, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent. The placard installed per item 1 above may be removed, provided the revisedFlight Manual Supplement, Chadwick Auxiliary Fuel System C-22, dated October 21, 1981, is incorporated in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual. 3. Alternate modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 4. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation Part 21, Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to operate each helicopter to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective September 1, 1982.