Results
2010-05-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a puncture voltage test of the aluminum-loaded paint on an in-service DHC-8 aircraft, conducted to validate an SFAR 88 [Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88] related task, Bombardier Aerospace (BA) discovered that the top wing fuel tank skin between Yw171.20 and Yw261.00 was painted with a non-aluminized enamel coating * * *. With this type of paint application, it is possible that, in the worst case scenario, a lightning strike could puncture the wing skin and create an ignition source in the fuel tank. Ignition sources inside fuel tanks, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequentloss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Model DC-9-80 series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect damage, burn marks, or discoloration at certain electrical plugs and receptacles of the sidewall lighting in the passenger cabin, and correction of discrepancies. This amendment would also require modification of the electrical connectors, which, when accomplished, would terminate the inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by reports of failures of the electrical connectors in the sidewall fluorescent lighting, which resulted in smoke or lighting interruption in the passenger cabin. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failures of the electrical connectors, which could result in poor socket/pin contact, excessive heat, electrical arcing, and subsequently, connector burn through and smoke in the passenger cabin.
2021-03-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of deviations concerning the assembly and overhaul of certain crew oxygen mask stowage boxes, including incorrect application of a certain thread-locker on the fitting sensor screws. This AD requires an inspection of certain crew oxygen mask stowage boxes for discrepancies, and replacement if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This action requires modification of the aft pitch load fitting of the diagonal brace of the nacelle strut of each wing. This action is necessary to prevent loss of the fuse pin of the pitch load fitting due to fatigue caused by improper clearance between the fuse pin and bushing, which could result in increased loads in the wing-to-strut joints and consequent separation of the strut and engine from the wing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
96-09-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Saab Model SAAB SF340A, SAAB 340B, and SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions, and to limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
95-06-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95-06-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires inspection to detect corrosion, severed braided strands, or fuel leakage of the fuel feed line hose assembly on engine number two; and subsequent inspection or replacement of the fuel hose with a serviceable part, if necessary. This AD also requires treatment of the ends of the fuel hose and modification of the heat-shrunk plastic cover and steel identification band area. This amendment is prompted by a report of failure of an aluminum-braided flexible fuel hose on a Model L-1011-385 series airplane due to corrosion. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a flexible fuel hose, which could result in failure of an engine, loss of fuel, and a resultant fire.
69-12-08: 69-12-08 AERO COMMANDER DIVISION, NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-782. Applies to Aero Commander Model 1121 series airplanes, S/N 3 through 150. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of fuel supply system hose assemblies, P/N AE700024-1, 6723008- 65, 6723008-67, 67-23008-149, and 6723008-179, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 15 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, (1) pressurize the engine fuel supply system by opening the fuel shutoff valves and turning the fuel boost pumps on. Visually inspect the fuel system flexible hose assemblies, P/N AE700024-1, 6723008-65, 6723008-67, 6723008-149, and 6723008-179 for any indications of leakage. Replace any defective hose assembly in accordance with paragraph (c), (2) install fuel valve switch guards, P/N 5883082-93, or the equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA, on the fuel control panel in accordance with Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or in a accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA, (3) insert FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual Revision dated April 9, 1969 in the applicable Airplane Flight Manual. (b) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove the fuel supply flexible hose assemblies referenced in paragraph (a)(1), unless replaced with new hose assemblies in accordance with paragraph (c), and vacuum test these flexible hose assemblies for separation of the hose liner material from the wire braid reinforcing cover in accordance with Part II of Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or in accordance with an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. (c) Replace any defective hose assemblies found as a result of the inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (b), before further flight, following procedures outlined in Part II, steps d., e., and f. of Aero Commander Service Bulletin No. J-7 dated May 13, 1969, or later FAA approved revision, with new hose assemblies of the same part number or the equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, FAA. This amendment becomes effective June 21, 1969.
2010-05-02: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Field reports have indicated that the possibility exists that both Primary Flight Displays (PFDs) could indicate a roll attitude offset of up to 10 degrees in the same direction if an accelerated turn onto the active runway is performed immediately followed by take-off. In addition, annunciated heading splits have been reported. This condition has been reported to correct itself after several minutes. Additionally, if the aeroplane is operating in geographical latitudes with low horizontal magnetic field strength, incorrect heading may be displayed if the ADAHRS switches from GPS track to magnetometer heading while the aeroplane is on the ground.This situation, if not corrected, could result in an undesired bank angle, heading splits and/or incorrect heading, which would constitute an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-04-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers. That AD requires, for certain serial numbers (S/Ns) of McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, initial and repetitive visual and dye penetrant inspections for cracks in the propeller hub, replacement of propellers with cracks that do not meet acceptable limits, and rework of propellers with cracks that meet acceptable limits. This AD requires, for all McCauley Propeller Systems 1A103/TCM series propellers, the same actions but at reduced compliance times. This AD also requires inspections of the bolt holes, reaming holes if necessary, and inspections of steel reinforcement plates and gaskets. This AD results from 16 reports received of propeller hubs found cracked since AD 2003-12-05 was issued. We are issuing this AD to prevent propeller separation due to hub fatigue cracking, which can result in loss of control of the airplane.
95-07-01: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 95-07-01 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming O-360, LO-360, HO-360, HIO-360, TIO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, TIO-540, LTIO-540, IVO-540, AEIO-540, TIO-541, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines by individual letters. This AD requires removal prior to further flight of suspect unapproved connecting rod bolts and replacement with serviceable connecting rod bolts. This amendment is prompted by reports of connecting rod bolt failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine failure due to connecting rod bolt failure, which could result in damage to or loss of the aircraft.
50-39-01: 50-39-01 CESSNA: Applies to All Models 190 and 195 Aircraft, Up to and Including Serial Number 7586. Inspection required not later than November 25, 1950, on aircraft having 300 hours or more service and at each 100 hours operation on all aircraft. Service experience has indicated that close inspection of rudder cables is necessary in order to detect premature cable fraying at the forward pulley. Due to the difficulty of inspection and since some failures may have occurred in core strands, the following methods are recommended: Detach the rudder cable from the rudder bellcrank in the aft fuselage or at the rudder horn at the pedal and pull the cable through the inspection openings immediately aft of the rudder pedal or through the tunnel at the aircraft centerline in the cabin. The cable should then be carefully inspected, by flexing, at a point 9 to 10 inches aft of the swaged fitting at the forward end of the cable for broken strands. Replace all cables showing signsof breakage. The above inspection may be discontinued when at least the next larger size pulleys are installed. (Cessna Service Kit, SK 9050-1 provides the larger pulley and inspection opening for those aircraft prior to Serial No. 7587.)
2021-02-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, -200 Freighter, -300, -800, and -900 series airplanes; Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes; and Model A340-541 and A340-642 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that an erroneous torque value for the attachment nuts to install a pitot probe was included in the affected Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) task. This AD requires re-torqueing the attachment nuts of each affected part. In addition, this AD prohibits the use of the affected AMM task, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-13-02: 66-13-02\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-236 Part 39 Federal Register May 13, 1966. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Airplanes Listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 1789, Revision 1. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished.\n \n\t(a)\tWithin the next 125 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, incorporate the following operating limitation in either the Airplane Flight Manual or on a placard installed adjacent to the cabin dome light switch: \n\n\t"THE DOME LIGHT SWITCH MUST BE IN EITHER THE BLUE, LOW OR BRIGHT POSITION DURING \t\t\tTAKEOFF AND LANDING". \n\n\t(b)\tWithin the next 1,200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a new relay in the emergency exit light circuit or rewire the circuit to use existing contacts on the essential a.c. power failure relay, so that the emergency exit lights will function automatically when power is lost on the essential a.c. bus in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 1789, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region.\n \n\t(c)\tThe operating limitation imposed under (a) may be removed when the modification required in (b) has been accomplished.\n\n\tThis directive effective May 13, 1966.
2004-01-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Hamburger Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H. Model HFB 320 HANSA airplanes, that requires replacement of the elevator trim control cable assemblies with new assemblies. This action is necessary to prevent loss of elevator trim and possible loss of rudder and/or elevator function due to stress-corrosion cracking of certain cable terminals. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Boeing Model 747-300 and -400 series airplanes equipped with certain stretched upper deck evacuation slides manufactured by BFGoodrich series airplanes. This amendment requires modification of the slide's main restraint strap, regulator assembly, and turbo fan flapper retaining roll pins. This amendment is prompted by reports of loss of air pressure and non-inflation of the inflatable tubes of the slide due to problems associated with the restraint strap, regulator assembly, and turbo fan flapper retaining roll pins. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of air pressure or non-inflation of the inflatable tubes of the slide, which could impede the successful evacuation of passengers from the airplane during an emergency.
2004-01-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Falcon 2000 and 900EX, and Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes. This AD requires measuring the paint thickness on the upper and lower surfaces of the left and right sides of the horizontal stabilizer, performing corrective actions if necessary, and installing maintenance caution placards on the upper surface of the left and right sides of the horizontal stabilizer. This action is necessary to prevent structural damage to the horizontal stabilizer after a direct lightning strike, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
58-10-07: 58-10-07 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. Cases have been reported of a variation in the clearances between the aileron lock arms and their associated locking levers on different aircraft when the control locks are disengaged. Vickers-Armstrong has issued the following corrective measures which the British Air registration Board considers mandatory: 1. As soon as possible, but not later than August 1, 1958, all aircraft should be inspected to determine that a nominal clearance of 0.15 inch is provided at the inboard and outboard aileron control lock assemblies. 2. If the clearances are less than 0.10 inch, the locking levers can be filed to a maximum of 0.10 inch to obtain the required clearance of not less than 0.15 inch. 3. If the clearances are between 0.10 and 0.15 inch, the filing of the locking levers to obtain the required clearance of not less than 0.15 inch, can be deferred until the next major check or next removal of the ailerons, whichever occurs sooner. The FAA concurs with this action and considers compliance therewith mandatory. (Vickers-Armstrong PTL No. 173 and Modification No. D.2491 cover this subject.)
2010-04-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been several in-service cases reported of impact damage to the blowout (decompression) panel protective cage assemblies installed in the aft baggage cargo compartment. When damaged, these cages could prevent proper operation of the blowout panels, with potential degradation of smoke detection and fire extinguishing capabilities in the event of a fire. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-09-24 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Bombardier Aerospace has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that it is necessary to introduce Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL), in order to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features during configuration changes such as modifications and repairs, or during maintenance actions. Failure to preserve critical fuel tank system ignition source prevention features could result in a fuel tank explosion. * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 21, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 21, 2009. On June 6, 2008 (73 FR 24143, May 2, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in the AD. We must receive comments on this AD by January 19, 2010.
2021-01-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524- A5, V2525-D5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2528-D5, V2530-A5, V2531-E5, and V2533-A5 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a root cause analysis of an event involving an uncontained failure of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) 1st-stage disk that resulted in high-energy debris penetrating the engine cowling. This AD requires removing certain HPT 1st-stage and HPT 2nd-stage disks from service. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120 series airplanes, that currently requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM), and either installing hydraulic tube assemblies incorporating a check valve, or visually inspecting the check valve if already installed and performing corrective actions if necessary. This action adds airplanes to the applicability of the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the landing gear doors from becoming blocked from opening during application of emergency procedures in the event of a loss of hydraulics. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
55-15-01: 55-15-01 BOEING: Applies to All Boeing 377 Series Aircraft with Hamilton Standard Propellers. Compliance required by first scheduled engine change after November 1, 1955, but not later than November 1, 1956. To increase the fire resistance integrity of the propeller feathering system against damage by a powerplant fire, all flexible hose components of propeller feathering lines forward of the firewall in zone 2 must be replaced with lines and fittings which will meet current fire resistance requirements. The following hose assemblies are considered acceptable for this applications: (a) Aeroquip 680-10S hose assemblies with Aeroquip 304 protective sleeves over end fittings (Aeroquip assembly P/N 304000). (b) Resistoflex SSFR-3800-10 hose assemblies. (c) Aeroquip 309009-10S hose assemblies.
2010-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A quality control performed during completion of one Falcon 900EX aeroplane has shown that the crew and passenger Right-Hand (RH) oxygen lines may both interfere with the frame 8 of the aeroplane structure. A subsequent design review of the oxygen lines routing has confirmed that, on certain aeroplanes, equipped in RH mid-cabin with a 115 cu-ft oxygen cylinder, the installation of the line support assembly at frame 8 needs to be accomplished with precaution; otherwise, the oxygen lines might interfere with the structure, and this condition could lead to an oxygen leak. * * * * * The unsafe condition is an oxygen leak, which would result in insufficient oxygen flow to passenger oxygen masks during a depressurization event. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-01-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that requires revising the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to prohibit using the landing light except for landing and takeoff until the 40 amp 10P1 and 10P2 contactors are replaced with 50 amp circuit breakers. Also, this amendment requires upgrading the electrical master boxes. This amendment is prompted by three reports of complete loss of electrical power generating systems, except for the direct battery power, due to a combination of high outside temperature and long flight duration with the landing light on that causes the nontemperature compensated trip switches to prematurely trip. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the helicopter power generator systems, loss of the use of flight instruments, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
95-16-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 SP, SR, -100, -200, and -300 series airplanes, that requires repetitive operational tests of the reversible gearbox pneumatic drive unit (PDU) or the reversing air motor PDU to ensure that the unit can restrain the thrust reverser sleeve, and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment is prompted by the results of an investigation, which revealed that, in the event of thrust reverser deployment during high-speed climb or during cruise, these airplanes could experience control problems. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure the integrity of the fail safe features of the thrust reverser system by preventing possible failure modes in the thrust reverser control system that can result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight.