Results
86-05-04: 86-05-04 BOEING: Amendment 39-5249. Applies to Model 737-100, -200, and -300 airplanes, as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25A1182, Revision 2, dated November 12, 1985, certificated in any category. To correct aft door emergency opening characteristics, accomplish the following within 6 months after the effective date of this amendment, unless previously accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tInstall escape slide cover restraining straps in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25A1182, Revision 2, Part II, dated November 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tNOTE: Installation of escape slide cover restraining straps in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-25A1182, Revision 1, dated September 24, 1985, is equivalent to such installation in accordance with Revision 2 of that service bulletin, and constitutes compliance with this paragraph. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this amendment who have not already received the appropriate service bulletin from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This service bulletin may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective April 11, 1986.
2018-23-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model DHC-8-102, -103, and -106 airplanes; Model DHC- 8-200 series airplanes; and Model DHC-8-300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a certain modification to the auto relight system is incompatible with a certain beta lockout system modification and could result in de-activation of the auto ignition feature of the No. 2 engine. This AD requires an inspection of the auto ignition system and applicable rectification. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-06-10: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 91-14-14, which currently requires repetitively inspecting the main landing gear (MLG) "A" frame assemblies for cracks on Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Model 76 airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech Model 76 airplanes), and replacing any assembly found cracked. AD 91-14-14 resulted from reports of fatigue cracks developing on the MLG "A" frame assemblies of the affected airplanes. Raytheon has developed improved design MLG "A" frame assemblies, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has determined that Model 76 airplanes with an improved design "A" frame assembly installed on both the left and right MLG should be exempt from AD 91-14-14. This action retains the requirement of repetitively inspecting the MLG "A" frame assemblies for cracks and replacing any cracked "A" frame assembly only for those Model 76 airplanes that do not have the improved design parts installed. The actions specified by this ADare intended to prevent MLG failure because of a cracked "A" frame assembly, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
2019-02-04: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-22-05, which applied to Engine Alliance (EA) GP7270, GP7272, and GP7277 turbofan engines with a certain high-pressure turbine (HPT) case installed. AD 2018-22-05 required removal of affected HPT stator cases (HPT cases) from service and their replacement with a part eligible for installation. This AD retains these requirements, reduces the compliance times for the removal and replacement of certain HPT cases, and identifies additional affected parts that must be removed and replaced. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility involving unapproved welds on HPT cases. Subsequent additional findings suggested the need for an updated risk analysis, resulting in reduced compliance times for those parts and the identification of additional affected parts. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-21-02: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 Rough Field Version (RFV) series airplanes, that currently requires inspection of the main landing gear (MLG) legs to determine if parts are missing or damaged, and modification, if necessary; and periodic measurements of the extension of each MLG shock absorber sliding member. That AD also provides for the accomplishment of a certain modification as optional terminating action for the periodic measurements. This amendment requires accomplishment of the previously optional terminating action, and revises the applicability of the existing AD to add an airplane model. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of the MLG sliding member, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the MLG.
2019-02-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2018-16-07, which applied to certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx turbofan engines. AD 2018-16-07 required removal and replacement of affected high-pressure turbine (HPT) stator cases (HPT cases). This AD retains those requirements, but reduces certain compliance times. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a quality escape at a manufacturing facility and a determination that the compliance time for the removal and replacement of certain HPT cases must be reduced. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
87-22-01 R1: 87-22-01 R1 BEECH: Amendment 39-5748 as revised by Amendment 39-6312. \n\n\tApplicability: Models 65, 65-80, A65, A65-8200, 70, 65-A80, 65-A80-8800, 65-B80, 65-88, 65-90, 65-A90, 65-A90-1, 65-A90-2, 65-A90-3, 65-A90-4 and B90 (all serial numbers (S/N)); C90 and C90A (S/N LJ-502 through LJ-1190); E90, H90, F90, 100, A100, B100, 99, 99A, A99A, B99 and C99 (all S/N); 200 and B200 (S/N BB-2 through BB-1314); 200C, 200CT, 200T, A200, A200C, A200CT, B200C, B200CT and B200T (all S/N); 300 (S/N FA-1 through FA-168 and FF-1 through FF-19); 1900 (all S/N); 1900C (S/N UB-1 through UB-74 and UC-1 through UC-78) airplanes certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the nose landing gear (NLG) fork due to undetected fatigue cracking, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 200 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours TIS for airplanes in the 65 Series, 70 Series, 80 Series, 99 Series and 1900 Series, and 150 hours TIS for airplanes in the 90 Series, 100 Series, 200 Series and 300 Series, inspect the NLG fork using fluorescent penetrant method in accordance with the instructions in Part II of Beech Service Bulletin No. 2102, Revision I, dated May 1987, or Revision II dated April 1988, or Revision III, dated June 1989. \n\n\tNOTE 1:\tInspection for slippage of the NLG fork collar on the strut tube per Part I of the Service Bulletin is recommended but not required by this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf no cracks are found, the airplane may be returned to service. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf a crack is detected at the tip of the weld, is not more than 0.75 inches in length, and does not branch out into the unwelded tube wall (See Figure 1 or Figure 2 as applicable), thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours TIS, inspect the NLG fork per paragraph (a) above until replacement with a serviceable part.The replacement part is immediately subject to the conditions of this AD, except as provided by paragraph (b), below. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf a crack is detected that exceeds the limits of paragraph (a)(2), prior to further flight replace the NLG fork with a serviceable part. The replacement part is immediately subject to the conditions of this AD, except as provided by paragraph (b) below. \n\n\t(b)\tThe repetitive inspections of this AD are no longer required if an improved nose landing gear fork Kit No. 101-8030-1S (except 1900 Series) or Kit No. 144-8015-1S (for 1900 Series) is installed. \n\n\t(c)\tAirplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tAn alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone 316-946-4400.NOTE 2:\tThe request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, at the above address. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Beech Aircraft Corporation, Commercial Service, Department 52, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085; or may examine these documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. \n\n\tThis amendment revises AD 87-22-01, Amendment 39-5748, which became effective on November 30, 1987. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6312, AD 87-22-01 R1) becomes effective on September 30, 1989.
2006-07-22: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Model Avro 146-RJ airplanes. This AD requires modifying the control cable duct on the left bulkhead structure at frame 12, and, for certain airplanes, the forward toilet bulkhead structure. This AD results from a structural analysis by the manufacturer that revealed that rapid decompression of the flight compartment with the door closed could cause structural deformation of the left bulkhead structure at frame 12, and of the attached cable duct structure. The duct structure protects the cables for the primary flight controls. We are issuing this AD to prevent deformation of the cable duct structure in the event of a rapid decompression, which could result in restriction of the primary flight controls and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
87-10-12: 87-10-12 PARTENAVIA COSTRUZIONE AERONAUTICHE, S.p.A.: Amendment 39-5614. Applies to Models P 68, P 68B, P 68C (Serial Numbers (S/N) 1 through 250), and P 68C-TC (S/N's 300-1TC through 300-22TC) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible loss of control and structural failure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, and each 100 hours TIS thereafter, visually and tactilely (by touch) inspect the composite leading edge wing ribs for cracking, and the composite wing leading edge for debonding from the ribs of both wings using the procedure and locally fabricated tool described in the "INSTRUCTIONS" section of Partenavia Service Bulletin (S/B) No. 67, Revision 1, dated November 5, 1986. (The tool is used to exert force on the ribs to check for lack of stiffness by tactile inspection.) If a crack or debonding is found,prior to further flight, remove the wing leading edge and repair the cracks or debonds as described by the repair "INSTRUCTIONS" in Partenavia Service Information (SI) No. 21, dated August 30, 1985. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (c) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; Telephone 513.38.30, extension 2710/2711. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document(s) referred to herein upon request to Partenavia Costruzione Aeronautiche, S.p.A., via Cava, Naples, Italy; or may examine the document(s) referred to herein at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment 39-5614 becomes effective on June 1, 1987.
86-07-03: 86-07-03 BOEING AND LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-5276. Applies to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce RB211-524 engines, and all Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, certificated in any category. To prevent loss of throttle control caused by an unstowed left rear fan cowl door support, accomplish the following within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished:\n\n\tA.\tModify the fan cowl support strut stowage mechanism in accordance with Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin RB211-71-7254, Revision 1, dated December 7, 1984.\n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, for Boeing Model 747 airplanes; or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, for Lockheed Model L-1011 airplanes.\n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD.\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124; the Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520; or from Service Modification Engineer, RB211 Propulsion Systems, Rolls-Royce Limited, P.O. Box 31, Derby, England. These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington; or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 10, 1986.
88-04-02: 88-04-02 PRATT & WHITNEY: Amendment 39-5817. Applies to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 turbofan engines. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent low pressure turbine (LPT) case penetration as a result of anti-rotation pin failures, accomplish the following: (a) Radiographic isotope inspect LPT cases installed in JT8D-200 series turbofan engines that incorporate Tinidur (AMS 5637) anti-rotation pins. Engines with new or refurbished (in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of paragraph 2.A.(2)(a) of PW service bulletin (SB) 5751, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1987) LPT case assemblies that have incorporated PW SB 5711, Revision 3, dated April 1, 1987, and have been concurrently assembled with new LPT third stage vane anti-rotation pins (Tinidur or Inco 901), are not required to meet the initial and repetitive inspection requirements of this paragraph. Engines requiring the inspection mustbe inspected in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions contained in PW Alert SB 5753, Revision 2, dated December 11, 1987, in accordance with the following schedule: (1) PW JT8D-209 engine LPT cases with 9,300 total cycles in service (CIS) or more on the effective date of this AD; inspect within 2,500 CIS from the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (2) PW JT8D-209 engine LPT cases with less than 9,300 total CIS on the effective date of this AD; inspect before the accumulation of 9,300 total CIS, or within 2,500 CIS from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (3) PW JT8D-217 engine LPT cases with 7,300 total CIS or more on the effective date of this AD; inspect within 700 CIS from the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (4) PW JT8D-217 engine LPT cases with less than 7,300 total CIS on the effective date of this AD; inspect before the accumulation on 7,300 total CIS, or within 700 CIS from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (5) PW JT8D-217A engine LPT cases with 3,300 total CIS or more on the effective date of this AD; inspect within 900 CIS from the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (6) PW JT8D-217A engine LPT cases with less than 3,300 total CIS on the effective date of this AD; inspect before the accumulation of 3,300 total CIS, or within 900 CIS from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (7) PW JT8D-217C/-219 engine LPT cases with 4,200 total CIS or more on the effective date of this AD; inspect within 1,000 cycles from the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. (8) PW JT8D-217C/-219 engine LPT cases with less than 4,200 total CIS on the effective date of this AD; inspect before the accumulation of 4,200 total CIS, or within 1,000 CIS from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, reinspect in accordance with the requirements of the table below. THIRD STAGE ANTI-ROTATION PIN REINSPECTION TABLE Number of fractured, missing, or bent pins Maximum CIS until reinspection JT8D-209 JT8D-217/-217A/-217C/ -219 0 7,000 1,700 1 6,640 1,610 2 6,280 1,525 3 5,920 1,440 4 5,560 1,350 5 5,200 1,265 6 4,840 1,180 7 4,480 1,090 8 4,120 1,005 9 3,760 920 10 3,400 830 11 3,040 745 12 2,680 660 13 2,320 570 14 1,960 485 15 1,600 400 (b) Remove from service prior to further flight, PW JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 engines with 44 fractured, missing, or bent LPT third stage vane anti-rotation pins found during the accomplishment of the inspection requirements of paragraph (a) above. (c) Remove from service within 10 CIS, PW JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 engines with 16 or more, but less than 44 fractured, missing, or bent LPT third stage vane anti-rotation pins, found during the accomplishment of the inspection requirements of paragraph (a) above. (d) Modify prior to return to service, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of PW SB 5751, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1987, those engines removed from service in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c) above. (e) Modify prior to return to service, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of PW SB 5751, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1987, PW JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 engines inspected in accordance with paragraph (a) above, at an engine shop visit, and found with 15 or more fractured, missing, or bent LPT third stage vane anti-rotation pins. (f) Modify PW JT8D-209, -217, -217A, -217C, and -219 engine LPT cases (including LPT cases from those engines referred to in paragraph (a) that were not required to meet the initial and repetitive inspection requirements) at the next LPT module disassembly after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of PW SB 5751, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1987. (g) Report the following information in writing within 30 days from the date of the inspection to the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, Telex Number 949301 FAANE BURL: (1) Inspection date (2) Engine serial number (S/N) (3) LPT case S/N (4) Engine total time and cycles (if estimate, so note) (5) LPT case time and cycles since last shop visit (if estimate, so note) (6) Number of third stage vane anti-rotation pins: (i) fractured (ii) missing (iii) bent NOTES: (1) For the purpose of this AD, LPT module disassembly occurs when the LPT rotor is separated from the LPT case and vane assembly. (2) Shop visit is defined as the input of an engine to a repair shop where the subsequent engine maintenance entails: (a) Separation of a major engine flange (lettered or numbered) other than flanges mating with major sections of the nacelle or reverser. Separation of flanges purely for purposes of shipment, without subsequent internal maintenance, is not a "shop visit." (b) Removal of a disk, hub, or spool. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Engine Certification Office, New England Region, may adjust the compliance times specified in this AD. PW Alert SB 5753, Revision 2, dated December 11, 1987, PW SB 5751, Revision 1, dated September 30, 1987, and PW SB 5711, Revision 3, dated April 1, 1987, identified and described in this document, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney, Publications Department, P.O. Box 611, Middletown, Connecticut 06457. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; Rules Docket Number 87-ANE-23, Room 311, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. This amendment becomes effective on March 4, 1988.
2019-02-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to \n\n((Page 2438)) \n\nincorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD was prompted by reports of warpage of internal engine fire handle components, which can cause binding and prevent proper operation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
92-23-03: 92-23-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8403. Docket No. 92-NM-182-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes; as listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A54-31, dated September 17, 1992; certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent structural damage to the engine mount structure, which could lead to loss of airplane components, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 15 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the previous 30 days, perform a visual inspection of the thrust link of the center engine forward mount to verify installation of shear pins, shear pin retainers, and shear pin retainer attaching parts, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A54-31, dated September 17, 1992.\n\n\t(1)\tIf shear pins, shear pin retainers, and shear pin retainer attaching parts are installed, repeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD thereafter at intervals not to exceed 60 days.\n\n\t(2)\tIf any shear pin, shear pin retainer, or shear pin retainer attaching part is missing, prior to further flight, repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n\n\t(b)\tVerification for tightness of the nuts of the four shear pin retainer attaching bolts in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A54-31, dated September 17, 1992, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a)(1) of this AD.\n\n\t(c)\tWithin 15 days after finding any discrepancy as a result of any inspections required by paragraph (a) or (a)(1) of this AD, submit a report of the discrepancy to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425; fax (310) 988-5210. The report must include a description of the discrepancy, the airplane serialnumber, and the number of flight hours and landings on the airplane. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.\n\n\t(d)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.\n\n\t(e)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(f)\tThe inspections and verification for tightness (of the nuts of the four shear pin retainer attaching bolts) shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A54-31, dated September 17, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(g)\tThis amendment becomes effective on November 5, 1992.
64-11-01 R7: 64-11-01\tBOEING: Amendment 39-763. Applies to models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tCracks have been discovered in the front and rear upper and lower wing spar chords on the 707/720 Series aircraft. Accordingly, in the interest of safety accomplish the following or an equivalent approved by Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region: \n\n\t(a)\tParagraph (a) Superseded by AD 77-02-01. \n\n\t(b)\tOn all 707 and 720 Series aircraft delivered prior to October 1962, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tOn 707 and 720 Series aircraft which have been inspected in accordance with AD 64-03-02, paragraph (b), visually reinspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 hours' time in service for spanwise cracks in the wing upper and lower front spar chords between front spar Station 727 and the production break fittings. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf a crack is detected, repair the cracked spar chord in accordance with Boeing front spar repair drawing 65-40144 oran Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, approved equivalent before further flight. The repetitive inspections required by subparagraph (1) may be discontinued on any chord repaired in accordance with this subparagraph. \n\n\t(c)\tUpon request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\tNOTE. - This AD supplements but does not cancel AD 64-03-02. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletins No. 1964 (R-3) and No. 1964(R-3)A cover this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective May 21, 1964. \n\n\tRevised August 22, 1964. \n\n\tRevised March 5, 1965. \n\n\tRevised May 1, 1965. \n\n\tRevised August 20, 1968. \n\n\tRevised October 29, 1968. \n\n\tRevised March 22, 1969.Revised May 9, 1969.
2000-02-37: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to determine whether latch pins on the lower lobe and main deck side cargo doors are installed backward, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires eventual modification of the latch pin fittings on certain cargo doors. This amendment is prompted by reports that latch pins have been found installed backward on the cargo doors of several airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent improper latching of latch pins and the mating latch cam on the cargo door, which could result in damage to the structure of the cargo door and doorway cutout and consequent opening of the cargo door during flight.
86-01-03: 86-01-03 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-5211. Applies to Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished within 90 days prior to the effective date of this AD. To prevent loss of the availability of one or more passenger doors during an emergency evacuation due to malfunction of the door emergency mode opening system, accomplish the following: A. Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, test and repair prior to further flight, as necessary, all passenger doors in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-52-206, dated December 20, 1985, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. B. Alternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base for accomplishment of the tests or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. This amendment becomes effective January 21, 1986.
71-02-01: 71-02-01 AIR CRUISERS COMPANY LIFE RAFTS: Amdt. 39-1142. Applies to Air Cruisers Company Division of Garrett Corp. Life Raft Models 12D11751-7, 12D11751-8, and 18D23350-5. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent loss of pressure in the inflation bottles on the rafts, accomplish the following: (a) Within 100 hours in service after the effective date of this AD, but not later than 100 hours in service since the last pressure check of the cylinder and valve assembly, unless the modification described in subparagraph (1) or (2) below has been accomplished, perform a pressure check of the cylinder and valve assembly, P/Ns 24C17382-1 and 24C17382-2. When pressure measures less than 2600 psig in the former, or less than 2000 psig in the latter, both at 70 degrees F, or an equivalent pressure at other temperatures, before return to service, accomplish the following: Disassemble the inflation valve assembly, P/N 24D29261-1, and inspect for corrosion in the 0-ring areas. 1. If no corrosion is found, replace the O-rings, in accordance with Air Cruisers Co. Service Bulletin 111-70-1, dated 18 December 1970. 2. If corrosion is found, either: (i) Strip and alodine the valve body, and replace the O-rings as described in para. (a)(1), or (ii) Replace the valve with P/N 24D29261-2, modified in accordance with Air Cruisers Co. Service Bulletin 111-70-1, dated 18 December 1970. (b) For those assemblies which have been modified in accordance with para. (a)(1) or (a)(2)(i) prior to the effective date of this AD, repeat the procedure described in para. (a) within 1800 hours in service after the last inspection. (c) Following the initial inspection pursuant to this AD, and until the modification described in para. (a)(2)(ii) is accomplished: 1. For assemblies which did not demonstrate a pressure drop, repeat the procedure of para. (a) every 100 hours in service thereafter. 2. For assemblies which did demonstratea pressure drop and which were modified pursuant to para. (a)(1) or (a)(2)(i), reinspect every 1800 hours in service thereafter. This amendment is effective January 14, 1971.
2006-08-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Brantly International, Inc. (Brantly) model helicopters. This action requires certain inspections and measurements of the upper tail rotor vertical gearbox (gearbox), vertical shaft (shaft) and shaft housing (housing) and their associated parts; and of the intermediate gear box bushing (bushing). This amendment is prompted by an accident and an incident report of fatigue cracking of a shaft. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking of a shaft, failure of a shaft, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2006-08-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 airplanes. This AD requires reinforcing the fuselage at the emergency locator transmitter system's antenna area. This AD results from a report that certain structural provisions for an optional antenna are of insufficient strength. We are issuing this AD to prevent reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2006-07-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing transport category airplanes. This AD requires determining if the terminal fittings of the spars of the wings are made of 7079 aluminum alloy material. For any positive finding, the AD requires doing repetitive inspections for cracks and corrosion of all exposed surfaces of the terminal fitting bores; doing repetitive inspections for cracks, corrosion, and other surface defects, of all exposed surfaces, including the flanges, of the terminal fitting; applying corrosion inhibiting compound to the terminal fittings; and repairing or replacing any cracked, corroded, or defective part with a new part. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of cracking of the terminal fittings of the spars of the wings. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct stress-corrosion cracking of the terminal fittings, which could result in the failureof one of the terminal fitting connections. Such a failure, combined with a similar failure of one of the other three terminal fittings, could result in the inability of the airplane structure to carry fail-safe loads, which could result in loss of structural integrity of the wing attachment points.
2018-26-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of thrust reverser actuators (TRAs) jamming. This AD requires repetitive greasing of the TRAs, dispatch restrictions and maintenance procedure revisions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2018-26-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed engine fuel shutoff spar valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires inspecting to determine the part numbers (P/Ns) of the motor-operated valve (MOV) actuators at the engine fuel shutoff spar valve positions, installing MOV actuators having a certain acceptable part number or software if necessary, and revising the maintenance or inspection program to add a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
84-19-01: 84-19-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-4913. Applies to Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2088, Revision 2, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tTo detect cracks and prevent failure of the frame to tension tie joint structure, accomplish the following unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes that have not been modified in accordance with Service Bulletin 747- 53-2088, within the next 500 landings after the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 8,000 landings, whichever is later, perform a close visual inspection of the tension tie at body station (BS) 760 on Group I and Group II airplanes, and at BS 780 on Group III airplanes, for cracks in the areas identified in Service Bulletin 747-53-2088, Revision 2, or later FAA approved revisions. Repeat inspections at intervals not to exceed 3700 landings. If cracks are found, repair and modify in accordance with Service Bulletin 747-53-2088, Revision 2, or later FAA approved revisions, prior to further pressurized flight. Inspections are to continue after repair. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes that have been modified in accordance with Service Bulletin 747-53- 2088, within the next 1000 landings after the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings after modification, whichever is later, perform a close visual inspection of the tension tie at BS 760 on Group I and Group II airplanes, and at BS 780 on Group III airplanes, for cracks in the areas identified for inspection in Service Bulletin 747-53- 2088, Revision 2, or later FAA approved revisions. Repeat inspections at intervals not to exceed 8000 landings. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with Service Bulletin 747-53-2088, Revision 2, or later FAA approved revisions, prior to further pressurized flight. Inspections are to continue after repair. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance with the AD which provide an equivalent level of safety maybe used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tFor purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tE.\tAircraft may be ferried to a base for maintenance in accordance with Section 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. \n\n\tF.\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the inspection times specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of an operator, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the adjustment period. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 19, 1984.
95-04-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain transport category airplanes equipped with Honeywell Standard Windshear Detection and Recovery Guidance System (WSS). This action requires a revision to the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to alert the flight crew of the potential for significant delays in the WSS detecting windshear when the flaps of the airplane are in transition. This amendment is prompted by a report of an accident during which an airplane encountered severe windshear during a missed approached. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that the flight crew is aware that there may be significant delays in the WSS detecting windshear when the flaps of the airplane are in transition.
86-19-14: 86-19-14 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-5505. Applies to all Model S-76A and S-76B helicopters, certificated in any category, equipped with tail rotor blade assemblies as follows: MODEL PART NUMBERS SERIAL NUMBERS S-76A 76101-05001 or A1 37-00766, -00774, -00775, 76101-05101 -00779,-00781, -00783, and -00785 S-76B 76101-05501 A245-00025, -00026, -00027, -00028, -00037, -00040, -00041, and -00047 Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible operation with an improperly manufactured tail rotor assembly, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to further flight after receipt of this AD, remove the above listed serial numbered tail rotor assemblies/spars, and replace with a serviceable part. The above listed serial numbered tail rotor assemblies/spars marked with the suffix (X) are serviceable parts. (b) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the requirements of this AD may be accomplished. (c) Upon request, an alternate means of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone (617) 273-7118. (d) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator, through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, New England Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone (617) 273-7118, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. This amendment becomes effective January 30, 1987, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by individual priority letter AD No. 86-19-l4 issued September 23, 1986, which contained this amendment.