Results
2002-14-17: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) (Eurocopter) Model EC135 helicopters, that currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and a one-time dye-penetrant inspection of a certain main rotor hub shaft (shaft) for cracks, and replacement of any cracked shafts. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD, but corrects the shaft part number (P/N) in the current AD, includes additional P/N's, increases the area of inspection from a 40mm area to a 50mm area of the shaft, and provides an option for using either a visual or dye-penetrant inspection to satisfy the repetitive inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by the need to correct the shaft part number and increase the area of inspection, as well as add additional affected shaft P/N's. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect fatigue cracks in the shaft that could lead to shaft failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
73-12-03 R1: 73-12-03 R1 ROLLS ROYCE LTD: Amendment 39-1652 as amended by Amendment 39-4277. Applies to Rolls-Royce DART engine models 542-10, 542-10J, and 542-10K which do not have Rolls-Royce, Ltd., Modification No. 1681 and Modification No. 1768 incorporated, as installed on, but not limited to, NAMC YS-11 airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To detect engine mounting foot cracks, and engine mounting foot stud fractures, looseness, and loose nuts, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, or within 400 hours time in service since the last inspection, whichever occurs sooner, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400 hours time in service since the last inspection, inspect engine top mounting feet which do not incorporate Modification 1681 and side mounting feet which do not incorporate Modification 1768 for cracks and the mounting feet studs for fracture, looseness, and loose nuts, in accordancewith Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin Da72-384, Revision 2, dated September 1979. (b) If any engine mounting feet are found cracked or any engine mounting feet studs are found to have loose nuts, or to be loose or fractured during an inspection required by paragraph (a), before further flight, repair in accordance with Rolls Royce Service Bulletin Da72-384 Revision 2, dated September 1979 or an FAA- approved equivalent. NOTE: Rolls-Royce DART Service Bulletins Da72-411 and Da72-444 concern Modification No. 1681 and Modification No. 1768, respectively. Amendment 39-1652 became effective July 1, 1973. This amendment 39-4277 becomes effective December 10, 1981.
2016-20-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the aft pressure bulkhead is subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead web for any cracking, incorrectly drilled fastener holes, and elongated fastener holes; and related investigative and corrective actions, if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead web at the ''Y''-chord, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane and rapid decompression of the fuselage.
59-08-02: 59-08-02\tBOEING: Applies to all Model 707-100 Series Aircraft with Bendix Flux Gate Compass system. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tReports have indicated that excessive indicator errors can be introduced in the Bendix remote compass system when it is in the slaving mode and when the aircraft is exposed to wing oscillations resulting from rough air, spoiler operation, etc. As an interim safety measure pending further investigation and development by the manufacturer of an improved Bendix flux valve installation, the following aircraft operating limitation is required for all aircraft incorporating the Bendix system: \n\tWhenever heading information is required by the pilots, the two Bendix systems (two RMI and two CDI indicators) should be frequently checked against each other and against the magnetic standby compass to detect obvious errors in indication. This information must be included, within the next 10 hours' flight time, on a placard adjacent to the RMI and CDI indicators until an approved Airplane Flight Manual revision covering this subject is available. The foregoing limitation does not apply to aircraft in which the magnetic sensing device (flux gate) is installed in the fuselage body by the manufacturer or installed in accordance with Boeing 707 Service Bulletin No. 587 "Bendix Compass System Flux Gate Relocation," which describes a satisfactory and approved means of mounting the flux valves.
52-14-01: 52-14-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6, DC-6A and DC-6B Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers Except as Otherwise Indicated. \n\n\tItems I and II are to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than August 1, 1952, and shall be completed no later than August 1, 1953. \n\n\tI.\tIn order to prevent inadvertent actuation of the propeller reversing solenoid valves, protect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other electrical circuits and protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other. This is to be accomplished in accordance with attachment A and the following instructions which pertain to some of the specific features to be considered in isolation of the reversing circuits from other circuits. Other features which are not specifically referred to in this list shall be treated in an equivalent manner: \n\n\t\tA.\tModify the following multiple pin connector assemblies as specified in item 2 of attachment A (See AD 52-13-02 Lockheed for Attachment A): \n\n\t\t\t1.\tFirewall connector (if the reversing solenoid lead has not already been removed). \n\n\t\t\t2.\tConnector at the front of the control pedestal. \n\n\t\t\t3.\tConnector at Hamilton Standard relay box (if used). \n\n\t\tB.\tModify the following terminal strips as specified in item 1 of Attachment A: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tFirewall junction box terminal strip (if used). \n\n\t\t\t2.\tTerminal strip at synchronizer compartment (if used). \n\n\t\t\t3.\tTerminal strip within propeller control box located behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\tC.\tProtect the following exposed terminals as specified in item 1(c) of Attachment A: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tExposed terminals at secondary throttle lock relays located behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\t\t2.\tExternal A2 and A3 terminals on "C" relays in propeller control box behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\tD.\tHamilton Standard reversing relay box (if used): Reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., to be shielded from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits shall be so installed that it will not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors on any two relay boxes. \n\n\t\tE.\tPressure seal disconnect: Modify in one of the following ways: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tBypass the pressure seal by using continuous wiring. \n\n\t\t\t2.\tProvide a separate connector for the reversing solenoid lead. \n\n\t\t\t3.\tPins adjacent to the reversing solenoid pins shall be deactivated or used only in circuits which cannot provide sufficient energy to activate the reversing solenoid or circuits which are energized only when reversing is desired. Also, provide an insulating shield for the reversing solenoid pins on both sides of the pressure seal. The reversing solenoid wire shall be secured to this shield or in some equivalent manner to prevent the wire from falling free in casethe terminal pin comes out of the socket. \n\n\t\t\t4.\tIsolate the solenoid valve lead insert on both sides of the seal by covering both the socket and the wire terminal with insulation which will cover all exposed metal parts when the wire is in place, when the wire terminal has come out of the socket, or when the wire is broken at any point up to the point at which it is secured in the bundle. The nature of the insulation or the provisions for securing it in place must be such that its installation will not be overlooked during maintenance. \n\n\t\tF.\tReversing solenoid circuit wiring: Modify in accordance with item 4 of attachment A. \n\n\t\tG.\tOther circuit modifications: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tAll airplanes with fuselage numbers below 233 shall be modified to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 221. \n\n\tII.\tReverse solenoid lock assembly: \n\n\t\tA.\tComply with Douglas Service Bulletin DC-6, NO. 356, dated March 9, 1949, to prevent excessive deflection of lock assembly components.B.\tThe "Reverse operable" warning device shall be clearly visible when the lock is open just a sufficient amount to permit pulling the throttles into the reverse regime. \n\n\tIII.\tMaintenance practices (to be instituted not later than August 1, 1952): \n\n\t\tA.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tInspect all points specified in items IB, IC, and IE. These inspections may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in item E1 or E2; item 1A or 1B of attachment A and item 2A or 2B of attachment A. \n\n\t\tB.\tAt any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to bereplaced as necessary. \n\n\t\tC.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operations of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. \n\n\t\tD.\tConduct the mechanical functional test specified in AD 50-16-01 at each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours. \n\n\tIV.\tOperating instructions: Comply with item 5 of attachment A. \n\n\tV.\t(NOTE: Propeller governor design changes, which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass tosafeguard against inadvertent reversing and ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
2024-17-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking on the radius of the rib 0 forward longeron at a certain frame. This AD requires a one-time inspection for defects of the radius, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-16-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A330-243, -302, -343, and -941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that a certain aft bulkhead cover panel may have been made with a non-conforming material. This AD requires replacing the aft bulkhead cover panel and prohibits the installation of affected parts, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-21-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) [[Page 71592]] Model S-92A helicopters. This AD requires altering the fire bottle inertia switch wiring and performing a cartridge functional test of the fire extinguishing system. This AD was prompted by the inadvertent tripping of inertia-switches that has led to unintentional discharging of the fire bottles, leaving the helicopter's auxiliary power unit and engines without fire protection. The actions are intended to prevent unintentional and undetected fire bottle discharges and subsequent unavailability of fire suppression in case of a fire.
53-03-01: 53-03-01 NAVION: Applies to All Model B Aircraft Equipped With Hartzell HC-12 X20-8C/9333C-0 Propellers. Compliance required not later than March 15, 1953. Vibration tests conducted subsequent to the initial tests of the Hartzell HC-12 X20- 8C/9333C-0 propeller installed on the Lycoming GO-435 engine revealed vibration characteristics of a hazardous nature. Therefore, to prevent possible blade cracks and/or failures, the existing r.p.m. restriction placard should be revised as follows: "Avoid continuous ground operation between 1675 and 2150 engine r.p.m."
2024-19-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain DG Aviation GmbH (type certificate previously held by DG Flugzeugbau GmbH) Model DG-400 gliders and all Model DG-500 Elan Orion, DG-500 Elan Trainer, DG-500/20 Elan, DG-500/22 Elan, DG-500M, DG-500MB, DG-800A, DG-800B, DG-808C, DG-1000M, DG-1000S, and DG-1000T gliders. This AD was prompted by a report of a broken rod end at the upper end of the elevator pushrod in the fin (vertical tail) of a DG Aviation GmbH Model DG-300 glider. Depending on the glider model, this AD requires revising your existing glider maintenance manual to incorporate new procedures for elevator control circuit free play adjustment, performing an operational check of the free play adjustment of the automatic elevator hook-up, accomplishing corrective actions as required, and replacing the elevator pushrod end with a new part. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-20-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, -200, and -300 series airplanes; and Airbus Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fuel leaking through fuel pump electrical connectors and of fuel pump electrical connector damage caused by the build-up of moisture behind the electrical connectors. This AD requires an inspection of the fuel pumps to identify their part numbers and replacement of affected pumps. We are issuing this AD to prevent a potential ignition source and a fuel leak through damaged fuel pump electrical connectors, which creates a flammability risk in an area adjacent to the fuel tank.
2016-20-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B64/P2, -1B67/P2, -1B70/P2, -1B70C/ P2, -1B70/75/P2, and -1B74/75/P2 turbofan engines with engine assembly, part number (P/N) 2447M10G01 or P/N 2447M10G02, installed. This AD was prompted by a report of a significant fan rub event. This AD requires rework of the engine fan stator module assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the fan blades and the load reduction device, loss of power to one or more engines, loss of thrust control, and loss of the airplane.
65-17-02: 65-17-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Amdt. 39-112 Part 39 Federal Register August 3, 1965. Applies to Model C-46 Series Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent further erroneous indication by the landing gear position warning light that the landing gear is down and locked, accomplish the following: Modify the gear position warning light system by providing a separate position indication circuit and separate green light or other equivalent indicator for the "down and locked" position for each of the three landing gears in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. This directive effective September 2, 1965.
2004-05-01 R1: The FAA is revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-05-01, which applies to certain Bombardier Inc. (formerly deHavilland Inc.) Model Otter DHC-3 airplanes that have turbine engines installed per one of three supplemental type certificates (STC). AD 2004-05-01 currently prohibits you from operating any affected airplane with these engine and propeller configurations unless a new STC for an elevator servo-tab with a redundant control linkage is installed. The FAA has since evaluated concerns, comments, and technical information related to all three STC configurations. Based on that evaluation, we have determined that further evaluation is necessary for the STCs owned by Texas Turbines Conversions, Inc., and Canada Turbine Conversions, Inc. Therefore, we are removing reference to these STCs from the AD, and the AD will only apply to those Bombardier Inc. airplanes that incorporate STC No. SA3777NM (A.M. Luton installation of Pratt and Whitney PT6A-34/ -135 engine). After further evaluation, we may initiate rulemaking action regarding airplanes with the Texas Turbines Conversions, Inc., and Canada Turbine Conversions, Inc., STC configurations. DATES: This AD becomes effective on May 25, 2004. On April 20, 2004 (69 FR 9523, March 1, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation. We must receive any comments on this AD by June 29, 2004.
2009-05-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model CL-215-6B11 (CL-215T variant) and CL-215-6B11 (CL-415 variant) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for contamination of grease, bearing wear checks, grease applications of the rudder lower torque tube upper bearing, and a rudder upper hinge gap check; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of corrosion on the rudder lower torque tube upper bearing. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corroded bearings which could lead to hinge deformation, and could result in a rudder jam and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-08-14: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glasflugel Models Mosquito and Club Libelle 205 sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the rudder actuator arm with an improved design rudder actuator arm. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent the rudder attachment actuator arm from failing due to ground handling damage. This failure could eventually result in reduced or loss of sailplane control.
2004-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections of the transfer pipe assembly installation for the tail tank for damage and cracks, and corrective action, if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct damage and cracks to the transfer pipe assembly installation for the tail tank, which could result in fuel leakage and possible ignition. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
70-23-04: 70-23-04 AEROSTAR: Amdt. 39-1109 as amended by Amendment 39-1270. Applies to Model 600 and 601 airplanes, Serial Numbers 60-0001 through 60-0056 and 61-0001 through 61-0070. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the wing flap tracks, jamming of the ailerons and possible loss of lateral control, accomplish the following: a. Before further flight after the effective date of this AD, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repair can be performed: (1) Install wing flap speed placard in accordance with Aerostar Service Bulletin No. 600-22A, dated August 12, 1970, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southwest Region, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas. (2) Inspect flap tracks in accordance with Aerostar Service Bulletin 600-22A, dated August 12, 1970, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and ManufacturingBranch, Southwest Region, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas. (3) If cracks are found, repair before further flight in accordance with Parts II, III and IV of Aerostar Service Bulletin 600-23, dated November 4, 1970, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southwest Region, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas. b. At the next annual inspection, or within the next 100 hours' time in service, whichever comes first after the effective date of this AD, install Aerostar Kit No. SB 600-23-1 in accordance with Aerostar Service Bulletin No. 600-23, dated November 4, 1970, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Southwest Region, FAA, Fort Worth, Texas. NOTE: Additional holes must be drilled in the wing mount brackets (wing fairing rib) in accordance with Drawing No. A200094 before accomplishing item III A of SB 600-23. c. When the modification has been incorporated, the placard required by paragraph (a)above may be removed. Amendment 39-1109 became effective to all known owners of Aerostar Model 600 and 601 airplanes upon receipt of individual copies mailed November 6, 1970 and to all other persons on November 16, 1970. This Amendment 39-1270 becomes effective August 23, 1971.
2021-11-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T1, EC135T2, EC135T2+, and EC135T3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of increased control force in the collective axis. This AD requires a one-time visual inspection of the main rotor actuator (MRA), as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-14-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A- 3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, and MBB-BK 117 C-1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of sudden severe vibrations and a cracked open blade trailing edge caused by a loosened lead inner weight. This AD requires inspections to determine if any bolted main rotor blades are installed, and replacement of the affected main rotor blades. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-08-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146-100A and -200A series airplanes, that requires an inspection to determine the part number of the inner links of the side stays for the main landing gear (MLG), and replacement of the inner links with new parts, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent the failure of the MLG, which could result in damage to the airplane structure or injury to airplane occupants. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2004-08-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-300 series airplanes, that requires a general visual inspection for clearance between the corners of the A1 galley and the aft pressure bulkhead, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires modification of the A1 galley. This action is necessary to prevent interference of the A1 galley with the radial stiffener on the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in fatigue crack propagation. Fatigue crack propagation could lead to possible rapid decompression of the airplane or to damage and/or interference with the airplane control systems that pass through the bulkhead and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2019-24-16: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-16- 08, which applied to certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-100 STD, -100 LR, -100 IGW, and -100 ECJ airplanes; and Model ERJ 190-200 STD, -200 LR, and -200 IGW airplanes. AD 2017-16-08 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD also adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by the FAA's determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-08-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-IV series airplanes. For certain airplanes, this AD requires installation of an additional indicator located on the pilot's instrument panel in primary view of the flightcrew. The indicator will inform the flightcrew that the airplane main batteries are powering the direct current (DC) essential bus, which supplies power to vital communication and navigation equipment. For certain other airplanes, this AD will require the EICAS (Engine Instruments/Caution Advisory System) to be used for this indication. This action is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is aware that an electrical system failure has occurred and that the airplane main batteries are powering the essential DC bus. If the flightcrew is unaware of this situation, action to stop depletion of the airplane batteries will not be taken, and critical communications and navigation equipment could fail. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2016-20-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900 and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that certain fastener locations in the window corner surround structure are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking in certain fastener locations in the window corner surround structure, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking around certain fastener locations that could cause multiple window corner skin cracks, which could result in rapid decompression and consequent loss of structural integrity of the airplane.