Results
2011-18-19: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires frequent inspections of the fuel pressure supply for excessive oscillations to determine if high-pressure (HP) fuel pumps have been exposed to damaging pressure oscillations. Pumps that have been exposed require replacement before further flight. This new AD requires the initial and repetitive inspections of AD 2010-23-09, but also requires installing HP fuel pump part number (P/N) E4A-30-200-000, as mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine power loss or in-flight shutdown, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
58-11-01: 58-11-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6 and DC-7 Series Aircraft as Indicated. \n\n\tSeveral instances have been reported wherein cracks have been found or failures have occurred in the nose wheel upper retract link assembly, P/N 5325437. In at least one case, failure resulted in folding of the nose gear when the aircraft stopped, following landing and taxi. \n\n\tThe failures occurred in the forged end fitting, P/N 5328993, caused by a crack starting in the vicinity of the 1/8-inch radius where the fitting is machined to the O.D. of the tube, P/N 2329712. Cracks in the unfailed parts were found in the same location. Failures occurred on two airplanes having a total of 24,000 and 13,800 hours respectively and a crack was reported on one airplane with 7,521 hours. The airplane time is not significant since the interchange of landing gear components at major overhaul may result in the gear components actually having more or less time than the airplanes themselves. \n\n\tSubsequent to DC-6 Series fuselage No. 435 and DC-7 Series fuselage No. 434, Douglas increased the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch radius. The following must be accomplished on all nose gear upper retract link assemblies, P/N 5325437, delivered by the manufacturer that do not incorporate the larger radius. \n\n\t1.\tInspect the right and left hand forged end fitting with the 1/8-inch radius at the earliest possible opportunity where facilities are available, and in any case, at the inspection period nearest 100 hours. Inspection should preferable be accomplished by magnaflux; however, dye penetrant inspection can be considered satisfactory if parts are uniformly warned to open tight cracks. \n\n\t2.\tIf cracks are found, parts must be replaced. No rework is considered feasible. \n\n\t3.\tParts which are not cracked should be reworked at the earliest practicable opportunity to increase the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch and polish the area to a 32-micro-inch finish. The reworked area should be protected with zinc chromate primer and aluminized lacquer and the reworked parts properly identified to distinguish them from those manufactured with the 3/4-inch radius. \n\n\t4.\tAfter the initial inspection, all parts must be inspected regularly at the inspection period nearest to 300 hours until rework is accomplished. \n\n\t5.\tAfter rework, inspections at frequent intervals should continue to assure that the rework has removed damaged material and/or incipient cracks. \n\n\t(Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A-677 for the DC-6 Series and A-139 for the DC-7 Series cover the above subject and describe how to increase the 1/8-inch radius to a 3/4-inch radius.)
96-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model 382 series airplanes, that requires that all landing gear brakes be inspected for wear and replaced if the wear limits prescribed in this AD are not met, and that the new landing gear brake wear limits be incorporated into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program. This amendment is prompted by an accident in which a transport category airplane executed a rejected takeoff (RTO) and was unable to stop on the runway due to worn brakes; and the subsequent review of allowable brake wear limits for all transport category airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of brake effectiveness during a high energy RTO.
96-25-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Pratt & Whitney JT9D series turbofan engines, that requires installing an improved design turbine exhaust case (TEC) with a thicker containment wall, modifying the existing TEC to incorporate a containment shield, or modifying the existing TEC to replace the "P" flange and case wall. This amendment is prompted by reports of 64 uncontained engine failures since 1972. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent release of uncontained debris from the TEC following an internal engine failure, which can result in damage to the aircraft.
96-23-14: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D series turbofan engines, that currently require repetitive eddy current, fluorescent penetrant, fluorescent magnetic penetrant, or visual inspections for cracks in the rear flange, and ultrasonic, fluorescent penetrant, or fluorescent magnetic penetrant inspections for cracks in the PS4 boss, and drain bosses of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC); and an additional inspection of the CCOC rear flange for intergranular cracking. This amendment requires reducing the rear flange inspection interval for CCOCs when only the aft face of the rear flange has been inspected, and introducing an improved ultrasonic probe assembly. In addition, this amendment introduces a rotating eddy current probe for shop inspections in which the case is removed from the engine. Also, this amendment eliminates fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI), fluorescent magnetic particle inspection (FMPI), and visual inspections from hot section disassembly level inspection procedures. This amendment is prompted by reports of crack origins in the forward face of the rear flange that could not be detected by the inspection methods for installed CCOC's that were mandated in the current ADs. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage.
92-26-03: 92-26-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8430. Docket No. 92-NM-207-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes; as listed in McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent uncommanded slat deployment during flight at cruise altitude, which could create significant vibrations and cause damage to the elevators, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install a cover on the flap/slat control module quadrant in the flight compartment in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe installation shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1992.
2011-17-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The airworthiness limitations applicable to Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items (DT ALI) are currently given in Airbus A330 ALI Document reference AI/SE-M4/95A.0089/97, which is approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and referenced in Airbus Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) Part 2. The issue 17 of Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this issue constitutes an unsafe condition. This [EASA] AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0102 [and retains the requirements therein], and requires the implementationof the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALI Document issue 17. The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking, damage, and corrosion in certain structure, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-23-03: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-23-03 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Textron Lycoming IO-320, LIO-320, AEIO-320, IO-360, LIO-360, AEIO-360, HIO-360, TO-360, IO-540, O-540-L, LIO-540, and AEIO-540 series reciprocating engines by individual letters. This AD requires a maintenance records check to determine if suspect high pressure fuel pumps are installed, and inspection to determine if the high pressure fuel pump has one of the suspect date codes. If the high pressure fuel pump has a suspect date code, this AD requires disassembly and inspection of the high pressure fuel pump, and, if necessary, removal from service and replacement with a serviceable part. In addition, this AD requires reporting findings of unserviceable high pressure fuel pumps. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight failures of high pressure fuel pumps. The actions specified by this AD areintended to prevent an inflight engine failure due to fuel starvation, which could result in a forced landing.
93-08-07: 93-08-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8554. Docket 93-NM-25-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes, manufacturer's fuselage numbers up to and including 532, and 535; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent chafing of the electrical power system control (EPSC) wire assemblies located in the center accessory compartment (CAC), which potentially could result in a fire, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time visual inspection to detect chafing or preload in the EPSC wire assemblies located in the forward cargo, aft bulkhead area of the CAC, and to determine if clamps and spacers are properly installed, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A24-64, dated March 29, 1993. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf no chafing or preload is detected, and a clamp and spacer are installed, no further action is required by this AD. \n\n\t\t(2)If no chafing or preload is detected, but the clamp and/or spacer are missing, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance with "Condition I" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf chafing or preload is detected, and the clamp and spacer are installed, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance "Condition II" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf chafing or preload is detected, and the clamp and/or spacer are missing, prior to further flight, modify the wire assembly in accordance with "Condition III" of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 30 days after accomplishing the one-time visual inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the results, both positive and negative, to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ANM-100L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach,California 90806-2425, or fax (310) 988-5210. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection and modification shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A24-64, dated March 29, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on May 11, 1993.
2011-17-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) helicopters with a certain tail rotor special hub plug (hub plug) installed. This action requires a one-time inspection to determine the tightening torque value of the hub plug, and depending on the inspection results, replacing certain parts or disassembling the tail rotor hub and blades assembly and inspecting for damage. If the tightening torque value is between 600 kgcm and 700 kgcm, the lock washer and o-ring must be replaced with airworthy parts, and no further action is required. If the tightening torque value is greater than 700 kgcm, the hub plug must be replaced with an airworthy part. Torque the new hub plug to the specified tightening torque between 600 and 700 kgcm. If the tightening torque value of the hub plug is less than 600 kgcm, the tail rotor hub and blades assembly must be disassembled and inspected for damage. If a part is found that is outside allowable damage tolerances, that part must be replaced with an airworthy part. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that a wrong tightening torque value for the hub plug was contained in a revision to the helicopter maintenance manual. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect an improperly torqued hub plug that could lead to tail rotor failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-17-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for ECF Model EC120B helicopters. This action requires inserting an emergency procedure appendix from an ECF Emergency Alert Service Bulletin into the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This action also requires modifying the emergency switch electrical wiring and performing tests to ensure correct operation of the emergency switch. This action also requires removing the emergency procedure appendix from the RFM after modifying the emergency switch electrical wiring and performing tests to ensure correct operation. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that simultaneously setting the emergency switch to the low position ``CUT-OFF'' and the generator (GENE) pushbutton to ``OFF'' position caused the starter-generator to restart. Investigation revealed that cross-wiring at the emergency switch caused this malfunction. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the inability to isolate electrical equipment during anemergency, creating the risk of an uncontrolled electrical fire and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-18-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There has been one reported case of an aft equipment bay fire occurring due to arcing of chafed integrated drive generator (IDG) power cables. Additionally, the hydraulic line support brackets located at the fuselage station (FS) 672 have been found broken in service on several aeroplanes. A broken hydraulic line support bracket at FS 672 could result in inadequate clearance between the IDG power cables and hydraulic lines, potentially resulting in chafing of the IDG power cables. Chafed IDG power cables can generate high energy arcing, which can result in an uncontrolled fire in the aft equipment bay. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-24-13: This document supersedes AD 75-26-18, which currently requires modifying the landing gear selector cable forward attachment pin assembly by installing a safety lock wire on certain The New Piper Aircraft Inc., (Piper) PA-31, PA-31P, and PA-31T series airplanes. The action will require the same action as AD 75-26-18. An incorrect designation of Piper Model PA-31 airplanes as Piper Model PA-31-310 airplanes in AD 75-26-18 prompted the proposed AD action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the landing gear selector cable forward attachment pin assembly from becoming separated from the powerpack control arm, which, if not corrected, could cause loss of landing gear retraction or extension.
2011-18-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires performing a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of the low-pressure turbine (LPT) rotor stage 3 disk at every shop visit at which the LPT module is separated from the engine. This AD was prompted by seven reports of uncontained failures of LPT rotor stage 3 disks and eight reports of cracked LPT rotor stage 3 disks found during shop visit inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent LPT rotor separation, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2010-08-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following successive ECAM [electronic centralized aircraft monitoring] warnings during the approach phase, just after the landing gear extension sequence and an uneventful landing, the maintenance inspection on an Airbus A340 has revealed a hydraulic leak that was caused by the failure of the Yellow high pressure (HP) hydraulic pipe supplying the back-up Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) which runs along the lower part of the avionic bay from frame 17 to frame 20. This leak resulted in the loss of the Yellow hydraulic system and contamination of the avionics bay with sprayed hydraulic fluid. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in aningestion of hydraulic fluid in the electrical connectors, which could generate an arcing phenomenon and, if sufficient energy is provided by the arcing, lead to an ignition source, which would be an unsafe condition. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
96-24-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-250, AT-300, AT-301, AT-302, AT-400, AT-400A, AT-401, AT-402, AT-501, and AT-502 airplanes that are equipped with a Gerdes part number (P/N) A-850-5 or Cleveland P/N 60-9 parking brake valve. This action requires replacing the parking brake valve with a Scott P/N 4500A-2 parking brake valve. This AD results from several reports of the parking brake valve inadvertently slipping to the "PARK" position during flight, which causes constant pressure on the brakes. When the pilot applies the brake upon landing, this pressure causes the airplane to overturn. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the airplane from overturning because of extreme pressure applied to the brake if the parking brake valve inadvertently slips to the "PARK" position during flight.
96-24-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Aerospace Technologies of Australia (ASTA) Nomad Models N22B, N22S, and N24A airplanes. This action requires inspecting the flap and aileron control rod fork ends for water accumulation and corrosion inside the internally drilled holes, and replacing the control rod fork ends if there is visible corrosion, or sealing the hole if no corrosion is found. Reports of water entering the internal holes of the flap and aileron control rod fork ends, causing corrosion, prompted this AD action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent corrosion and water accumulation in the flap and aileron control rod fork ends, which, if not detected and corrected, could cause loss of control of the flaps and aileron and possible loss of control of the airplane.
2011-17-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain M7 Aerospace LP Models SA226-T, SA226-T(B), SA226-TC, and SA226-AT airplanes. This AD requires repetitive replacement and inspection of certain elevator, rudder, aileron, and aileron-to-rudder interconnect primary control cables, and checking and setting of flight control cable tension. This AD was prompted by a report of a failure of a rudder control cable. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
90-21-10: 90-21-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-6761. Docket No. 90-NM-47-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727-100 and -100C series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, certified in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect delamination, cracking, and/or corrosion of fuselage crown skin circumferential joint at body station (BS) 1080 and to prevent depressurization, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes modified in accordance with Part IV of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989: Within the next 15 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish an internal close visual inspection in accordance with the NOTE in Part I.A of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no corrosion is detected, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 30 months. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf corrosion is detected, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with PartIII of the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes not modified in accordance with Part IV of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, within the next 15 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish an external visual inspection in accordance with Part II.A of the service bulletin and a LFEC inspection in accordance with Part II.B of the service bulletin. Perform an internal close visual inspection within 15 months after the external inspection, in accordance with Part II.C of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no corrosion is detected, repeat the external visual inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months and, the LFEC inspection and internal close visual inspection at intervals not to exceed 30 months. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf corrosion is detected, prior to further flight, accomplish one of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tRepair in accordance with Part III of the service bulletin; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tConduct a low frequency eddy current (LFEC) inspection in accordance with Part II.B of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tIf corrosion depth is found to be less than 10 percent of the skin thickness, conduct a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection in accordance with Part II.D of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t\t\t(a)\tIf no cracking is detected repeat the HFEC and LFEC inspections at intervals not to exceed 15 months. \n\n\t\t\t\t\t(b)\tIf cracking is detected, repair prior to further flight, in accordance with Part III of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tIf corrosion depth is found to be greater than 10 percent of the skin thickness, repair prior to further flight, in accordance with Part III of the service bulletin. \n\n\tC.\tWithin the next 3,000 landings or 30 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, accomplish a HFEC inspection in accordance with Part II.D of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no cracking is detected, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings or 48 months, whichever occurs first. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracking is detected, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Part III, or IV of the service bulletin. \n\n\tD.\tModification in accordance with Part III of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by this AD for those modified areas. \n\n\tE.\tModification in accordance with Part IV or Part V of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 3, dated September 28, 1989, terminates the inspections required by paragraph C. of this AD for those modified areas. \n\n\tF.\tModification in accordance with Part III of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-0109, Revision 1, dated January 11, 1973, or Revision 2, dated June 20, 1973, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraph C. of this AD, for those modified areas. Within the next 15 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish a close external visualinspection for cracking of the skin adjacent to the fastener heads in the modified areas. If cracks are detected, repair in accordance with Part III or IV of the service bulletin. If no cracks are detected repeat the close external visual inspection at intervals not to exceed 15 months. \n\n\tG.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO.\n \n\tH.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6761, AD 90-21-10) becomes effective on November 13, 1990.
91-07-11: 91-07-11 BOEING: Amendment 39-6946. Docket No. 90-NM-211-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0199, dated July 5, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the No. 2 cargo doorway frames and depressurization of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to accumulating 22,000 total flight cycles or within the next 500 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, conduct either of the following inspections in accordance with Figure 1 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0199, dated July 5, 1990, or Revision 1, dated November 29, 1990: \n\n\t\t1.\tConduct a visual inspection and an eddy current inspection of the No. 2 cargo doorway forward and aft frames for cracks. Repeat the visual inspections and eddy current inspections at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles. \n\t\n\t\t\t\t\tOr2.\tConduct a visual inspection of the No. 2 cargo doorway forward and aft frames for cracks. Repeat the visual inspection at intervals not to exceed 500 flight cycles, until an eddy current inspection for cracks in the affected area is accomplished. Perform the eddy current inspection within the next 3,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD. Thereafter, repeat the visual inspections and eddy current inspections at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles. \n\n\tB.\tIf cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0199, dated July 5, 1990, or Revision 1, dated November 29, 1990. \n\n\tC.\tIncorporation of repairs in accordance with Figure 2 or modification in accordance with Figure 3 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-53A0199, dated July 5, 1990, or Revision 1, dated November 29, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspection requirements of paragraph A. of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternative method ofcompliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6946, AD 91-07-11) becomes effectiveon April 29, 1991.
96-24-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain HOAC Austria Model DV-20 Katana airplanes. This action requires replacing the muffler with one of improved design, installing a heat shield around the exhaust system endpipe, and adjusting the airplane weight and balance. This AD results from reports of cracks in the welding joint that connects the exhaust system endpipe to the muffler on three of the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent separation of the exhaust system endpipe from the muffler because of cracks in the welding that connects these parts, which could result in heat damage to the electrical system and engine controls.
79-19-02: 79-19-02 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3555. Applies to certain Model DC-9 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, including Military Type C-9A, C-9B and VC-9C, serial numbers corresponding to fuselage numbers 1 through 839 as identified in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin 55-28, Revision 4, dated May 18, 1979. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 3400 hours' time-in-service unless already accomplished within the past 200 hours' time-in-service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3600 hours' time-in-service, on all airplanes with over 5000 hours' time-in-service as of, and after, February 13, 1978. Accomplishment of superseded AD 78-01-12 may be credited as accomplishment of this AD until the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t(a)\tPerform an X-ray inspection of the elevator spars, P/N 9918450-1 or -501 in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 2 of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 55-28, Revision 4, dated May 18, 1979. \n\n\t(b)\tCracked parts found during any of the inspections of paragraph (a) which do not exceed the crack limits and McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 55-28, Revision 4, dated May 18, 1979 may be continued in service. However, in addition to the 3600 hour repetitive general inspection requirements of paragraph (a), the area 12 inches inboard and outboard of all cracks must be X-ray or dye penetrant inspected at intervals not to exceed the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tLength of longest crack up to 2 inches - 800 hours' time-in-service. \n\n\t\t(2)\tLength of longest crack between 2 and 4 inches - 400 hours' time-in-service. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found during any reinspections of paragraphs (a) or (b) which exceed the crack limits of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 55-28, Revision 4, dated May 18, 1979, the cracked spar must be repaired or replaced before further flight. If the cracked spar is repaired per McDonnell Douglas Service Sketch 27378, the inspection procedures in paragraph (a) of this AD must be accomplished within 1800 hours' time-in-service after the repair and at intervals of 1800 hours' time-in-service thereafter. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tIf the original 7075-T651 spars (P/N 9918450-1 or -501) are replaced with 7075-T7351 spars (P/N 9918450-503), the inspection requirements of this AD will not apply to that airplane. \n\n\t(f)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(g)\tUpon request of operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region may adjust the initial and repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 78-01-12, Amendment 39-3119. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 13, 1979.
2011-16-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires a general visual inspection for cracks and holes of the main equipment center (MEC) drip shields, and repairs if necessary; installation of a fiberglass reinforcing overcoat; and, for certain airplanes, installation of stiffening panels to the MEC drip shields. This AD was prompted by a report of a loss of bus control unit number 1 and generator control units numbers 1 and 2 while the airplane was on the ground, and multiple operator reports of cracked \n\n((Page 47428)) \n\nMEC drip shields. We are issuing this AD to prevent water penetration into the MEC, which could result in the loss of flight critical systems.
95-26-15 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to various transport category airplanes equipped with Allied Signal Commercial Avionics Systems CAS-81 TCAS, that currently requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flightcrew with procedures to cycle power to the TCAS processor via the circuit breaker or power bus, and to perform a TCAS functional test to verify proper operation of the TCAS. That AD was prompted by reports of failure of the audio output of the CAS-81 TCAS. The actions specified by that AD are intended to ensure that the flightcrew is advised of the potential hazard associated with failure of the audio output of the CAS-81 TCAS, and of the procedures necessary to address it. This amendment adds a revision of the AFM requirements that provides an alternative method of compliance with the currently required AFM revision; and provides for a modification to the TCAS processor, which, if accomplished, terminates the requirements of the AD.
96-22-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain HB Aircraft Industries AG HB-23 2400 Hobbyliner/Scanliner sailplanes. This action requires inspecting the rudder bearing support bracket for cracks, replacing the bracket if cracked, and modifying the bracket with a third bolt, if no cracks are found. Cracks found in the rudder bearing support brackets prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent cracks in the rudder bearing support bracket, which could cause loss of control of the rudder and possible loss of the sailplane.