Results
72-10-02: 72-10-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-1444. Applies to 707 and 720 Series Airplanes utilizing single attachment point escape slides listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 3078, dated January 10, 1972, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tTo preclude loss of escape slide retention at the forward and aft passenger doors accomplish the following: \n\n\tWithin the next 500 hours in service after the effective date of the A.D., unless previously accomplished, replace the two spring pins in the floor attach fitting with new spring pins in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3078, dated January 10, 1972, or later FAA- approved revision, or equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region.\n \n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 7, 1972.
2009-02-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the CL-600-2C10/CL-600-2D24 aircraft fuel system against the new fuel tank safety standards. * * * The assessment showed that a single failure due to chafing of fuel system wiring with high power wiring at the centre fuel tank front spar could result in overheating of the fuel boost pump. The assessment also showed that chafing of the high power wiring with the centre fuel tank front spar structures could result in overheating of the fuel tank wall. Overheating of * * * the fuel tank wall could lead to hot surface ignition resulting in a fuel tank explosion. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-16-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 777 series airplanes, that requires modification of the supports for the wire bundles of the fuel quantity indicator system (FQIS), and follow-on actions, if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing of the FQIS wiring on surrounding structures and systems. Such chafing could result in exposure of the bare conductor in close proximity to structures or other electrically conductive return paths, and potential electrical arcing and explosion in the fuel tank in the event of an additional wiring failure outside the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-16-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 and -300 series airplanes, that requires inspecting the identification plate on the fire extinguisher bottle of the auxiliary power unit (APU), and replacing the existing actuating cartridge of the fire extinguisher bottle with a correct actuating cartridge, if necessary. This AD also requires removing the fire extinguisher bottle equipped with the actuating cartridge from the APU, and reinstalling the fire extinguisher bottle equipped with the correct actuating cartridge into the APU. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the actuating cartridge on the APU fire extinguisher, which could result in the inability to extinguish an APU fire in-flight, and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2025-01-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 787-8, 787-9, and 787-10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of operators receiving No. 1 flight compartment windows that may not meet type design requirements for withstanding a bird impact. This AD requires replacing affected No. 1 flight compartment windows and prohibits the installation of affected windows. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-24-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for SOCATA Model TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as corrosion of the horizontal stabilizer. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-16-23: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and "900 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive tests of the rudder pedal force or repetitive inspections of the rudder feel and centering unit to determine the condition of the inner spring; corrective action if necessary; and eventual replacement of the spring assembly on the rudder feel and centering unit with a new assembly, which would terminate the repetitive requirements. This action is necessary to prevent reduced rudder pedal feel and centering force, which, combined with failure of the outer spring of the spring assembly, could result in pilot-induced oscillation and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-14-27: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0070, 0100, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 series airplanes, that currently requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) that prohibits takeoff in certain icing conditions unless either a tactile inspection is performed or specific takeoff procedures are followed. This amendment requires adding a requirement, for certain airplanes, for modification of the wing leading edge ice protection system to include on-ground wing ice protection, and a new revision to the AFM. This amendment is prompted by the development of a modification that introduces a wing anti-icing system that will operate on the ground as well as in flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent takeoff with snow, ice, or frost on the critical surfaces of the airplane, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2015-24-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, A340- 300, A340-500, and A340-600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of skin disbonding on a composite side panel of a rudder installed on an A310 airplane. This AD requires a review of the maintenance records of the rudder to determine if any composite side shell panel repair has been done; a thermography inspection limited to the repair areas or complete side shells, as applicable, to identify possible in-service rudder repairs, damages, or fluid ingress; and applicable related investigative and corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct the rudder skin disbonding, which could affect the structural integrity of the rudder, and could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
88-12-02: 88-12-02 SCHWEIZER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER COMPANY; HUGHES HELICOPTERS, INC.): Amendment 39-5926. Applies to Model 269C helicopters certificated in any category, equipped with tail rotor retention strap assemblies, P/N 269A6065 and P/N 369A1706. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the tail rotor retention strap assembly which could result in loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, or upon the accumulation of 3,540 hours time in service, whichever occurs later, remove tail rotor retention strap assemblies, P/N 269A6065 and P/N 369A1706, from service. (b) Replace P/N 269A6065 and P/N 369A1706 with serviceable parts. (c) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (d) Alternative inspection, modification,or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. This amendment becomes effective June 10, 1988.
93-25-04: 93-25-04 GULFSTREAM: Amendment 39-8770. Docket 93-NM-190-AD. Applicability: Model G-1159 (G-II) series airplanes equipped with Aviation Partners winglets manufactured in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA5964NM, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent in-flight failure of one or both winglets, and a resultant unsafe flutter condition of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD. (1) Remove the Aviation Partners winglets manufactured in accordance with STC SA5964NM and, prior to further flight, restore the airplane to its original type design. The FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) limitation, previously imposed by STC SA5964NM, may be removed following removal of these winglets. Or (2) Revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved AFM to restrict the gross operating weight and/or operating speed in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) This amendment becomes effective on January 3, 1994.
2015-23-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. This AD was prompted by new occurrences of certain cracked main landing gear (MLG) rear hinge pins. This AD requires identifying the serial number and part number of the MLG rear hinge pins, and replacing pins or the MLG if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked rear hinge pins, which could lead to MLG structural failure, possibly resulting in collapse of the MLG and consequent injury to the occupants of the airplane.
2015-23-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2008-22-20 for certain Airbus Model A330-200, A330-300, and A340-300 series airplanes. AD 2008-22-20 required repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking, repair if necessary, and modification of the upper shell structure of the fuselage. This new AD shortens certain compliance times. This AD was prompted by a determination from a fatigue and damage tolerance evaluation that the compliance times must be reduced. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the upper shell structure of the fuselage, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2002-16-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 727 series airplanes that have been converted from a passenger- to a cargo-carrying ("freighter") configuration, that requires, among other actions, installation of a fail-safe hinge, redesigned main deck cargo door warning and power control systems, and 9g crash barrier. This amendment is prompted by the FAA's determination that the main deck cargo door hinge is not fail-safe; that certain main deck cargo door control systems do not provide an adequate level of safety; and that the main deck cargo barrier is not structurally adequate during an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the main deck cargo door hinge or failure of the cargo door system, which could result in the loss or opening of the cargo door while the airplane is in flight, and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane, including possible loss of flight control or severe structural damage; and to prevent failure of the main deck cargo barrier during an emergency landing, which could injure occupants.
2002-14-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and -11F airplanes that requires installation of a new support bracket with a clamp and screw to support the wire harness of the integrated drive generator (IDG). This action is necessary to prevent chafing and arcing of the wire harness of the IDG due to inadequate support, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the area of the forward engine mount. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
90-15-17: 90-15-17 BOEING: Amendment 39-6673. Docket No. 89-NM-210-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 28A1072, dated August 27, 1987, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent engine fuel starvation resulting from main wing tank suction feed system stress fractures or fuel boost pump bypass valve freezing, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 150 flight hours after January 27, 1988 (the effective date of Amendment 39-5823, AD 88-01-06), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hours, perform an operational test of the bypass valves in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1072, dated August 27, 1987. \n\n\tB.\tThe operational tests required by paragraph A., above, may be terminated when the fuel system modifications, detailed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-28A1072, Revision 2, dated February 18, 1988, or Revision 3, dated October 6, 1988, are installed. \n\n\tC.\tFor airplanes modified in accordance with paragraph B., above: Within one year after the effective date of this amendment, conduct an inspection of the suction feed bypass system for preloading in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1072, Revision 4, dated August 7, 1989. If preloading is discovered in the suction feed bypass system, prior to further flight, modify in accordance with that service bulletin. \n\n\tD.\tFor all other airplanes: Within one year after the effective date of this amendment, modify the fuel boost pump bypass valves system in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-28A1072, Revision 4, dated August 7, 1989. This modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive operational tests required by paragraph A., above. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approvedby the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 88-01-06 R1, Amendment 39-5990. \n\tThis amendment (39-6673, AD 90-15-17) becomes effective on August 27, 1990.
87-17-04: 87-17-04 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5705. Applies to Model BAe-146 series airplanes listed in British Aerospace BAe-146 Service Bulletin 27-54-70193A, Revision 1, dated June 3, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished: To prevent the loss of primary or secondary drive of the flap system torque limiter output, accomplish the following: A. Inspect torque limiter drive sprocket splines for excessive backlash and replace, if necessary, in accordance with BAe Alert Service Bulletin 27-A54, Revision 1, dated April 22, 1986. B. Repeat the following inspections described in BAe Service Bulletin 27-A54, Revision 1, dated April 22, 1986; 1. Paragraph 2A: At intervals not exceeding 600 landings. 2. Paragraph 2B: At intervals not exceeding 300 landings. C. Modification of the flap drive system in accordance with BAe Modification Service Bulletin 27-54-70193A, Revision 1, dated June 3, 1986, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph B., above. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Service Bulletin Librarian, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective September 14, 1987.
77-24-05: 77-24-05 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3087. Applies to Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-30, DC-10-30F, and DC-10-40 airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent in-flight separation of an air conditioning compartment access door accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tUnless already accomplished, within 2000 flight hours after January 12, 1977, (the effective date of AD 77-01-04) accomplish the inspection and rigging procedure specified in the DC-10 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 52-42-01, Temporary Revision 52-231, dated September 17, 1976, Paragraph 3, or later FAA approved revision with the following manual amendments: \n\n\t\t(1)\tSteps outlined in 3.A.(1), (a) through (d) and 3.A.(2) may be omitted. \n\n\t\t(2)\tBefore accomplishing steps 3.A.(3), (a), and (b) and (3a), (a) through (g) inspect the doors to verify that when the upper edge of the door makes contact with the door jamb the clearance does not exceed 1.2 inches between thelower edge of the door and door jamb. If this dimension is not exceeded, steps 3.A.(3), (a) and (b) and (3a), (a) through (g) may be omitted. Otherwise, those steps must be performed. \n\n\t(b)\tUnless already accomplished, within the next 2000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD modify the air conditioning compartment access door handle as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tInstall a Camloc stud (fastener) in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 52-116, dated July 2, 1974, or later FAA approved revision, or \n\n\t\t(2)\tInstall a handle catch in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin No. 52-168, dated June 7, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the air conditioning compartment access door is removed to accomplish the handle modification, verify the door handle position and loads are in accordance with paragraphs 3.A(11) and 3.A(18) of the DC-10 Maintenance Manual, Chapter 52-42-01, Temporary Revision 52-231, dated September 17, 1976,or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\t(c)\tEquivalent procedures or modifications may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes AD 77-01-04. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 6, 1978.
2015-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Zodiac Aerotechnics (formerly Intertechnique Aircraft Systems) flightcrew oxygen mask regulators as installed on, but not limited to, various transport and small airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that improper maintenance on oxygen mask regulators was found. This AD requires the identification and replacement of all potentially affected units. This AD also requires installation of a placard and revision of the airplane flight manual to include an operational procedure for use in case of depressurization. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct affected oxygen mask regulators, which could lead to inadequate protection to the affected flightcrew against hypoxia. [[Page 72577]] Hypoxia can start from a headache and drowsiness and lead eventually to unconsciousness with severe consequence in terms of airplane controllability.
73-12-11: 73-12-11 BEECH: Amdt. 39-1662 as amended by Amendment 39-1691. Applies to Models 23, B23, and C23 (Serial Numbers M-1 through M-554 and M-1095 through M-1361, except M-3); Sundowner C23 (Serial Numbers M-1362 through M-1420, M-1423, M-1425, M- 1430, M-1438, M-1439, M-1442, M-1447, and M-1453 through M-1473); Models A23-19, 19A, M-19A, and B19 (Serial Numbers MB-1 through MB-520); and Sport B19 (Serial Numbers MB- 521 through MB-585) airplanes which do not have carburetor alternate air boxes modified in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instruction 0574-241 (installation of Beech P/N 23-9011-1S, 3S, or 5S Kits). Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent engine power loss caused by ingestion of pieces of failed carburetor air valves, accomplish the following: A) Prior to further flight, except that the airplane may be ferried to the inspection location and at subsequent intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service, inspect the carburetor air box for the following: 1) Wear and looseness between the carburetor alternate air valve and its shaft. 2) Looseness of rivets which hold the valve plates together. 3) Looseness and wear of the cap screws which attach the valve plates to the shaft. If any of these conditions are found, accomplish Paragraph B below. B) Within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, remove the existing carburetor air box valve and install Beech P/N 23-9011-1S or 23-9011-3S or 23-9011-5S Kit, as applicable, in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions 0574-241, or later FAA-approved revision or any alternate modification approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. The repetitive inspections specified in Paragraph A may be discontinued when this modification is accomplished. This AD Amendment 39-1662 cancels and supersedes AD 72-01-04. Amendment 39-1662 became effective June 18, 1973. This amendment 39-1691 becomes effective July 27, 1973, to all persons except those to whom it was made effective by letter dated July 9, 1973.
2015-22-11: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2011-09-04 for all Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes. AD 2011-09-04 required repetitive inspections for damage to the lower surface of the center wing box (CWB), and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds related investigative actions, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) that indicated that the CWB is subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the lower surface of the CWB, which could result in structural failure of the wings.
90-26-51: 90-26-51 BOEING: Amendment 39-6881. Docket No. 90-NM-278-AD. Final Rule of Telegraphic AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes, line number 001 through 340, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect defective torque tube fittings in the leading edge slat drive system, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 20 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the outboard leading edge slat torque tube fittings in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 27A0110, dated December 13, 1990. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf a defective torque tube fitting is found, prior to further flight, replace the fitting or install a new torque tube assembly in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-27A0110, dated December 13, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tNo further action is required if the torque tube fitting is found to have the correct dimensions. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 10 days after completion of the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, submit a report of findings of discrepancies to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; Rapid fax: (206) 227-1181. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6881, AD 90-26-51) becomes effective on February 19, 1991, as to all persons, except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T90-26-51, issued on December 13, 1990, which contained this amendment.
90-26-11: 90-26-11 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-6840. Docket No. 90-ASW-15. Applicability: All Bell Model 212 helicopters, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent fatigue failure of the main rotor drag brace assembly which could result in loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, determine if drag brace assemblies, part numbers (P/N) 204-011-140-003 or -005, are installed in the main rotor hub assembly, P/N 204-012-101-009. For helicopters equipped with drag brace assembly, P/N 204-011-140-003 or -005, comply with the requirements of paragraph (b). (b) For main rotor hub assemblies, P/N 204-012-101-009, with 1,200 or more hours' time in service, since new or since the last overhaul, comply with the following within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, comply at intervals of 1,200 hours' time in service from the last inspection- (1) Remove the main rotor drag brace assemblies, P/N 204-011-140-003 or - 005. Inspect for corrosion and mechanical damage. Magnetic particle inspect all parts (as specified in BHTI Component Repair and Overhaul Manual, BHT-212-CR&O-1); (2) If cracks are found, or if corrosion or mechanical damage is present which cannot be removed within the rework limits of BHT-212-CR&O-1, replace with serviceable parts; and (3) Assemble the drag brace assemblies as specified in BHTI Component Repair and Overhaul Manual, BHT-212-CR&O-1, with the following additions: (i) Apply a soft film corrosion preventive compound to the barrel threads prior to assembly. (ii) Install the drag brace assemblies and torque the locking nuts to 275-325 foot pounds. (iii) After first flight confirm the torque of 275-325 foot pounds and apply a hard film corrosion preventive compound to the exposed threads. (c) An alternative method of compliance, or adjustment of compliance times, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. (d) Bell Helicopter, Inc., Alert Service Bulletin 212-90-59, dated February 5, 1990, provides an acceptable means of compliance with this AD. This amendment (39-6840, AD 90-26-11) becomes effective on January 18, 1991.
2015-23-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-100-1A10 (Challenger 300) airplanes. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of chafing found on an electrical wiring harness in the aft equipment bay, caused by contact between the wiring harness and a neighboring hydraulic line. This AD requires an inspection, repair if necessary, and modification of the wiring harness installation to ensure that the wiring harness routing is correct and a minimum clearance between the wire and the hydraulic line is maintained. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing on an electrical wiring harness, which could cause an electrical short circuit or lead to a malfunction of the flight control system, the engine indication system, or the hydraulic power control system; and adversely affect the continued safe operation and landing of the airplane.
2015-21-06: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-07-08 for certain The Boeing Company \n\n((Page 69840)) \n\nModel 737 airplanes. AD 2002-07-08 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the lower skin at the lower row of fasteners in the lap joints of the fuselage; repair of any cracking found; modification of the fuselage lap joints at certain locations, which terminated the repetitive inspections of the modified areas; and replacement of a certain preventive modification with an improved modification. This new AD adds repetitive inspections for cracking at certain window corner fastener holes, a preventive modification, and repair if necessary. This AD was prompted by the FAA's determination that certain modifications of the fuselage lap joints do not provide an adequate level of safety, and the subsequent discovery of cracks in additional fastener locations in the window belt skin panels, adjacent stringers, and window frames in locations outside the previous inspection area. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage lap joints and window belt skin panels, which could result in reduced structural integrity and sudden decompression of the airplane.