Results
2010-04-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During acceleration up to One Engine Inoperative (OEI) 30-second rating, one event of flight loss of full automatic control occurred on an Arriel 2S1 engine. The selection of OEI 30-second rating on engine 1 was triggered by the automatic detection of an OEI situation further to a transient deceleration of engine 2. The transient deceleration of engine 2 was caused by the untimely reset of its digital electronic control unit (DECU). Once this reset was completed, engine 2 resumed its nominal operation. Afterwards the aircraft then continued its flight safely with its engine 1 operating in manual control mode. The loss of full automatic control of engine 1 was caused by loss of steps of the stepper motor controlling the fuel metering valve inside the Hydro-mechanical Unit (HMU). It has been found that high accelerations, notably up to OEI 30- second rating, increase the risk of loss of steps of the HMU stepper motor. Therefore, this event has led to the consideration of the following unsafe condition at aircraft level: In-flight loss of full automatic control of the engine induced by the loss of steps of the stepper motor during acceleration up to OEI 30-second rating, further to an actual OEI situation on the other engine (such as a power loss event). We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of full automatic control of the engine during acceleration up to the OEI 30-second rating. This condition could result in reduced controllability of the helicopter.
2010-02-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Some operators have reported airframe vibration under specific flight conditions including gusts. Investigations have revealed that under such conditions, vibrations may occur when the hinge moment of the elevator is close to zero, associated to elevator free-play. * * * * * The unsafe condition is excessive vibration of the elevators, which could result in reduced structural integrity and reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
91-07-16: 91-07-16 BOEING: Amendment 39-6957. Docket No. 90-NM-266-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes, line numbers 001 through 209, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of various systems capabilities, release of smoke into the airplane, and possibility of fire, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tInstall a wire bundle stand-off in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757- 24-0061, dated November 15, 1990. Visually inspect the wires in wire bundles W1232 and W1234 around the area of the placement of the new stand-off for signs of chafing. Any wire found damaged must be replaced or repaired prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6957, AD 91-07-16) becomes effective on May 6, 1991.
63-14-01: 63-14-01 BOEING: Amdt 580 Part 507 Federal Register June 27, 1963. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 2,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. \n\n\tThere have been a number of instances of separation of the two-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-1, during pressure fueling. This has resulted in a potentially hazardous fire condition from spillage of fuel. \n\n\tTo prevent further fuel spillage from this cause, replace the two-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-1, with the one-piece fuel tank adapter, Boeing P/N 10-3062-2, on the pressure fueling receptacles. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 715 covers this subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective July 29, 1963.
58-09-03: 58-09-03 VICKERS: Applies to All Viscount 700 Series Aircraft. Compliance required not later than December 31, 1958. In order to give the flight crew immediate warning of an unacceptable drop in oil pressure on any engine, installation is required of an oil pressure warning means for each engine or a master warning means for all engines with provision for isolating the individual warning means from the master warning means, as provided for in Civil Air regulations, Part 4b, paragraph 4b.604(1). Vickers Modification Bulletin No. D.2270 covers this subject and is considered to describe an acceptable method of compliance. Capital Airlines Modification No. ME-A-58-84 is also considered to describe an acceptable method of compliance. Modifications made in any other way should be submitted to the FAA engineering evaluation and approval.
2010-04-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following scheduled maintenance, an A310 operator reported finding cracks around the wing top skin panels fastener holes at Rib 2 (LH or RH) [left-hand or right-hand], between stringers 2 and 14 on some of its aircraft. This condition, if not corrected, may lead to degradation of the structure in this area. An inspection programme is necessary to restore and retain the structural integrity. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
68-03-05: 68-03-05 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT: Amendment 39-552. Applies to Dassault Fan Jet Falcon airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 thru 107, 109 thru 113, and 115. Compliance required as indicated. To detect and prevent binding of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables, accomplish the following unless already accomplished. (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, ground test the functioning of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables under simulated flight pressurization deflection of the fuselage floor, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC-approved revision, or FAA-approved equivalent. If control cable binding is evidenced during the ground test, comply with paragraph (d) before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown unpressurized to a base where the modification can be performed in accordance with FAR Sec. 21.197.(b) If control cable binding is not evidenced during the ground test, flight test the functioning of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables under actual pressurization deflection of the fuselage floor at the next flight, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC-approved revision, or FAA-approved equivalent. Passengers may not be carried during this test. If control cable binding is evidenced during this flight test, comply with paragraph (d) before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown unpressurized to a base where the modification can be performed in accordance with FAR Sec. 21.197. (c) If control cable binding is not evidenced during the tests required by paragraphs (a) and (b), comply with paragraph (d) within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. (d) Modify the fuselage floor support angles and the upper fairleads, clamps and antichafing strips of the auxiliary hydraulic system selector valve control cables, in accordance with Dassault Service Bulletin 29-17, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1967, or later SGAC- approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa and Middle East Region. Performance of this modification at any time makes further action under this AD unnecessary. This amendment becomes effective February 13, 1968.
2010-04-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During the year 2000, life extension exercise programs were launched for Airbus A310 and A300-600 aircraft. Certification of Extended Service Goal (ESG) is based on analysis, except for fan cowl and thrust reverser (T/R) latches, which are always certified by tests. * * * testing of the T/R door centre latch has shown that this does not meet the requirements for ESG. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible failure of the T/R latch and detachment of the T/R from the airplane, which could result in structural damage and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition onthese products.
93-14-15: 93-14-15 AVCO LYCOMING: Amendment 39-8639. Docket No. 91-ANE-30. Applicability: Lycoming Model IO-360-A1B6D and IO-360-A3B6D engines, modified per Aircraft Design, Inc., STC SE4757NM; installed on Mooney M20J, modified per Aircraft Design, Inc., STC SA4758NM. Compliance: Required within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished previously. To prevent possible premature engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Fabricate and install on the instrument panel a placard, in accordance with FAR 23.1541(b), stating "DO NOT OPERATE ENGINE ABOVE 33.0 IN Hg." (b) Re-mark the manifold pressure gauge by removing the radial red line at 38.5 Hg and placing the radial red line at 33.0 Hg. (c) Revise the Limitations and Normal Procedure Sections of the Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement as follows: (1) Delete "38.5" Hg" as it appears in these sections and insert in lieu thereof "33.0" Hg." (2) Delete "36.0 Hg" as it appears in Normal Climb Throttle and insert in lieu thereof "33.0 Hg." (d) Attach this AD as a permanent appendix to the Aircraft Flight Manual. (e) An alternative method of compliance, or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. (f) Special flight permits may be issued, in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, to ferry the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (g) This amendment becomes effective on August 23, 1993.
92-11-01: 92-11-01 MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM (MBB): Amendment 39-8250. Docket Number 92-ASW-12. Applicability: MBB Model BO 105 LS A-3 helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) 2001 through 2037, certificated in any category and equipped with a torque indication hose assembly, part number (P/N) AE707355-1. Compliance: Required no later than July 31, 1992, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the torque indication hose assembly during an engine compartment fire, thereby, fueling the fire with engine oil and leading to possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the existing torque indication hose, P/N AE707355-1, on each engine with a new fire resistant torque indication hose, P/N AE705145-14, in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions of MBB Alert Service Bulletin No. ASB-BO 105 LS-60-4, Revision 1, dated November 15, 1991. (b) Special flights permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operatethe helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager of the New York Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office. (d) The removal and replacement of the torque indication hose shall be done in accordance with Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions of MBB Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. ASB-BO 105 LS-60-4, which incorporates the followingpages: Pages Revision Level Date 1 through 2 Revision 1 November 15, 1991 3 through 5 Original August 30, 1991 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from MBB Helicopter Corporation, 900 Airport Road, P.O. Box 2349, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Bldg. 3B, Room 158, Fort Worth, Texas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. (e) This amendment becomes effective on August 28, 1992.