Results
95-25-01: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 757 series airplanes, that currently requires various modifications and terminating actions for the passenger door, and repair, if necessary. This amendment requires additional inspections, and replacement of certain parts, if necessary. This amendment also provides for optional terminating action for certain inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports of excessive gaps between lockout cams and crank stops, which resulted in broken power assist triggers. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent broken power assist triggers, which could result in an inoperative door opening system during an emergency evacuation.
59-08-01: 59-08-01 BEECH: Applies to Models A35, B35, C35, Serial Numbers D-1501 Through D-2800. Compliance required prior to July 1, 1959. Several cases of landing gear actuation failure have been attributed to malfunctioning of the landing gear limit switches due to oil accumulation in the switch. Inspect the switches in the gear box area and if they are located under the gear box they must be: (1) Cleaned and sealed at the switch case parting surfaces with polyethylene, vinyl or rubber cement and reinstalled in the same location; (use minimum cement to assure that none gets inside switch) or (2) Replaced with new switches installed in a location to preclude oil contamination. Beechcraft Service Bulletin 35-21, A35-14, B35-7, and C35-5, dated June 1, 1953, and Supplement dated August 15, 1953, provide an acceptable procedure for relocation of the switches.
2010-11-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Quartz Mountain Aerospace, Inc. Model 11E airplanes. This AD requires you to clean and lubricate the aileron pushrod bearings. This AD results from reports of the aileron control stick force increasing and of the controls being very noisy. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct insufficient lubrication and residual metallic paint particles in the pushrod end ball joints, which could result in difficulty actuating aileron controls sometime during flight after takeoff. This condition could lead to difficulty controlling the airplane in flight.
2004-03-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R (collectively called A300-600) series airplanes; and Model A310 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flight crew with procedures to maintain controllability of the airplane in the event of an in-flight deployment of the thrust reverser. This action is necessary to ensure that the flight crew is advised of the potential hazard associated with an in-flight deployment of the thrust reverser, and the procedures necessary to address it. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-25-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Beech Model 400A airplanes, that requires an inspection to verify if the securing rivet is installed on the rod end of the control push rods of the spoiler flight control system, an inspection to verify if the jam nut is secure on the opposite end of the rod end, and repair of any discrepancy. This amendment is prompted by a report of loss of roll control on the co-pilot's control wheel shortly after takeoff due to a rivet missing from the control push rod. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that the push rod rivets are installed. Missing control push rod rivets could result in the disengagement of the push rod end from the push rod tube; this could lead to loss of roll control and subsequent reduced controllability of the airplane after takeoff.
2021-03-11: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-02- 21, which applied to all Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 2000 airplanes. AD 2020-02-21 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-04-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Piper Aircraft, Inc., (Piper) Models PA-46-350P (Malibu Mirage), PA- 46R-350T (Malibu Matrix), and PA-46-500TP (Malibu Meridian) airplanes. This AD was prompted by a finding of several airplanes with wing assemblies that did not have the proper stall warning heater modification design. Without the proper stall warning heat control modification kit installed, during flights into icing conditions with the landing gear down, ice can form on the stall vane, which may result in failure of the stall warning system. This AD requires identifying and correcting nonconforming stall warning heat control systems. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Learjet Model 31, 31A, 35, 35A (C-21A), 36, and 36A airplanes, that requires modification of the drag angles of the fuselage and engine pylons to gain access to the shear webs of the forward engine beams; repetitive inspections of the shear webs of the forward engine beams for cracks; follow-on actions; and modification/repair of the shear webs of the forward engine beams, as necessary, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to prevent significant structural damage to the engine pylons, possible separation of the engines from the fuselage, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-18-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Beech Model 400 and 400A airplanes, that requires modification of the autopilot and rudder boost interlock. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the rudder boost system installed on these airplanes does not operate correctly during deployment of a thrust reverser. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent incorrect operation of the rudder boost system during deployment of a thrust reverser and to prevent the autopilot from exceeding certain bank angle limits; these conditions could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8 series airplanes. This action requires eddy current inspections to detect cracking of the pivot tubes in the drag strut of the nose landing gear (NLG), and repair or replacement of any cracked tube with a serviceable or new tube. This amendment is prompted by reports that the pivot tubes cracked or failed completely due to fatigue. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the pivot tube, which could result in a nose gear-up landing.
69-15-06: 69-15-06 LEARJET: Amendment 39-802. Applies to Model 23 (Serial Numbers 23-012, 23-019 and 23-030 thru 23-099) equipped with Controlex ball bearing throttle cables; Model 24 (Serial Numbers 24-100 thru 24-139) equipped with Controlex ball bearing throttle cables; and (Serial Numbers 24-140 thru 24-180); and Model 25 (Serial Numbers 25-003 thru 25-024) Airplanes. Compliance: Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished: To prevent the possibility of the engine power control cable jamming, accomplish the following: Remove the one-piece Controlex throttle cables and install two-piece quick-disconnect type ball bearing throttle cables in accordance with Lear Service Kit No. 23/24/25-317, dated May 19, 1969, or later Federal Aviation Administration approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective August 15, 1969.
2021-01-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain MHI RJ Aviation ULC Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by evidence that a revised structural life limit of some components of the nose landing gear (NLG) and/or main landing gear (MLG) was not implemented during repair. This AD requires verifying that the affected components are installed on the airplane, revising the structural life limits in the existing structural deviation inspection requirements (SDIR) airplane document, and replacing affected components if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
57-25-02: 57-25-02 HELIO: Applies to Model H-391B Aircraft Serial Numbers 001 Through 055. Compliance required as indicated. Cracks have been found in the fin front spar underneath the steel attachment fittings holding the stabilizer to the fin. Cracks were also discovered in the flanges of the fins nose ribs second and third from the bottom. To preclude possible failure of the fin spar, the following inspections and rework are required: 1. Aircraft with less than 400 hours total time. (a) Inspect visually for cracks the fin front spar and lower nose ribs within the next 100 hours of operation and every 100 hours thereafter until reinforced as described in Helio Service Bulletin No. 17 or equivalent. (b) If cracks are found they must be stopdrilled and the parts reinforced prior to further flight. (c) If no cracks are found reinforcement of the fin front spar and lower nose ribs attachments is required prior to the accumulation of 400 hours total time.2. Aircraft having 400 hours or more total time. (a) Visual inspection and reinforcement are required within the next 25 hours flight time. If any cracks are found, they should be stop-drilled prior to adding the reinforcements. (Helio Service Bulletin No. 17 covers this subject.)
95-15-52: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95-15-52 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Boeing Model 747-100 and -200 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires a revision of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Airplane Weight and Balance Supplement to restrict cargo loading to a certain level. This AD also provides for the removal of the restrictions following accomplishment of a modification of the longitudinal floor beams. This amendment is prompted by a determination that inadequate strength in the floor beams exists on certain airplanes that have been modified for cargo configurations. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the longitudinal floor beams, which may cause the keel beam to fail and result in rupture of the fuselage.
95-23-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Model PA-46-350P airplanes. This action requires installing a placard (to the right of the manifold pressure gauge in full view of the pilot) that specifies manifold pressure limits, and incorporating a revision into the Limitations section of the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue damage to the propeller caused by operating above certain manifold pressure limits.
2021-02-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the necessary sealant was not applied to the side of body (SOB) slot as a result of a production drawing that provided unclear SOB slot sealant application instructions. This AD requires a general visual inspection for insufficient sealant in the SOB slot, and related investigative and corrective actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-03-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for a certain Air Cruisers Company Emergency Evacuation Slide/Raft System. That AD currently requires a one-time unpacking and subsequent repacking of the slide/raft systems, identified by basic part number (P/N) with dash numbers, and serial numbers (SNs) listed in the AD, and mandates repacking of all other slide/raft systems of the same design at the next required normal maintenance schedule of the slide/raft system. This AD contains the same requirements but replaces the specific slide/raft system P/N dash numbers with the word "-series", reduces the number of affected slide/raft systems to the SNs identified in paragraph (g) of the AD, and eliminates mandating the utilization of the applicable Folding Procedures for subsequent repacking of all slide/raft systems of the same design during the normal scheduled maintenance. This AD is prompted by recent information received that Air Cruisers Company has made modifications which have added new dash numbers to the slide/raft system basic P/N. This has affected some of the SN slide/raft systems listed in the AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the slide/raft to properly inflate, which could impede the emergency evacuation of passengers in the event of an airplane emergency. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective March 11, 2004. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of March 11, 2004. The incorporation by reference of certain other publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 7, 2003 (68 FR 4897; January 31, 2003).
2010-11-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: In the past, some operators have reported difficulties to pressurise the hydraulic reservoirs, due to leakage of the Crissair reservoir air pressurisation check valves. * * * The leakage of the check valves was caused by an incorrect spring material. The affected Crissair check valves * * * were then replaced with improved check valves P/N [part number] 2S2794-1 * * *. More recently, similar issues were again reported on aeroplanes with Crissair check valves P/N 2S2794-1 installed. The investigations * * * have shown that a spring, mounted inside the valve, does not meet the Airbus type design specifications. This situation, if not corrected, can cause hydraulic system functional degradation, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane when combined with an air duct leak, air conditioning system contamination or, if installed, malfunction of the fire extinguishing system in the Class `C' cargo compartment. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-09-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: AD CF-2002-12 [which corresponds to FAA AD 2003-04-21, amendment 39-13070] mandated installation of revised overwing emergency exit placards showing that the exit door should be opened and disposed from a seated position. However, it was later discovered that the new placards illustrated an incorrect hand position for removal of the exit upper handle cover. These incorrect instructions could cause difficulty or delay when opening the overwing emergency exit. As a result, the timely and safe evacuation of passengers and crew may be impeded. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective June 3, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of June 3, 2010. On April 4, 2003 (68 FR 9509, February 28, 2003), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication listed in this AD.
2021-04-02: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-04- 22, which applied to certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 2000EX airplanes. AD 2020-04-22 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 2020-04-22 and also requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate additional new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-10-24: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the overhaul of a Main Landing Gear (MLG) of a Falcon 2000, the sleeve on the hydraulic flow restrictor in the shock absorber was found displaced, because of the rupture of its three retaining screws. * * * Failure of the retaining screws has been determined to be the final phase of a slow unscrewing process under normal operational conditions. The unsafe condition only exists once the three screws have failed. * * * * * The unsafe condition is failure of three retaining screws of the MLG shock absorber, which could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafecondition on these products.
57-08-01: 57-08-01 BELL: Applies to All 47 Series Helicopters With Tail Rotor Drive Shafts, P/N 47-644-115-1, 47-644-126-3, 47-644-172-3, 47-644-177-1, 47-644-179-7, 47-644-180-1, 47-644- 186-1, 47-644-187-1, 47-644-187-5, and 46-644-214-1, Having Less Than 100 Hours Service Time and All Spares of These Part Numbers. Compliance required as indicated. Due to suspected defective materials, the listed tail rotor drive shafts must be inspected for evidence of longitudinal cracks, as follows: 1. Inspect all spare shafts by magnaflux methods immediately. 2. Shafts installed on helicopters and having less than 100 hours service time must be thoroughly cleaned and inspected daily with at least a 10-power magnifying glass, and inspected by magnaflux methods not later than the next 10 flying hours. The daily inspections may be discontinued upon completion of the magnaflux inspection. 3. Spare shafts and helicopters delivered from Bell after April 15, 1957, have these inspections accomplished and may be identified by a double interlocking magnaflux stamp in approximately the centers of the shafts. (This AD covers the same inspections required by CAA telegraphic instructions, dated April 12 and 17, 1957.)
2004-03-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 series airplanes. This action requires revising the applicable airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with more restrictive procedures for operating in icing conditions. This action is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is aware of the procedures required to prevent ice from contacting the ice impact panels on the engine fan case. Such contact could result in a panel coming loose during flight and blocking the bypass flow through the engine outlet guide vanes, and consequent reduction of the engine thrust, resulting in insufficient thrust to maintain flight. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-02-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747- 200B, 747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, and 747SR series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of inboard foreflap departures from the airplane. This AD requires repetitive replacement of certain parts; a general visual inspection to determine production configuration for certain parts; a repetitive lubrication of certain parts and a repetitive general visual inspection of certain parts for any exuding grease; repetitive detailed inspections of certain parts for loose or missing attachment bolts, cracks or bushing migration, cracks or gouges, or broken, binding, or missing rollers; repetitive detailed inspections of certain parts for cracks or corrosion; repetitive lubrication; and on-condition actions if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
54-22-01: 54-22-01 LOCKHEED: Applies to Models 49, 649, 749, and 1049 Airplanes as Noted in Referenced Service Bulletins. Compliance required by April 1, 1955. A recent engine fire resulted in a premature failure of a flexible hose in the feathering line and in penetration of fire from zone 1 into zone 2. 1. To increase the fire resistance integrity of the propeller feathering line between the pump and the governor, replace the existing flexible hose assemblies meeting current fire resistance requirements. The following Lockheed Service Bulletins cover this subject: No. 49/SB-786 for Model 049 through 749 airplanes and No. 1049/SB-2195 for Model 1049 airplanes. The following hose assemblies may also be considered acceptable for this application: (a) Aeroquip 680-10S hose assemblies with Aeroquip 304 protective sleeves over end fittings. (b) Resistoflex - SSFR-3800-10 hose assemblies. 2. To increase the fireproof integrity of the zone 1 fire seal diaphragm against burn-through into zone 2 in the event of a power section fire install steel plates over the lower engine cowling longerons adjacent to the diaphragm. The following Lockheed Service Bulletins cover this subject: No. 49/SB-760 for Model 649/749 airplanes and No. 1049/SB-2115 for Model 1049 airplanes.