Results
2009-06-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following in-flight test deployments, several Air-Driven generators (ADGs) failed to come on-line. Investigation revealed that, as a result of a wiring anomaly that had not been detected during ADG manufacture, a short circuit was possible between certain internal wires and their metallic over-braided shields, which could result in the ADG not providing power when deployed. * * * The unsafe condition is that failure of the ADG could lead to loss of several functions essential for safe flight. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\tDuring overhaul on a Dornier 328-100 landing gear unit, parts of the MLG (main landing gear) main body and trailing arm bushings have been found corroded. Investigation showed that over time, these bushings can migrate, creating the risk of corrosion in adjacent areas. Such corrosion, if not detected, could cause damage to the MLG, possibly resulting in MLG functional problems or failure. \n\n* * * * *\nFunctional problems or failure of the MLG could result in the inability of the MLG to extend or retract. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-06-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the wing skin, and related investigative/ corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks found in the lower wing skin originating at the forward tension bolt holes of the aft pitch load fitting. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the lower wing skin for the forward tension bolt holes at the aft pitch load fitting, which could result in a fuel leak and reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2009-06-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 727-100 and 727-200 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive internal and external high frequency eddy current, mid frequency eddy current, low frequency eddy current, and magneto optic imaging inspections to detect cracks, corrosion, delamination, and materials loss in the lower fastener row of the lower skin and the upper fastener row of the upper skin, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of decompression in a Boeing Model 737 airplane at flight level 290. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scratches and excessive reduction in material thickness from excessive blend-out or corrosion, which could lead to premature cracking in the lap joint. Such cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of the airplane.
2009-06-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-200C, 747- 200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747SR, and 747SP series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for skin cracks at the shear tie end fastener locations of the fuselage frames, and repairing cracks if necessary. This AD results from a wide-spread fatigue damage assessment of Model 747 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the fuselage skin that can propagate and grow, resulting in a loss of structural integrity and a sudden decompression of the airplane during flight.
2009-05-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) model helicopters. This action requires reidentifying a certain part-numbered main rotor yoke (yoke) based on whether it was ever installed on a Model 412CF helicopter or on a Model 412 or 412EP helicopter with a slope landing kit. This AD also requires reducing the retirement life of the reidentified yokes from 5,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) to 4,500 hours TIS. Also, this AD requires recording the reidentified yoke part number (P/N) and the reduced retirement life on the component history card or equivalent record. This amendment is prompted by fatigue analysis that shows that the retirement life should be reduced on certain yokes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking of a yoke, failure of a yoke, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-06-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A321-131 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections to detect cracks in the wing inner rear spars at the attachment holes of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) forward pintle fitting, the actuator cylinder anchorage fitting, and rib 5 fitting; and repair of the sealant or repair of any crack. This AD results from a finding that certain A321-131 airplanes may not reach the design life goal due to differences in thickness of the inner rear spars and that fatigue cracks may develop on inner rear spars starting from the fastener holes for the attachment of gear rib 5, the forward pintle fitting, and the actuating cylinder anchorage on these airplanes. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue cracks, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2009-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 155B and EC155B1 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI states that "the Airworthiness Directive (AD) is prompted by the discovery of a short circuit evidence in hoist connector "24 Delta'' even though the hoist was removed from the rotorcraft. The short circuit generated sufficient heat to ignite the paint on the cooler support cowling near the hoist cut-off connector "24 Delta.'' This condition, if not corrected, could result in a fire in this area which could propagate to surrounding zones.'' This AD requires actions that are intended to address this unsafe condition.
2009-05-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Trimble or FreeFlight Systems 2101 I/O Approach Plus global positioning system (GPS) navigation system (2101 I/O Approach Plus system) that requires a software upgrade for this system. This amendment is prompted by an incident that led to the discovery of several annunciation errors with the 2101 I/O Approach Plus system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a pilot from making an unsafe decision based on erroneous information provided by the 2101 I/O Approach Plus system, which could result in loss of control of the aircraft.
80-19-06: 80-19-06 GROUPEMENT d'INTERET ECONOMIQUE (AIRBUS INDUSTRIE): Amendment 39-3891. Applies to Type A300 airplanes, all models, certificated in all categories, not incorporating AI Modification No. 1909/AI Service Bulletin No. A300-57-065, dated December 15, 1977. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent in-flight loss of wing slat closing plates, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 20 flights after the effective date of this AD, or prior to accumulation of 800 flights since new, whichever occurs later, and at intervals thereafter not exceeding 1,400 flights, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this AD, since the previous inspection, until modified in accordance with AI Service Bulletin No. A300-57-065, dated December 15, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent, visually inspect No. 1 L.H. and R.H. wing slat closing plate assemblies for cracks in the piano hinges, for failure of rivets, and for cracks or distortion at spring strutattachment lugs, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions, subparagraph 2.A., Inspection, of AI Alert Service Bulletin No. A300-57-063, Revision No. 1, dated September 5, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If, during any inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, piano hinge cracks of less than 2.0 inches in length are found, verify that the pin of the piano hinge is complete and correctly installed and repeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, within the next 800 flights and at intervals thereafter not exceeding 800 flights since the previous inspection, or, alternatively, proceed as prescribed in paragraph (c) of this AD. (c) If, during any inspection required by this AD, hinge rivet failures, piano hinge cracks of 2.0 inches in length or greater, or cracks or distortion of the spring strut attachment brackets are found, before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a place where the work can be performed, accomplish the following: (1) Incorporate the modification specified in AI Service Bulletin No. A300- 57-065, dated December 15, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent; (2) For hinge rivet failures, and for hinge cracks of or greater than 2.0 inches in length, replace rivets or replace hinge, as appropriate, in accordance with subparagraph 2.C., Replacement of Cracked Hinges, of AI Service Bulletin No. A300-57-063, Revision No. 1, dated September 5, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent; and (3) For cracks or distortion of the spring strut attachment brackets, replace the closing plate with a serviceable plate of the same part number in accordance with applicable portions of paragraph 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of AI Alert Service Bulletin No. A300-57- 063, Revision 1, dated September 5, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) For purposes of this AD, one flight is one takeoff and landing cycle. (e) For purposes of thisAD, an FAA-approved equivalent may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective September 17, 1980.