Results
2002-16-08: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D models -209, -217, -217A, -217C and -219 turbofan engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive fluorescent magnetic particle inspections or fluorescent penetrant inspections of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC) for cracks, and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. Also that AD requires a one-time material verification of drain and Ps4 bosses, and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. Finally, that AD requires replacement of CCOC's with welded-on bosses with improved, one-piece CCOC's. This amendment requires lower initial inspection thresholds for all CCOC's installed in any JT8D model -209, -217, -217A, -217C or -219 turbofan engine. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracked CCOC's that had accumulated fewer cycles in service than the initial inspection thresholds required by the current AD. Also, a CCOC partnumber was discovered with incorrect material not identified by serial number in JT8D Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) A6359, Revision 2, dated July 31, 2000. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncontained failure of the CCOC, which could cause release of debris, damage to the airplane, or fire.
89-09-06: 89-09-06 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-6193. Applicability: All Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, on which British Aerospace (BAe) main landing gear support structure Modification PM3070 is installed and Modification PM5928 has not been installed, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent collapse of a main landing gear, accomplish the following: A. Perform initial and repetitive ultrasonic and eddy current inspections of the main landing gear support beams at initial times and repetitive intervals shown in Table I of this AD using procedures in BAe Alert Service Bulletin 57-A-PM6000, Issue 2, dated February 17, 1988. TABLE I Airplane Identification Modification PM6000 Accomplishment Status Initial Inspection Compliance Time Repetitive Compliance Time Interval After Initial Inspection Serial Numbers up to and including 402 Not Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within 300 landings after July 30, 1987, (the effective date of AD 87-13-03, Amendment 39-5654); or -within 3 years since installation of new left and right main support beams. Ultrasonic inspection: at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Eddy current inspections: at intervals not to exceed 36 months. Airplane Identification Modification PM6000 Accomplishment Status Initial Inspection Compliance Time Repetitive Compliance Time Interval After Initial Inspection Serial Numbers 403 and subsequent Not Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within the next 300 landings after July 30, 1987 (the effective date AD 87-13-03 Amendment 39-5654); or -within 6 years since new; or -within 6 years since installation of new left and right main support beams. Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 12 months. Eddy current inspections: at intervals not to exceed 36 months. For all A/P's on which Mod. PM6000 is accomplished prior to assembly of main support beam into wing Accomplished Whichever occurs later: -within 8 years since new; or -within 8 years since new right and left main support beams are installed. Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 2 years. For all A/P's on which Mod. PM6000 is accomplished after assembly of main support beam into wing. Accomplished Within 2 years after installation of Modification PM6000 Ultrasonic inspections: at intervals not to exceed 2 years B. Cracks in the main landing gear main support beam must be repaired, prior to further flight, in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Installation of main support beam, part number EDO3-5007/8 (Modification PM5928) constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace PLC, Librarian for Service Bulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This AD supersedes AD 87-13-03 (Amendment 39-5654) which became effective on July 30, 1987. This amendment (39-6193, AD 89-09-06) becomes effective on May 16, 1989.
98-06-31: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300, A310, and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect cracking of the aft door frame area, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in the aft door frame area, which could result in reduced structural integrity and rapid decompression of the airplane.
2016-07-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-8 series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine if all oxygen components in the passenger oxygen system are installed, installation of new o-rings, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report that oxygen tube couplings in the passenger oxygen system could be missing or incorrectly installed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct oxygen leaks from oxygen tube couplings in the passenger oxygen system, which could result in depletion of emergency oxygen at a faster rate than expected, reduce the passengers' and crews' protection from hypoxia at elevated cabin altitudes, and increase the risk of a fire.
2016-07-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-300, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracks at the floor panel attachment fastener holes; repetitive inspections for cracks in the upper and lower chords of the upper deck floor beams at permanent fastener locations; repetitive inspections for cracks in certain repaired and modified areas; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires repetitive replacement of the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams, including pre-replacement inspections and corrective action if necessary; and post-replacement repetitive inspections and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the upper chords of the upper deck floor beams. Undetected cracking could result in large deflection or deformation of the upper deck floor beams, resulting in damage to wire bundles and control cables for the flight control system, and reduced controllability of the airplane. Multiple adjacent severed floor beams could result in rapid decompression of the airplane.
2002-16-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger- to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires, among other actions, installation of a fail-safe hinge, redesigned main deck cargo door warning and power control systems, and 9g crash barrier. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that the main deck cargo door hinge is not fail-safe; that certain main deck cargo door control systems do not provide an adequate level of safety; and that the main deck cargo barrier is not structurally adequate during an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the main deck cargo door hinge or failure of the cargo door system, which could result in the loss or opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane, including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage; and to prevent failure of the main deck cargo barrier during an emergency landing, which could injure occupants.
97-14-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Gulfstream Model G-159 (G-I) airplanes, that currently requires modification and repetitive inspections for cracks in the main landing gear (MLG) retract cylinder attachment fittings. This amendment requires installation of improved attachment fittings which, when accomplished, terminates the requirement for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by the development of a modification that positively addresses the identified unsafe condition. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the MLG retract cylinder attachment fitting due to fatigue cracking. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the inability to retract the MLG.
91-18-20: 91-18-20 BOEING OF CANADA, LTD., DE HAVILLAND DIVISION: Amendment 39- 8024. Docket No. 91-NM-41-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-7 series airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 27, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required, as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent a possible failure of the main landing gear (MLG), accomplish the following: (a) Within one year after the effective date of this AD, remove each MLG upper drag strut assembly from the airplane and perform a non-destructive test in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 2.D.(1) through (3), of Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 32-18, Revision 1, dated June 5, 1980. (1) If there is no evidence of cracking, prior to further flight, overhaul the assembly in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph 2.D.(4), of the service bulletin. (2) If cracking is evident, prior to further flight, replace the assembly with a serviceable part, in accordance with the service bulletin. NOTE: The Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin references Menasco Mfg. Component Maintenance Manual 32-10-16, dated September 1, 1976, as an additional source of service information for performing overhaul procedures. NOTE: In the referenced Menasco Component Maintenance Manual, procedures are found only for "Repair." For this application, repair is equivalent to overhaul. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANE-170, FAA, New England Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FARs 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order tocomply with the requirements of this AD. (d) The inspection, overhaul, and replacement requirements shall be done in accordance with Menasco Canada, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 32-18, Revision 1, dated June 5, 1980. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing of Canada, Ltd., de Havilland Division, Garratt Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K 1Y5, Canada. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; at the FAA, New England Region, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. This amendment (39-8024, AD 91-18-20) becomes effective on October 15, 1991.
2016-06-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by investigations that revealed that the cover seal of the brake dual distribution valve (BDDV) was damaged and did not ensure efficient sealing. This AD requires modifying the BDDVs having certain part numbers; modifying the drain hose of the BDDV; checking for the presence of water, ice, and hydraulic fluid; re-identifying the BDDV; and doing related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage to the BDDV, which could lead to water ingestion in the BDDV and freezing of the BDDV in flight, possibly resulting in loss of braking system function after landing.
2002-16-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to CFM International (CFMI) CFM56-5B and -7B series turbofan engines. This amendment requires retirement of stage 2 low pressure turbine (LPT) nozzle segments and stage 3 LPT nozzle segments, listed in Table 1 of this AD, from service before accumulating 25,000 cycles-since-new (CSN) or at the next LPT module shop visit when either stage 2 LPT nozzle segments or stage 3 LPT nozzle segments are exposed, whichever occurs first. This amendment also requires installation of new design (either new or reworked) nozzle segments, that will aid in containment of the LPT rotor in the event of LPT shaft failure. This amendment is prompted by a report of an LPT shaft failure caused by a hydromechanical unit (HMU) malfunction that induced a higher than anticipated LPT rotor overspeed. The actions specified by this AD are intended to aid in containment of the LPT rotor in the event of LPT shaft failure, which couldresult in uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
76-16-06: 76-16-06 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA: Amendment 39-2693. Applies to Lockheed L- 1011-385 Series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent serious degradation of airplane flight performance due to possibility of missing Visco Jet Restrictors, P/N 19XVC112DN1 or P/N VXCA2501112D, in the A and B rudder control system, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 additional hours time in service or 24 hours after receipt of this telegraphic AD, whichever occurs earlier, discontinue training flights, and do not dispatch any airplane with the C system main pump or C system air turbine motor pump inoperative, until (b) is accomplished. (b) Within the next 50 additional hours time in service after receipt of this telegraphic AD, perform the following inspection: (1) Turn on aircraft electric power, no hydraulic power. (2) Turn on B system AC motor driven hydraulic pump. (3) Note and record hydraulic system B pressure indicated on flight engineering panel. (4) Engage 8 degree mechanical rudder limiter stops with switches on overhead instrument panel. (5) Slowly push rudder pedals to move rudder against travel limiter, then continue to push pedal until stop is felt. (6) Note and record system B hydraulic pressure. If pressure is at least 200 psi lower than recorded in step 3, Visco Jet Restrictor is missing. (7) Release pedal. (8) Turn on hydraulic system power transfer unit B to A. (9) Open circuit breaker K-12 on CB-2 panel 'Rudder Servo A.' (10) Switch off rudder Servo with guarded switch on overhead instrument panel. (11) Note and record system A hydraulic pressure on flight engineers panel. (If pressure fluctuates widely turn on/off servos as required to minimize fluctuations.) (12) Repeat item 5. (13) Note and record system A hydraulic pressure. If pressure is at least 200 psi lower than recorded in step 11, Visco Jet Restrictor is missing. (14) Release pedal. (15) Turn off hydraulic and electric power. If the Visco Jet Restrictor(s) is not installed, install prior to further flight. Record compliance and method of compliance with this AD per FAR 91.173. (c) Equivalent inspections and installation may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (d) Special flight permits may be issued per FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base to perform the inspection or repair required by (b), provided that the C System main pump and C System air turbine motor pump are operative. This amendment is effective August 19, 1976 for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated July 23, 1976, which contained this amendment.
2001-01-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain British Aerospace HP137 Mk1, Jetstream series 200, and Jetstream Models 3101 and 3201 airplanes that are equipped with certain nose landing gear units. This AD requires you to inspect the steering jack assembly to assure proper clearance between the bush heads on the steering plates and the shim on the steering jack trunnions and to assure that there is adequate lubrication at both trunnions and the eye end fitting. This AD also requires you to adjust the clearance and provide adequate lubrication, as necessary. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracked steering jack piston rods caused by inadequate clearance or inadequate lubrication of the steering jack pivot points. The condition could result in failure of the nose wheel steering system with consequent loss of airplane control.
2000-04-25: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to BHTC Model 407 helicopters, that requires modifying the door latch assemblies on all four crew and passenger doors. This amendment is prompted by an incident that occurred during a manufacturer's flight test, in which a door latch assembly broke, preventing occupants in the helicopter from opening the door. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a door latch rod assembly from disengaging from the door handle and preventing helicopter occupants from opening the door
2000-26-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A310 series airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed visual inspections to detect cracks propagating from the fastener holes that attach the left- and right-hand pick-up angles at frame 40 to the wing lower skin and fuselage panel, and corrective actions, if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduced structural integrity of the airplane due to fatigue damage and consequent cracking of the pick-up angles at frame 40. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-26-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace Model BAe 146 and Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of a revision to the airworthiness limitations of the BAe/Avro 146 Aircraft Maintenance Manual, which specifies new inspections and compliance times for inspection and replacement actions. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
47-43-03: 47-43-03 CESSNA: (Was mandatory Note 14 of AD-768-5.) Applies Only to 120 and 140 Seaplanes Operated Without Spreader Struts Between Floats. Compliance required prior to January 1, 1948. Due to the independent suspension of the floats, racking loads imposed by rough water operation can cause extensive structural damage. As a result, the following inspections and modifications are necessary: 1. Replace all loose and sheared rivets at the joints between the instrument panel and door posts and between the instrument panel and the fuselage skin with AD-5 rivets. In case of damage to the instrument panel at the sheared rivets, an 0.040-inch 24ST alclad channel, 1-inch wide with 5/8-inch flanges, extending the full length of the rivet pattern should be installed with one flange against and riveted to the skin and with the web picking up the rivets through the door post and panel. 2. Inspect the formed brace channel fittings which attach the front and rear door posts to the rear edge of the fuselage carry through spars for cracks in the flanges. If cracks are found the fitting should be replaced or repaired by stop drilling the crack and installing a flat 0.051-inch 24ST alclad strip, cut to the width and contour of the flange, with two or three AD-4 rivets above and below the crack. 3. Inspect the front carry through spar for cracks, particularly below the inboard bolt hole in the attachment of the door post to the spar. If cracks are found the channel should be replaced. 4. Inspect fuselage fitting, Cessna P/N 0440109, to which rear outboard float brace attaches, for cracks in flange at bolt head and along weld bead. Replace with new fitting if cracked. 5. Inspect fitting at fuselage, Edo P/N 88-S-145, to which front outboard float brace attaches, for cracks in weld at bend in top plate and at inboard end of insert where weld is ground off. If cracked, replace with revised fitting having three welded inserts at bend. 6.Replace inboard float brace struts to which outboard struts attach directly, with struts modified to incorporate a universal joint at the attachment of the outboard struts. 7. Add spreader struts, Edo P/N 88-5-175, and diagonal wires, Edo P/N 92-S-200-4, between the floats. 8. Rivet 0.051-inch 24ST alclad doubler, Cessna P/N 0440113, to the fuselage skin below each door just aft of the main landing gear bulkhead. If the fuselage skin is buckled in this area sufficient 1/4-inch rivets should be added to the standard pattern to remove the buckles. (Cessna Service Letters No. 45 dated July 30, 1947, and No. 47 dated August 15, 1947; Edo Drawing 88-03-00A, change 1, dated May 15, 1947; and Edo Service Bulletin No. 3 dated August 30, 1947, cover this same subject.)
76-26-05: 76-26-05 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM (MBB): Amendment 39-2794. Applies to all Model BO-105A and BO-105C helicopters, certificated in all categories, incorporating main rotor brake system, MBB P/N 105-10501. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible rotor failure with consequent engine damage, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, except that the helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the work can be performed, accomplish the following: (1) Install an operating limitation placard on the instrument panel in full view of the pilot, setting forth the following limitation: "DO NOT OPERATE ROTOR BRAKE." (2) Inspect the main rotor brake saddle Goodrich P/N 2-1188, for loose or detached brake blocks, Goodrich P/N 27-516. (b) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD a loose brake block is found, before further flight, remove the main rotor brake saddle in accordance with the procedures contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this AD. (c) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD a brake block is found detached, before further flight, accomplish the following: (1) Inspect the main gearbox compartment for the brake block or brake block debris. If the entire brake block is not recovered, inspect the compressor section of each engine for foreign object damage, and repair, as necessary, in accordance with the Allison Maintenance and Overhaul Manual for the Model 250 engine. (2) Remove the main rotor brake saddle as follows: (i) Detach pressure hose, P/N 105-10610, at rotor brake saddle. (ii) Operate brake lever until flow of fluid from detached hoses ceases. (iii) Detach hose, P/N 105-10610, from pressure relief valve, P/N 105-10511. (iv) Seal outlet of pressure relief valve, P/N 105-10511, with non- metallic blind plug or with tape. (v) Remove bolts attaching main rotor brake saddle to main gearbox. (vi) Remove main rotor brake saddle. (d) If, during the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD, the brake block is found not to be loose or detached, within the next 10 hour time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the brake block saddle in accordance with the procedures contained in paragraph (c)(2) of this AD. (e) The operating limitations placard required by paragraph (a) of this AD, may be removed upon the installation of an improved main rotor brake saddle, Goodrich P/N 2-1188-J. NOTE: The helicopter is approved for operation without the main rotor brake saddle. This amendment becomes effective January 6, 1977.
2016-06-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of fuel leaking onto the hot exhaust portion of an engine as a result of an unintended leak path from the leading edge through the pylon. This AD requires installing new seal dams in the inboard and outboard corners of the aft pylon frame on the left and right engines, including an inspection for damage of the outboard blade seal and applicable corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel leaking from an unintended drain path from the leading edge through either the left or right pylon and onto the hot engine parts or brakes, which could lead to a major ground fire.
2016-06-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Quest Aircraft Design, LLC Model KODIAK 100 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of limited control yoke movement of the elevator control system due to cushion edging jammed in the elevator control anti-rotation guide slot. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the elevator control system cushion edging for proper condition; replacing the cushion edging; and at a specified time terminating the repetitive inspections by installing wear pads on the elevator bearing assemblies. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-26-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAe Systems (Operations) Limited Model ATP airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of a revision to the airworthiness limitations of the British Aerospace ATP Aircraft Maintenance Manual, which specifies new inspections and compliance times for inspection and replacement action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
53-17-01: 53-17-01 MOONEY: Applies to All Model M-18 Series Aircraft. Compliance required by October 15, 1953. To prevent possible fouling of controls and the control stick by foreign objects install canvas boot P/N 22-7 around control stick and secure to floor boards. These boots are available from Mooney Aircraft, Inc., Box 72, Kerrville, Texas. (Mooney Service Bulletin No. 11 covers this same subject.)
2016-06-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking at certain fastener locations in the window corners of the window belt area. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for fatigue cracking in certain fastener locations in the window corners of the window belt area, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides an optional preventive modification that terminates the inspections at the modified location. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking around fastener locations that could cause multiple window corner skin cracks, which could result in rapid decompression and loss of structural integrity of the airplane.
2016-05-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) PT6A-60AG, -65AG, -67AF, and -67AG turboprop engines. This AD requires removing Woodward fuel control units (FCUs) and installing an FCU that is eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by incidents of corrosion and perforation of the two-ply Cu-Be bellows in Woodward FCUs. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the Woodward FCU and engine, in-flight shutdown, and loss of control of the airplane.
2000-26-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of a revision to the airworthiness limitations of the British Aerospace J41 Aircraft Maintenance Manual. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
78-06-02: 78-06-02 MCCAULEY PROPELLERS: Amendment 39-3159 as amended by Amendment 39-3233. Applies to the following three bladed full feathering constant speed Model 3FF32C501 propellers installed on but not limited to the Cessna Model 421C and 404 aircraft: Affected Propeller Serial Numbers 769303 769304 769571 769572 769573 769574 769575 769576 769577 769578 769579 769580 769581 769582 769583 769584 769585 769586 769587 769588 769589 769590 770176 770177 770178 770179 770601 770602 770603 770604 770605 770606 770607 770643 770644 770645 770646 770647 770648 770649 770650 770651 770652 770653 770654 771239 771291 771318 771319 771320 771321 771322 771323 771324 771325 771326 771327 771328 771329 771330 771331 771332 771333 771334 771335 771491 771492 771493 771495 771496 771497 771498 771499 771500 771534 771535 771536 771537 771538 771539 771540 771734 771735 771736 771737 771738 771739 771740 771741 771742 771743 771744 771745 771746 771747 771748 771839 771840 771841 771843 771848 772212 772213 772335 772336 772337 772338 772339 772340 772341 772342 772343 772344 772345 772346 772347 772348 772349 772396 772397 772398 772399 772400 772401 772429 772430 772432 772433 772434 772435 772436 772437 772438 772439 772440 772952 772953 772958 772959 772960 772961 772994 772995 772996 772997 772998 772999 773000 773047 773048 773049 773050 773051 773052 773053 773054 773055 773056 773057 773058 773059 773060 773061 773062 773066 773184 773185 773186 773187 773188 773189 773190 773191 773348 773349 773350 773351 773352 773353 773356 773358 773359 773360 773361 773573 773574 773575 773896 773897 773898 773899 773903 773966 773969 773970 773971 773973 773974 774113 774116 774122 774124 774175 774178 774180 774181 NOTE: Serialnumbers are stamped on the side of the propeller hub. These propellers are equipped with Model 90UMB-0 blades. Compliance required before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a Federal Aviation Administration Certificate Propeller Repair Station. To prevent possible blade pitch control failures, accomplish the following: (a) Replace blade actuating pin screws, P/N A-1635-104 (cadmium plated), with new screws, P/N A-1635-108 (black oxide) in accordance with McCauley Service Bulletin No. 131 dated January 20, 1978, and Service Manual No. 751201 or later Federal Aviation Administration approved revisions. (b) Replacement of the above parts must be accomplished by a Federal Aviation Administration Certificated Propeller Repair Station, since it is considered a major repair. (c) When the affected propellers are approved for return to service, compliance with this airworthiness directive shall be noted in the Aircraft's Records. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified in this directive are incorporated herein and made part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by the directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to McCauley Accessory Division, Cessna Aircraft Company, Box 7, Roosevelt Station, Dayton, Ohio 45417. These documents may also be examined at the Great Lakes Regional Office, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591. A historical file on this airworthiness directive which includes incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the Great Lakes Region. Amendment 39-3101 became effective March 22, 1978. This amendment 39-3233 becomes effective on June 7, 1978.