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2010-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been determined that due to an intermittent communication between AMS [Air Management System] controller cards and both Secondary Power Distribution Assemblies (SPDAs) the message "RECIRC SMK DET FAIL'' is displayed in the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). This communication failure could result in loss of automatic activation of engine inlet ice protection system when in ice condition. In this situation the caution messages "A-I Eng 1 Fail'' and "A-I Eng 2 Fail'' will be displayed and if the flight crews do not follow the associated procedures ice may accrete in the engines inlet and cause a dual engine shut down. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
84-15-03: 84-15-03 BOEING VERTOL COMPANY: Amendment 39-4892. Applies to Boeing Vertol Model 234 helicopters certified in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent bypassing of the lower boost dual actuating cylinder(s) and to prevent fatigue failures of NAS 1351-3H10P cap screws on lower boost dual actuating cylinders in the flight control system, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, revise Boeing Vertol Rotorcraft Model 234 Flight Manual by inserting Revision 13 dated May 9, 1984. (b) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect for water and total chlorine of the aircraft hydraulic system fluid in accordance with the contamination level test procedure specified in Boeing Process Specification BAC 5820, Revision A, as amended by Process Specification Department Number 8-2. An alternate inspection (including intervals between inspections) may be approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. For aircraft exceeding allowable contamination levels, flush the hydraulic system in accordance with the procedure specified in Boeing Vertol telex No. 8-1420-3-5459 dated May 25, 1984, or an equivalent approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. Sample to insure acceptability following flushing. Repeat the contamination level test procedure at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time in service, except that an alternate interval approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581, may besubstituted. (c) Within the next 200 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and subsequent to accomplishing the work of paragraph (b), remove all lower boost dual actuating cylinders Part Numbers (P/N) 234HS560-1 and -2 and inspect the shutoff valve spools for any visual signs of staining or pitting on the spool lands (shiny, lapped, interface surface). Replace the actuator with a serviceable part if staining or pitting is found, except for staining between lands in the machined clearance areas if no scaling rust or corrosive debris is present. A follow-on spool inspection is not required unless the repetitive fluid contamination level test cited in paragraph (b) shows an increase in chlorine contamination levels. Prior to returning the actuator to service, replace shutoff valve lap assembly P/N 1303-084, Rev. C, with shutoff valve lap assembly P/N 1303-084, Rev. D. (d) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 575 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service, replace the six NAS 1351-3H1OP cap screws that attach the gland retainers, P/N 1303-044, to the actuator manifold assembly, P/N 1303-010, on all four lower boost dual actuating cylinders, P/N's 234HS560-1 and -2, with zero time screws. Torque the new screws to a value of 30- to 35-inch-pounds (wet). (e) Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service, conduct the inspections, jam indicator button checks, leakage checks, and safety wire replacement contained in paragraphs 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D, and 3E of Boeing Vertol telex No. 8-1420-3-5455 dated May 25, 1984, or an equivalent approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Valley Stream, New York 11581. (f) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, New England Region, may adjust the compliance times specified in this AD. This amendment becomes effective August 3, 1984.
88-21-02: 88-21-02 BEECH: Amendment 39-6028. Applies to the Beech airplanes listed below, certificated in any category: TABLE 1 MODEL SERIAL NUMBER COMPLIANCE PARAGRAPH F33A CE-621 through CE-1024 (b) F33C CJ-112 through CJ-155 (b) V35B D-9830 through D-10403 (b) A36 E-632 through E-789 E-790 through E-1945 E-1947 through E-2103 E-2105 through E-2110 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) (a)(b) A36TC, B36TC EA-2 through EA-319 EA-321 through EA-388 (a)(b) (a)(b) 95-B55, 95-B55A TC-1918 through TC-2456 (b) E-55, E-55A TE-1071 through TE-1201 (b) 58, 58A TH-579 through TH-702 TH-703 through TH-1388 TH-1390 through TH-1395 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) 58P, 58PA TJ-12 through TJ-27 TJ-28 through TJ-435 TJ-437 through TJ-443 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) 58TC, 58TCA TK-1, TK-2 TK-3 through TK-146 TK-148 through TK-150 (a) (a)(b) (a)(b) Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.To prevent failure of the pilots and copilots seat attachment during an emergency landing condition, accomplish the following: (a) For the airplanes identified in Table 1 as requiring Compliance Paragraph (a): Fill the three aft seat positioning holes in the center seat tracks of the pilot and copilot seats in accordance with Beech Service Bulletin Number 2010, Revision 1, dated May 1988. The seat track reinforcement provided in Beech Service Bulletin Number 2233, dated April 1988, may be installed in lieu of filling these holes. (b) For the airplanes identified in Table 1 as requiring Compliance Paragraph (b): (1) Inspect the aft bolts on the two aft feet on both the pilot and copilot seat frame assemblies to insure that a AN960-10 washer has been installed under the nut. If a washer has been installed and the provisions of paragraph (a) have been completed, if applicable, the airplane may be returned to service. (2) If no washer is found per paragraph (b)(1) above, prior to further flight install an AN960-10 washer under the nut, on the lower aft bolt as shown in Service Bulletin No. 2010, Revision 1, dated May 1988. This applies to both the left and right hand sides of the pilot and copilot seat frame assemblies. (c) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (d) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Rm 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 946-4400. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Beech Aircraft Corporation, Commercial Service, Dept. 52, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201-0085; or may examine the documents referred to herein at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Thisamendment, 39-6028, becomes effective on October 31, 1988.
90-02-01: 90-02-01 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-6460. Docket No. 89-NM-255-AD. Applicability: Model BAe-146 series airplanes, Serial Numbers up to and including E3125, equipped with a rear left modular toilet (BAe Modifications HCM00344A and HCM30102C), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent damage to or jamming of the flight controls, accomplish the following: A. Within 14 days after the effective date of this AD, perform an inspection of the elevator control cables and the water pipe assembly in the vicinity of Frames 42 and 44, in accordance with British Aerospace Service Bulletin 27-A105, dated November 7, 1989. 1. If chafing or damage is found, repair and modify prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. 2. If the clearance between the water pipe assembly and the elevator control cable is not greater than 0.25 inch, modify within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the service bulletin. B. Repeat the procedures required by paragraph A., above, whenever a rear left-hand modular toilet is removed and reinstalled. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, PLC, Librarian for ServiceBulletins, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6460, AD 90-02-01) becomes effective on January 22, 1990.
90-05-06 R1: 90-05-06 R1 FAIRCHILD (SWEARINGEN): Amendment 39-6519 as revised by Amendment 39-6668. Docket No. 89-CE-32-AD. Applicability: Models SA226-T (Serial Numbers (S/N) T201 through T275, and T277 through T291), SA226-T(B) (S/N T(B)276 and T(B)292 through T(B)417), SA226-AT (S/N AT001 through AT074), SA226-TC (S/N TC201 through TC419), SA227-TT (S/N TT421 through TT541), SA227-AT (S/N AT423 through and AT695), SA227-AC (S/N AC406, AC415, AC416, and AC420 through AC729) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 250 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished per AD 90-05-06. To prevent the main landing gear doors from jamming against the nacelle skin and preventing the extension of the landing gear, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the gap between the main landing gear doors and the adjacent nacelle skins to insure a clearance of 0.38 plus/minus .03 inches in accordance withthe instructions specified in Fairchild Service Bulletin (S/B) SA226-32-055 and (S/B) SA227-32-027, both dated December 8, 1988, as applicable. If rework of the door(s) is required to obtain the specified clearance, prior to further flight, accomplish the task in accordance with the instructions in the above applicable S/B. (b) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (c) An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time which provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0150. Note: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein uponrequest to the Fairchild Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 790490, San Antonio, Texas 78279-0490, or may examine these documents at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th St., Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This AD amends AD 90-05-06, Amendment 39-6519. This amendment (39-6668, AD 90-05-06 R1) becomes effective on August 13, 1990.
97-03-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplanes, that requires repetitive checks to detect backlash in the elevator mechanical control system, and various follow-on actions. This amendment also provides for an optional terminating action for the repetitive check requirements. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that corrosion was found on the pivot bolts and bushings of the backlash remover lever mechanism on the elevator booster control unit (BCU) of a Model F28 Mark 0100 series airplane. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such corrosion, which could result in backlash in the elevator controls and reduced elevator control authority in the manual mode.
2011-03-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires an inspection to determine the serial numbers of the auxiliary power unit (APU) generator and the left and right engine direct current (DC) generators, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires revising the airplane flight manual. This AD was prompted by a report of a DC generator overvoltage event which caused smoke in the cockpit and damage to numerous avionics and electrical components. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct an overvoltage condition on the DC electrical busses caused by exciter stator winding failures, and subsequent failure of the generator control unit (GCU) overvoltage protection circuitry, which could result in damage to critical electrical and avionics components.
96-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) (Eurocopter) Model BO-105, BO-105A, BO-105C, BO-105S, and BO-105LS A-1 helicopters, that requires a ground test and inspection of the tandem hydraulic switch-over system (switch-over system) for component wear and parts replacement, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by incidents involving Model BO-105 series helicopters in which, during the switch-over from Hydraulic System 1 to Hydraulic System 2, a 3-inch drop in the collective occurred, caused by component wear in the switch-over system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect switch-over system component wear, which could result in a sudden drop in the collective and a sudden loss of altitude.
96-07-13: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect cracking of certain areas of the rear spar caps, web, skin, and certain fastener holes; and repair or modification, if necessary. That AD was prompted by reports of fatigue cracks in the caps, web, and skin of the wing rear spar inboard of inner wing station 346. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent rupture of the rear spar, which could result in extensive damage to the wing and fuel spillage. This amendment adds various improved inspections and follow-on actions, and requires that the initial inspections be accomplished at reduced thresholds.
55-24-01: 55-24-01 LUSCOMBE: Published in 21 FR 9540 on December 4, 1956, and as amended in 22 FR 2416 on April 11, 1957, is further amended by Amendment 39-1565 and 39-1640. Applies to All 8 Series Aircraft Except Model 8-F with Serial Numbers S-1 and Up. To be accomplished by March 1, 1956, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months from last inspection. Extreme surface corrosion has been found to exist inside the fuselage spar carry through structures P/N 28018 and 28019 of Luscombe Series 8 aircraft, particularly in those airplanes which are located near coastal areas. If allowed to progress, such corrosion could deteriorate the spar carry through members until a structural failure occurred. This corrosion is internal and cannot be detected by an external inspection. Therefore, the inside surfaces of the spar carry through members must be inspected. This may be accomplished by either of the two following acceptable methods: (1) Remove wings from the airplane and also the wing attachment fittings. The ends of both the front and rear spar superstructures will then be open so that an internal inspection of these hat-section members can be made. (2) Use of this method of inspection will not require the removal of the wings from the airplane. One-half inch holes may be drilled through the top wing skin directly over each spar carry through member so that a visual inspection can be made directly into the bottom of the hat sections. The airframe structure had adequate margins of safety in this area so that the existence of the 1/2-inch inspection holes will not impair the structural integrity of the airplane. Five of these 1/2-inch holes should be drilled over each of the spar carry through hat sections, one hole at the middle of each spar carry through, one hole 5 inches from each outboard end of the wing attachment fittings and one hole approximately centrally located between this latter hole and the middle hole. Thiswill provide a distance of approximately 7 1/2 inches between holes and should render it possible to inspect all of the internal surface of the hat-section spar carry through members. After the inspection has been made, the 1/2-inch holes must be covered with a small patch of aircraft fabric doped to the surface of the wing skin or by the insertion of a rubber or neoprene seal plug, or equivalent. This method will also provide a ready means of rechecking the spar carry through members for corrosion during the time of subsequent inspections. If any evidence of corrosion is found to exist, the affected spar carry through member should be removed and replaced with an identical new part. The above inspections may be discontinued if both spar carry through structures are replaced with new parts that are identical to the original and properly anodized and painted to prevent corrosion, or if an equivalent modification is approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch,FAA Southern Region. Amendment 39-1565 became effective December 2, 1972. This Amendment 39-1640 becomes effective May 22, 1973.
2008-22-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required * * * a design review against explosion risks. * * * * * The unsafe condition is the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-08-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Flight Trails Helicopters, Inc. hardpoint assemblies, installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. SH6080NM, or in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Form 337, "Major Repair and Alteration," approved on McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MDHS) Model 369D, 369E, 369F, 369FF, and 500N helicopters, that requires removing any Flight Trails Helicopters, Inc. hardpoint assembly not identified by part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N). This amendment is prompted by two incidents in which the hardpoint assembly used to support a search light or night vision system reportedly failed. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the hardpoint assembly, separation of the hardpoint assembly from the helicopter, and subsequent contact between the hardpoint assembly and the fuselage or rotor system of the helicopter.
2011-01-53: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD supersedes Emergency AD 2011-01-51, requires an immediate functional test of the fuselage drain holes, and requires sending a report of the results to the FAA. This AD also allows, with noted exceptions, for the return/ position of the airplane to a home base, hangar, maintenance facility, etc. This AD was prompted by reports of water accumulation in the belly of the fuselage that froze and caused the flight controls to jam. We are issuing this AD to prevent water or fluid from accumulating in the belly of the fuselage and freezing when the aircraft reaches and holds altitudes where the temperature is below the freezing point. This condition could cause the flight controls to jam with consequent loss of control.
2010-06-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for IAE V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2525-D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, and V2533-A5 turbofan engines. This AD requires a onetime fluorescent penetrant inspection of certain vortex reducers for cracks. This AD results from reports of fractured vortex reducers found at shop visits. We are issuing this AD to inspect for cracks in the vortex reducer. Cracks in the vortex reducer could result in an uncontained failure of the high-pressure (HP) compressor stage 3-8 drum and subsequent damage to the airplane.
96-07-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Beech Model BAe 125-1000A and Hawker 1000 series airplanes, that requires a detailed visual inspection to detect chafing damage to the hydraulic pipes adjacent to the hydraulic module, and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by reports of chafing damage between hydraulic pipes at three locations in the rear equipment bay adjacent to the hydraulic module. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such chafing damage to the hydraulic pipe and subsequent hydraulic fluid leakage, which could lead to failure of essential airplane systems.
81-07-01 R1: 81-07-01 R1 GOVERNMENT AIRCRAFT FACTORIES (GAF): Amendment 39-4068 as amended by Amendment 39-4388. Applies to Nomad Model N22B (Serial Nos. N22B-5 and up) and N24A (Serial Nos. N24A-42 and up) airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of structural rigidity which could result in hazardous tail flutter and subsequent loss of airplane control, accomplish the following (a) Modify the horizontal stabilizer to incorporate mass balance weights, improved riveting, addition of access panels, and structural reinforcements to the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with Part 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS," of Government Aircraft Factories Nomad Service Bulletin NMD-55-10, Revision 1, dated May 2, 1980, or an FAA- approved equivalent. All AGS pop rivets removed as a result of this modification must be replaced with MS20470AD rivets.NOTE: AGS 2048-420-BS 1/8 inch pop rivets are acceptable in the access panel door as specified in Service Bulletin NMD-55-10, Rev. 1. (b) Install high strength steel trim tab control brackets, self-aligning control rod ends, and longer control rods in accordance with Part 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS," of Government Aircraft Factories Nomad Service Bulletin NMD-55-8, Revision 3, dated September 1, 1980, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) Modify the horizontal stabilizer pivot bracket attachments in accordance with Part 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS," of Government Aircraft Factories Nomad Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-55-13, Revision 1, dated August 22, 1980, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) In accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 the airplane may be flown to a location where these modifications can be accomplished. (e) If an equivalent means of compliance is used in complying with paragraphs (a) through (c) of this AD, that equivalent means must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Honolulu, Hawaii. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Government Aircraft Factories, 226 Lorimer Street, Port Melbourne 3207 Vic., Australia. These documents may be examined at FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, 300 Ala Moana Blvd., Room 7321, Honolulu, Hawaii, and at FAA Headquarters, Room 916, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC. Amendment 39-4068 became effective April 2, 1981. This amendment 39-4388 becomes effective on June 10, 1982.
82-23-03 R1: 82-23-03 R1 GARRETT TURBINE ENGINE COMPANY: Amendment 39-4488 as amended by Amendment 39-4761. Applies to all Garrett TFE731-2, -3, -3R, -3A, -3AR, -3B and -3BR series turbofan engines. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. (a) To prevent failure of high pressure compressor impellers due to cracks originating from a double radius in the seal relief region or a manufacturing notch in the forward balance ring, inspect and rework compressor impeller, Part Number 3070274-1 or 3072639-1, in accordance with the procedures contained in the accomplishment instructions section of Garrett Service Bulletin Number TFE731-72-3239RWK, dated September 13, 1982, or equivalent means approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Field Office, ANM- 170W, Northwest Mountain Aircraft Certification Division. Inspect in accordance with the following schedule: (1) Impellers which have been operated in TFE731-3, -3R, -3A, -3AR, -3B, or -3BR engines during any portion of their service lives must be inspected prior to exceeding 5,100 cycles in service. NOTE: The engine life limited parts log card for each impeller is located with the impeller or in the engine log book. This card lists the engine serial number of each engine in which the impeller has operated. The 5 digit serial numbers of the TFE731-3 series engines begin with the 2 digits 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 90, or 94. (2) Impellers which have been operated in TFE731-2 engines, only, must be inspected prior to exceeding 6,200 cycles in service. NOTE: The 5 digit serial numbers of the TFE731-2 series engines begin with the 2 digits 73, 74, 81, 86, 88, or 89. Impellers found to have crack indications are to be removed from, and not returned to, service. Impellers not found to have crack indications may be returned to service after having the seal relief region and notch in the forward balance ring recontoured in accordance with the procedures contained in the accomplishment instructions section of Garrett Service Bulletin Number TFE731-72-3239 RWK, dated September 13, 1982, or equivalent means approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Field Office, ANM-170W, Northwest Mountain Aircraft Certification Division. (b) To prevent cracking and possible failure of the following listed fan and compressor rotor discs, used in TFE 731-2 series engines, the life limits on these parts have been reduced. Unless already accomplished, remove rotor discs from service prior to reaching the life limits shown below or, before accumulation of an additional 30 cycles in service after March 7, 1975, whichever occurs later: Component Part Number Life Limit in Cycles Fan Disc 3072162 10,000 First Stage Compressor 3072190 3,000 Second Stage Compressor 3072191 3,700 Third Stage Compressor 3072192 1,200 Fourth Stage Compressor 3072193 1,200 NOTE: For the purpose of this AD, a cycle is considered as any engine operating sequence involving an engine start, at least one acceleration to 80 percent low pressure rotor speed or above, and shutdown. NOTE: Garrett FAA approved Service Bulletin TFE731-72-3001, Revision 15, dated June 30, 1983, provides the cyclic life limits for all life limited components not covered by this AD. This bulletin may be revised in the future, with the approval of the FAA, in order to provide life limit increases if appropriate. (c) Service life limits have been assigned to the following specific parts used in the TFE731-2 series engines: (1) Replace the High Pressure Turbine Blades, Part Number 3072111-1, (used in high pressure turbine rotor assembly, part number 3070098), with serviceable turbine blades before exceeding 1,000 hours total time in service, or before exceeding 200 additional hours time in service after March 7, 1975, whichever occurs later. (2) Model TFE731-2 engines Serial Numbers P-74101 through P-74113 and Serial Numbers P- 73106 through P-73184 not modified by incorporation of Power Section Change Number 22: Replace the Pinion Gear Assembly, Part Number 3071626-1, and Sun Gear, Part Number 3071598-1, with a serviceable Pinion Gear Assembly and Sun Gear before exceeding 500 hours total time in service, or before exceeding an additional 50 hours time in service after March 7, 1975, whichever occurs later. (3) Model TFE731-2 engines Serial Numbers P-74101 through P-74138 and Serial Numbers P- 73106 through P-73209 not modified by incorporation of Power Section Change Number 41 or 44: Replace the Third Stage Compressor Stator Assembly, Part Number 3070279-7, -8, or -10, with a serviceable Third Stage Compressor Stator Assembly before exceeding 500 hours total time in service, or before exceeding an additional 50 hours time in service after March 7, 1975, whichever occurs later. NOTE: Power Section Change Numbers are annotated on the Engine Data Plate affixed to the engine. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Garrett Turbine Engine Company, P.O. Box 5217, Phoenix, Arizona 85010. These documents also may be examined at FAA New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts. This Amendment 39-4761 amends Amendment 39-4488 (47 FR 50462), AD 82-23-03, and supersedes Amendment 39-2116 (40 FR 8939), AD 75-05-12. Amendment 39-4488 became effective November 15, 1982. This Amendment 39-4761 becomes effective December 9, 1983.
96-07-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to determine if hinge bolts and nuts are installed in the overhead stowage bins, and the installation of hinge bolts and nuts, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports that overhead stowage bins in the passenger compartment have fallen out of position due to missing hinge bolts. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that hinge bolts are installed in the overhead stowage bins. Missing hinge bolts could result in the overhead stowage bins falling out of position and injuring airplane occupants.
2011-03-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The TC Holder received from operators, whose fleets are operated in demanding operating-conditions and with very frequent Short Take- Off and Landing (STOL) operations, reports of cracks located in the web of fuselage frame 19. On 05 February 2007, EASA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-0028 which mandated Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 228-266 and required an inspection of the frame 19 on all Dornier 228 aeroplanes. In addition, the TC Holder also initiated a flight-test campaign including strain measurements as well as finite element modelling and fatigue analyses to better understand the stress distribution onto the frame 19 and the associated structural components. The results of these investigations confirmed that STOL operations diminish extensively the fatigue life of the frame 19. Fuselage frame 19 supports the rear attachment of the Main Landing Gear (MLG). This condition, if not corrected, could cause rupture of frame 19, leading to subsequent collapse of a MLG. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-06-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that the AD is issued following a manufacturing nonconformity found on one batch of the servo-control caps. With a defective servo-control, rotation of the distributor might not be stopped mechanically since only friction of inner seals holds the distributor sleeve in its position. The AD actions are intended to address the unsafe condition created by a manufacturing nonconformity found on one batch of servo-control caps. If not corrected this condition could cause untimely movements of servo-controls, which are used on main and anti-torque rotors, and lead to the loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-03-04: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. AD 2009-09-09 currently requires repetitive inspections of the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets for damage, i.e., cracking, deformation, and discoloration. If damage is found during any inspection, AD 2009-09-09 also requires replacing the damaged rudder hinge and/or rudder hinge bracket. This new AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 2009-09-09, adds airplanes to the Applicability section, and adds a terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD resulted from the manufacturer developing a modification that terminates the repetitive inspections and from the manufacture adding airplane serial numbers into the Applicability section. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets, which could result in failure of the rudder. This failure could lead to loss of control.
2011-02-07: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-45 and CF6-50 series turbofan engines with certain low-pressure turbine (LPT) rotor stage 3 disks installed. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 1 and stage 2 blades for wear and damage, including excessive airfoil material loss. That AD also requires fluorescent-penetrant inspection (FPI) of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk under certain conditions and removal of the disk from service before further flight if found cracked. That AD also requires repetitive exhaust gas temperature (EGT) system checks (inspections). This AD requires HPT rotor stage 1 and stage 2 blade inspections and EGT system inspections. This AD also requires FPI of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk under certain conditions, removal of the disk from service before further flight if found cracked, and an ultrasonic inspection (UI) of the LPT rotor stage 3 disk forward spacer arm. This AD also requires initial and repetitive engine core vibration surveys and reporting to the FAA any crack findings, disks that fail the UI, and engines that fail the engine core vibration survey. This AD was prompted by reports received of additional causes of HPT rotor imbalance not addressed in AD 2010-12-10, and two additional LPT rotor stage 3 disk events. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life-limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2011-01-14: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The current Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) of PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models does not include a Chapter 04 in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS). For PC-6 models other than B2-H2 and B2- H4, no ALS at all is included in the AMM. With the latest Revision 12 of the AMM, a new Chapter 04 has been introduced in the AMM for PC-6 B2-H2 and B2-H4 models. For PC-6 models other than B2-H2 and B2-H4, a new ALS document has been implemented as well. These documents include the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information (MCAI) which are maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations developed by Pilatus Aircraft Ltd and approved by EASA. Failure to comply with these MCAI constitutes an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-07-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and Eurocopter France (Eurocopter France) Model AS 350B, BA, B1, B2, and D, and Model AS 355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters, without an autopilot installed, that requires a visual inspection to determine whether the cyclic pitch change control rod (rod) end fittings were safetied, and removal and replacement of the rod if the rod end fittings were not safetied. This amendment is prompted by a manufacturer's report that some of the rod end fittings had not been safetied at the factory. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of tightening torque on the adjustment nuts of the rod, shifting of the neutral point of the cyclic stick, reduction in the amount of available movement of the cyclic stick in the roll axis, and subsequent reduction in the controllability of the helicopter.
2021-26-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Stemme AG Model Stemme S 12 gliders. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the incorrect installation of an axle connecting the main landing gear (MLG) to the center steel frame. This AD requires inspecting the MLG installation and repairing if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.