Results
2010-19-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC AE 3007A series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or surface wave ultrasonic test (SWUT) inspection on each affected high-pressure turbine (HPT) wheel. This AD requires removing or performing initial and repetitive ECIs or SWUT inspections on HPT stage 2 wheels for cracks. This AD also reduces the approved life limits of certain HPT stage 2 wheels. This AD results from reports of cracked HPT stage 2 wheels. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained failure of the HPT stage 2 wheel and damage to the airplane.
2000-15-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection to determine if certain wire bundles are routed incorrectly and to detect damage, and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent damage of certain wire bundles routed to the fuel tank transfer pumps in the horizontal stabilizer, which could result in electrical arcing and a possible fire adjacent to the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2000-14-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain BFGoodrich main brake assemblies as installed on Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to determine the length of the wear indicator pins of the main brake assemblies of the main landing gear (MLG); follow-on inspections; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports from several operators that severe oxidation was found on the rotor disk assemblies of the main brake assemblies. This action is necessary to detect and correct thermal oxidation of the main brake assemblies, which could result in deterioration of the MLG brakes, and consequent reduced braking performance.
2015-19-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of a potential latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve actuator circuitry, which was not identified during actuator development. This AD requires replacing certain engine and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel shutoff valve actuators with new actuators, and also requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation into the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure.
2015-19-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2012-24-10 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. AD 2012-24-10 required installing new software, replacing the duct assembly with a new duct assembly, making wiring changes, and routing certain wire bundles. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2012- 24-10 and requires installing a new or serviceable pressure switch bracket and altitude pressure switch. This new AD also adds an airplane to the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports of intermittent or blank displays of a certain integrated display unit (IDU) that were due to an intermittent false electrical ground that was not addressed by the software installation or wiring changes required by AD 2012-24- 10. We are issuing this AD to prevent IDU malfunctions, which could affect the ability of the flightcrew to read primary displays for airplane attitude, altitude, or airspeed, and consequently reduce the ability of the flightcrewto maintain control of the airplane.
2000-14-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the upper and lower reading lights in the forward crew rest area with a redesigned light fixture. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and smoldering blankets in the forward crew rest area due to a reading light fixture that came into contact with the blankets after the light was inadvertently left on. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a possible flammable condition, which could result in smoke and fire in the forward crew rest area.
86-09-04: 86-09-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE AIRCRAFT GROUP: Amendment 39-5290. Applies to Model HS 748, constructor numbers 1793, 1794, and 1795 (Mod 402); and 1796 (Mod 400); and to any other airplanes which incorporate Modification 6953, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD. To prevent the accidental disarming of the emergency lighting system, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: 1. Modify the emergency lighting system in accordance with BAe HS 748 Service Bulletin 33/29, dated April 2, 1984. 2. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Inc., Librarian, Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective May 26, 1986.
81-26-06: 81-26-06 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-4283. Applies to Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, Serial Numbers as listed below, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: A. To prevent an unnecessary shutdown of the number 2 engine due to false Airborne Vibration Monitor System indications, incorporate electrical system modifications in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of Lockheed-California Company L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-23-083 dated October 13, 1981, for the following 42 aircraft: S/N 1083-1090 S/N 1117-1119 S/N 1134-1136 S/N 1092-1097 S/N 1121-1123 S/N 1139 S/N 1099-1103 S/N 1126-1129 S/N 1141 S/N 1105-1106 S/N 1132 S/N 1145-1147 S/N 1112-1113 B. Alternative means of compliance providing an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed-California Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Support Contracts, Dept. 63-11, U-33, B-1. These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108; or the Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. This Amendment becomes effective December 31, 1981.
2015-19-08: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-19-04, for all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2011-19-04 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the left- hand and right-hand inboard and outboard elevator servo-control rod eye-ends, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection to determine if certain elevator servo-control parts are installed, and replacement if necessary. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain elevator servo-control parts that do not conform to the approved type design have been installed and may have the potential of cracks in the rod eye-end. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct rod eye-end cracking, which could result in uncontrolled elevator surface and consequent reduced control of the airplane.
2000-14-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes equipped with General Electric Model CF6-45 or -50 series engines, that requires repetitive inspections and tests of the thrust reverser control and indication system, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires installation of a thrust reverser actuation system (TRAS) lock, repetitive functional tests of that installation, and repair, if necessary. Installation of the TRAS lock terminates the repetitive inspections and certain tests. This amendment is prompted by the results of a safety review, which revealed that in-flight deployment of a thrust reverser could result in a significant reduction in airplane controllability. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail-safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes, which could result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
82-26-07 R1: 82-26-07 R1 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Amendment 39-4512 as amended by Amendment 39-4884. Applies to Model 214ST helicopters certificated in all categories which have upper left tailboom attach longeron part number (P/N) 214-031-431-1 01 installed. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible separation of the tailboom from the fuselage due to failure of the upper left tailboom attach longeron, accomplish the following: (a) Before the first flight of each day on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification described in paragraph (d) below, inspect the aft portion of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment and the portion visible inside the aft left electrical compartment for cracks. (b) Within the next 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 20 hours time in service, and thereafterat intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service, perform the following inspection on those helicopters that have not had the longeron modification installed: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the upper left longeron, P/N 214-031-431- 101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, just aft of the fairing attach bracket, P/N 214-021-700-129. Inspect for a crack that may extend from the pin hole in the longeron across the longeron and forward. (c) If the longeron is found to be cracked during the inspections of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, replace it with a serviceable part and install the modification described in paragraph (d) below before further flight. (d) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 100 hours total time in service, whichever occurs later, install a reinforcement modification to the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, installation. This reinforcement consists of the addition of a new support, P/N 214-031-454-101, and the replacement of a doubler, P/N 214-031-702-131, with a new doubler, P/N 214-031-643-101. Remove the attaching pin, P/N 100-048-5-4, that is installed in the most aft hole in the longeron outboard flange and plug the remaining hole with adhesive. Accomplish the reinforcement in accordance with Bell Helicopter Textron (BHT) Alert Service Bulletin No. 214ST-82-3, dated 10/25/82 or other FAA approved data. (e) After installation of the longeron modification, conduct the following inspection at intervals not to exceed 250 hours time in service: (1) Remove forward fairing assembly, P/N 214-061-866-113, and LH and RH fairing assemblies, P/N's 214-061-866-115 and -117. (2) Visually inspect the aft end of the longeron, P/N 214-031-431-101, immediately adjacent to and inboard of the service deck, P/N 214-031-702-101, for cracks. Also, inspect that portion of the longeron adjacent to the newly installed support that is visible inside the aft left electrical compartment and that portion of the longeron that is visible inside the oil cooler compartment for cracks. (f) Replace any cracked parts found during the inspections of paragraph (e) with serviceable parts. (g) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. (h) In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the inspection required by this AD may be accomplished. Amendment 39-4512 became effective December 23, 1982. This Amendment 39-4884 becomes effective August 17, 1984.
2015-19-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which \n\n((Page 55528)) \n\ncould result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
2015-19-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the \n\n((Page 55522)) \n\nfuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
2015-17-24: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by numerous reports of failures of the proximity sensor within the slat skew detection mechanism assembly (DMA) leading to slats up landing events. This AD requires replacing the slat skew DMAs with new slat skew DMAs, and marking the existing identification plates on the slat with the new part number. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the proximity sensor, which could result in the slats being shut down and a slats up high speed landing. This condition, in combination with abnormal landing conditions such as a short runway or adverse weather conditions, could result in a runway excursion.
2000-14-10: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect failure of the attachment fasteners located in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer. That AD also requires a one-time inspection to detect cracking of the flanges and bolt holes of the banjo No. 4 fitting, and repair or replacement of the attachment fasteners with new, improved fasteners. This amendment adds a new one-time inspection to determine whether certain fasteners are installed in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer, and follow-on actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of certain fasteners installed in the banjo No. 4 fitting of the vertical stabilizer. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking of the attachment fasteners of the vertical stabilizer, which could result in loss of fail-safe capability of the vertical stabilizer and reduced controllability of the airplane. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC10-55-023, Revision 02, dated October 30, 1996; and McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin DC10-55-023, Revision 03, dated March 25, 1998; as listed in the regulations, is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 23, 2000.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 55-23, dated December 17, 1992; and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 55-23, Revision 1, dated December 17, 1993; as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 24, 1997 (61 FR 12015, March 25, 1996).
2000-14-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires replacement of any brake system accumulator that has aluminum end caps with an accumulator that has stainless steel end caps. This amendment is prompted by reports of fractures of aluminum end caps on brake system accumulators. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent high-velocity separation of a brake system accumulator barrel, piston, or end cap, which could result in injury to personnel in the wheel well area, loss of cabin pressurization, loss of certain hydraulic systems, or damage to the fuel line of the auxiliary power unit.
2000-14-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that requires replacement of existing door handle mounting hub assemblies with new, improved hub assemblies. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracked or broken mounting hub assemblies for the interior door handles on the cabin doors. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracking or breaking of the door handle mounting hub, which could result in the interior door handle breaking off while the door is being opened. In an emergency situation, this could impede evacuation of the airplane.
78-23-07: 78-23-07 HILLER HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3344. Applies to Hiller Model UH-12D, UH-12E and UH-12E (4 Place) helicopters certificated in all categories, including Military Models UH-23D, OH-23G, H-23F and turbine-powered models, equipped with the finite life components listed below: PART NO. NOMENCLATURE REPLACEMENT PERIOD APPLICABILITY 63192-7, -11 Snubber Assy., engine, longitudinal 4,650 hrs Note A 63192-5, -9 Snubber Assy., engine, lateral 4,650 hrs All 63197 Bracket, engine snubber 6,160 hrs All 63197-5 Bracket, engine snubber 9,850 hrs All 31197-3 Flyweight collective pitch ballast 2,500 hrs All 31318 Bellcrank, collective control 15,000 hrs Note B 31319-3 Tube, collective control 23,500 hrs Note B 31321 Shaft, dual collective control 10,400 hrs Note B 31344, -3, -5, or -9 Block Assy., collective stick 6,400 hrs Note B 31403 Arm Assy., collective and throttle controls 21,500 hrs E (4 place) 34141, -5 Scissor, cyclic control, lower 275 hrs All AN3-7A Attaching bolts, engine snubber (used to attach P/N 63197 bracket to deck and lord mount) 600 hrs All Note A - All models except turbine-powered. Note B - All models except UH-12D and UH-23D. To prevent failure of the above listed finite life components accomplish the following: (a) Within fifty (50) hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the service history of each of the finite life components listed in this AD for adequacy of documentation. NOTE: The finite life components may be documented by serial number, part nomenclature, part number or any combination. (b) For those finite life components listed in this AD for which service history can be documented, no further action is required by this AD. (c) For any finite life component listed in this AD for which service history cannot be documented: (1) Prior to further flight, remove and replace those finitelife components whose replacement period is less than helicopter total time in service. (2) Within five hundred (500) hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, remove and replace those components whose replacement period is greater than helicopter total time in service. NOTE: The Criteria in (c), (1) and (2) applies to aircraft in service. Finite life criteria for aircraft submitted for original airworthiness certification are contained in AC-21-13. (d) Only finite life components for which prior service history or representation as new can be documented may be used as replacement parts. Equivalent inspection procedures may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective December 14, 1978.
90-13-13: 90-13-13 GENERAL DYNAMICS (CONVAIR): Amendment 39-6638. Docket No. 89-NM-235-AD. Applicability: Models 340, 440, and C-131, B, C, D, E, F, and G (Military) series airplanes, including all airplanes converted to turbopropeller power, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent progressive damage to the airframe, accomplish the following: A. Perform a visual inspection of the fuselage frames in accordance with General Dynamics, Convair Division, Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 53-15, Revision 1, dated December 1, 1989, in accordance with the schedule below. Any drilled holes found which do not conform to the limitations specified in the service bulletin, or any holes found which are cracked, must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. Any holes specifically used for attaching an FAA-approved interior, or original Convair manufacturing holes, may be disregarded ifthey are not degraded or cracked, and if they meet the criteria specified in the service bulletin. 1. Within 1,650 hours time-in-service or 18 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish the inspections specified in Part I of the service bulletin. 2. Within 2,300 hours time-in-service or 24 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish the inspections specified in Part II of the service bulletin. B. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). The PMI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the General Dynamics, Convair Division, P. O. Box 85377, San Diego, California 92138, Attn: Chief, Aircraft Logistical Support, Mail Zone 92-2920. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6638, AD 90-13-13) becomes effective on July 30, 1990.
66-04-02: 66-04-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 39-187 Part 39 Federal Register January 29, 1966. Applies to Models 188A and 188C Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated. In order to detect and remove or repair damage, and to retard cracking induced by corrosion in the upper and lower wing plank splice areas and at the access door-to-plank splices, accomplish the inspections and repairs set forth herein, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. The inspection required by (a) must be continued until inspection of the same area in accordance with (b) and (c) has been accomplished. (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours' time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service from last inspection: (1) Visually inspect internally for cracks the upper wing plank splice underlying tang riser radius adjacent to risers Nos. 29, 36, 43 and 50, in the wing area located between the upper inboard nacelle skate angles, except those areas covered with production doublers or repair doublers. (This area is shown in Item 5, Figure 3 and Riser Locations, Figure 4, of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E or later FAA-approved revision. (2) For airplanes utilizing the area described in (a)(1) as an integral fuel tank, purge the tank and remove the sealant covering the inspection areas before each inspection. (This area is shown in Item 5 and upper 1/2 inch of aft face of Item 11, Figure 3 of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E or later FAA-approved revision. (b) For airplanes on which the splice gap has been widened to a width of 0.070 0.010 inch and has been cleaned, sealed, and painted in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.J. through 2.N., or later FAA-approved revision, accomplish the inspections set forth in (1) on the areas and at the times prescribed in (2), except those areas covered with production doublers or repair doublers. (1) Visually inspect for corrosion around fastener heads and for bulging between fasteners and along the wing plank edge, and ultrasonically inspect for corrosion and cracks in the wing plank splices in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.B or later FAA-approved revision. (2) Inspect the areas described in Column 1 of the following table at the time specified in Column 2 unless already accomplished within the time specified in Column 3. These inspections must be repeated once at the time interval specified in Column 4 and thereafter at the time interval specified in Column 5 beginning at the time of the last inspection. AREA (Col.1) INITIAL TIME (Col. 2) LAST INSPECTION (Col. 3) 1st REPETITIVE (Col. 4) REPETITIVE (Col. 5) UPPER WING SURFACE 2. Under fuselage fillets 1400 2600 40008000 3. Between fillet and wing station 83 1400 2600 4000 8000 4. Around inboard fuel tank access door 700 3300 4000 8000 5. Between nacelle skate angle & wing station 155 700 3300 4000 8000 6. Between nacelle skate angle & wing station 221 700 3300 4000 8000 7. Between wing station 221 & 257 at planks 2-3 splice & planks 3-4 splice 1400 2600 4000 8000 8. Around outboard fuel tank access door 700 3300 4000 8000 9. Around fuel probe access door 1400 2600 4000 8000 10. All remaining splices except center section wing between fuselage fillets 2000 2000 4000 8000 LOWER WING SURFACE 2. Under fuselage fillets 1400 6600 8000 8000 3. Between fillet & wing station 83 1400 6600 8000 8000 4. Between nacelle skate angles & wing sta. 155 & 221 700 7300 8000 8000 5. Around access doors 14006600 8000 8000 6. All remaining splices except center section wing between fuselage fillets 2000 6000 8000 8000 (c) For airplanes on which the splice gap has not been widened to a width of 0.070 + 0.010 inch in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.C(a), accomplish any one of the following: (1) Inspect in accordance with the provisions of (b)(1) at the times specified for initial inspection set forth in (b)(2), accomplish the requirements of (d), widen all unwidened joints to a width of 0.070 + 0.010 inch, and clean, seal, and paint the joints, unless already accomplished, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.J. through 2.N., or later FAA-approved revision. These requirements must be accomplished on those areas specified in the table set forth in (b), except areas covered by production doublers or repair doublers. The inspections must be repeated at the intervals specified in the table set forth in (b). (2) Inspect in accordance with the provisions of (b)(1) at the times specified for initial inspection set forth in (b) (2), accomplish the requirements of (d), and clean, seal, and paint the unwidened joints, unless already accomplished, in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.J., through 2.N., or later FAA-approved revision. These requirements must be accomplished on those areas specified in the table set forth in (b), except areas covered by production or repair doublers. The inspections must be repeated once within a time interval of not less than 1800 hours' time in service and not more than 2200 hours' time in service from the time the splices were sealed, after which the repetitive inspection intervals specified in the table set forth in (b) may be used. (3) Widen the splice gap to a constant width of 0.070 + 0.010 inch, if not previously accomplished, and visually inspect for corrosion around fastener heads and for bulging between fasteners and along the wing plank edge, and in the wing plank splices in accordance with the instructions of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.B. or later FAA-approved revision. If corrosion is detected in the skin riser radius of the underlying tang, inspect the radius for cracks by the dye penetrant procedure described in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.C. or later FAA-approved revision. These requirements must be accomplished on those areas and at the time specified for initial inspection set forth in (b)(2), except areas covered by production doublers or repair doublers. Accomplish the repairs as necessary in accordance with (d). These inspections must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 1000 hours' time in service from the last inspection until the joints have been cleaned, sealed, and painted in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.J. through 2.N., or later FAA-approved revision after which the repetitive inspection intervals specified in the table set forth in (b) may be used. (4) Inspect in accordance with the provisions of (b)(1), the areas specified in the table set forth in (b)(2), except those areas covered by production doublers or repair doublers, at the time specified for initial inspection set forth in that table. Accomplish the repairs as necessary in accordance with (d). These inspections must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 1,000 hours' time in service from the last inspection until the provisions of (1) or (2) are accomplished. (d) Remove all corrosion and cracks found during the inspections performed in accordance with (a), (b), and (c) before further flight, in accordance with the instructions provided in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.E. and 2.F. or later FAA-approved revision, except that removal of corrosion damage that does not exceed the limits of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.G. or later FAA-approved revision, may be deferred for an interval not to exceed 300 hours' time in service. Repair all areas where material removed exceeds the limits of Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Section 2.G. or later FAA-approved revision, before further flight in accordance with the instructions provided in Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.O. and 2.P., or 2.O. and 2.Q. or later FAA-approved revision. If a repair described in Section 2.P. is used, the instructions in 2.P. pertaining to special inspections, inspection intervals, and additional repairs must be complied with. The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the corrosion removal and repairs can be performed. (e) Within 4,000 hours' time in service after December 29, 1966, for airplanes with splices sealed before that date, and within 4,000 hours' time in service after the splices are sealed for airplanes with splices sealed after December 29, 1966, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours' time in service from the date of the last inspection: (1) Visually inspect splices, except areas covered by production doublers or repair doublers, or enclosed by fillets and nacelle structure, for looseness of sealant. (2) Re-seal any loose areas in accordance with Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620E, Sections 2.J. through 2.N., or later FAA-approved revision. (f) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. (g) The inspection provisions of (b)(2) table, columns 2, 3, and 4, of this revision, are considered to have been previously accomplished if, prior to the effective date of this revision, inspections were accomplished in accordance with theprovisions listed in (b)(2) table, columns 2, 3, and 4, of Amendment 39-187, AD-66-04-02. In addition, the repairs accomplished in accordance with AD 66-04-02 are not affected by this amendment. (Lockheed Service Bulletin 88/SB-620D covers this same subject). This directive effective January 29, 1966. Revised February 11, 1966. Revised April 26, 1966. Revised December 29, 1966. Revised February 18, 1967.
2015-18-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Vulcanair S.p.A. Model P.68R airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as a discrepancy in the climb performance reported in the airplane flight manual and in the actual performance of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-19-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrence of corrosion on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) mounting rods that could cause the APU rod to break, affecting the APU support structure integrity. * * * * * APU support structure failure could result in loss of power of the APU and possible loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-14-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Short Brothers Model SD3-60 series airplanes, that requires affixing a label containing revised engine limitations on the ditching hatch, and revising the airplane flight manual to reflect the revised engine limitations. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the use of incorrect engine limitations, which could result in an overspeed of the propellers and potential for blade failure.
2000-14-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the fuselage skin adjacent to the drag splice fitting to detect cracking, and follow-on actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage, and consequent rapid depressurization of the airplane.
89-18-08: 89-18-08 GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION: Amendment 39-6307. Applicability: Gulfstream Aerospace Models AA-5, AA-5A, AA-5B, and GA-7 (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 25 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To preclude fuel tank/fuel system contamination caused by deterioration of fuel tank access cover sealant, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the fuel tanks, fuel system, and the electric fuel pump filter for fuel tank sealant contamination in accordance with the instructions specified in Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (GAC) Service Bulletin (SB) No. 176, dated July 26, 1989, or GAC S/B No. ME 22, dated July 26, 1989, as applicable. If contamination is detected, prior to further flight clean the fuel system and all fuel system components in accordance with the instructions in the above listed applicable GAC S/B. (b) Reseal the fuel tank access covers using high-octane fuel resistant sealant per the instructions in the applicable GAC S/B listed in paragraph (b) of this AD. (c) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, Technical Operations Department, Travis Field, P.O. Box 2206, Savannah, Georgia 31402-2206; or may examine the documents at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment (39-6307, AD 89-18-08) becomes effective on September 21, 1989.