Results
2009-06-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A fuselage spoiler cable disconnect sensing device was installed in production on later DHC-8 Series 100/200/300 aircraft, and on all DHC-8 Series 400 aircraft. On earlier DHC-8 Series 100/200/300 aircraft, its installation was mandated by [Canadian] Airworthiness Directive CF-2006-13 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2007-21-16]. However, several incorrectly assembled spoiler cable disconnect sensing devices have recently been discovered on in-service aircraft. A pulley and plastic spacer had been inadvertently interchanged during assembly of the device in production, resulting in the spoiler cable sliding on the spacer rather than on the pulley, as designed. Continued operation with an incorrectly assembled spoiler cable disconnect sensing device could result in impaired operation of the sensing device and/or an eventual fuselage spoiler cable disconnect, with possible reduced controllability of the aircraft. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-20-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Models PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for certain installed fuel booster pumps and replace that fuel booster pump, inspect other certain fuel booster pumps for defects, and either install lead protection spiral wrap or replace the defective fuel booster pumps, depending on whether defects are found. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct any defective fuel booster pump, which could result in electrical arcing from the leads in an air/fuel mixture. Such failure could lead to a fire or explosion of a fuel tank.
81-07-09: 81-07-09 DOWTY ROTOL: Amendment 39-4076. Applies to Dowty Rotol (c)R.289/3-110- F/1 and (c)R.289/3-110-F/11 propellers installed on the WSK-Pezetel Model PZL-3S engine used on Gulfstream American (formerly Grumman) Model G-164A, B, C airplanes modified by STC SA2731SW, and Ayres (formerly Rockwell) Model S2R-R3S, and Model S2R airplanes modified by STC SA3897WE. Compliance is required as indicated unless previously accomplished. To preclude the possibility of blade tip failures, accomplish the following: Within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD or by April 30, 1981, whichever occurs first, perform the following: (a) Reindex propeller shaft to engine crankshaft in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-941 dated February 5, 1981, and PZL-Rzeszow Service Instruction No. 28/PZL-3S/81 dated January 30, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent. (b) After reindexing propeller shaft to engine crankshaft, replace all blades P/N660705335 that have been operated prior to reindexing in accordance with paragraph (a) above with new blades P/N 660705335 per Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-941 dated February 5, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent. (c) Establish a 600-hour safe life limit on all new blades P/N 660705335 installed per paragraph (b) above. (d) Upon request of an operator, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, AGL-210, Federal Aviation Administration, Great Lakes Region, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD provided such requests are made through an FAA Maintenance Inspector and the request contains substantiating data to justify the request for that operator. (e) For purposes of this AD, an equivalent must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing and Manufacturing Branch, AGL-210, Federal Aviation Administration, Great Lakes Region. This amendment becomes effective April 2, 1981.
2020-19-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, - 113, \n\n((Page 59407)) \n\n-114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, - 211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of crack findings in and around the fastener holes of the central and lateral window frame upper junction; those cracks were found on fastener holes outside of the inspection area specified in a certain airworthiness limitation item (ALI) task. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the upper junction fastener holes at the lateral window frame for cracking; and for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the spotface around the fastener holes for cracking; and corrective actions if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. TheFAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-08-01: 77-08-01 PIPER: Amendment 39-2871. Applies to Models PA-24, PA-24-250 and PA- 24-260, Serial Nos. 24-1 through 24-5047; Model PA-24-400, Serial Nos. 26-2 through 26-148; Model PA-30, Serial Nos. 30-2 through 30-2000; Model PA-39, Serial Nos. 39-1 through 39- 155; certificated in all categories except aircraft incorporating Piper Kit number 760 914. To prevent possible hazards in flight associated with aileron spar cracks, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours in service from the effective date of this AD or upon the attainment of 1000 total hours in service, whichever is later, and at intervals not to exceed 100 hours in service from the last inspection, inspect and alter as necessary in accordance with the instructions sections of Piper Service Letter No. 787 dated December 1, 1976, or equivalent. (b) Upon the incorporation of Aileron Outboard Hinge Bracket Replacement, Piper Kit No. 760 914 or equivalent, compliance with the requirements of thisAD may be dispensed with. (c) Equivalent inspections and alterations must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (d) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region may adjust the inspection intervals specified in this AD. This amendment becomes effective April 18, 1977.
2003-20-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing transport category airplanes. This action requires inspection of the attachment of the shoulder restraint harness to the mounting bracket on certain observer and attendant seats to determine if a C-clip is used in the attachment, and corrective action, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent detachment of the shoulder restraint harness of the attendant or observer seat from its mounting bracket during service, which could result in injury to the occupant of the seat. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2020-19-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK 117 D-2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of an erroneous low rotor revolutions per minute (RPM) indication after establishing a one engine inoperative \n\n((Page 59414)) \n\n(OEI) condition. This AD requires a software (SW) modification for the aircraft management computer (AMC). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-05-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 208 and 208B airplanes. This AD requires you to modify the aileron carry-through cable attachment to the aileron upper quadrant with parts of improved design. This AD results from reports of a "catch'' in the aileron control system when the control yoke is turned. We are issuing this AD to prevent the cable attach fitting on the aileron upper quadrant assembly from rotating and possibly contacting or interfering with the aileron lower quadrant assembly, which could result in limited roll control and reduced handling capabilities.
2020-18-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A319-151N and -153N; A320-251N, -252N, and -253N; and A321-251N, -252N, -253N, -251NX, -252NX, and -253NX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that Kathon FP 1.5 biocide added to fuel and running through an airplane's engines can lead to engine performance degradation. This AD requires removing Kathon FP 1.5 biocide from the fuel tanks and engines and prohibits operation of an airplane with Kathon FP 1.5 biocide in a fuel tank or engine, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020- 0176, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
63-02-01: 63-02-01 BOEING: Amdt. 527 Part 507 Federal Register January 11, 1963. Applies to All 707/720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 500 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tThe upper and lower fairings installed over the anticollision lights have been found to disturb the light distribution in certain peripheral areas. To prevent a reduction in the effective light intensity: \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the anticollision light upper fairing, (P/N's 69-10789, 9-66041-3000) and the lower fairing, (P/N's 69-10789-1, 9-66041 or 9-66041-3000); and \n\n\t(b)\tPlug the mounting holes for the fairing assembly fasteners with Boeing material specification 5-13 Type A aerodynamic smoother or equivalent. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1651 covers the same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective February 12, 1963.
2003-20-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires an inspection to detect chafing or damage to the electrical wire harnesses in the left and right wing fuel tanks, applicable corrective action(s) if necessary, and installation of harnesses. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires modifying the collector tank walls. This action is necessary to prevent chafing damage to the electrical wire harnesses in the left and right wing fuel tanks, which could cause misleading data and erroneous fuel pump cautions to be displayed to the flightcrew, and could result in electrical arcing with consequent increased potential for fire or explosion in the fuel tank. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2009-06-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Transport Canada has received numerous service difficulty reports concerning Viking DHC-7 and Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft fluorescent lamp holder damage due to overheating. It has been determined that lamp holder overheating is a result of arcing between the fluorescent tube pins and the lamp holder contacts when the tube is not properly seated during installation. Overheating of lamp holders, if not corrected, could generate fumes and smoke * * *. * * * * * * The unsafe condition could result in an in-flight fire. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-12: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The Bombardier CL-600-2B19 airplanes have had a history of flap failures at various positions for several years. Flap failure may result in a significant increase in required landing distances and higher fuel consumption than planned during a diversion. * * * * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-18-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that when the number 2 engine thrust reverser (T/R) was opened, the right-hand T/R hinge nut located at position 4 was found detached; investigation revealed that certain nuts could have been installed with noncompliant locking features, or with locking features that could degrade quicker than anticipated. This AD requires replacing any existing nut on the T/R hinge with a new nut, installing a new nut and washer if necessary, and applying a torque stripe at each T/R hinge location, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-18-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GE90-110B1 and GE90-115B model turbofan engines with a certain high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 2 disk installed. This AD was prompted by a report from the manufacturer that a subsurface anomaly was found on a HPT rotor stage 2 disk. This AD requires an ultrasonic inspection (USI) of the HPT rotor stage 2 disk and, depending on the result of the inspection, replacement of the HPT rotor stage 2 disk with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
62-08-07: 62-08-07 GRUMMAN: Amdt. 420 Part 507 Federal Register April 14, 1962. Applies to Model G-164 Aircraft Serial Numbers 1 Through 100 Inclusive. For aircraft with 200 or more hours' time in service, compliance is required within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. For aircraft with less than 200 hours' time in service, compliance is required within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, or before 210 hours' total time in service is exceeded whichever occurs first. To preclude loss of aileron control, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the aileron cable control sector support brackets, upper and lower, in lower wing panels with new support brackets, P/N 1854-13 (Kit of replacement parts, A1854, furnished by Grumman), or FAA approved equivalent. Install the parts and the aileron cables in accordance with Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 20 dated January 24, 1962, or FAA approved equivalent.(b) Visually inspect aileron control system pushrod assemblies, Grumman P/N's A1866-1 and A1866-3, in both lower wing panels, for loose rod end fittings due to elongation of rivet holes. Repair or replace loose fittings prior to further flight. After initial compliance, visually inspect the aileron control system pushrod assemblies at each periodic inspection thereafter until one of the following, or FAA approved equivalent is accomplished: (1) Insert aluminum alloy bar, 2024-T3, 7/16 O.D. x 7/8-inch plugs in each end of A1866-11 and A1866-13 tubes and reinstall the rod ends with two AN 470-AD5 rivets per rod end. (2) Install Grumman P/N A1866-25 in lieu of A1866-1 and P/N A1866-27 in lieu of A1866-3. (Grumman Service Bulletin No. 20 dated January 24, 1962, and the Addendum thereto dated February 3, 1962, cover this subject.) This directive effective April 25, 1962.
2003-20-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31 and DC-9-32 airplanes. This action requires, among other actions, various inspections to detect cracks of the cockpit enclosure window sill, and follow-on and corrective actions, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent fatigue cracking of the internal doublers and frame structure of the fuselage skin of the cockpit enclosure window sill, which could result in rapid decompression of the fuselage and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
94-16-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections, adjustments, and functional tests of the thrust reverser system. This amendment adds a requirement for installation of an additional thrust reverser system locking feature, periodic functional tests of that locking feature following its installation, and repair of any discrepancy found. This amendment is prompted by the identification of a modification that ensures that the level of safety inherent in the original type design of the thrust reverser system is further enhanced. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible discrepancies in the thrust reverser control system that can result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight.
2003-20-05: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain PILATUS Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-7 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the forward and aft dihedral fittings for cracks and replace any cracked fitting. This AD also requires you to modify the aft dihedral fitting and spar-cap bolt holes. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Switzerland. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracks from developing in the forward and aft dihedral fittings, which could result in failure of the wing in certain maneuvers. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
2020-18-51: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sandia attitude indicators (attitude indicators). This AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of aircraft with these attitude indicators installed. This AD requires revising the existing Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) for your airplane to prohibit operation under instrument flight rules (IFR) or night visual flight rules (VFR) and prohibit coupling the autopilot with an affected attitude indicator. This AD was prompted by reports of 54 failed attitude indicators. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
80-22-11: 80-22-11 BELL: Amendment 39-3950. Applies to Model 206 L-1 helicopters, certificated in all categories (Airworthiness Docket No. 80-ASW-44). Compliance required as indicated. To prevent possible fatigue failure of the main rotor grip, P/N 206-011-132-009, remove and replace as specified below, the main rotor grips having serial numbers: A1-00001, A1-00004 through A1-00007, A1-00009, A1-00010, A1-00014, A1-00016, A1-00017, A1-00019, A1-00021 through A1-00024, A1-00027 through A1-00029, A1-00031 through A1-00036, A1-00038 through A1-00040, A1-00042 through A1-00044, A1-00046 through A1-00050, A1-00053 through A1-00057, A1-00059, A1-00061, A1-00062, A1-00064, A1-00066 through A1-00068, A1-00071, A1-00073 through A1-00075, A1-00077, A1-00078, A1-00080, A1-00083 through A1-00093, A1-00095, A1-00096, A1-00098 through A1-00101, A1-00103 through A1-00106, A1-00111, A1-00113, A1-00115, A1-00116, A1-00118 through A1-00120, A1-00124, A1-00130 through A1-00136, A1-00192, A1-00222,A1-00248, A1- 00287, A1-00300, A1-00305, and A1-00308. a. Replace those grips with less than 1,150 hours' total time in service on the effective date of this AD, prior to accumulating 1,200 hours' total time in service. b. Replace those grips with 1,150 or more hours' total time in service on the effective date of this AD, within 50 hours' time in service. c. Compliance with Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin 206L-80-15, dated July 29, 1980, fulfills compliance with this AD. d. The retirement time of those main rotor grips specified above is reduced from 4,800 hours to 1,200 hours by this AD. e. The helicopter may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where repairs can be performed. This amendment becomes effective October 27, 1980.
77-04-02: 77-04-02 PIPER: Amendment 39-2834. Applies to Model PA-36-285, Serial Nos. 36- 7360001 through 36-7660135 certificated in all categories. To prevent possible hazards associated with loss of directional control due to tail wheel shimmy, accomplish the following within the next 100 hours in service from the effective date of this AD unless previously accomplished.: (a) On aircraft Serial Nos. 36-7560001 through 36-766080 incorporate Piper Kit Number 761 034 tail wheel modification or equivalent. (b) On aircraft Serial Nos. 36-7360001 through 36-7660135 incorporate Piper Kit Number 761 067, Fuselage Frame Reinforcement or equivalent. (c) Equivalent alterations must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (d) Upon request with substantiating data, submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the compliance time for incorporating the alterations may be adjusted by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (Piper Service Bulletin Number 506 pertains to this subject.) This amendment is effective February 21, 1977.
88-08-01: 88-08-01 (BELL); HERCULES; LENAIR CORPORATION; SMITH HELICOPTERS; AND WEST COAST FABRICATIONS: Amendment 39-5887. Applies to Model UH-1E, UH-1L, and TH-1L helicopters certified by Hercules; Lenair Corporation; Smith Helicopters, and West Coast Fabrications certified in any category that have P/N 204-076-428-1, -3, or -5 rod end bearing assemblies installed. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect possible cracks in the collective and cyclic rod end bearing assemblies, P/N 204-076-428-1, -3, or -5, installed on Model UH-1E, UH-1L, and TH-1L helicopters, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the next flight after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 10 hours' time in service from the last inspection, visually inspect the rod end bearing assemblies for cracks. Perform the visual inspections by disconnecting the cyclic and collective control tube assemblies from the swashplate horns and the collective pitch control lever. (b) Whenever the rod end bearing assemblies are removed for any reason, inspect for cracks using a fluorescent penetrant or equivalent method. NOTE: Inspections specified by paragraphs (a) and (b) above are not required on rod end bearing assembly P/N 204-076-428-5 having documented time in service of less than 600 hours. (c) If a crack is found during these inspections replace the rod end bearing with a serviceable part prior to further flight. (d) Replace rod end bearing assemblies, P/N 204-076-428-1 or -3 within 11 calendar months from the effective date of this AD with rod end bearing assembly, P/N 204-076-428-5, having a documented known service life of less than 600 hours' time in service. (e) Replace rod end bearing assembly P/N 204-076-428-5, not having a documented known service life, or those with greater than 600 hours' time in service, within 11 calendar months from the effective date of this AD with rod end bearing assembly P/N 204-076-428-5 having a documented service life of less than 600 hours' time in service. (f) Retire from service rod end bearing assembly, P/N 204-076-428-5 at 600 hours' time in service or less after initial replacement described in paragraphs (d) and (e). (g) An equivalent method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas, 76193-0170. This amendment, 39-5887, becomes effective May 6, 1988.
2020-17-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 and 787-9 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the cabin air compressor (CAC) outlet check valve failed due to fatigue of the aluminum flappers, and exposed the Y-duct to temperatures above its design limit. This AD requires installing new inboard and outboard CAC outlet check valves on the left-side and right-side cabin air conditioning and temperature control system (CACTCS) packs. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
60-09-03: 60-09-03 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 134 Part 507 Federal Register April 20, 1960. Applies to All Model 188 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. (a) Post following two placards in full view of pilot: (1) Following operating speeds shall be observed, Vno normal operating speed equal to 225 knots CAS or MACH number 0.55; Vne never exceed speed equal to 245 knots CAS or MACH number 0.55. (2) Feather propeller in event the torquemeter indicator should go to zero or full scale in flight. This placard may be removed from the aircraft when all its installed engines are equipped with midbearing torquemeter, P/N 6823900 identified by a 1/2-inch by 2 1/2-inch blue stripe on forward bevel of housing as described in Allison Commercial Engine Bulletin No. 72- 113. In case of aircraft having one or more, but not all, engines equipped with midbearing torquemeters, the placard may be suitably altered to indicate those engines so equipped, which are exempt form compliancewith its provisions. The placard described in (a)(1) may be removed when the provisions of Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 88/SB-500 have been accomplished. The torquemeter placard described in (a)(2) may be removed when the provisions of AD 60-21-01, effective November 9, 1960, which requires installation of the midbearing torquemeter housing assembly, has been accomplished. The placard on aircraft having one or more but not all engines equipped with midbearing torquemeters may be suitably altered to indicate those engines so equipped which are exempt from compliance with its provisions. (b) Until modifications outlined below have been accomplished, the autopilot shall be deactivated. Operation of the autopilot is permissible under either of the following conditions: (1) Modifications are made to the autopilot system as described in FAA approved Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 88/SB-453 Part II as amended December 21, 1960, (reactivation of autopilot). Under this condition, the "altitude-hold" function is inoperative and operation with autopilot engaged is limited to speeds at or below 225 knots. (2) Modifications are made to the autopilot system as described in Part II and Part III of FAA approved Lockheed Alert Service Bulletin No. 453 as amended December 21, 1960. Under this condition, the "altitude-hold" function is operative and the above Service Bulletin No. 453 Part II speed restriction is removed. (d) Superseded by AD 60-13-03. This airworthiness directive sent by telegram to all operators of 188 aircraft on March 25, 1960. Revised June 24, 1960. Revised December 31, 1960.