Results
2012-11-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Alpha Aviation Concept Limited Model R2160 Airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as oil lines fitted to affected aircraft are not fire resistant. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-04-37: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Sabreliner Model NA-265-40, -60, -70, and -80 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
97-14-09: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-159 (G-I) airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect cracking in the mounting lugs of the elevator trim tab actuators, and replacement, if necessary. This amendment requires the installation of improved elevator trim tab actuators that are not susceptible to the subject cracking. This amendment is prompted by the development of a modification that positively addresses the identified unsafe condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the mounting lugs on the elevator trim tab actuator due to cracking; such failure could result in severe vibration during flight and/or reduction or loss of elevator trim tab capability, which could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane.
91-12-01: 91-12-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-7012. Docket No. 91-ASW-04. Supersedes AD 91-04-01. Applicability: All Model S-61 series helicopters, certificated in any category, on main rotor head assemblies equipped with sleeve and spindle assemblies, P/N S6110-23350-041, that were manufactured or overhauled prior to February 6, 1991. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of a main rotor blade spindle, which could cause loss of the main rotor blade and subsequent loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after receipt of this AD, visually inspect all sleeve and spindle assemblies for evidence of proper application of sealing compound between the spacer, P/N S6112-23055-101, and the spindle assembly, P/N S6112-23027-041, on main rotor head assemblies equipped with sleeve and spindle assemblies, P/N S6110-23350-041, that have 6 months or 500 hours or more time in service on the effective date of this AD since new or the last overhaul. Visually inspect in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. (b) For main rotor head assemblies equipped with sleeve and spindle assemblies, P/N S6110-23350-041, that do not have 6 months or 500 hours time in service since new or overhaul, visually inspect the spindle assemblies for evidence of proper application of sealing compound between the spacer, P/N S6112-23055-101, and the spindle assembly, P/N S6112-23027-041, on main rotor head assemblies equipped with sleeve and spindle assemblies, P/N S6110-23350-041, in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. Conduct this inspection within 10 hours time in service after reaching 6 months or 500 hours time in service since new or overhaul, whichever comes first. NOTE: Two configurations of spacers exist. One has two puller slots spaced 180 degrees apart. The second has no puller slots. The spacers, P/N S6112-23055-101, affected by this AD have slots.(c) Utilizing an inspection mirror and flashlight, visually inspect all 5 rotor head sleeve and spindle assemblies for evidence of proper sealing compound application in the spacer slot area. (d) If the sealing compound is not present in the spacer slot, or if the sealant has voids, gaps, or pores, before further flight, inspect each suspect spindle, P/N S6112-23027-041, for crack or flaws in accordance with Sikorsky Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 61B10-48, dated January 18, 1991, using the ultrasonic inspection method. (e) If a crack or flaw indication is found in the spindle (from the inspections of paragraph (d)), replace the sleeve and spindle assembly prior to further flight with an airworthy component using standard maintenance instructions. (f) If no indication of cracks or flaws are found from the inspections of paragraph (d), return the sleeve and spindle assembly to service using ASB No. 61B10-48 and standard maintenance instructions and, thereafter, conduct repetitive ultrasonic inspections in accordance with paragraph (d) at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service. (g) For slotted sleeve and spindle assemblies that have the sealing compound intact in the slot area (i.e., that did not require ultrasonic inspection in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD), conduct a one-time ultrasonic inspection of the spindle in accordance with ASB No. 61B10-48 within the next 200 hours time in service after the initial visual inspection required in either paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD. (h) An alternate method of compliance with the inspections and rework of paragraph (a) through (g) can be accomplished by tearing down the sleeve and spindle assembly as specified in Part 3 of ASB No. 61B10-48 and inspecting the spindle radius area for corrosion. If corrosion is found in the spindle radius area, replace the spindle assembly with an airworthy component. If no corrosion is found, reassemble and reseal the sleeve andspindle in accordance with Part 3 and reinstall on the rotor head in accordance with the maintenance manual. Sleeve and spindle assemblies that have been torn down, inspected, and resealed in accordance with Part 3 of ASB 61B10-48, are no longer required to comply with paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) above. (i) Record compliance with paragraphs (e), (f), (g) or (h) by part number, serial number and blade location in the aircraft logbook/maintenance records. (j) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used if approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803. (k) In accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where the ultrasonic inspections required by this AD may be accomplished. The ultrasonic inspections and sleeve and spindle disassembly and the inspection for corrosion shall be done in accordance with pages 1 through 33 of Sikorsky Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin No. 61B10-48, dated January 18, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06601-1380, Attn: Commercial Customer Support. Copies may be inspected at the Rules Docket, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Building 3B, Room 158, Fort Worth, Texas 76193, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, Room 8401, Washington, DC 20591. Amendment 39-7012 supersedes Priority Letter AD 91-04-01, issued on February 6, 1991. This amendment (39-7012 AD 91-12-01) becomes effective on July 8, 1991.
77-18-07: 77-18-07 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-3035. Applies to Lockheed-California Company Model L-1011-385 Series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent take-off with a possible jammed elevator drive system on the horizontal stabilizer of the primary pitch control system which can result in degradation of the airplane controllability, accomplish the following: (a) Initiate the following check program prior to next flight after the effective date of this amendment, until the repetitive or the one-time modification requirements of the paragraph (d) have been accomplished on all aircraft of each operator's fleet: (1) Prior to each take-off conduct an exterior visual check of the elevator/stabilizer surface positions after the full aft controls check and with the control column full forward to assure there is no obvious discrepancy between elevator positions. The pilot in command shall be informed of the results ofthis check. (2) If obvious discrepancy noted, correct prior to further flight. (3) No further full aft control column movement may be performed prior to take-off. NOTES: (1) This check can be accomplished with any one single hydraulic system pressurized by any main hydraulic system pump. (2) FAA approved Lockheed-California Company Alert Service Bulletin 093- 27-A158, Revision 1 dated August 17, 1977, Paragraph 2.A, covers the same subject. (b) Within the next thirty days after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished, revise the FAA Approved Lockheed L-1011 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), LR 25925, to incorporate the Pitch Axis Control Assist Procedures contained in the AFM revision dated June 17, 1977. Flight crews should be informed of these procedures as soon as practicable. (c) Within the next 150 hours time in service after the effective date of this amendment, unless already accomplished, inspect the elevator quadrant bearingsin accordance with the applicable instructions of the FAA approved Lockheed-California Company Alert Service Bulletin 093-27-A158, Revision 1, dated August 17, 1977 or later FAA approved revisions. (1) The upper and lower bearings which do not meet the specified acceptable inspection standards must be replaced prior to next flight. (2) Those inspections accomplished prior to August 17, 1977 will be considered acceptable provided the inspection standards used are equivalent to those specified in the above service bulletin. NOTE: The inspections accomplished in accordance with the requirements of AD 77-10- 04 are not considered to be equivalent to the inspections required by the paragraph (c), above. (d) Within the next 1500 hours time in service after the effective date of this amendment, or on or before March 1, 1978, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished, accomplish either (1) or (2), below. (1) Modify the elevator drive systems in accordance with the instructions of Paragraph 2.E of FAA approved Lockheed-California Company Alert Service Bulletin 093-27- A158, Revision 1 dated August 17, 1977, or later FAA approved revisions, except as provided in paragraph (e), below. Accomplish this modification at intervals not to exceed 2000 hours time in service; or (2) Modify the elevator drive systems in accordance with the instructions of the FAA approved Lockheed-California Company Service Bulletin 093-27-158, dated August 10, 1977 or later FAA approved revisions. (e) The initial modification performed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (d)(1) need not include the installation of the thrust washer, P/N 1616733-103. However, at the next subsequent modification required by paragraph (d)(1) the installation of the thrust washer, P/N 1616733-103, is required. (f) Equivalent checks, inspections and modifications may be used when approved by Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This supersedes Amendment 39-2898 (42 FR 24721), AD 77-10-04, and Amendment 39- 2956 (42 FR 34865), AD 77-14-06. This amendment becomes effective September 15, 1977.
2012-11-11: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes. That AD currently requires replacing the separation link assembly on the applicable entry and service doors with an improved separation link assembly, and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds an \n\n((Page 33620)) \n\nairplane to the applicability and removes certain other airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that an additional airplane is subject to the unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of an entry or service door to open fully in the event of an emergency evacuation, which could impede exit from the airplane. This condition could result in injury to passengers or crewmembers.
2012-11-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by four reports of retaining cross bolt hardware not fully engaged into the fuse pins of the forward trunnion lower housing of the main landing gear (MLG), which could result in an incorrect MLG emergency landing break-away sequence. This AD requires a detailed inspection of the fuse pin cross bolts and fuse pins of the left and right MLG forward trunnion lower housing to verify that the cross bolts are correctly installed and that there are no missing fuse pins, and replacement of the fuse pins if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent an incorrect emergency landing MLG break-away sequence, which could result in puncturing of the wing box and consequent fuel leaks and an airplane fire. Failure of the fuse pins could also result in a possible landing gear collapse causing a runway excursion during take-off or landing.
98-04-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain AeroSpace Technologies of Australia (ASTA) Models N22B and N24A airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved airplane flight manual (AFM) to specify procedures that will prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This AD is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
73-17-04: 73-17-04 BELL: Amdt. 39-1704. Applies to Bell Model 204B and 205A-1 helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this A.D. for tail rotor grips with 495 or more hours total time in service on the effective date of this A.D., and prior to attaining 500 hours time in service for tail rotor grips with less than 495 hours total time in service on the effective date of this A.D., except that the aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the inspections can be performed. To prevent possible failure of the tail rotor grips, P/N 204-011-706 or 204-011-728, as applicable, to preclude corrosion in the retaining threads of the tail rotor grip, and to assure serviceable condition of the tail rotor grip bearings, accomplish the following: (a) Remove the tail rotor hub and blade assembly from the helicopter, remove the blades from the grips, and remove the grips from the hub assembly in accordance with the appropriate model maintenance manual. (b) Remove the tail rotor grip bearings from each yoke spindle and inspect the bearings for roughness or seizure. If the bearings are rough and unserviceable, replace the bearings prior to next flight. (c) Replace the tail rotor grips prior to next flight. (d) Assemble the tail rotor hub and blade assembly as noted in Section VI of Model 204B Maintenance and Overhaul Instruction Manual, or Section III of Model 205A/205A-1 Maintenance and Overhaul Instruction Manual, as applicable. Apply sealant to the inboard end of each grip as specified in Bell Helicopter Co. Service Letter No. 204B-86/205A-68, dated 12 February 1971, or later FAA approved revision, or as specified by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. Balance the assembly as noted in the appropriate model maintenance manual. (e) Install and track the tail rotor hub and blade assembly as noted in Section VI of Model 204B Maintenance and Overhaul Instruction Manual, or Section III of Model 205A/205A- 1 Maintenance and Overhaul Instruction Manual, as applicable. (f) The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Service Manager, Bell Helicopter Company, P.O. Box 482, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this A.D. which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the Southwest Region Office in Fort Worth, Texas. (Bell Helicopter Company Service Bulletin Nos. 204-05-73-2, Rev. A, and 205-05-73-4, Rev. A, dated July 25, 1973, pertain to this subject.) This supersedes Amendment 39-1470, 37 F.R. 12308, A.D. 72-13-06. This amendment becomes effective August 20, 1973.
88-11-02: 88-11-02 SAAB-FAIRCHILD: Amendment 39-5921. Applies to Model SF-340 series airplanes, listed in SAAB-SCANIA Service Bulletin SF340-33-016, Revision 1, dated April 3, 1987, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent electromagnetic interference with navigation and other systems, and the loss of the wheel brake system, accomplish the following: A. Within 5 days following the effective date of this AD, incorporate the following, as applicable, into the limitations section of the airplane flight manual. This may be accomplished by including a copy of this AD in the airplane flight manual: 1. For airplanes that do not have the fluorescent lighting inverters modified in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin SF340-33-021, dated June 12, 1987: a. During all flight operations and ground operations with the engines running, deactivate the circuits providing power to the cabin internal overhead and window lights by first switching off these lights, and then opening circuits breakers numbers F24 and F25. b. During operation with the cabin overhead and window lights deactivated, one reading light in each row must be turned on; or for those airplanes so configured, Row B on the flight attendant's panel must be selected "on". 2. For airplanes that have the fluorescent lighting inverters modified in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin SF340-33-021, dated June 12, 1987: Prior to the first flight of the day, a crew member must inspect the cabin internal overhead and window lights to ensure that all fluorescent lamps are lit. If a lamp is not lit, it must be replaced prior to further flight, or the circuits which power the lamp must be deactivated. B. Modification of the fluorescent lighting inverter assembly, P/N 18- 994, S/N 650- 1992 without blue dot, and inverter assembly P/N 18-966, S/N 1100- 3420 without blue dot, in accordance with SAAB Service Bulletin SF340-33-021, dated June 12, 1987, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph A.1., above. C. Installation of Modification 1422, as described in SAAB-SCANIA Service Bulletin SF340-33-016, Revision 1, dated April 3, 1987, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph A. of this AD. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not alreadyreceived the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to SAAB-Fairchild, Product Support, S-58188, Linkoping, Sweden. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This Amendment 39-5921 supersedes AD 85-25-54 R1, Amendment 39-5760 (52 FR 41975; November 2, 1987). This amendment, 39-5921, becomes effective June 3, 1988.
2012-10-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Burkhart GROB Luft- und Raumfahrt GmbH Models GROB G 109 and GROB G 109B powered sailplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as excessive corrosion on the nose plate in the vertical stabilizer, which could cause the vertical stabilizer nose plate to fail. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-04-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Pilatus Britten-Norman Limited BN-2A, BN-2B, and BN-2T Series airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associatedwith such conditions.
2012-11-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Model G-1159, G-1159A, and G-1159B airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, a measurement to determine the clearance (gap) of the exposed rounded portion of the doubler and clothespin fitting at the wing-to-fuselage attachment, and repair if necessary. This AD also requires, for certain other airplanes, determining if a certain aircraft service change has been incorporated, and for affected airplanes, a measurement to determine the clearance (gap) of the exposed rounded portion of the doubler and clothespin fitting at the wing-to-fuselage attachment, and repair if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of an improper structural modification that had excessive gaps in the wing-to-fuselage attachment fittings. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct excessive gaps in the wing-to-fuselage attachment fittings, which could result in reduced structural integrity at the wing-to-fuselage attachment and consequent separation of the wing from the airplane.
2010-10-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that supersedes an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * Engineering analysis using the new calculated loads has shown that the structural integrity of the forward engine mount cannot be guaranteed after either thrust link has accumulated 15500 Flight Cycles (FC). * * * * * A loss of structural integrity of the forward engine mounts could lead to the loss of the load path for the forward engine mount and damage to other engine mount structures, which could result in failure of the forward engine mount, possible separation of the engine from the airplane, damage to the wing, or loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to addressthe unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective May 28, 2010. On January 29, 2010 (75 FR 2057, January 14, 2010), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD. We must receive comments on this AD by June 28, 2010.
51-09-01: 51-09-01 PRATT & WHITNEY: Applies to Boeing Model 377 Aircraft Equipped With Wasp Major TSB3-G or B5 Engines Using Antidetonate (Wet Power) for Takeoff. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than May 1, 1951. A. Each operator of an airplane covered shall select a power which he undertakes to maintain. If that power is less than the corresponding value available during the type certification tests of the airplane, the operating weights of the entire fleet shall be reduced to values such as will enable the airplanes to comply with the transport category performance requirements with the takeoff power selected. Appropriate flight manual revisions shall be made to indicate whatever changes in performance have resulted. B. The power actually developed by each engine shall be measured each time it reaches each of the following stages: (1) Upon installation of overhauled engines in aircraft; (2) At the No. 3 inspection nearest to the midpoint ofthe authorized service time between overhauls; and (3) At the nearest No. 3 inspection or some convenient point near or at, the end of the authorized service time between overhauls. C. The procedures and methods employed in making these power measurements shall be acceptable to the FAA. (1) The frequency of the power measurements should be continued as indicated above until the results obtained on each operator's fleet have been evaluated for the purpose of establishing whether more frequent or less frequent measurements are warranted; (2) Operators not employing line maintenance practices which will reasonable insure the continued availability of the selected power will start this program making more frequent power measurements than indicated above. D. An airplane incorporating an engine which at any of the required power measurements fails to develop the selected power shall not be dispatched unless: (1) The power is restored to the selected value,or (2) The engine is replaced by one developing the selected power, or (3) The operating weights of the individual airplane are reduced as specified in A. E. If, on a fleet-wide basis, the initial powers measured during any individual power measurement are consistently below the selected power, the operator shall: (1) Initiate or improve line maintenance to the extent necessary to give reasonable assurance that the selected power is continuously available, or (2) Make more frequent measurements of power, or (3) Select a lower value of power representative of the initially measured values and reduce operating fleet weights as specified in A. F. Results of the above power checks are to be submitted regularly and promptly to the assigned FAA Field Agents.
2012-10-12: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all RR RB211-Trent 553-61, 553A2-61, 556-61, 556A2-61, 556B-61, 556B2-61, 560-61, 560A2-61, 768-60, 772-60, 772B-60, 875-17, 877-17, 884-17, 884B-17, 892-17, 892B-17, and 895-17 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires inspecting the intermediate-pressure (IP) compressor rotor shaft rear balance land for cracks. This new AD continues to require initial inspections, adds additional inspections, and a mandatory terminating action. This AD was prompted by additional cracking on RB211-Trent 700 and RB211-Trent 800 IP compressor rotor shafts found since the existing AD was issued. We are issuing this AD to detect cracking on the IP compressor rotor rear balance land. IP compressor rotor rear balance land cracking can lead to uncontained failure of the rotor and damage to the airplane.
2012-10-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion damage on the outer diameter chrome surface of the horizontal stabilizer pivot pins. Micro-cracks in the chrome plating of the pivot pin, some of which extended into the base metal, were also reported. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a fractured horizontal stabilizer pivot pin. This AD requires replacing the existing horizontal stabilizer pivot pins with new or reworked pivot pins having improved corrosion resistance, doing repetitive inspections after installing the pivot pins, and doing corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fractured horizontal stabilizer pivot pin, which may cause excessive horizontal stabilizer freeplay and structural damage significant enough to result in loss of control of the airplane.
98-04-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Partenavia Costruzioni Aeronauticas, S.p.A. Model P68, AP68TP 300, AP68TP 600 airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2012-09-09: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2500-A1, V2525-D5 and V2528-D5 turbofan engines, and certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of IAE V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive ultrasonic inspections (USIs) of certain high-pressure compressor (HPC) stage 3 to 8 drums, and replacement of drum attachment nuts. This new AD expands the affected population for initial and repetitive inspections of the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum, introduces an eddy current inspection (ECI) procedure, and requires additional cleaning and repetitive USI of some HPC stage 3 to 8 drums. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the HPC stage 3 to 8 drum, which could result in damage to the airplane.
2010-10-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-76A, B, and C helicopters that requires inspecting each installed Woodward HRT (formerly HR Textron) main rotor servo actuator (servo actuator) for a high rate of leakage and replacing each affected servo actuator with a servo actuator containing a newly re-designed servo actuator piston. This amendment is prompted by a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation issued in response to an accident involving a Model S-76C helicopter. In the NTSB Safety Recommendation, the performance of a servo actuator piston upon reaching 3,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) was questioned as a result of piston head seal leakage and piston head plasma spray flaking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent degraded servo actuator performance as a result of piston head seal leaking and plasma spray flaking, which could result in subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
98-04-17: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-03-03, which applies to certain Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd. (Pilatus) BN-2, BN-2A, and BN-2B series airplanes that do not have Modification NB/M/1571 generator terminal diodes installed. AD 97-03-03 currently requires the installation of higher capacity diodes on the generator switches regardless of whether the airplane is equipped with the original 50 amp DC generating system or a Modification NB/M/1148, which is a 70 amp system. This action retains the actions of AD 97-03-03, but modifies the applicability section to reflect that this AD does not apply to Pilatus BN-2, BN-2A, and BN-2B series airplanes with 50 amp DC generation systems installed. This AD is the result of reports that the applicability section of AD 97-03-03 is incorrect. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a loss of electrical power to the navigation, communications, and lighting systems, which could impair the pilot's ability to maintain control of the airplane. The incorporation by reference of Pilatus Britten-Norman Manufacturers Service Bulletin (SB) BN-2/SB.228, Issue 2, dated January 17, 1996, as listed in the regulations was previously approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 23, 1997 (62 FR 4909, February 3, 1997).
91-25-07: 91-25-07 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-8108. Docket No. 91-NM-134-AD. Supersedes AD 91-09-13, Amendment 39-6979. Applicability: All Model ATP series airplanes which have not installed Modification 10170A (described in British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-55-5), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent reduced directional control of the airplane due to impairment of the operation of the rudder, accomplish the following: (a) For airplanes with rudders in pre-Modification 10165A configuration: Prior to the accumulation of 750 hours time-in-service, or within 125 hours time-in-service after May 28, 1991 (the effective date of AD 91-09-13, Amendment 39-6979), whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 125 hours time-in-service, perform a detailed visual inspection of the angle brackets attaching the hinge ribs at Stations 27.582 and 29.582 for cracks, and a detailed visual inspection of the fasteners attaching the reinforcing plates for security, in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-3, Revision 4, dated June 28, 1990. (1) If cracking or local distortion is found on the angles or doubling plate flanges on the front face of the rudder spar, prior to further flight, remove the bolts and doubling plates, and perform a detailed visual inspection in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin. (2) All items found cracked and all rivets found distorted or insecure must be replaced with a serviceable part prior to further flight, in accordance with paragraph 2.C of the service bulletin. (b) For airplanes with rudders fitted with Modification 10165A during production: Prior to the accumulation of 6,250 hours time-in-service, or within 30 days after May 28, 1991 (the effective date of AD 91-09-13, Amendment 39-6979), whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500hours time-in-service, perform a detailed visual inspection of the angle brackets attaching the hinge ribs at Stations 27.582 and 29.582 for cracks, and a detailed visual inspection of the fasteners attaching the reinforcing plates for security, in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-3, Revision 4, dated June 28, 1990. (1) If cracking or local distortion is found on the angles or doubling plate flanges on the front face of the rudder spar, prior to further flight, remove the bolts and doubling plates, and perform a detailed visual inspection in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin. (2) All items found cracked and all rivets found distorted or insecure must be replaced with a serviceable part prior to further flight in accordance with paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin. (c) For airplanes with rudders fitted with Modification 10165A in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP-55-4, or by previous repair or replacement action: Prior to the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service following installation, or within 30 days after May 28, 1991 (the effective date of AD 91-09-13, Amendment 39-6979), whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours time-in-service, perform a detailed visual inspection of the angle brackets attaching the hinge ribs at Stations 27.582 and 29.582 for cracks, and a detailed visual inspection of the fasteners attaching the reinforcing plates for security, in accordance with paragraph 2.A. of British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-3, Revision 4, dated June 28, 1990. (1) If cracking or local distortion is found on the angles or doubling plate flanges on the front face of the rudder spar, prior to further flight, remove the bolts and doubling plates, and perform a detailed visual inspection in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of the service bulletin. (2) All items found cracked and all rivets found distorted or insecure must be replaced with a serviceable part prior to further flight in accordance with paragraph 2.C. of the service bulletin. (d) The installation of Modification 10170A, which includes strengthening the rudder lower hinge ribs at Stations 27.582, 29.582, and 24.82, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-5, dated November 30, 1990, or Revision 1, dated January 3, 1991, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this AD. (e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (f) Special flight permits may be issuedin accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. (g) The inspection and replacement requirements shall be done in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletins ATP 55-3, Revision 4, dated June 28, 1990. The optional modification shall be done in accordance with either British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-5, dated November 30, 1990, or British Aerospace Service Bulletin ATP 55-5, Revision 1, dated January 3, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041-0414. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (h) Airworthiness Directive 91-25-07, supersedes AD 91-09-13, Amendment 39-6979. (i) This amendment (39-8108, AD 91-25-07) becomes effective on January 9, 1992.
2012-10-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701 & 702), CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), and CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes. That AD currently requires a one- time inspection of the main landing gear (MLG) shock strut assemblies for part and serial numbers; for certain MLG shock strut assemblies, a one-time inspection of the torque link apex joint, and corrective actions if necessary; and, for certain MLG shock strut assemblies, replacement or rework of the apex nut. This new AD continues to require the actions in the existing AD, and adds the previously omitted part and serial numbers. This AD was prompted by reports of loose or detached main landing gear (MLG) torque link apex pin locking plate and the locking plate retainer bolt in the torque link apex joint. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper assembly and damage of the MLG torque link apex joint, which could cause heavy vibration during landing, consequent damage to MLG components, and subsequent collapse of the MLG.
2010-09-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, MD-10-10F, MD-10-30F, MD-11, and MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time installation of electrical bonding jumpers for the fill valve controllers of fuel tanks. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent point-of-contact arcing or filament heating damage in the fuel tanks, which could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
98-03-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, that requires one-time inspections to verify proper installation and to detect chafing and/or damage of certain rerouted wire bundles; to verify if certain protective grommets are installed properly and to detect missing grommets; and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by a report of smoke and fire in the lower left-hand side of the E1-1 rack of the electrical equipment bay due to chafing of wire bundles as a result of missing protective grommets. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing of wire bundles, which could result in smoke and fire at the E1-1 rack of the electrical equipment bay.